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In this book, we embark on a journey through the highly complicated and diverse 
world of interest organizations in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE). Great scholarly effort and passion have been dedicated to understanding 
how CEE countries have tackled the unprecedented simultaneous transforma-
tion from one-party monopolies to democratic political institutions, from com-
munism to capitalism and, in many cases, the establishment of new nation-states 
(Bruszt & Stark, 1998; Hellman, 1998; Merkel, 1999; Offe, 1994; Ramet, 2010; 
Rose, 2008). Countless scholars have comparatively analysed the evolution of 
formal political and electoral institutions (Beliaev, 2006; Dimitrov et al., 2006; 
Easter, 1997), emerging party systems (Grzymała-Busse, 2003; Kitschelt et al., 
1999; Lewis, 2006; McAllister & White 2007) as well as the impact of Europe-
anization on institutions and policy-making in CEE (Ágh, 1999; Goetz & Woll-
mann, 2001; Grabbe, 2001; Rupnik & Zielonka 2013; Zielonka, 2007; Zubek, 
2011). Entire academic journals, books, conferences, symposiums and seminars 
are dedicated to better understanding the challenges of post- communism, span-
ning from their integration into world economies, tensions between desires for 
national sovereignty and Europeanization, managing ethnic conflicts, and the 
daunting ongoing reform processes in individual policy areas such as social pol-
icy and pensions, agriculture, education, the environment and healthcare, to 
only name a few.
Despite the impressive wealth of knowledge on the region, the previous liter-
ature has arguably not focused sufficiently on organized interests as key players in 
post-communist democracies. This is surprising because organized interests – as 
major conveyors of citizens’ inputs into the political process – can be regarded 
as a precondition of democracy (Dahl, 1971) and facilitator of democratic transi-
tions (Linz, 1990; Schmitter, 1992). Organized interests can legitimize political 
decision-making by enabling the flow of citizens’ preferences and expertise in 
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the process. However, the governmental process may also be undermined when 
certain groups, in particular those engaging in particularistic rent-seeking (Ol-
son, 1965), acquire monopolistic positions and continuously assert their demands 
(Dür & De Bièvre, 2007) to the detriment of other broader civic interests. More-
over, democracy may suffer when channels of interest intermediation are weak, 
dysfunctional or biased towards singular interests.
Organized interests and civil society in general are burdened with a difficult 
legacy in CEE. Under communism, political parties turned organized interests 
into their own appendages and held monopolies over participatory politics. One 
major facet of the communist experience was the compromised public sphere. 
While communist regimes indeed promoted a variety of civic organizations – 
from sports associations to youth movements – participation in these organi-
zations was often mandatory and highly regulated by state authorities. Other 
independent alternatives were either marginalized or outlawed. As a result, the 
transition countries initially suffered from a constrained “civic infrastructure” 
(Pop-Eleches & Tucker, 2011).
This historical oppression of civic participation outside the party apparatus 
has reinforced the view that organized interests are weak and fragmented in the 
CEE (Ekiert & Foa, 2011; Howard, 2003). However, the events of 30 years ago 
generally are considered an enormous triumph of previously suppressed civil 
societies. In essentially all post-communist countries, civic movements which 
sought confrontation with communist regimes and gained momentum in the 
late 1980s ultimately brought communism to its knees. For example, the anti- 
communist opposition in Poland was fuelled by the Catholic Church and the 
Solidarność workers’ movement, both of which succeeded in gaining concessions 
from the communist party and a seat at the table during round-table negotia-
tions. In Czechoslovakia and Hungary, civic groups consisting of academics, 
students, artists as well as common citizens also formed alliances with trade un-
ions to call for a softening of Soviet control. Already in the late 1970s, Czech-
oslovak anti-communists coalescing around the idea of human rights, tolerance 
and free speech signed the Charter 77 document, paving the way towards the 
breakdown of the communist system. In the former Yugoslavia, a combination 
of social justice and nationalist-separatist movements put the individual republics 
on a pathway to independence and democratization. Hence, diverse civil society 
movements defied political oppression and ultimately achieved what had seemed 
unthinkable only a few years before (see Ekiert & Kubin, 1998).
Nevertheless, the path-breaking year of 1989 cannot be automatically taken 
for granted as the permanent victory of civil societies over dysfunctional state 
apparatuses. Robert Putnam, a giant of social capital studies, expressed a less 
favourable opinion about post-communist civic societies in the early transfor-
mation phase:
(…) the formerly Communist societies had weak civic traditions before 
the advent of Communism, and totalitarian rule abused even that limited 
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stock of social capital. Without norms of reciprocity and networks of civic 
engagement (…) amoral familialism, clientelism, lawlessness, ineffective 
government, and economic stagnation – seems likelier than successful 
democratization (…).
(1993, p. 183)
This weak historical starting point for organizational life was compounded by 
the post-1989 political and economic trajectory. Socialist welfare states were dis-
mantled, harsh neoliberal policies introduced, and key pre-existing industries 
struggled to survive. At the political level, new parties emerged to confront the 
gargantuan task of pushing through reforms which would often bring about 
many short-term losers (e.g. striking workers, former state bureaucrats, pension-
ers, to name a few), while long-term gains remained uncertain (Hellman, 1997). 
This unsurprisingly often led to widespread disenchantment and, in some cases, 
the return of neo-authoritarianism or illiberal populism (Bustikova & Guasti, 
2017; Ekiert et al., 2007; Greskovits, 2015; Sata & Karolewski, 2020).
Strong workers’ organizations and unionism – arguably one of the positive 
characteristics of communist societies – also succumbed to the turbulent changes 
of the early 1990s. Aside from the special case of Slovenia, which managed to 
sustain a relatively lively organized interest landscape and civil society under 
communism and a vibrant labour movement in its aftermath (see Jahn, 2016; 
Stanojević, 2011), the collapse of communism generally heralded the at least par-
tial decline of traditional trade unions as a voice of workers. The leadership of 
many organizations was also weakened (Nielsen et al., 1995, p. 29), since many 
appointees were technical experts who held similar positions during the commu-
nist control. Hence, the path dependence of old forms of interest intermediation 
exemplified in the revitalization of old networks and behavioural patterns often 
delayed the emergence of fully fledged systems of interest representation (ibid., 
pp. 29–30).
Indeed, the defining features of CEE civil society after 1989 were low mem-
bership levels, low participation in associational life, low trust in organized civil 
society and weak consultative procedures (Borragán, 2004; Kostelka, 2014; Ost, 
2011). Paradoxically, one could argue that the relatively successful democra-
tization process initially driven by civil society mobilization was carried out 
by strong public institutions and public servants without genuine civil society 
input. In other words, it was ultimately technocratically operating executives 
largely insulated from civic participation who steered these fragile democracies 
through the unprecedented manifold challenges of post-communism (Dimitrov 
et al., 2006). At least in the 1990s, there seemed to be little space left for com-
mon  citizens – most of whom were simply struggling to make ends meet – to 
voice their demands in the political process by means of organized mobilization. 
Hence, numerous authors argue that post-communist politics has become “over- 
parliamentarized” and “over-particized” (Borragán, 2004; Grzymała-Busse, 
2003; Rueschemeyer et al., 1998) and dominated by state authorities (Zubek, 
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2011). In the region, there has been a widespread perception of party politics as 
the embodiment of participatory politics (Borrogán, 2006, p. 150). This falls in 
line with the previously observed weakness of corporatist, dialogue-oriented 
structures in the region (see Ost, 2011). As Borrogán (2004) argues, the rules of 
consensual democracy that evolved in the West during lengthy periods of polit-
ical and economic stability are inapplicable in the post-communist context. The 
triumph of neoliberalism over communism and the radical reforms which rat-
tled nearly every sector of society in the 1990s were not conducive for balanced 
relations between the market, state and society as a whole (Borrogán, 2006). 
Twenty-five years ago, Ágh (1996) already lamented a “missing middle” after the 
collapse of communism, thus an absence of institutions, which systematically and 
effectively channel civic interests into the policy-making process. More recently, 
scholars have argued that the continued prevalence of technocratic executives 
(Zubek, 2005), private clientelistic networks (Pleines, 2004), the ongoing legacy 
of the demoralization of citizens under communism and widespread apathy to-
wards the political process (Cox, 2012; Kostelka, 2014; Pop-Eleches & Tucker, 
2011) still stand in the way of participative democracy and functional interest 
representation in the region.
Yet there are also good reasons to doubt the “weak civil society hypothesis”. 
For example, Foa and Ekiert (2017) argue that many post-communist societies 
display vigorous public spheres and active civic society organizations, which due 
to their strong linkages to transnational civic networks are able to shape domes-
tic policies (2017, p. 419). An alternative view of the authoritarian heritage is 
that communist regimes did not simply repress independent social and political 
organizations, but actively built their own associational structures, which may 
still provide an arena for the subsequent development of civic life. Even though 
the communist systems as such were highly undemocratic, the micro-level of 
associational life still offered some space for civic engagement. And while the as-
sociational structures of the communist era have indeed weakened, they are still 
there and being supplemented by new organizations, networks and initiatives.
Along these lines, Fink-Hafner (1998) put forward the optimistic hypothesis 
that CEE is experiencing the “reinvention of civil society” on the bedrocks of 
the past, reflected in a manifest growth of new forms and strategies of collective 
interest representation. Supporting this argument, numerous scholars have em-
pirically shown that organized interests have rapidly developed in CEE (Duva-
nova, 2007; Fink-Hafner, 1998; Labanino et al., 2020; Rose-Ackerman, 2007; 
Rozbicka & Kamiński 2021; Wallace et al., 2012). This view is backed by numer-
ous analyses on the density of membership in civic organizations (Fink-Hafner, 
1998; Howard, 2003; Petrova & Tarrow, 2007; Rueschemeyer, 1998), and the 
regulatory constraints imposed on unfettered lobbying activities in the region 
(McGrath, 2008; Vargovčíková, 2017).
Thus, there is also a good argument that the strength of organized inter-
ests and civil society has been underestimated. This may be even more the case 
in view of the European integration process, which many post-communist 
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countries underwent. The European Union (EU) accession negotiations brought 
about a new array of organized interests aiming to impact the negotiation process 
by lobbying national governments. Accession also led to processes of diffusion, 
learning, adaptation to European models and repertoires (Grabbe, 2001), not 
only with regard to individual policies but also for interest groups as organiza-
tions. As Carmin (2010) shows, the EU and other transnational organizations 
constitute a crucial source of funding for CEE interest groups. Along these lines, 
European umbrella organizations (see Hanegraaff & van der Ploeg, 2020) may 
also enhance ties with like-minded actors and function as sources of information, 
resources and expertise for post-communist interest organizations. This may fa-
cilitate their professionalization and strengthen their bargaining position vis-à-
vis national governments. In contrast, it is also plausible that CEE interest groups 
(in particular business interests) shifted their lobbying activities to Brussels and 
thus potentially altered national opportunity structures (Borragán, 2004). Alto-
gether though, the general tenor in the literature is that the EU has conveyed 
new norms, ideas and collective understandings to CEE interest groups, while 
upgrading their means for action in national political settings (Fagan & Kopecký, 
2017; Guasti, 2016; Vándor et al., 2017).
1 Aim and structure of the book
In recent years, various scholars have made crucial contributions to our under-
standing of civic participation and mobilization and their determinants as key 
parts of the elements of the post-communist democratization process (Guasti, 
2016; Mansfeldová et al., 2004; Rakušanová, 2005; Vráblíková, 2009, 2014). 
Other noteworthy studies have comparably explored protest movements in the 
region before, during (Ekiert & Kubin, 1998) and after the collapse of com-
munism (Císař & Vráblíková, 2012, 2019). However, we are convinced that there 
are still large gaps in the research, especially when it comes to organized interests 
in concrete policy-making processes. In other words, we have learned a lot about 
how, when and why civil society mobilizes in the post-communist context, but 
our understanding of how organized groups of citizens, professionals and busi-
nesses actually shape policy in the region is still limited.
This book positions itself in the growing body of advanced contemporary 
research on interest groups (Baumgartner et al., 2009; Eising, 2008; Klüver, 
2012; Baumgartner & Leech, 1998; Mahoney, 2007) to partially overcome this 
research gap. Like social or civic moments, interest groups are characterized by 
their fragmented nature and heterogeneity (Eising, 2008), resulting also in a 
multitude of terms such as “special interest organizations”, “lobbying groups”, 
“advocacy associations”, “NGOs” and “civic groups”. What they all have in 
common and distinguishes them from looser social movements is that they are 
organized groups pursuing political interests by seeking to influence political 
decision-making processes. Eising argues that three attributes are inherent to 
interest groups: “organization, political interest, and informality” (2008, p. 5). 
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Organization means that they strive to “influence policy outcomes (…). Political 
interest refers to attempts (…) to push public policy in one direction or another 
on the behalf of constituencies or a general political idea” while “[i]nformality 
relates to the fact that interest groups do not normally seek public office but pur-
sue their goals through informal interactions with politicians and bureaucrats” 
(Eising, 2008, p. 5).
Indeed, numerous existing studies have grappled with the role of interest 
groups in CEE politics (Cox & Vass, 2000; Fink-Hafner, 1998; Gallai et al., 2015; 
Novak & Fink-Hafner, 2019), their relations with the state (Cox & Vass, 2000) 
and parliamentary representation (Fink-Hafner, 2011). Other scholars have ex-
plored the activities of interest groups from the post-communist region in the 
European policy-making arena (Obradovic & Pleines, 2007; Pleines, 2010; No-
vak & Lajh, 2018), or vice versa, the impact of Europeanization on CEE interest 
groups (Fink-Hafner et al., 2015). However, most previous studies focus only on 
individual countries (most frequently Slovenia) or policies (see Roberts, 2009, 
for healthcare) and thus often lack a comparative focus. Therefore, there are still 
numerous open avenues for comparative research, which the authors of the book 
chapters wish to embark on. In doing so, they shall move beyond normative and 
theoretical discussions on civil society in the region and assess the actual role of 
organized interests as the concrete “embodiment” of civil society in the region.
No single work can cover the entire breadth and heterogeneity of organi-
zational activity and interest groups politics. After all, thousands of large and 
small interest organizations operate in countless areas of public policy in the 
enormously heterogeneous post-communist sphere spanning from Vladivostok 
to Berlin. Therefore, we narrowed down the scope of the book to four countries, 
three policy areas and four overarching questions in order to ensure a certain 
degree of coherence, while also still enabling us to grasp the diversity of interest 
group politics in the region.
Our case selection comprises four post-communist countries – the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. They are similar regarding a wide 
range of broader features (e.g. post-communist democracies, new market econo-
mies, middle-income countries, EU members), but differ starkly on three decisive 
characteristics for interest group politics: election funding, lobbying regulations 
and economic coordination. The Czech Republic is a highly open market econ-
omy with privately funded elections and weaker lobbying regulations (McGrath, 
2008; Šimral, 2015) and thus potentially more penetrable by organized inter-
ests. Poland also is a relatively liberal and weakly coordinated market economy. 
However, elections are publicly funded, and extensive lobbying regulations exist, 
which may stymie the influence of interest groups (McGrath, 2008). Hungary 
exhibits stronger market coordination (Duman & Kureková, 2012; Tarlea, 2017), 
whereby elections are publicly funded, and lobbying activities relatively tightly 
monitored (Ikstens et al., 2002; McGrath, 2008). Slovenia is the most coordi-
nated market economy in CEE (Avdagić & Crouch, 2006; Bohle & Greskovits, 
2012). As an ex-Yugoslav country, the Slovenian economy has historically been 
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highly decentralized and enjoyed considerable autonomy from the state. Regu-
latory controls over lobbying, party funding and electoral campaigns are com-
paratively weak, hence providing an interesting polar opposite case to Poland.
Looking at these countries, we move beyond economic policy (see Avdagic, 
2005; Nölke & Vliegenthart, 2009) and explore three policy areas which are 
equally critical for the viability of post-communist democracies: energy, higher 
education and healthcare. The policy areas represent a large portion of public 
budgets and are of long-term strategic importance for the security and well- 
being of nations. In other words, they are “high-stakes” policies which strongly 
impact the viability of any country in the 21st century. These diverse and non- 
interrelated policy areas thus provide us broad foundations for general insights on 
policy-making in the region.
Energy is a highly relevant policy area in CEE and beyond due to the im-
portance of secure, affordable and environmentally friendly sources of energy. 
However, CEE countries generally share a legacy of environmental neglect and 
inefficient energy usage, as reflected in their cautious opposing stance to Ur-
sula von der Leyen’s Green Deal presented in 2019. While the transformation 
and European integration processes along with the bankruptcy of many energy- 
intensive industries indeed resulted in a reduction of usage, CEE is still character-
ized by dependence on domestic coal and Russian gas, high pollution levels and 
underdeveloped renewables sectors (Aalto et al., 2017; Binhack & Tichý, 2012). 
Thus, most CEE countries find themselves in a difficult balance aiming to pro-
mote renewable, safe and diversified energy sources, while also preventing mass 
unemployment through rapid de-carbonization. Against this background, the 
support of major interest organizations may be a crucial prerequisite for facilitat-
ing energy transitions and implementing reforms or vice versa, blocking change.
During democratic consolidation, all CEE countries moved away from their 
inherited healthcare model based on state ownership and control towards the 
establishment of a national insurance authority or a system of private insurers 
(Rechel & McKee, 2009; Roberts, 2009). Many CEE countries attempted to re-
turn to pre-Soviet structures and institutions based on the Bismarck social insur-
ance model. However, economic downturns and high public debt forced many 
governments to introduce “out-of-pocket” payments to compensate for financial 
gaps (Rechel & McKee, 2009). This shift away from large state-run facilities 
was accompanied by measures to privatize hospitals and transfer services to pri-
vate providers and decentralized authorities (Björkman & Nemec, 2013). Even 
though the healthcare systems are based on the principle of territoriality, the EU 
has influenced this sector through a number of different regulatory initiatives 
(e.g. medical trials, data protection, pharmaceuticals). During the coronavirus 
pandemic, functional healthcare systems which enable effective channels for key 
stakeholders (patients, medical experts, healthcare workers) are more important 
than ever.
CEE higher education systems have also undergone a process of “simultane-
ous transition”. They are challenged not only by the heavy burdens with which 
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Western Europe is also struggling such as underfunding amid expansion, academic 
output and efficiency, but also dilemmas particular to their special  socio-economic 
and political circumstances. Among the most crucial post-communist challenges 
were the dismantling of state planning and the restoration of self-governance, 
autonomy and academic freedoms, while achieving an effective balance between 
state regulation and institutional autonomy has been a particularly sensitive issue. 
The Bologna Process has provided an impetus for reforms of including govern-
ance, funding and quality assurance (Dobbins, 2011). Europeanization and inter-
nationalization have recently also shed light on the relative underperformance of 
CEE higher education with regard to research, patents and innovations. This has 
resulted in targeted state strategies to promote university-industrial collaboration 
to generate “home-grown” human capital (Dobbins, 2017).
The book chapters revolve around four sets of overarching questions, which 
enable us to comparatively explore organized interests from different angles. 
Based on the motto “OrgIntCEE & friends”, Chapters 2–9 (and 13) present the 
results of the core research project “The Missing Link: Exploring Organized 
Interests in Post-Communist Policy-Making – OrgIntCEE”, while Chapters 
10–12 put the reader on excursions into exciting and highly significant related 
themes not covered by the core project. The book is divided into the following 
sub-parts:
1  Population ecology: How have populations of organized interests evolved 
in the communist and post-communist phases and what factors impact the 
“births” and “death” of organizations? How have the breakdown of com-
munism, the Europeanization process, broader political reform processes as 
well as the trends towards illiberalism in the region affected the number of 
organized interests operating in specific policy areas?
2  Interest intermediation: How are interest organizations incorporated 
into the political process? How penetrable are post-communist systems for 
organized interests and how polycentric is the policy-making process? In 
what political arenas do organized interests operate? To what extent have 
post-communist interest intermediation systems gravitated towards the cor-
poratist, pluralist or statist policy-making paradigms? And do different types 
of groups (e.g. civic/ideational, business) operate in different political fo-
rums and how do lobbying systems vary between countries?
3  Access and power organized interests: How large is the clout of or-
ganized interests in specific policy-making processes and what factors 
(e.g. resources, expertise, size, professionalization) facilitate their access to 
policy-makers?
4  Europeanization effects: Many questions related to Europeanization in 
general and the Europeanization of CEE organized interests in particular 
are still open to debate. How has the European integration process affected 
organized interests? Which dimension of Europeanization is the most salient 
in CEE? Did the EU accession change the rules of the game? Can the EU 
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be seen as a gigantic socialization agency, which actively promotes rules, 
norms, practices and structures of meaning to which member states (includ-
ing the advocacy and interest organizations) are exposed and which they 
have to incorporate into their domestic structures?
5  Excursions to other territory: Looking beyond the core project, our ex-
ternal authors Joanna Kulska, Tomasz Kubin and Paweł Kamiński cover 
additional essential ground. Their chapters explore how the church engages 
with civil society and the state in CEE, how coal mining unions are a key 
factor in explaining the aversion to more progressive energy and climate 
policies in the region and how the ideological positions of interest groups are 
distinct from those of political parties.
In addition to rich empirical material largely based on interviews, Parts 1–4 
strongly rely on two fresh datasets. The first dataset consists of “population ecol-
ogies” of all interest groups operating in all three mentioned policy areas in all 
four countries from communist times up to present. Our main sources for identi-
fying national organizations and their foundation dates were national online reg-
istries for civil society organizations. We used a harmonized set of keywords for 
each language and filtered out regional-level organizations as well as companies 
listed in the registries. For Poland, we used the National Court Registry (Krajowy 
Rejestr Sądowy – KRS), for Hungary the court registry of civil society organiza-
tions (Civil szervezetek névjegyzéke), for Slovenia the AJPES registry (Agency of 
the Republic of Slovenia for Public Legal Records and Related Services) and for 
the Czech Republic the registry of the Czech Statistical Office (for more details 
and data limitations, see Chapter 2).
Our survey for book parts two to four was divided into three parts. First, 
we requested general information on membership structures (e.g. employees, 
volunteers, member institutions, member firms, individual members). We then 
asked each organization about its affiliations with European, international or 
national umbrella organizations. The second large set of questions addressed the 
frequency of consultations between interest groups and parties, previous and 
present governments, as well as their activity within parliamentary committees 
and their relationships with rivalling organizations. The questions were multiple- 
choice, generally requesting the frequency of contacts and consultations on a 1–5 
scale (never, biannually, annually, monthly, weekly), but also offered respondents 
to provide comments. The section also contained questions regarding access to 
government bodies and parties as well as the perceived level of political coor-
dination on 1–5 scales, also with a comment option. We then posed numerous 
questions regarding the territorial level of activities of interest groups (regional, 
national, European) as well as their main advocacy platforms (e.g. outsider lob-
bying through social media, protests, through the press, vs. insider lobbying 
through diverse political institutions). Finally, we asked each organization about 
its perceived influence on policy as well as whether it perceives itself or rivalling 
organizations at an advantage.
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The third segment covered organizational professionalization. We asked about 
the expertise organizations provide to policy-makers, ties with like-minded or-
ganizations at the European level and activities geared towards professionaliza-
tion such as the training of lobbyists, fundraising, strategic planning and human 
resource development. The segment also included questions about financial 
sources and financial stability.
We were extremely fortunate to receive responses from nearly 440 CEE in-
terest organizations in our three key policy areas (see Annex for the survey and 
response rate by policy area).
2 Brief overview of the book chapters
As outlined above, the book is divided into five parts, four of which present 
results from the core project “The Missing Link – Organized Interests in Post- 
Communist Policy-Making” and the final of which broadens our perspective 
through journeys into new territory.
Part 1 Interest organizations in numbers (population ecology)
In Chapter 2, Rafael Pablo Labanino, Michael Dobbins and Rafał Riedel ex-
plore to what extent legacies shaped the trajectory of interest organizations 
during and after transition. Assuming that the number of associations and level 
of civil society activity are decisive for economic growth, good governance 
and democratization in general, they look at interest organization populations 
and densities during the pre-transition phase in CEE. Drawing on our datasets 
of interest organizations operating in the healthcare, energy and higher edu-
cation sectors of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovenia, they ad-
dress how “dense” populations of organizations were under communism and 
during the transition. Shedding doubt on the idea of a complete “tabula rasa” 
after 1989, they explore to what degree different “varieties of communism” 
and the nature of the breakdown of communism later affected organizational 
populations.
Linking directly to Chapter 2, Michael Dobbins, Rafael Pablo Labanino and 
Brigitte Horváthová explore in Chapter 3 how populations of interest organiza-
tions have developed in the post-communist era and to what extent they were 
transformed by the transition to a market economy, democracy and in some cases 
nation-building. They also address whether EU accession and membership have 
reshaped the organizational landscapes, while also analysing how organizational 
populations were affected by internal reform processes. Drawing on the theory 
of “density dependence”, the authors also show at what point organizational 
populations became “saturated”. The chapter is also the first to examine whether 
“democratic backsliding” in the region is affecting organizational “births” and 
“deaths”.
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Part 2 Interest Intermediation
Chapter 4 written by Szczepan Czarnecki is, to our knowledge, one of the first 
to address lobbying tactics of organized interest groups in the post-communist 
context (see also Rozbicka et al., 2020). Based on our comparative survey data, 
he explores the forums (governments, parliaments or the public) in which en-
ergy advocacy groups operate. In doing so, Czarnecki tests Binderkrantz’s (2015) 
hypothesis regarding whether ideational or cause groups – in this case environ-
mental protection or renewable energy groups – pursue different tactics (e.g. out-
side lobbying tactics such as protests and petitions) than business interest groups. 
He also explores whether and how lobbying strategies are contingent on issues 
themselves, i.e. whether issues are divisible or non-divisible. Importantly, he ex-
amines to what extent lobbying regimes (e.g. the Czech Republic with more 
liberal with privately funded elections; Poland with more regulated with publi-
cally funded elections) impact the chosen strategies of organized energy-related 
interest groups.
Chapter 5 by Michael Dobbins, Emilia Piotrowska and Maximilian von 
Bronk also focuses on interest intermediation from the perspective of corpo-
ratism. Specifically, the authors address the intensity of consultations between 
different healthcare interest groups with governments, political parties and 
other political institutions and whether certain groups (e.g. the medical profes-
sion, patients) are at structural advantage or disadvantage. The article builds on 
pre-existing measurements of corporatism and applies them to post-communist 
healthcare policy-making using survey data. Drawing on the previous work of 
Siaroff (1999) and Jahn (2016), the chapter concludes with a “healthcare corpo-
ratism score” for Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia.
Part 3 Influence of Organized Interests
The third part strongly reflects the mixed-method approach of the book. Chap-
ter 6 by Szczepan Czarnecki, Emilia Piotrowska and Rafał Riedel applies some 
of the major hypotheses in the political science literature to explore the access of 
green energy and traditional energy advocacy groups to national policy-makers. 
Using our survey data collected directly from organized interests operating in 
the energy sector in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Hungary, the 
authors explore how different types of resources (e.g. financial stability, profes-
sionalization and various types of expertise) enable access to governments and 
political parties. In a region otherwise not known for progressive, ecologically 
friendly energy and environmental policies, they assess whether green and re-
newables organizations enjoy an equal playing field compared to groups repre-
senting traditional, non-regenerative sources of energy.
Chapter 7 by Brigitte Horváthová and Michael Dobbins also engages with our 
survey data to assess the factors, which enable healthcare interest groups to access 
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to national parliaments and governments. Using ordinal logistic regressions, 
they explore to what extent human resources, financial resources, expertise and 
professionalization enable healthcare organizations to access the policy-making 
apparatus. Tying into Chapter 2, Horváthová and Dobbins simultaneously test 
whether organizations that existed under communism enjoy an advantage over 
newly founded organizations. The chapter is also one of the first in the literature 
to operationalize and test what specific types of professionalization (e.g. collabo-
ration with other organizations, focus on organizational development) facilitate 
or impede access to policy-makers.
Chapter 8 by Aleš Vlk, Michael Dobbins and Rafał Riedel is a comparative 
case study of recent developments in Czech and Polish higher education. Rely-
ing on the process-tracing method, the authors show how the configuration and 
strategies of organized academic interests vis-à-vis the state and the state’s capac-
ity to govern the sector have resulted in strikingly divergent recent developments 
in the governance of both higher education systems. Their main argument is 
that a combination of an increasingly strong state in Poland, combined with 
fragmented interest organizations, brought about the centralization of higher 
education, while a combination of a weaker state and much more consolidated 
stakeholders in the Czech Republic resulted in the persistence of pre-existing 
policy arrangements. Their analysis sheds new light on how the current Polish 
government pushed through a fundamental reform of Polish higher education 
against the will of numerous previously influential organized interests despite 
long-lasting multilateral consultations with stakeholder groups. This stands in 
contrast to the Czech situation, where internal stakeholders and institutions of 
“academic democracy” continue to dominate.
Part 4 Europeanization Effects
In Chapter 9, Szczepan Czarnecki and Rafał Riedel visit the crossroads of Eu-
ropeanization and professionalization in their comparative analysis of the inter-
play between these two groups of factors determining the recent evolution of 
organized interests in CEE. Such an empirical study of the professionalization 
of interest groups is crucial to understand the development of post-EU accession 
advocacy groups and their evolution as a vitally important element of civil soci-
ety. This chapter shows that it is not the standard channels of Europeanization 
(top-down and bottom-up) which drive the professionalization process, rather 
“cross-loading” Europeanization mechanisms (i.e. socialization through organ-
izational ties).
Part 5 Excursions to other territory
The final part consists of chapters written by “friends” of the OrgIntCEE pro-
ject who venture out into new territory not covered by the core project data-
sets, yet which are critical for understanding civil society and policy-making in 
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CEE. Chapter 10 written by Tomasz Kubin explores why the Czech Republic 
and in particular Poland have been so resistant to the European Union’s de- 
carbonization strategy. Focusing on mining trade unions, their structure, their 
strategies, their interlinkages with the state and party systems, Kubin explains 
why Poland has had such difficulties embracing a more progressive and ecologi-
cally friendly energy policy, whereas the Czech Republic has gradually come on 
board with the European Union’s energy and climate strategy.
In Chapter 11, Joanna Kulska engages with the Catholic Church, which is 
arguably the largest interest group in the region, and in Poland in particular. She 
comparatively analyses the evolving role, goals and strategies applied by the Pol-
ish and Czech Catholic churches, against the background of the different position 
of religion in both countries’ social-political contexts. Focusing on the fusion 
of national and religious identities, Kulska explores to what extent and in what 
policy areas the church is able to effectively exert political influence. In doing 
so, she provides explanations for the highly different development of abortion 
policies in both countries.
In Chapter 12, Paweł Kamiński enters unchartered territory in CEE by sys-
tematically analysing the relationship between interest groups and political par-
ties (see also Rozbicka et al., 2020). Specifically, he explores whether interest 
groups in CEE are occupying territory in the political space, which is “aban-
doned” by political parties, or contrarily, whether interest groups and parties 
are following a similar pattern of biased representation and indifference towards 
civil society. Using quantitative and comparative data gathered between 2016 
and 2018 from six EU countries, the chapter sheds light on the interplay between 
interest groups and political parties in three CEE countries – Poland, Slovenia 
and Lithuania – and three “old” EU member states – the Netherlands, Sweden 
and Belgium. The study is one of the first to compare CEE interest groups with 
their western counterparts.
This final Chapter 13 by Michael Dobbins, Emilia Piotrowska and Rafał 
Riedel recaps the findings of the individual chapters and lays out comparative 
conclusions regarding structures and patterns of interest intermediation in the 
region, while also comparatively reassessing how organized interests impact the 
direction of policy. The authors also briefly present some simple aggregated data 
related to organized interests of all four countries, enabling us to identify some 
broader trends in the countries’ interest group ecosystems, their intensity of con-
sultation and cooperation in policy-making, their perception of power and influ-
ence as well as their professionalization processes.
3 A final introductory note
As already hinted above, the world of interest groups offers infinite possibilities for 
exploration, but is also hampered by infinite methodological, analytical and practi-
cal challenges. However, we are fortunate not to be alone in this undertaking. Al-
most simultaneously to the publication of this book, another monograph on interest 
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group representation in the post-communist region is to be published: Achieving 
Democracy Through Interest Representation: Interest groups in Central and Eastern Europe 
by Patrycja Rozbicka, Paweł Kamiński, Meta Novak and Vaida Jankauskaitė.
Initially unaware of this parallel endeavour, the contributors of both mon-
ographs have increasingly engaged with one another, resulting in very fruitful 
discussions and exchanges despite the obstacles posed by coronavirus. In our 
view, both books perfectly complement each other as each book addresses gaps 
in the research which the other does not, while offering different approaches 
and lenses on civil society and organized interest in the region. While the mon-
ograph by Rozbicka and colleagues covers Poland, Lithuania and Slovenia, the 
present book adds perspectives on two additional countries, the Czech Republic 
and Hungary. Their book has the strength that the population ecology analyses 
cover the entire interest group populations of these countries, while ours places 
a narrower focus on three policy areas – energy, higher education and health-
care. Our stronger focus on vital rates enables us to single out the determinants 
driving organizational births and deaths such as communist heritages, domestic 
reform processes, Europeanization as well as population densities. While their 
book offers a highly informative overview of the legal foundations of interest 
group activities, our book stands out with its focus on specific policy-making 
processes in non- interrelated policy areas.
The book by Rozbicka et al. (2020) also more systematically addresses ties be-
tween interest groups and political parties, while the authors of the present book 
engage more intensively with the phenomena of democratic backsliding and il-
liberal civil society in CEE. And while their book offers outstanding overviews 
of where interest groups target their activities (courts, parliaments, executives, 
civil servants, parties, etc.), we place greater emphasis on the factors facilitating 
their access to policy-makers such as expertise, resources and professionalization. 
Both books also take different approaches regarding the funding of organiza-
tions: the upcoming chapters focus on whether funding facilitates political ac-
cess, whereas Rozbicka, Kamiński, Novak and Jankauskaitė offer more detailed 
insights into how CEE interest groups are funded. And while their team of au-
thors more systematically explores the activities of interest groups from the CEE 
region at the European level, we turn the focus around and look at the impact of 
European-level networking activities on the internal structures of CEE organ-
ized interests. Finally, whereas their book descriptively covers the development 
of trade unions in the economic sphere, we extend the focus to emerging forms 
of corporatism in healthcare – a previously largely unexplored policy area in the 
region – using a novel indicator-based conceptualization of corporatism.
Thus, we are firmly convinced that both books are unique and ideally com-
plement each other. Hence, by no means should they be viewed as competing 
books, as territory not covered in the one book is covered in the other. And, after 
all, only a diverse collection of chapters taking different angles can do justice 
to this highly complex topic. Thus, taken together, we believe that both books 
will not only help overcome the strong bias towards Western Europe and North 
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America in interest group research, but hopefully also provide a solid foundation 
for scholars of post-communism to build on in the future and better understand 
a region which has captivated and will continue to captivate scholars for years 
to come.
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To what extent did organized interests operate in totalitarian societies? How do 
interest group populations existing before the democratic transition affect later 
interest group evolution? Is there a clean slate after totalitarianism, as Olson 
(1982) suggested? Or are organizations able to survive enormous political, social 
and economic transformations? On the one hand, the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE) experienced a gargantuan simultaneous economic, politi-
cal and (in many cases, such as Slovenia) national “triple transition” 30 years ago 
(Offe & Adler, 1991). This undoubtedly unique historical experience was accom-
panied by a deep economic and societal crisis. Following the assumption of Olson 
(1982) of an organizational “tabula rasa” precisely after such events, one might 
contend that interest groups started out with a clean slate after 1989. On the other 
hand, communist regimes varied with respect to their level of oppressiveness and 
strategies towards civil society, while undergoing periods of relative openness and 
closure. Thus, there are grounds to assume that communist regimes did not fully 
oppress and perhaps may have even facilitated the mobilization of civic organi-
zations. While communist regimes promoted a variety of civic organizations – 
from sports associations, labour unions, to youth movements – participation in 
these organizations was often mandatory and highly regulated by state authori-
ties. Other independent alternatives were either marginalized or outlawed. As a 
result, the transition countries suffered from constrained “civic infrastructure”, 
including the healthy system of interest intermediation (Pop-Eleches & Tucker, 
2013). In either case, in the symbolic year of 1989, civic society was transformed 
on the ruins of the communist past. Yet to what extent did legacies shape the 
evolutionary trajectory of societal organizations during and after transition?
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In order to explore communist legacies and their implications for the associ-
ational life after 1989, we look at interest organization populations and densities 
during the pre-transition phase in CEE. In doing so, we deliberately take issue 
with Kopecký and Mudde (2003), who caution against focusing on organizational 
density as a reflection of civil society mobilization. While their advice should 
be headed by students of civil society understood broadly, for those studying 
organized interests the foundation and mortality rates of interest group popu-
lations and their density are among the theoretically most important variables. 
After all, organizational density, the number of associations and civil society ac-
tivity are widely seen by social scientists as decisive factors determining economic 
growth, good governance and democratization in general (Olson, 1965, 1982; 
Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1993). Thus, they have been addressed by many 
scholars as key factors driving post-communist democratization (Bruszt, Campus, 
Fidrmuc, & Roland, 2010; Ekiert & Kubik, 1998; Kopecký & Mudde, 2003). 
However, it is surprising that in contrast to a plethora of studies on civil society 
and industrial relations in post-communist CEE (e.g. Avdagic, 2005, 2006; Crow-
ley, 2004; Crowley & Ost, 2001; Greskovits, 1998; Krzywdzinski, 2008; Ost, 
2005), little attention has been devoted to organizational populations and the in-
fluence of specific organized interest groups, particularly in a comparative setting.
To address this gap, we draw on our dataset of interest organizations operating 
in the healthcare, energy and higher education sectors of the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. We show that variations in pre-transitional au-
thoritarian governance and the nature of the breakdown of communism signif-
icantly impacted organized interest populations throughout the 20th century. 
In particular, we highlight how sizable organizational populations were already 
present when communism crumbled, which substantially varied in size across 
policy fields and countries though. Moreover, we show that not only a consider-
able organizational density was present during transition, but that organizations 
existing under communism constitute a sizable share of contemporary interest 
group populations. This observation goes against the assumption of a tabula rasa 
after precisely such historical events (Olson, 1982) and also has serious conse-
quences for two major population ecology approaches to interest organizations: 
the theory of density-dependent vital rates (Hannan & Carroll, 1992) (see Chap-
ter 3) and the energy–stability–area (ESA) model of interest organization density 
(Gray & Lowery, 1995, 1996; Lowery & Gray, 1995).
We first take a closer look at the assumptions regarding organizational den-
sity after a fundamental change in a given polity, such as foreign occupation or 
the collapse of a political and economic system in Olson (1982) and in the ESA 
model (Lowery & Gray, 1995). Then, we introduce a theoretical framework for 
the varieties of communist regimes based on Kitschelt, Mansfeldova, Markowski 
and Tóka (1999), which helps us to hypothesize how the differences in com-
munist regimes and consequently in democratic transitions affect pre-transition 
interest organization density. In Section 4, we introduce the dataset, analyse the 
data and explain the differences based on the model. Looking at the Hungarian 
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sub-sample, we also explore the long-term effects of the pre-transition interest 
group density and diversity. The last section summarizes our findings and paves 
the way for some of the upcoming chapters.
2 The density of new interest organization populations
In his classic book, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, 
and Social Rigidities, Mancur Olson states that “Stable societies with unchanged 
boundaries tend to accumulate more collusions and organizations for collective 
action over time” (Olson, 1982, p. 80). He contends that the accumulation of 
organized interests follows an exponential growth curve since the last major dis-
ruption in a country. That is, the number of interest groups is determined by the 
time since the formation of the political system, foreign occupation or some other 
fundamental political change. Lowery and Gray (1995) equate this view with the 
huge asteroid that wiped out the dinosaurs along with three-quarters of all life 
on Earth. A fundamental extinction-level change to a political system “resets 
the clock and group formation begins anew” (Lowery & Gray, 1995, pp. 3–4). 
Indeed, Olson (1982) lays out this argument analysing the differences between 
Britain, a country which did not experience any disruption to its political system 
since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, and continental Europe, where 
foreign occupation and radical political change occurred time and time again 
since the early modern age until the end of World War II. Olson (1982) considers 
totalitarianism a particularly disruptive force. His two examples, Germany and 
Japan, both experienced institutional change imposed violently by totalitarian 
governments and then by the occupying Allied forces. Olson cites from another 
study supporting his argument that while 51% of all associations existing in the 
UK in 1973 were founded before 1939, the corresponding numbers were 24% in 
West Germany, 19% in Japan and 37% in France, which also experienced foreign 
occupation and a fascist puppet government during World War II (Olson, 1982, 
p. 173). The question never arises, however, whether these numbers are as low as 
his theory would assume – namely a tabula rasa more or less – and what could this 
mean for interest group density and diversity.
As Lowery and Gray (1995) point out, despite the central importance of the 
number of interest groups for Olson’s theory of economic growth, his 1982 book 
includes no direct measure of it. In contrast, Lowery and Gray (1995) and Gray and 
Lowery (1995, 1996) introduced a theoretical model of interest group density. The 
energy–stability–area (ESA) model of population density builds on the popula-
tion ecology studies in biology. That is, instead of looking at  organizational-level 
variables in explaining organizational diversity and density, it sees these as be-
ing determined by the carrying capacity of the organizations’ environment. The 
model posits that “the diversity of a population is a summed function of how the 
environmental forces specified in the ESA model separately influence carrying 
capacities for each species or organization type” (Gray & Lowery, 1996, p. 105). 
The underlying theoretical assumption of the population ecology approach is 
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that the number of organizations is constrained by “the availability of organiza-
tional resources, relatively independent of mobilization rates and dependent on 
the pre-existing density of organizations” (Berkhout et al., 2015, p. 465).
In studies drawing on the population ecology approach to interest organiza-
tion populations, the focus is usually on the energy and area terms of the model. 
The number of potential constituents corresponds to the latter, the “habitat” of 
the interest organization population, that is, the size of the potential constituency. 
In many studies, habitat is labelled as the supply side (population/membership 
environment). It is important to note that the existing density of organizations 
in a population itself is a supply side, membership environmental factor. Existing 
density is also of central importance in population ecology studies on the growth 
and mortality rates of interest groups (Hannan & Carroll, 1992; Hannan & Free-
man, 1977, 1989). On the energy – or “demand” – side of the model are the in-
terests of the constituents regarding the actual and potential government actions 
affecting them, as well as issue certainty, that is, the likelihood of policy change. 
These are “vital resources that interest organization entrepreneurs employ to 
secure sponsorship” (Gray & Lowery, 1996, p. 106). The stability term, that is, 
fundamental political, economic and institutional change of a polity, usually is 
only controlled for or left out completely though.1
Our data on national-level interest group formation and dissolution in energy 
policy, healthcare and higher education in four post-communist countries, three 
of which were also under foreign occupation for 40 years, offer an opportunity 
to analyse formal organizational activities through the patterns of organizational 
formation and density. In other words, our data enable us to directly explore 
the stability term. We move beyond simply treating it as the time since the last 
major political disruption or the age of the political system. First, we theorize 
and systematically analyse the causes for the variance in density of pre-transition 
interest group populations. Then, in a second step, we examine the mortality rate 
of pre-transition organizations between 1990 and 2019.
3 Organizational density and varieties of communism in CEE
Several former studies on civil society during communism challenged the view 
of these societies as being bereft of genuine civil society activities (Bruszt et al., 
2010; Ekiert & Foa, 2011; Ekiert & Kubik, 1998; Kopecký & Mudde, 2003). 
Ekiert and Foa (2011) emphasized that in CEE, there was more to civil society 
than forced mobilization by the state or their function as “transmission belt” 
between the society and the party state. They argue that even mass organizations 
underwent significant transformation towards genuine interest representation 
during the 1970s and 1980s, particularly in Poland and Hungary. Ekiert and 
Foa (2011) call communist countries “incomplete civil societies” with a large 
number of associations and a dense structure of organizations without “auton-
omy, a legally defined public space and enforceable rights and liberties” (2011, 
p. 12). These studies, however, do not deal with specific interest organizations. 
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Ekiert and Kubik (1998) and Bruszt et al. (2010) instead explore the size of civil 
society and dissident activity (demonstrations, strikes, etc.) between 1989–1993 
and 1985–1989, respectively.2 The authors reveal large differences between the 
different communist regimes regarding civil society and social movement activi-
ties during communism. East-Central Europe and Yugoslavia had a more robust 
and vibrant civil society than the Soviet Union or Romania and Bulgaria. Yet 
none of these studies theorize how the different communist regimes affect civil 
society development in general, and interest group density in particular.3 After 
all, these communist regimes differed in many important respects for organiza-
tional development: their level of openness to non-command economic activity, 
the opportunities for formal interest representation in decision-making, and the 
nature of their opposition and transition processes varied significantly.
In line with this non-homogeneity thesis, we opt for a comparative ap-
proach enabling the identification of main similarities and differences among the 
post-communist CEE interest organizations, representing an important part of 
civil society. We recognize that instead of a single, homogenous CEE civil soci-
ety shaped by a shared communist past, civil societies in the region are largely de-
termined by different national political contexts (Navrátil & Kluknavaská, 2020), 
which along with the transition process itself created both conditions and the 
necessary impetus for the development of interest groups and other civil society 
organizations. As we will show, the differences between the respective commu-
nist regimes – the changes in their relative openness to societal interest articula-
tion and intermediation – and the resulting transition processes – the level and 
nature of societal and political mobilization – are reflected in the pre-transition 
organizational formation rates. 
All countries under the rule of Marxist–Leninist parties were indeed totalitar-
ian societies. From a systemic point of view, communist rule, or as Kornai (2000) 
put it, “the socialist system” as the empirically existent political- economic system, 
just like the capitalist system shared common characteristics. All 26 countries 
that experienced communist rule had five common, observable traits: (1) undi-
vided power of the Marxist–Leninist party, (2) dominant position of state and 
quasi-state ownership, (3) preponderance of bureaucratic coordination, (4) soft 
budget constraint; weak responsiveness to prices; plan bargaining; quantity drive, 
(5) chronic shortage economy; sellers’ market; labour shortage; “unemployment 
on the job”4 (Kornai, 2000, p. 29). However, just as there are varieties of cap-
italism (Hall & Soskice, 2001) or welfare capitalism (Esping-Andersen, 1990), 
there were varieties of “existing socialism”. Kitschelt et al. (1999) constructed a 
model describing this variety, which distinguished three regime archetypes: the 
 bureaucratic-authoritarian, national-accommodative and patrimonial regimes.
Bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes evolved in countries characterized by already 
high industrialization, early secularization and a socioeconomic class divide 
(a strong and organized working class), as well as experiences with democracy in 
the interwar period, such as Czechoslovakia and East Germany. In these coun-
tries, communist parties had a strong base among organized industrial workers. 
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After the forced merger with the broader social democratic camp (with the help 
of Soviet pressure and outright violence), communists did not have to accom-
modate their opponents. Nevertheless, they were always aware of the threat of 
social democratic and “bourgeois” (Christian-democratic, conservative, liberal, 
religious) revival. These characteristics explain their repressive, orthodox Marx-
ist nature, which relied on a professional and effective bureaucratic machine. In 
these regimes, the transition process came suddenly and they collapsed in weeks 
under the pressure of a unified anti-communist opposition movement and mass 
demonstrations.
In national-accommodative regimes, such as Hungary and Poland, the commu-
nists came to power in countries with a large agricultural sector, an influential 
Catholic Church, and in Hungary also a reformed (Calvinist) Church. There 
was considerable industrialization, but it was confined to a number of metropol-
itan and mining areas. Democratic legacies were weak or non-existent, but both 
countries experienced some form of a political pluralism in the interwar years 
(even if constrained and authoritarian). During this period, the communists did 
not play any significant role and the social democrats were only strong in the in-
dustrialized areas.5 After the Stalinist period, the communists in both countries 
eventually had to accommodate large segments of a hostile population. For ex-
ample, in Hungary, the industrial workers were the base of the armed revolution 
against the Stalinists and the Soviet Army in October–November 1956. The op-
position movement in Poland during the 1970s and 1980s led by Lech Wałęsa – a 
shipyard electrician – was similarly driven by industrial workers (Grodsky, 2017). 
Consequently, the communist regimes of these countries were characterized by 
technocratic experimentation with economic reform, and co-optation rather 
than full-blown repression. As János Kádár, Chairman of the Hungarian Social-
ist Workers’ Party and father of “Goulash-communism”6 famously described this 
modus vivendi: “those who are not against us are with us”. These countries were 
characterized by a negotiated transition process between the communist party 
and the anti-communist opposition (Kitschelt et al., 1999, pp. 64–67).
Patrimonial regimes evolved in overwhelmingly agrarian countries with weak 
industrialization and secularization, such as Bulgaria and Romania. These re-
gimes were characterized by a corrupt and unprofessional communist party state 
penetrated by clientelist networks, and a weak, disorganized, fragmented op-
position, without any historical appeal to another form of modernization than 
communism. These regimes collapsed suddenly under popular pressure (and in 
case of Romania – armed struggle with the army siding with the revolutionaries 
against communist security forces). However, the transition was managed by 
the intransigent ruling parties with pre-emptive (partial) reform7 (Crowther & 
Suciu, 2013; Karasimeonov & Lyubenov, 2013; Kitschelt et al., 1999, pp. 67–69).
While Kitschelt et al. (1999) applied this model of communist regime diversity 
to trace differences in post-communist party systems, we argue that their classi-
fications are also relevant for our study of pre-transition interest group popula-
tions. Accordingly, we would expect the lowest level of interest group density in 
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the bureaucratic-authoritarian and patrimonial variety of communist rule, which 
is closest to the assumption of Olson (1982) about the effect of authoritarianism. 
However, in the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime, as it evolved in highly devel-
oped countries, we would expect a number of pre-communist-era organizations 
to be present and “survive” communist rule. We anticipate the highest interest 
group density in national-accommodative regimes, such as Hungary and Poland. 
Here, we expect to find a high share of communist-era organizational formation 
as the communist parties had to co-opt and accommodate large segments of so-
ciety (see Figure 2.1). Although Kitschelt et al. (1999) did not include any former 
Yugoslav countries in their sample, Yugoslavia is categorized as a mixture of the 
national-accommodative and patrimonial variety in the literature, with Slovenia 
being rather the former (Meyer-Sahling, 2009).
However, there are also significant differences between the respective commu-
nist systems of the countries in our sample belonging to the national- accommodative 
regime: Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. Specifically, they differed in the relative 
and formal openness of the political system to social interests and the level of 
political and societal mobilization during the run-up to transition (1988–1989). 
We start by comparing Hungary and Poland, as these countries were in a very 
different situation – namely, under Soviet occupation, but with varying degrees 
of Soviet control and influence during communist rule – then Slovenia, which 
was a constituent republic of non-aligned Yugoslavia.
First, the outcome of the October 1956 protests, the starting point for moving 
away from Stalinism to the eventual national-accommodative model, was very 
different in Hungary and Poland. Whereas in Poland the moderate communist 
leader, Władysław Gomułka, was eventually tolerated in power by the Soviets 
and able to keep popular demands for reform at bay and implement relatively 
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FIGURE 2.1  The expected effect of communist regime types (Kitschelt et al., 1999) on 
pre-transition interest group density in CEE.
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incremental changes, in Hungary the events led to an armed uprising against 
Soviet occupation. Poland experimented with limited pluralism as early as 1957, 
allowing the participation of groups such as the United Peasant Party, the Dem-
ocratic Party or the Catholic organization, Znak (Colomer & Pascual, 1994, 
pp. 277–278). In Hungary, mass imprisonment and hundreds of executions took 
place during this phase, and such experiments with pluralism were never even 
considered. The two countries, however, soon converged, and from the 1960s on 
both regimes implemented several waves of economic reform (Lutz &  Krueger, 
1995; Przeworski, 1993). After the 1963 amnesty, the Hungarian regime “con-
solidated” its rule and the communists tried to co-opt and accommodate Hun-
garian society (with success).
However, by the 1980s, the two countries diverged again: Poland was home 
to the only truly independent mass movement of the Eastern Bloc, the Independ-
ent Self-Governing Trade Union Solidarity movement (Niezależny Samorządny 
Związek Zawodowy Solidarność ). Even after the implementation of martial law 
in December 1981, Solidarity was able to retain its 10 million members (Ost, 
2005). Unable to solve the country’s deep economic crisis and having lost their 
legitimacy, the communist government entered into negotiations with Solidarity 
leaders in January 1989, which led to semi-free elections held in June 1989. The 
election marked the end of the regime, as all but one of the contested Senate seats 
were won by the opposition (Millard, 2010; Rose & Munro, 2009), whereas in 
the Sejm (the lower chamber of the Polish parliament) the democratic opposition 
won all 35% of the seats, which were subject to competitive electoral process, 
as the remaining 65% were guaranteed for the PZPR (Polska Zjednoczona Partia 
 Robotnicza – Polish United Workers’ Party) and its satellites. In Hungary, how-
ever, there was no mass opposition movement or protest until 1988–1989. The 
communist government had a firm grip on power until 1988, and the country did 
not experience the same level of shortages as in Poland (although the economic 
crisis also rapidly accelerated in Hungary). There were indeed organized dissi-
dent groups, but they were sharply divided along ideological lines. Moreover, in 
Hungary, there was never any unified front against the communists. During the 
1989 Roundtable Negotiations with the communists, all opposition parties and 
“societal organizations” (both independent and loyal unions and interest groups) 
had their own representatives. By 1989, the Hungarian opposition was relying 
more on mobilization and confrontation. As Bruszt and Stark (1991) argue, this 
outcome can be explained precisely by the fragmentation and relative weakness 
of the Hungarian opposition. As there was no powerful, unified a nti-communist 
movement, the reform faction of the communist party also had an incentive for 
confrontation and partisan competition. Eventually, the split in the opposition 
became official, when the liberal and agrarian parties refused to sign the Septem-
ber 1989 agreement with the communists and initiated a referendum on the four 
most important points they disagreed with (and won).8
Yugoslavia, which Slovenia was part of, was very different from both Hu ngary 
and Poland. As Stanojević (1999) emphasizes, communism resulted from the 
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military victory of the popular partisan movement over the German occupiers 
and the simultaneous civil war against their domestic allies. Hence, in contrast to 
Poland and Hungary, Yugoslav communism was endogenous (Stanojević, 1999, 
p. 42). Yugoslavia was never under Soviet military occupation, and after Tito’s 
1948 break with Stalin, it already embarked on a deregulation and decentrali-
zation process in 1951. Yugoslavia implemented industrial democracy with the 
so-called self-management of its enterprises: the elected workers’ council was 
the highest decision-making body, which also nominated and fired directors. 
Thus, management was responsible for the workers of a company (Stanojević, 
1999, p. 46).
Yet self-management did not stop at the company level. Based on social own-
ership, Yugoslavia had a unique socialist-corporatist system, a kind of social part-
nership that permeated the formal legislative structures of every republic (Lukšič, 
1997). As Lukšič (1997) argues, this elaborate system of corporatism provided 
genuine interest intermediation mechanisms. The parliament in every republic 
comprised three chambers: the Chamber of Communes, the Chamber of Asso-
ciated Labor and the Socio-Political Chamber. In addition, Self-Management 
Interest Communities were organized for important social interests with equal 
representation for consumers and producers. These communities also had the 
right to participate in parliamentary sessions on matters of importance to them. 
In the Chamber of Associated Labor, representatives of workers and managers 
were elected for different branches of the economy and social services. Through 
their respective trade union delegations, they also had the right to speak in the 
Socio-Political Chamber (Lukšič, 1997, pp. 106–107).
However, the Yugoslav system of self-management was in crisis by the late 
1980s. The country could not continue to provide a high level of social security 
to the entire workforce. The restructuring and downsizing of Yugoslav com-
panies were imminent, and the work councils increasingly lost power. Hence, 
the coalition between the communist party elite and industrial workers disin-
tegrated (Stanojević, 1999, p. 46). In Slovenia, the reformist wing took over the 
communist party in 1986. First, there was political mobilization inside existing 
socio-political organizations, such as the Alliance of Socialist Youth (which later 
became the Liberal Democratic Party, the dominant party of the country during 
the 1990s) (Fink Hafner, 1997a). As Fink Hafner (1997a) describes, such “em-
bryonic” political parties were first established in spring 1988. “Multi-partyism” 
was also legalized at the end of the 1980s, however, within the existing one-
party framework (1997a, p. 142). Regime change in Slovenia was also a national 
question. After the Slovenian communists broke with their Yugoslav comrades 
in January 1991 by walking out of the 14th Congress of the Yugoslav League 
of Communists, the army was the only federal Yugoslav institution left in the 
country (Fink Hafner, 1997a, pp. 140–141).
Summing up the differences between the three national-accommodative re-
gimes, we can conclude that the Yugoslav regime was the most open to social 
interests – at least in the formal decision-making process – and the Hungarian for 
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the most part the least open, although between 1981 and 1988, the Polish regime 
was more repressive than the Hungarian. Regime change also played out differ-
ently in the three countries. As Bruszt and Stark (1991) argued, the Hungarian 
regime change eventually relied more on political and societal mobilization than 
the Polish one, where the opposition struck an early compromise with the com-
munists. The Slovenian regime change was also a much more managed process 
than the Hungarian, as the communists already allowed some form of pluralism 
within the one-party model, and the Slovenian regime was in general the least 
repressive of the three. It is equally important that in Hungary, there was true 
pluralism within the opposition. The opposition was fragmented and divided 
along ideological lines. Party competition already started during the round- 
table talks with the communists directly affecting the regime change process. 
Altogether, we expect these systemic differences – both among the national- 
accommodative regimes and with the bureaucratic-authoritarian Czech(oslovak) 
regime – to explain the relative importance of the different periods of commu-
nist rule for pre-transition interest organization formations.
4  Exploring the density and diversity of pre-transition interest 
group populations
To explore the expectation outlined above, we draw on our complete sample 
of active and dissolved Czech, Hungarian, Polish and Slovenian interest groups 
operating at the state level in three policy fields, energy, healthcare and higher 
education. As a rule, we collected data from public registries of civil society or-
ganizations. We cross-checked the data with Internet searches, lists from parlia-
ments and different ministries that invited organizations to various committees, 
meetings and interest intermediation bodies. We used the same set of keywords 
in all four languages. As in healthcare and higher education there are highly 
specialized professional, patient and student groups, we also made a standardized 
list of medical professions and higher education disciplines to improve compa-
rability. For Poland, we used the State Court Registry (Krajowy Rejestr Sądowy – 
KRS) as a starting point. Since the KRS database only indicates registrations 
from 2001 on, we checked for each organization whether it was founded before 
this period and systematically searched for organizations founded before 2001. 
Our main source for the Hungarian data was the court registry of civil society 
organizations. The Hungarian court registry starts in 1989; that is, organiza-
tions founded before nonetheless have 1989 as their founding date. In each case 
though, we checked for the actual foundation date. For Slovenia, our primary 
source was AJPES registry (Agency of the Republic of Slovenia for Public Legal 
Records and Related Services). Our main source for the Czech data was the reg-
istry of the Czech Statistical Office. 
With the exception of Hungary, these registries do not contain information 
on dissolutions.9 Therefore, we systematically checked whether organizations 
were active or inactive with Web searches and even by contacting them. In many 
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cases, we could not determine the exact date of dissolution, only the last date of 
activity or that the organization was active/inactive at the time of data collection 
(2019). The information on dissolutions in the Hungarian registry also has limi-
tations. The unified court registry was established in 2011, and the courts started 
to dissolve inactive organizations effectively as of 2014. As a result, there has 
been a “mass dissolution” of civil society organizations since then, even though 
most of these organizations have been inactive for years if not decades (Sebestény, 
2017). We followed Sebestény (2017) in considering any organization as still ex-
istent, which was listed in the record as existent, did not have any addition in its 
name field that indicated a dissolution procedure (e.g. under liquidation), and had 
at least one financial report in the records since 2011. In addition, we conducted 
Web searches for every Hungarian organization in the dataset.
We included 1,590 organizations in our sample from the four countries in the 
three policy areas, of which 264 (16.6%) were founded before 1990. As shown in 
Table 2.1, with 95 interest groups in total, Hungary has the highest number of 
pre-transition organizations, followed by 83 in Poland, 53 in Slovenia and 33 in 
Czechia (Czechoslovakia until 1992).
4.1  Explaining the founding rates and density of pre-transition 
interest groups
The order of the relative size of the 1989 density of the three populations as a 
proportion of all formations as of 2019 seems to be independent of regime type. 
With a 5.25% average across the four countries, the formations in the energy 
policy population up to 1989 constitute the smallest share of all formations. The 
corresponding proportions are 24.9% and 20.8% in higher education and health-
care organizational formations, respectively. However, among higher education 
and healthcare policy interest groups, the variance in formations is greater be-
tween countries than among populations across countries (see Figures 2.1–2.4). 
To test the differences between the bureaucratic-authoritarian Czech, and the 
national-accommodative Hungarian, Polish and Slovenian regimes, we sorted 
the organizations into three groups based on foundation period: organizations 
founded before 1946, between 1947 and 1987, and in 1988–1989.   
TABLE 2.1  The number of pre-transition interest 
groups per country (total: energy policy, 
healthcare and higher education)
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FIGURE 2.2 Percentage of organizations founded before 1990.
FIGURE 2.3 Percentage of organizations founded before 1990 – energy policy.
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As we expected from our theoretical model, Czechia has by far the smallest 
pre-transition density: as of 2019, a mere 8.1% of active interest organizations in 
the three policy areas were founded before 1990 (generally as Czechoslovak fed-
eral organizations, which we counted as Czech organizations). This is less than 
half of the other three countries. The corresponding number is the highest in 
Hungary (22.5%), followed by Poland and Slovenia (18% and 17.8%, respectively). 
Czechia has also the highest proportion of pre-transition organizations that were 
founded before the communist takeover (48.5%), followed by Poland (37.3%) 
and Hungary (28.4%) (in Slovenia we found no such organizations) ( Figure 2.2). 
A small number of professional and scientific organizations as well as unions were 
incorporated into the communist party state, but no genuine interest intermedi-
ation was possible in an orthodox Marxist–Leninist regime. 
Differences between the accommodative regimes are also clearly visible in the 
data. Among pre-transition organizations, Slovenia has the highest share of in-
terest groups founded during the communist era (i.e. between the communist 
takeover and 1988), namely 90.6% of all organizations in 1989, which is expected 
considering the Yugoslav system of socialist corporatism. The share of such or-
ganizations among pre-transition interest group formations is less than 50% in the 
other two countries: 49.4% in Poland and 35.8% in Hungary. The almost 15 per-
centage point difference between Poland and Hungary is, however, indicative 
of the relatively more pluralist nature of communist rule in Poland (i.e. between 
1957 and 1981). With 35.8%, Hungary has the highest proportion of organizations 
FIGURE 2.4 Percentage of organizations founded before 1990 – healthcare.
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founded in 1988–1989 among its pre-transition organizations compared to only 
13.3% in Poland, and a mere 9.4% in Slovenia (Figure 2.2). This again reflects 
that Hungary had the most dynamic process of regime change with an opposition 
strategy of increasing mobilization and confrontation (Bruszt & Stark, 1991). In 
absence of a united, anti-communist mass movement, with a fragmented, but rap-
idly growing anti-communist opposition characterized by partisan competition 
and increasing political mobilization, interest organizations proliferated along ide-
ological and professional lines in Hungary in the last two years of communist rule. 
This finding is also predicted by population ecology theory. In the ESA model 
of organizational density, the level of issue certainty, that is, the likelihood of 
policy change, is part of the energy term, i.e. the demand side of the model. Con-
stituent interest and issue certainty are perceived as “vital resources that interest 
organization entrepreneurs employ to secure sponsorship” in the model (Gray & 
Lowery, 1996, p. 106). Political mobilization, the dynamic political confrontation 
and competition between various opposition parties, the reform communists and 
the hardliners, as well as the withering away of the party state in a rapidly worsen-
ing economic situation is certainly such a resource-rich environment for organ-
izational formations.10 The first truly independent organizations were founded 
already in 1988 (e.g. the Democratic Union of Teachers in November 1988 or an 
independent youth movement in March 1988 called the Alliance of Young Dem-
ocrats, better known by its Hungarian abbreviation FIDESZ). The initial high 
fragmentation of the Hungarian interest group landscape was already observed 
by scholars of industrial relations (Avdagic, 2005, 2006), whereas in Poland there 
was a sharp initial ideological divide between Solidarity and the successor union 
confederation, OPZZ. However, after 1989, the union landscape also became 
increasingly fragmented in Poland too (Guardiancich, 2013, p. 149).
Our finding that Slovenia has by far the most organizations founded during 
the communist era is also supported by Fink-Hafner (1997b). Although we had 
a much narrower definition by only including national-level interest groups in 
three policy fields, whereas she included all organizations (voluntary, social and 
self-management organizations with no restriction to specific policy fields), we 
found similar patterns. As she shows, organizational foundations boomed during 
the 1980s, but slowed down in 1988 and 1989 (Fink-Hafner, 1997b, p. 115).11 In 
our sample of Slovenian pre-transition interest organizations, 56.6% of organiza-
tions were founded before 1980, 34% between 1980 and 1987, and 9.4% in 1988 
and 1989, which is similar to the patterns observed by Fink-Hafner (1997b).
Regarding the three policy fields, we find roughly the same patterns, with 
Hungary having the largest proportion of pre-transition organizations except 
for energy policy, where Slovenia has a slightly larger share of 8.7% compared 
to 6.7% in Hungary (Figures 2.3–2.5). The ranking based on the periods when 
pre-transition organizations were founded also stays the same, with the exception 
of energy policy, in which pre-transition population in Poland has more organ-
izational formations in 1988–1989 (60%) than in Hungary (50%) (Figure 2.3). 
However, energy policy interest groups comprise just a fraction of the sample.
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Our model explaining the variance in organizational formation rates in com-
munist dictatorships can be summed up and formalized as follows:
• In general, more accommodative regimes are more open to societal inter-
est representation and intermediation. In such regimes, a higher number of 
communist-era interest organizations outside the formal party state struc-
ture (i.e. typically professional, scientific and leisure in nature) are expected.
• However, even in more accommodative regimes, there is a variance in for-
mation rates over time. Periods of technocratic experimentation with eco-
nomic reforms (economic liberalization) and/or of political accommodation 
(political liberalization) are associated with higher organizational formation 
rates. Periods of increasing political repression are associated with lower for-
mation rates.
• The nature of regime change makes a difference in formation rates during 
this period. Whether a transition process is negotiated, or it is the “Vel-
vet Revolution” type (when street protests and civil disobedience force the 
communists to abandon power in a matter of weeks) does not seem to mat-
ter. The decisive factor is the level of political mobilization. An environment 
of political fragmentation, partisan competition and increasing political mo-
bilization (e.g. Hungary) is associated with higher formation rates than ei-
ther a managed transition process (e.g. Slovenia) or when a united opposition 
faces the communist party (e.g. Poland).
FIGURE 2.5 Percentage of organizations founded before 1990 – higher education.
40 Rafael Labanino et al.
4.2  Analysing the vital rates of Hungarian pre-transition interest 
groups after democratic transition
How did pre-transition organizations fare after the democratic and economic tran-
sition? We already analysed the proportion of pre-transition organizations among 
active organizations (as of 2019) in our sample of four countries (Figure 2.2). How-
ever, the proportion of pre-transition organizations among active interest groups 
in 2019 is not necessarily indicative of their survival rates. Did these organiza-
tions dissolve during the years after the first democratic elections because they 
could not cope with the new political and economic context? A recent survey of 
 Hungarian national-level interest organizations found that this might not be the 
case. On the contrary, organizations founded during the communist era can enjoy 
an advantage over newer organizations. Gallai, Döme, Molnár and Reich (2015) 
determined that there is a difference in the frequency of advocacy strategies used 
by organizations based on the period of founding. Formation during communism 
had a significant and positive effect on governmental and civil relations over pre- 
communist-era and post-communist-era organizations. Interest groups founded 
before 1948 tend to resort to mobilization, demonstrations and non-conventional 
instruments less frequently than those founded later (Gallai et al., 2015, p. 1474).
As already noted, the Hungarian court registry of civil society organizations 
is the only one that contains every organization founded before and after 1989, 
including the dissolved ones. Therefore, for illustration, we restrict our analysis 
of the mortality rates of pre-transition organizations to the Hungarian sub-sam-
ple. It turns out that such pre-existing organizations have a much lower mortality 
rate than those founded after 1990 in the three policy areas. On average, only 
6.3% of pre-transition groups dissolved as of 2019 compared with 27.8% of in-
terest groups founded after 1990. Among the pre-transition organizations, those 
founded in 1988–1989 have the highest mortality rate (11.8%), followed by or-
ganizations founded between 1947 and 1987 (5.9%). The organizations founded 
before the communist takeover exhibited the highest degree of longevity and 
were all still active in 2019 (Figure 2.6). The latter are mostly renowned – his-
toric –  organizations in higher education and healthcare, representing large and 
influential professional groups. There are also differences between dissolved or-
ganizations based on both their policy area and founding period. 56.8% of the 
dissolved organizations that were founded after 1990 are energy interest groups, 
27.3% healthcare policy groups and 15.8% higher education organizations. The 
order is different, however, among the dissolved organizations founded before 
1990: 50% are higher education groups, whereas energy and healthcare policy 
groups are both 25%, respectively.
5 Conclusion
This study is the first to our knowledge to explore interest group populations 
in the communist era and their post-communist survival rates. While exploring 
three salient policy areas, we showed that pre-transition organizations constitute 
There Is No Tabula Rasa 41
a significant proportion of contemporary interest group populations in four CEE 
countries. However, the relative size of pre-transition densities and their share 
among organizations still active in 2019 varies significantly: they comprise 22.5% 
of the three contemporary policy-specific populations in Hungary, 18% and 17.8% 
in Poland and Slovenia, respectively, but only 8.1% in Czechia (Figure 2.2). The 
respective size of pre-transition density (Table 2.1) also reflects the same order. 
We linked these differences in organizational density between the four countries 
to differences in their respective communist regime types: the orthodox Marxist–
Leninist and repressive bureaucratic-authoritarian type in Czechoslovakia, and 
the national-accommodative type in Hungary, Poland and Slovenia (Figure 2.1). 
However, we also found considerable variation between the major foundation 
periods of the latter three countries: the Slovenian pre-transition populations are 
dominated by communist-era interest groups, whereas the Polish ones are more 
balanced, and Hungary has the most interest groups founded in the immedi-
ate run-up to transformation (1988–1989). We explained this variance among 
the three formerly national-accommodative communist regimes by their relative 
openness to societal interests in the formal decision-making process and the nature 
of the opposition and regime change. Regarding the sub-sample of Hungarian in-
terest groups – for which we fortunately have data on organizational dissolutions – 
we found that a much lower proportion of pre-transition organizations dissolved 
(6.1%) than organizations founded after 1990 (27.8%). This gives credence to the 
argument that organizational longevity and organizational survival under vastly 
different political and economic circumstances may be correlated. 
The results, which point to at least a moderate level of organizational activity 
under communism and organizational longevity after communism, contrast with 
Olson’s assumption (1982) on the effect of totalitarianism on organizational den-
sity and development. It is beyond dispute that a totalitarian dictatorship (which 
FIGURE 2.6  Percentage of active and dissolved organizations among Hungarian 
 interest groups.
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in three of our cases was combined with four decades of military occupation) is 
hostile towards any independent organizations, even if they are as harmless as a 
choir. However, the view that the development of interest organizations starts 
mostly anew after the crumbling of a totalitarian regime is oversimplified. The 
relative size of pre-transition organizations is a factor in the political and societal 
developments during the totalitarian regime and varies significantly between 
countries. As we showed, even communist regimes, which all shared a number 
of fundamental characteristics and most of which were under Soviet control, 
exhibited a significant degree of variance. 
Returning to the energy–stability–area model of organizational density, our 
analysis also draws attention to the importance of the proper conceptualization 
of the stability term (Lowery & Gray, 1995). The stability term, that is, a funda-
mental disruption of the political system, is usually neglected in the literature, 
which even today mostly has a US focus. As far as the post-communist countries 
are concerned, where the democratic transitions are relatively recent, we believe 
that the pre-transition density should be explored in quantitative or qualitative 
analysis alike, as legacies are essential for understanding the development of in-
terest organizations in the present. 
Moving beyond population ecology analysis, the question also emerges 
whether pre-existing organized interests are more influential nowadays than 
those founded in the post-communist era (see Horváthová & Dobbins in this 
volume), as organizational longevity may impact organizational resources (finan-
cial, personnel and logistical) in the present. Moreover, the degree to which the 
organizational population “survived” or was “de-communized” after 1989 also 
may affect the position of individual groups in interest intermediation systems as 
well as their ability to forge alliances with other interest groups.
Our findings are also relevant for the debate on the legacy of communism on 
civil society development and democratization. The scholarly consensus is that 
in post-communist countries, civic society revival still lags in many respects due 
to the erosion of civic norms and low social capital due to communist rule. As 
Putnam et al. (1993) wrote
(…) the formerly Communist societies had weak civic traditions before 
the advent of Communism, and totalitarian rule abused even that lim-
ited stock of social capital. Without norms of reciprocity and networks of 
civic engagement (…) amoral familialism, clientelism, lawlessness, ineffec-
tive government, and economic stagnation – seems likelier than successful 
democratization (…).
(1993, p. 183)
Other scholars, however, question the weakness of post-communist civil society 
thesis. They assert that the CEE civic societies are not as feeble as assumed. In their 
opinion, many post-communist societies possess vigorous public spheres and ac-
tive civic society organizations, strongly connected to transnational civic networks 
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able to shape domestic policies (Foa & Ekiert, 2017, p. 419). Communist regimes 
accordingly did not simply repress independent social and political organizations, 
but actively built their own associational structures, which are relevant for the fol-
lowing development of civic life. This perspective on civic organizations as mech-
anisms of democratic socialization, where citizens are socialized into the basic 
democratic norms of “debate, negotiation, compromise or consensus” dates back 
to Alexis de Tocqueville. Whereas communist systems were indisputably deeply 
repressive, the micro-level of associational life can be treated as offering some space 
for civic engagement. Foa and Ekiert (2017) argue that the associational structures 
of the communist era have indeed somewhat weakened, but they are still there, 
and they are being supplemented by new organizations, networks and ties.
In the light of our findings, future studies should explore the effects of 
 communist-era interest organization density and diversity, and interest inter-
mediation structures on post-communist civil society and interest intermedia-
tion development. Building on our work and Gallai et al. (2015), the differences 
between the vital rates and strategies of communist-era and post-communist 
interest organizations should be examined comparatively across interest group 
populations and countries. Whether and how these legacies affected democrati-
zation could be re-examined based on such empirical work.
The considerations above pave the way for the upcoming chapters. In Chap-
ter 3, we explore how individual organizational populations developed in the 
post-communist period with a focus on major reform activity and processes of 
Europeanization, while also introducing the concept of density dependence. We 
then move on to empirical analyses of the influence of interest groups, in which 
we also assess the viability of pre-transitional organizations in the policy process.
Notes
 1 Lowery and Gray (1995) include in their study on US state-level interest group den-
sity a control for the interest-group-system age following Olson (1982). However, 
they note that Olson’s hypothesis probably does not apply to the USA, “unless one 
assumes that there is a century-long time lag in reaching equilibrium or that popula-
tion growth is open-ended and unconstrained” (Lowery & Gray, 1995, p. 12).
 2 The terminology used by Ekiert and Foa (2011) is somewhat unclear: they explicitly 
write about individual organizations, but then also add civil society networks and 
social movements to their analysis.
 3 Bruszt et al. (2010) include the distance from Vienna as a control variable in their 
regression analysis of the average number of dissident activities per year in communist 
countries between 1985 and 1989.
 4 That is, superfluously employed people.
 5 In Hungary, there was a 100-day communist rule in 1919, but it was eventually 
crushed by Romanian and Czech forces, and a restorationist right-wing authoritarian 
regime was imposed by the Entente powers.
 6 Or the “happiest barrack” as Hungarians used to refer to their own country’s rela-
tively less oppressive (after the 1963 amnesty, that is) “welfare communist” regime.
 7 More so in Romania than in Bulgaria, where the opposition was stronger and the 
communist party more divided (e.g. in Bulgaria one of the main players of the regime 
change was an independent trade union movement, see Iankova (2002)).
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 8 For an analysis of the differences in the strategies of the opposition and the reform 
communists in Poland and Hungary (with a focus on the latter case), see Bruszt and 
Stark (1991).
 9 The Slovenian registry only contains active organizations, whereas in the Czech and 
Polish registries one cannot be sure whether the organizations listed there are still active.
 10 Furthermore, the last communist government introduced significant economic and 
social policy reforms between 1987 and 1989 (e.g. price liberalization, privatization, 
establishment of a two-tier banking system, easing of wage regulation and introduc-
tion of unemployment benefits) (OECD Hungary, 1991).
 11 Fink-Hafner (1997b) also included profit-oriented enterprises in her organizational 
count. On this measure, again, Hungary would fare better than Czechoslovakia or 
Poland, as the Hungarian economy was the most liberalized by 1989 among commu-
nist countries except for Yugoslavia. Private activity in the agriculture and small pri-
vate enterprises mostly in the service sector were tolerated (these entrepreneurs were 
called “maszek” in Hungarian, an abbreviation of “magán szektor”, private sector).
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1 Introduction
How have populations of interest organizations developed in the post- communist 
era? While scholars have focused on “births” and “deaths” of interest organiza-
tions in the USA and the European Union (EU) (Berkhout et al., 2015; Gray & 
Lowery, 1996), we still have little knowledge on how interest group landscapes 
are developing in post-communist democracies. The very particular context of 
the abrupt collapse of command economies and authoritarian regimes followed 
by a fast-paced transition to democracy and market economy is likely to have 
fundamentally impacted interest group populations. This unprecedented trajec-
tory of simultaneous economic, political and social transformation, often com-
bined with nation-building, offers a unique chance to assess changes and stability 
in populations of organizations.
After having looked at organizational development under communism and 
post-transition survival rates in Chapter 2, a series of new questions arise. First, 
how radically were interest group populations transformed by the transition to 
a market economy, democracy and in some cases nation-building? To what ex-
tent did EU accession, full membership and the integration into trans-European 
structures reshape the organizational landscape? To what degree have organiza-
tional populations been affected by internal reform processes? And, at what point 
did populations of organizations become “saturated”?
We address these questions by exploring the formation and density rates of or-
ganized interests in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovenia – the lat-
ter two of which became independent countries and all of which joined the EU in 
2004. We again focus on energy, healthcare and higher education (HE). All three 
policy areas have concentrated interests (e.g. energy producers, university profes-
sors, the medical profession) and more diffuse interests (environmental groups, 
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students, patients) and, importantly, are currently subject to strong, but varying 
degrees of reform and harmonization pressures reinforced by Europeanization.
To track changes over time, we compiled databases of all nationally operating 
interest groups in these three policy areas based on court registries, while also 
checking whether the organizations existed during communism. This enables us 
to assess the volatility and continuity of each different interest group system from a 
cross-country and cross-policy perspective. In doing so, we broke down organiza-
tions into specific types (e.g. patients vs. medical profession, students vs. academic 
profession, energy producers vs. consumers, clean vs. dirty energy, see below) to 
gain a clearer picture of “birth” and density rates within individual policy areas.
First, we briefly review some existing research on organization ecology. We 
then discuss the specific post-communist context, while deriving numerous 
working hypotheses on external and internal processes, which may affect organ-
izational populations. Against this background, we present descriptive statistics 
reflecting population developments, while discussing change and stability based 
on our theoretical framework. The conclusions summarize our findings and offer 
ideas for future research.
2 Theoretical background and working hypotheses
As outlined in Chapter 2, population ecology studies the founding, mortality and 
density of organizations on the aggregate level. Hannan and Freeman (1977) em-
phasized that the ability of organizations to adapt to environmental changes is 
limited. Organizations are characterized by structural inertia stemming from both 
internal pressures (material and human resources are not easily transferable, lack of 
information, status quo bias within organizations) and external pressures (legal and 
fiscal barriers to entry or exit, cost of information, legitimacy constraints, problem 
of collective rationality). They defined populations as aggregates of organizations 
(rather than members) that are “relatively homogenous in terms of environmental 
vulnerability” (1977, p. 934). The question is then not how individual organiza-
tions adapt to changes in the organizational environment, but how change impacts 
the “size distributions” and “the diversity of organizational forms within broadly 
defined areas of activity” (1977, p. 957). In other words, organizational selection 
happens at the level of populations and not individual organizations.
Another key theoretical concept is density dependence. It explains “the var-
iation in founding and mortality rates as functions of organizational density” 
(Hannan & Carroll, 1992, p. 15). Organizations initially struggle to legitimize 
their existence. With the gradual legitimation of an organizational form, the need 
for justification decreases (Hannan & Freeman, 1989), thus reducing the cost of 
organizing. However, as density grows, the “supplies of potential organizers, 
members, patrons and resources become exhausted” (Hannan & Carroll, 1992). 
Subsequently, the competition for resources also increases, potentially resulting 
in a saturation effect, which may inhibit new foundations. Thus, organizational 
populations are expected to evolve as an inverted “U-shaped” curve, i.e. ∩.
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Another well-known theory of interest group formation and stability is the 
political opportunity structure (POS) approach (Meyer & Imig, 1993; Meyer 
& Minkoff, 2004), which focuses on the political and economic environment. 
Meyer and Imig (1993, p. 255) argue that “external political circumstances set 
the context in which the calculus of participation takes place, determining the 
urgency of particular issues, and the scope and intensity of conflict”. Thus, any 
type of system-level crisis or transformation may induce opportunities for mobi-
lization. Yet not only political crises, but also changes in the balance of power or 
major policy reforms may induce new interest groups to jump into the playing 
field. POS theory differentiates both between structural changes and signals, 
and issue-specific versus general openings in the polity. Structural changes are 
profound changes in political alignments and policies, whereas visible signals in 
the political environment are rather symbolic in nature (Meyer & Minkoff, 2004, 
p. 1464).
Drawing from these two schools of thought, we formulate several working 
hypotheses to grasp developments in four post-communist democracies. Based 
on density dependence theory, we first explore whether there are “saturation 
effects” in our populations of post-communist organizations. In other words, do 
we first observe a phase of gradual growth as organizations struggle to legitimize 
themselves and then a “flattening out” before organizational births decline as the 
playing field becomes crowded out?
Hypothesis 1: Interest group formation in CEE is density-dependent, 
characterized by gradual growth, then a plateau and decline.
Based on POS theory, we also explore how critical junctures in post- communist 
trajectories impacted organizational formation. Although there were interest or-
ganizations in communist states representing genuine interests, few organiza-
tions independent of the communist party and state control existed. As shown in 
Chapter 2, the 1989–1990 critical juncture did not wipe the field clean. There 
were new, independent organizations or splinter groups of larger, hitherto offi-
cial ones that started to form in the 1980s in relatively “liberal” countries such 
as Hungary or even long before in Slovenia. However, rapid and simultaneous 
transition from totalitarianism to liberal democracy, from command to market 
economy, and in many cases to regained or new nationhood is a unique historical 
experience (Offe, 1994) likely to stimulate organizational population growth:
Hypothesis 2: The period of immediate transition (and statehood in 
Slovenia and the Czech Republic) positively affects interest organization 
formation.
EU accession in 2004 constitutes another critical milestone. According to 
Grabbe (2001), accession led to processes of diffusion, learning and adaptation 
to European models for interest representation, which potentially may have 
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created new POS for CEE organizations. Various authors (e.g. Carmin, 2010; 
Hanegraaff, van der Ploeg & Berkhout, 2020) have shown that membership 
in EU umbrella organizations and transnational networks may positively af-
fect the material and non-material resources of interest groups. Hence, we 
hypothesize that
Hypothesis 3: EU accession and the run-up to it positively affect interest 
organization formation.
According to POS theory, legislative activity may also stimulate interest group 
formation (Meyer & Imig, 1993; Meyer & Minkoff, 2004; Nownes, 2004). It 
not only sends signals to individuals about the importance of an issue, thereby 
providing them incentives to form organizations, but also may affect the core 
interests of existing organizations and their constituencies. Reform activity also 
may generate higher levels of interest intermediation and/or protest.1
Hypothesis 4: We expect major reforms and reform attempts to positively 
affect interest group formation in CEE.
Following POS theory, we additionally provide some preliminary insights on 
the impact of neo-authoritarian-style governments on organizational ecologies. 
The trend towards “democratic backsliding” (Bermeo, 2016) and/or national 
conservatism most notably in Hungary, but arguably also in Poland (Sata & 
Karolewski, 2020) with accompanying widespread civic opposition may jump-
start counter-movements. This may boost organizational populations. However, 
as Greskovits (2020) emphasizes, the illiberal Fidesz party reinvented itself by 
heavily investing in grassroots, civil society networks after their surprise electoral 
defeat in 2002. This civic activism of educated middle-class supporters has trans-
formed Hungarian civil society and served as an important factor not only in 
Viktor Orbán’s second, landslide victory in 2010, but contributes to the remark-
able political resilience of his regime. Indeed, Orbán’s subsequent governments 
systematically realigned state funds supporting civil society and cultural insti-
tutions towards openly right-wing, nationalist and loyal religious organizations 
(Hungarian Network of Academics, 2020). Ekiert has referred to a similar phe-
nomenon in Poland, namely the emergence of a “dark side of civil society”, i.e. 
new organized interests with illiberal and nationalist objectives (Ekiert, 2019).2
Therefore, we assume that:
Hypothesis 5a: “Democratic backsliding” will jump-start civic counter- 
mobilization in the form of new organizational foundations.
Hypothesis 5b: Illiberal governments will cultivate alternative “ecosys-
tems” of supporter organizations, leading to an increase in organizational 
foundations.
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Yet national-conservative governments also may be keen on centralization and 
authoritarian-style governance, thus cracking down on hostile civil organiza-
tions and reducing their means for influence.
Hypothesis 6: “Democratic backsliding” has a negative impact on organ-
izational foundations.
3 Case selection and methodology
As outlined in Chapters 1 and 2, we focus on organizations operating in energy, 
higher education and healthcare in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovenia between 1990 and 2018. While transformation and Europeanization 
processes are more or less restricted to a particular timeframe, grasping the im-
pact of policy reforms on organizational populations (H4) poses some – arguably 
unsurmountable – challenges. For example, major reforms were often a direct 
result of the 1989/1990 transformation process itself (H1), making it difficult to 
disentangle their effects. EU accession poses the same challenge, as national re-
forms were often direct reactions to Europeanization processes (H3). Moreover, 
we may observe long-term reform attempts (e.g. in Czech HE; see Vlk, Dobbins 
& Riedel in this volume), which never materialized as intended, but perhaps 
triggered new organizational formations.
Nevertheless, in line with POS theory, we do our best to differentiate between 
general structural changes such as the breakdown of communism (H2) or EU ac-
cession (H3), and issue-specific changes, that is, major reforms or reform attempts 
(H4). We opted for a pragmatic approach to pinpointing major reform (attempts) by 
first drawing on Peter Hall’s “three orders of policy change” (1993). “First-order” 
policy changes aim to readjust existing policy instruments (e.g. university tuition 
increase, expansion of medical coverage). “Second-order” changes generally in-
troduce new policy instruments (e.g. tuition fees, private health insurance, carbon 
taxes), while “third-order” changes usually entail a full-scale paradigmatic shift in 
policy goals (e.g. large-scale privatization of a state-run healthcare or HE system; 
energy market liberalization). For example, in HE systems, the reinstatement of 
academic autonomy in 1989/1990 was a third-order change. Poland (and later the 
Czech Republic) then experienced second-order policy change with the intro-
duction of private universities in the 1990s without dismantling the public system.
Baumgartner (2013) argues, however, that first- or second-order reforms may 
also trigger significant policy change. For example, a large university tuition 
increase, major healthcare funding cuts or major increase of carbon taxes (i.e. 
 technically first-order change) may generate large-scale political and organi-
zational mobilization. Therefore, Baumgartner (2013) suggests assessing policy 
changes based on whether they substantially break up the status quo or not. 
While this criterion is admittedly softer and more qualitative, we keep it in mind 
when assessing policy reforms. Thus, for every policy field and country, we iden-
tify the four to five most important reforms or reform attempts, many of which 
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were triggered by the transformation and Europeanization processes. While we 
mostly focus on third-order changes, we also include some second- and first- 
order reforms, which shook up the political status quo.
Regarding HE, essentially all CEE countries underwent third-order policy 
change with the quick reinstatement of university autonomy and academic freedom 
as a cornerstone of democratization. Most CEE countries, including the four ana-
lysed here, also experienced massification, i.e. rapidly increasing student numbers. 
The Bologna Process initiated in 1999 was arguably the largest external reform stim-
ulus in CEE. Driven by Europeanization through transnational “soft governance” 
and multilateral learning, the process has in some countries resulted in third-order 
changes such as mass privatization or the fundamental redesign of university govern-
ance (Dobbins & Knill, 2014). Other countries, e.g. the Czech Republic and Poland, 
underwent more sluggish post-Bologna reforms, resulting in the recalibration of 
existing institutions or introduction of new structures into existing paradigms (e.g. 
quality assurance bodies, new forms of student representation) (see Vlk, Dobbins & 
Riedel in this volume). Hungary’s HE policy pathway has been less consistent. Like 
the other CEE countries, it first focused on restoring academic self-governance in 
the early 1990s and then later accountability and market orientation under the Bolo-
gna Process (Kováts, Heidrich, & Chandler, 2017). In 2012–2013, a first-order pol-
icy change, namely harsh austerity and cuts in state-funding study places, triggered 
strong counter-mobilization by the academic community. The recent crackdown on 
Central European University (CEU) and seizure of the research institute network of 
the Hungarian Academy of Sciences arguably are third-order policy changes accom-
panied by mass protests. The new Polish HE Act (2018) also is regarded by observers 
as a mass overhaul provoking support and opposition from the student and academic 
community (see Vlk, Dobbins & Riedel in this volume).
Unlike in HE, CEE countries altogether did not experience major, i.e. third- 
order or large second-order, change, in energy and environmental policy in 
the early 1990s. Generally, they were regarded as environmental laggards as the 
political- institutional and economic transformation was prioritized (Skjærseth & 
 Wettestad, 2007). However, EU integration brought numerous stimuli for changes 
of all orders. Specifically, the EU’s energy acquis prescribes the liberalization of gas 
and electricity markets (arguably third-order change), as well as major pollution 
restrictions. Europeanization pressures were reinforced with the European Energy 
Strategy of 2007, which called for increasing energy supply and security and ensur-
ing the availability of affordable energy, while promoting environmental sustaina-
bility. The common energy policy consists of a mixture of both binding measures 
and softer coordination of energy supply issues and regional markets (Szulecki, Fis-
cher, Gullberg, & Sartor, 2016). This has prompted all four CEE countries to draft 
new wide-ranging energy strategies in the past ten years (see Table 3.1).
As laid bare by the coronavirus crisis, healthcare policy generally remains out-
side the direct orbit of the EU. Nevertheless, European legislation has resulted in 
numerous, primarily first-order policy changes, including obligations for mem-
ber states to integrate foreign suppliers into domestic healthcare (Vrangbæk & 
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Sindbjerg Martensen, 2008). In specific areas, such as medical trials, data protec-
tion and pharmaceuticals, EU regulations also provide common standards and 
rights, which may exceed those granted by domestic rules. Numerous regula-
tions and directives regarding the movement of medical professionals, patients’ 
rights3 and social security also target the sector.
Our countries of analysis experienced large-scale healthcare reforms at different 
phases of post-communism. The Czech Republic already underwent third-order 
change early by turning the previously state-run system into a competitive fee-
for-service system with numerous private insurers (Roberts, 2009). In Poland, 
by contrast, pre-existing structures initially were preserved. However, the late 
1990s heralded several major changes, including the diversification of funding, a 
new payment concept and the establishment of general practitioner institutions 
(Grzeskiewicz, 2015; Hellich & Wierzowiecka, 2017). While funding was initially 
transferred from the central government to multiple healthcare funds, in 2003 one 
centralized insurance fund (Narodowy Fundusz Zdrowia) was created.
Hungary introduced a Social Insurance Fund already in 1989 to manage 
healthcare costs. Between 1988 and 1994, several key reforms introduced de-
centralization in healthcare provision and self-governance in social insurance. 
However, from 1994, the direction of reforms was towards re-centralization and 
cost-cutting (particularly between 1994–1998 and 2005–2008). After 2012, the 
subsequent Orbán governments completed re-centralization in both healthcare 
governance (the National Health Insurance Fund Administration was dissolved 
into the Ministry of Human Capacities) and ownership (hospitals were trans-
ferred from municipalities to the central government in 2012) (Gaál, 2004; Gaál, 
Szigeti, Márton, Gaskins, & Panteli, 2011; OECD Hungary, 2019). Yet despite 
extreme underfunding, weak performance by international standards, the mi-
gration of medical personnel, Hungarian healthcare has not undergone radical 
transformational change in the post-communist period. In 1992, Slovenia cre-
ated a Bismarck-type social insurance system based on a signal national insurer 
and uniform national legislation. These foundations have essentially remained in 
place ever since. Nevertheless, gradual privatization occurred over the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, as various services were supplemented by independent providers 
by means of contracts with public funds (Albreht & Klazinga, 2009).
Fully aware of the difficulties in grasping the magnitude of individual re-
forms, we present a small overview (see Table 3.1) of major reform initiatives and 
outputs in CEE. We also bear in mind that frustration with the lack of reform 
despite problem pressure may also stimulate organization population growth.
After compiling lists of organizations and their foundation/dissolution dates 
(see Chapter 2 for data compilation and limitations), we broke down our or-
ganizational populations by type. For HE, we coded each organization as either 
“student interest”, “teacher/employee interest” (typically trade unions), “profes-
sional/scientific associations” (e.g. geographical, mathematical society) and “in-
stitutional” (e.g. conference of rectors, deans). Regarding professional/scientific 
associations, we applied strict criteria and only included larger disciplines listed 
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in Wikipedia’s outline of academic disciplines.4 All national-level student associ-
ations from all disciplines were included because they are explicitly involved in 
and affected by HE policy.
For healthcare, we cross-checked whether every specific medical speciali-
zation (e.g. immunology, radiology, diabetes) actually exists and coded them 
by constituency, that is, the professional and/or societal groups they represent: 
“medical doctors or healthcare professionals”, “other employees”, “patients”, 
“employers/institutional” and “business”.
We coded energy organizations according to sectors, that is, “fossil energy 
and general energy policy groups”, “renewable energy”, “nuclear energy” and 
“green civic organizations/nature protection”. Environmental organizations 
were also included if they express a preference for certain sources of energy (gen-
erally renewables, but potentially also nuclear).5
4 Empirical analysis
We first present some general data on country- and policy-specific population 
sizes. Table 3.2 shows the frequency of organizations (with an identified founda-
tion date). Altogether, we identified 1,590 organizations across the three policy 
fields in the four countries, of which a total of 264 (16.6%) were founded before 
1990 (see Chapter 2). The data reveal that a country’s (human) population size 
does not necessarily correlate with organizational population sizes, as Czechia’s and 
Hungary’s organizational ecology is nearly as large as Poland’s with four times as 
many inhabitants.6 Slovenia (population approx. 2 million) exhibits an organiza-
tion ecology approx. two-thirds the size of Poland’s (with 38 million inhabitants).7
As for specific policies, healthcare populations are unsurprisingly the largest 
due to the many specific medical disciplines (e.g. dentistry, immunology, paedi-
atrics) represented by organized interests. In energy, Czechia and Hungary have 
the largest populations.
As already discussed in Chapter 2, we unfortunately do not have reliable data 
on “organizational mortality”, in particular exact dissolution dates.8 Neverthe-
less, it is worth reporting that we found by far the highest mortality rates in the 
Czech and Hungarian energy populations, which amount to 50.3% and 39.3% 
of all organizations founded between 1990 and 2018, respectively9 (Figure 3.1).
TABLE 3.2  Size and relative size of all interest organizations 
populations combined (three policy areas)
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The Hungarian court registry has reliable data on dissolution and inactivity – 
just not on the real dates, as the courts started to legally dissolve inactive or-
ganizations as of 2013–2014 – and in the other cases, we systematically checked 
online whether an organization shows any sign of activity (we double-checked 
the Hungarian data as well). Thus, we can tentatively conclude that this signifi-
cantly higher mortality rate among Czech and Hungarian energy policy groups is 
indicative of the relative differences between the mortality rates of energy policy, 
HE and healthcare populations in these two countries. In Czechia, more than 
51% of all general/fossil groups dissolved (38/74), whereas in Hungary only 40% 
(33/82). Among renewable groups, the proportions are 54% in Czechia (23/42) 
and 38% in Hungary (19/50). The dissolution rates are also high in the smaller 
nuclear energy and environmental protection populations. Three of seven and 
two of eight nuclear groups dissolved in Czechia and Hungary, respectively. 40% 
(14/35) of the Czech and 30% (3/10) of the Hungarian environmental protection 
groups dissolved.
FIGURE 3.1 1% of dissolved and inactive organizations – energy policy.
TABLE 3.3  Breakdown of all covered organizations by policy area and country
Policy field Country Total
Czechia Hungary Poland Slovenia
Energy 158 150 135 46 489
Healthcare 204 188 240 171 803
Higher education 47 84 86 81 298
Total 409 422 461 298 1,590
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4.1 Post-communist organizational foundation rates: energy
Let us now look at foundation rates in energy policy. For all four countries, pop-
ulations changed dramatically after 1990. Other than some four or five organiza-
tions, Polish energy basically started with a clean slate and then saw an immediate 
post-communist bump (see Figure 3.3). This was followed, however, by relatively 
low foundation activity in the 1990s. The run-up to EU accession in 2004 gave a 
strong boost to energy organization formation, followed by somewhat of a slowdown.
From 2005 to 2007, the national-conservative PiS had a governmental ma-
jority. Then, the liberal Platforma Obywatelska (Civic Platform) regained control 
of the parliament until late 2015. We see renewables and general/fossils groups 
essentially following the same foundation patterns regardless of governmental 
coalitions, which can arguably be attributed to heated ideological battles over the 
direction of Polish energy policy (pro-coal/fossil vs. renewables). The adoption 
of the 2007 European Energy Strategy and 2009 Energy Strategy until 2030 also 
coincided with this phase of heavy formation activity, whereas since 2016 we ob-
serve a decline in foundation rates, lending some preliminary support to hypoth-
esis 6 (i.e. a slowdown in formations under national-conservative governments).
As shown by Labanino, Dobbins, Czarnecki and Železnik (2020), the founding 
rates of Polish energy policy organizations do not seem to be density- dependent. 
Renewable energy organizations proliferated after 2005, but the formation of 
FIGURE 3.2  Polish energy organizations: formation rates and density, and formation 
rates by type.
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general/fossil as well as environmental protection groups also has several peaks 
from 2009 on. Perhaps we do not see any saturation yet, because the formation 
of energy organizations seems to really only “take off” after 2000.
The development of Czech10 energy organizations is roughly similar. After 
starting with a more or less clean slate in 1989, the new opportunity structure 
gave a moderate thrust to organizational formation, thus lending moderate sup-
port to hypothesis 1.
In line with hypothesis 2, we observe a steady foundation rate during the EU 
accession process and then indeed a boom in foundations around the 2010 period, 
which can be attributed to the 2007 European Energy Strategy. In reaction, the 
Czech Republic approved its own State Energy Policy in 2015, which outlines the 
state’s energy-related priorities and strategic intentions. Again, here we see a chron-
ological overlap between major reform projects and organizational formation.
The Czech energy formation rates also do not seem to be density-dependent. 
However, as already discussed, half of all Czech energy organizations are inactive 
or dissolved (Figure 3.1), and in most cases, the exact date of dissolution (or last 
year of activity) could not be determined. That is why we see a steep decline 
in density at the end of the timeframe because we could only be certain that as 
of 2018–2019 these organizations were inactive (Figure 3.4). Nevertheless, this 
high mortality rate should make us cautious in making inference about density 
dependence in this population.
FIGURE 3.3  Czech energy organizations: formation rates and density, and formation 
rates by type.
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The Hungarian data almost mirror those of the Czech Republic and Poland, 
with one major difference being the noticeably weak foundation rates since the 
takeover of the national-conservative Orbán government in 2011, again lending 
some credence to hypothesis 6 that democratic backsliding may stunt organizational 
population growth. This observation is further compounded by the fact that Hun-
gary also adopted a major National Energy Strategy in 2012 ( Horváthová & Dob-
bins, 2019), which seems to have little to no impact on organizational formation.
The Hungarian population also seems more density-dependent than both 
the Polish and the Czech populations. There are relatively high initial forma-
tion rates between 1989 and 1992 along a low initial pre-transition density. As 
density grows, first there is a 13-year ebb in formation rates, as predicted by 
the theory. However, between 2005 and 2009, there are three years with high 
formation rates with a peak in 2009 (which is on par with the new foundings 
in the transition years). These foundings are mostly all renewable energy inter-
est groups except for 2011, when five new general/fossil energy groups were 
founded ( Figure 3.5). Then, from 2011 on, energy policy formation rates decline 
to a historic low though. We would argue that Figure 3.5 shows a legitimacy 
process at relatively low density and an increasing competition process as density 
grows, thus supporting the density-dependency hypothesis. Around the middle 
of the timeframe, we see a temporary uptick in formations as renewable energy 
groups gained legitimacy from 2001.
FIGURE 3.4  Hungarian energy organizations: formation rates and density, and for-
mation rates by type.
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What first catches the eye regarding Slovenia is the smaller energy policy 
population in contrast to HE and healthcare.
Hence, the figures require caution, as two or three foundations per year seem 
to strongly impact the population. Nevertheless, we see a similar effect of the 
transition phase (despite the considerable number of foundings in 1989) and EU 
integration. First, there is a bump, then a slowdown and again a strong increase 
during the EU accession process. The European Energy Strategy (2007) that in-
spired the first National Energy Efficiency Action Plan (2008) and second long-
awaited National Energy Efficiency Action Plan 2014–2020 also coincide with a 
major push in foundations (Figure 3.6).
The formation rates here are closest to a clear density-dependent process. 
However, as a post-communist characteristic, we also witness the importance of 
the immediate transition years, then foundations ebb, and as density grows, for-
mation rates peak again around the half of the timeframe, only to decline steeply 
again for the third decade.
4.2 Post-communist organizational foundation rates: higher education
As discussed in Chapter 2, in the four countries on average one in five HE groups 
active in 2018 was founded before 1990 (ranging from 33% in Hungary to 21% in 
Czechia). This is a crucial point because organized interests in HE played a key 
FIGURE 3.5  Slovenian energy organizations: formation rates and density, and forma-
tion rates by type.
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role in bringing down communism and institutionalizing democracy. Thus, we 
can expect a strong mobilization to defend intellectual integrity and university 
autonomy after communism.
For Poland, where about one-fifth of organizations were founded before or 
under communism, our graph essentially reflects the immediate massive push 
to represent university interests in 1989/1990 by means of the establishment of 
student and academic organizations (e.g. rectors’ conferences).
The early authorization of private universities in Poland in the 1990s seems to 
have not affected the formation rates, whereby Poland – along with Slovenia (see 
below) – indeed experienced a “Bologna boom” in student organizations. We 
again see some moderate activity around the 2010s, likely stimulated by efforts 
to promote a more market-oriented approach to HE with greater stakeholder 
engagement (see Dobbins, 2015). Interestingly, one of the largest public consul-
tation processes in modern Polish history, i.e. the deliberations over the 2018 HE 
law (see Vlk, Dobbins & Riedel in this volume), apparently did not stimulate a 
substantial number of organizational formations.11
Just as Labanino, Dobbins, Czarnecki and Železnik (2020) found, density 
dependence seems to hold, but again is heavily affected by the post-communist 
context. There is a high initial density and founding rate in 1990 and, conse-
quently, a quickly declining founding rate with minimal or no activity during 
most of the 1990s. As density slowly grows, there is a peak in formations around 
FIGURE 3.6  Polish HE organizations: formation rates and density, and formation 
rates by type.
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the turn of the millennium, followed by lower formation rates, which are never-
theless higher than during the 1990s.
In the Czech Republic,12 we also observe large-scale mobilization after the 
collapse of communism, and then a pre-Bologna “spike” in formations. How-
ever, as Bologna did not fundamentally transform Czech HE, we would attribute 
this growth in organizations to the late authorization of private universities in 
1998. Indeed, Figure 3.8 shows a peak in foundations of organizations repre-
senting specific (private) institutions between 1999 and 2005. Czech HE has 
changed little since the fundamentals of university autonomy, self-governance 
and internal stakeholdership were set in 1990/1991 (see Vlk, Dobbins & Riedel 
in this volume). Thus, we also see very little subsequent formation activity. Or, 
expressed differently, (frustration with) the lack of reform also did not seem to 
generate organizational births.
Czech HE formation rates do not seem to follow the classic density depend-
ence curve. Nevertheless, high density seems to inhibit the formations of new 
organizations. Although the pre-transition density is low – as in Czechia in 
general (see Chapter 2) – no subsequent period matches the importance of the 
first three years of transition. As already mentioned, mostly due to HE business 
groups, there are two to three “busier” years around 2000 but then the forma-
tions return to one, two or zero formations a year. That is, we did not witness 
a steady increase and decline as the density dependence theory would assume. 
FIGURE 3.7  Czech HE organizations: formation rates and density, and formation 
rates by type.
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We can nevertheless conclude that the first ten post-communist years are the 
busiest with relatively high formation rates at the end of the decade: more than 
half of all organizations were founded by 1999.
Hungary is the country with the second highest number of academic 
 organizations – again with 1990 being a landmark year without any notable 
activity afterwards. Unlike the other countries, we observe – at best – a very 
weak “Bologna boom” in the late 1990s and early 2000s. What is also striking 
is that mobilization among academics against intrusions by the Orbán govern-
ment on internal university workings (e.g. law requiring Hungarian students 
in state-funded places to remain in Hungary; decreases in university funding; 
2012–2013) did not generate new organizational formations.13 The same holds 
with the measures taken against CEU and the Academy of Sciences. In fact, we 
see almost no new student organization formations in the post-communist phase. 
In line with our parallel finding for Hungarian energy, this seems to – at least 
preliminarily – confirm hypothesis 6, which hints at suppression of organiza-
tional foundations by national-conservative governments (Figure 3.8).
The reason could also be, however, that just as the Czech formation process, the 
Hungarian national-level HE interest group population reached saturation very 
early. Hungary starts with a very high pre-transition density of 26, out of which 
14 were founded during 1988–1989 (and only three in the entire period between 
the communist takeover in 1948 and 1987). To put this into perspective, these 
FIGURE 3.8  Hungarian HE organizations: formation rates and density, and  formation 
rates by type.
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26 interest groups correspond to 41% of the HE interest group density in 2018 
of 62 organizations (although only 33% of these 2018 active organizations were 
founded before 1990). After 1990, formation rates immediately decline steeply 
to none in 1993, and apart from 1996, it never reaches five organizations a year 
again. That is, we cannot observe a slow increase with a legitimacy process and a 
gradual decline with a competition process, but rather that high density affects the 
formation rate profoundly by keeping it low. In Hungary, density reached 62 in 
2001, peaked at 71 in 2014, then declined again to 62 in 2018. Since we had data 
on dissolutions for Hungary (even if exact dates were sometimes missing), we 
could also observe that at high density mortality increased (as of 2004).
Slovenia is an outlier regarding the sheer number of organizations, considering 
the significantly smaller size of this sector (four public universities). We would 
attribute this to the country’s strong tradition of student democracy ( Novak & 
Fink-Hafner 2019). Student groups have historically represented the multi-
tude of political divisions and social movements in Slovenian society spanning 
from  Catholicism, nationalism, communism, pan-Yugoslavianism, anarcho- 
liberalism, to market socialism and beyond (Plut-Pregelj & Rogel, 2007). Hence, 
we find (often long-standing) professional organizations for nearly every aca-
demic discipline and sub-discipline (not counted here), as well as a strikingly 
large number of student organizations. As for formation rates, Slovenia is in line 
with the other three countries, having experienced a boom in 1989 and then a 
FIGURE 3.9  Slovenian higher education organizations: formation rates and density, 
and formation rates by type.
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drop, only again to experience a “Bologna boom” before the field levelled out in 
the 2000s (Figure 3.9).
The HE formation rates (like in the Czech Republic) are closer to a “textbook 
case” of density dependence than the Polish and the Hungarian cases. Despite 
relatively high initial density, the foundation rate increases gradually during the 
late 1990s, and the saturation seems to decrease foundings as density reaches 
around 60% of the density in 2018 (around 2000). However, there are a few more 
active years later as well (2011 and 2012).
4.3 Post-communist organizational foundation rates: healthcare
Unlike energy and similarly to HE, between 10% and 30% of organizations 
active in 2018 were founded before 1990. While the lion’s share of these pre- 
existing organizations emerged under communism (in Slovenia all of them), 
between 25% and 40% were founded before communist takeovers and hence 
survived communism and its collapse. This pertains, in particular, to numerous 
organizations representing individual medical specializations (see Chapter 2).
In line with hypothesis 1, the immediate transformation period in Poland her-
alded a major boom in formations, which immediately slowed down from 1990 
to 1998. This trend also lends support to hypothesis 4 (reform activity). While 
the pre-existing fundaments of the Polish healthcare system were essentially left 
in place in the early 1990s, thus negatively affecting the formation rate, the first 
major post-communist reform passed in 1997 and implemented in 1999 (see  Table 
3.1) boosted the formation rate (Hellich & Wierzowiecka, 2017). When the gov-
ernment replaced multiple health funds with one, centralized National Health 
Fund in 2003 with regional branches, we again see a “mini-boom” in founda-
tions, while patients’ organizations, in particular, have proliferated in this period.
Despite the high pre-transition density, Polish healthcare organizations seem 
to follow the classic density dependence curve (Figure 3.10). Their number more 
than doubled in the first ten years after 1990. There is a peak in foundations at 
a relatively high level of density (60% of the 2018 density in 2002), followed by 
a decline in formations. Most new organizations are organizations of medical 
professionals, which are driven by the increasing specialization in healthcare and 
medicine. However, even this seems to be density-dependent. From 2002, an 
increase in patients’ organization formations also occurs for several years.
Czech(oslovakia) also experienced a very strong spike in foundations in the 
1989–1992 phase. After the 1993 split-up, many previously Czechoslovak or-
ganizations became exclusively Czech organizations, which we counted as pre- 
existing organizations. Altogether, our data reveal that there is no major increase 
in foundations in 1993, which supports hypothesis 2 that the immediate transi-
tion period (but not statehood in the Czech case) was the main catalyst behind 
organizational formation.
We also see a drastic spike in formations coinciding with the transformation 
and de-monopolization of the previous Soviet-style system into a more privatized 
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system in the mid-1990s (Kinkorová & Topolčan, 2012; see Horváthová et al. in 
this volume). Considering that healthcare remains more or less outside the orbit of 
the European integration process, we would also attribute the strong organization 
population growth around 2006 to the domestic reform, which shifted hospital 
ownership to regional management. Thus, along with the immediate transfor-
mation process, major reform activity (hypothesis 3) appears to be more decisive 
for organizational formations than other factors (EU accession, Czech statehood).
As for density dependence, the Czech formation rates, due to the generally low 
pre-transition density, are closer to the classic density-dependent process than the 
Polish or Hungarian rates (see below). However, as already noted, the immediate 
transition years have the highest formation rates. Nevertheless, after a decline – 
but still at a high level – formation rates then increase again significantly in 1997, 
only to gradually decline again for the remainder of the timeframe (from 1998, 
see Figure 3.11). It is also telling that although domestic reform activity affected 
foundation rates at relatively high density (in 2006), it had a much smaller effect 
than at relatively low density (in 1997).
Hungary entered the 1990s with a relatively high pre-existing organizational 
population, and like the Czech Republic and Poland, it experienced a swift in-
crease in 1989 and then a dramatic drop.
In contrast to the other countries, reforms do not seem to have significantly 
driven organizational foundations in Hungary, other than a few smaller waves 
FIGURE 3.10  Polish healthcare organizations: formation rates and density, and for-
mation rates by type.
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FIGURE 3.11  Czech healthcare organizations: formation rates and density, and for-
mation rates by type.
of foundations during the 1990s, and the mid-2000s and early 2010s. How-
ever, organizational formation rates were exceptionally high during 1988–1989 
(15 foundings) when the reform communist government introduced a series of 
systemic reforms.14 Formation rates also remained high between 1990 and 1993 
(32 formations) when the first democratic government continued the reforms: 
it decentralized the ownership of hospitals to local governments, and separated 
the Social Insurance Fund into a Health Insurance Fund and a Pension Insur-
ance Fund and made them self-governing (Gaál, 2004, pp. 102–104). From 1994 
on, Hungarian healthcare reforms moved towards cost containment and gradual 
re-centralization. Between 2006 and 2008, a failed attempt at partial health in-
surance privatization took place (Gaál, 2004; Gaál et al., 2011; see also Table 3.1). 
Thus, the data tend to support hypothesis 1 and – to a somewhat lesser extent 
than Poland and the Czech Republic – hypothesis 3 (Europeanization). Also no-
ticeable is the marked drop in formations under Orbán (2011 to present). The sec-
ond Orbán government transferred hospital ownership from municipalities to the 
central government in 2012. This made it much easier to effectively silence hos-
pital directors and doctors, as their employer is directly the government (OECD 
Hungary, 2019) and did not stimulate any noteworthy foundation activity.
In Hungary, no other period can compete with the first two years (1990–
1991) in formation rates with a very high pre-transition density of 57 (of which 
15 groups were formed during 1988–1989 as mentioned above). Although the 
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formation rates then are similar to the Polish and Czech ones, with some upticks 
during the 1990s, the interest group density seems to have reached saturation 
earlier, perhaps due to the earlier start of the transition phase (including 1988 
and 1989) (Figure 3.12). Already in 1994, there were 90 national-level healthcare 
interest groups. Hence, it took four years after transition for the organizational 
density to reach 50% of the peak density of 180 groups in 2018. We can there-
fore conclude that the Hungarian healthcare interest group population density 
reached saturation very early on. Just as the theory predicts (Hannan & Carroll, 
1992), high organizational density meant increased competition for scarce re-
sources (whether financial, network or organizational), which kept formation 
rates low. This is exacerbated by the fact that Hungarian healthcare organizations 
are also remarkably stable with only 9.6% of them having been dissolved or in-
active as of 2018 compared with a 38% and 26.2% dissolution rate among energy 
policy and HE groups, respectively.
While around 20% of Slovenian healthcare organizations were founded 
during the socialist period, the immediate transformation again drastically in-
creased the population. Remarkably however, the switch to Bismarck-type so-
cial insurance only resulted in a handful of new foundations. These foundations 
have essentially remained in place ever since, with Slovenia exhibiting a lower 
level of reform activity. Nevertheless, moderate privatization has gradually oc-
curred over the late 1990s and early 2000s. Our graphs show that this gave an 
FIGURE 3.12  Hungarian healthcare organizations: formation rates and density, and 
formation rates by type.
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FIGURE 3.13  Slovenian healthcare organizations: formation rates and density, and 
formation rates by type.
impetus to organizational formations, in particular those representing the med-
ical profession.
These formation rates are similar to the Czech and Polish ones. As noted 
above, Slovenia had a relatively high density in 1990, but nowhere near the 
 Hungarian levels. Consequently, there was a more gradual saturation around 
2000, followed by a slow decline in formation rates just as in the Czech and 
 Polish cases (Figure 3.13). Bearing in mind that the Slovenian records only con-
tain active organizations, we can tentatively conclude that the formation rates 
follow a density-dependent process.
5 Discussion
In this chapter, we explored the formation of interest organizations in four 
post-communist countries from a policy-specific angle, while testing several as-
sumptions on the factors driving organizational “births”. While our approach 
does not enable us to identify the exact motivation for establishing an interest 
group in each individual case, the aggregate data highlight some clear trends. 
Most notably, the various hypotheses regarding the political opportunity struc-
ture were largely confirmed. The transformation and democratization pro-
cess provided a gigantic stimulus for organizational formation in essentially all 
Exploring populations of organized interests 71
countries and policy areas, whereby Slovenia and Hungary, in particular, had 
larger pre-existing populations already. For all countries, we subsequently saw 
a swift decline in foundations after 1992/1993, followed by a re-acceleration in 
the late 1990s or early 2000s, fuelled either by national reforms (in healthcare 
particularly), European integration or a combination of both (e.g. the national 
implementation of the Bologna Process).
Our data also show that “democratic backsliding” and illiberalism are detri-
mental or at least not conducive to organizational foundations, in particular in 
Hungary under Orbán (2010 to present). Except for a spike in foundations of 
renewable energy organizations in the 2000s, Hungary seems to show the lowest 
foundational activity in the past 20 years, which we attributed to a combination 
of the already relatively high density of organizations in the late communist 
phase (Chapter 2) and the unfavourable climate for interest organizations. For 
Poland, it is still premature to assess whether the low formation rates since the 
national-conservative PiS party has ruled (2015 to present) are the result of den-
sity dependence effects or a crackdown on civic organizations, but our data do 
point in the latter direction.
On a positive note from a civil society standpoint, our data also reveal that 
the past 10–15 years (and 2000–2010 in Hungary) were favourable to the foun-
dation of “diffuse/civic interest groups” (Olson, 1965). We see high birth rates 
of organizations representing patients, students as well as renewables and green 
energy groups, all of which typically face structural disadvantages and are attrib-
uted to weaker mobilization capacity. Whether such organizations are formally 
integrated into the decision-making process, how they interact with political 
parties and whether they actually have clout over policy outcomes remain to be 
seen in the upcoming chapters.
As mentioned above, we found evidence for density dependence in all 12 
national-level populations. The differences between policy fields also seem to be 
independent from the national contexts. Energy organization populations had 
the smallest pre-transition density everywhere (see Chapter 2) and hence do not 
seem to have reached saturation yet. However, we also found the highest mor-
tality rates in the energy populations. HE and healthcare populations reached 
saturation in every country around 2000 at the latest. How closely the formation 
rate curve resembles the classic inverted U-shape ∩ of increasing formations 
at growing density and decreasing at high density depends on the size of the 
pre-transition interest group populations. The bigger the pre-transition density, 
the earlier an interest group population reaches saturation. That is why Hungar-
ian healthcare and HE populations, which were the biggest of all national pop-
ulations, show decreasing formation levels already in the late 1990s. Moreover, 
as shown in Chapter 2, pre-transition organizations have much lower mortality 
rates than those founded after 1990, which exacerbates this effect. Our data also 
showed that the effect of both general, structural-level changes (such as the po-
litical and economic transition or the EU accession) and major issue- specific 
changes (policy reforms) is contingent on the level of population density. That is, 
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policy reforms and structural political changes do have a positive effect on forma-
tion rates ceteris paribus, but the size of this positive effect depends on population 
density: at low density, openings in the POS increase interest group formations 
much more significantly than at high density.
Despite these clear findings regarding our theoretical assumptions, our ap-
proach still bears some limitations. In the future, researchers should aim for a 
clearer operationalization of reform dynamics. This could be done, by means 
of analysis of media coverage or the frequency of parliamentary hearings or the 
intensity of legislative activity (Labanino et al., 2020; Nownes, 2004). Other fac-
tors potentially affecting interest group growth or decline such as the stability or 
volatility of the party system or the evolution of lobbying regulations over time 
lend themselves to empirical analysis. Finally, future research should focus on the 
long-term impact of national conservatism on organizational populations, as well 
as attempts by such political movements to cultivate alternative (illiberal) interest 
group landscapes from a more micro-perspective.
Notes
 1 In line with POS theory, it would also be interesting to look at how (changes in) 
lobbying regulations or electoral campaign finance legislation affect organizational 
foundations and/or mortality. Numerous researchers indeed have highlighted differ-
ences in the stringency of regulations in our four countries, with Poland and Hun-
gary generally considered to have stricter lobbying regimes with public funding of 
elections and Slovenia and the Czech Republic more liberal regimes with a larger 
role of private money in elections (Šimral, 2015; Vargovčíková, 2017). However, 
lobbying reforms in the region have often been watered down and the ultimate im-
pact of such reforms has been largely viewed as ineffective (Bauer, Pielucha, & Thiel, 
2016).
 2 It is an open question whether Czech democracy is also “backsliding” (see Hanley & 
Vachudova, 2018).
 3 For example, the European patient’s cross-border mobility directive.
 4 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Outline_of_academic_disciplines; for example, gen-
eral historical or philosophical associations were included, but not specific organiza-
tions such as “The Association of Eastern European Historians” or “The Association 
of Platonic Philosophy”. Moreover, we narrowed down the population to organi-
zations with active university personnel and mentions of HE and science policy or 
university research on their website.
 5 Environmental organizations focusing on biodiversity or animal protection were 
excluded, except for groups opposing wind energy due to its impact on birds and 
insects.
 6 This may be compensated by more regionally operating organizations in Poland, 
which is larger and more administratively decentralized. We did not include region-
ally active organizations.
 7 See Novak and Fink-Hafner (2019) or Fink-Hafner (1997) for more data on Slovenian 
interest groups.
 8 We can only be sure to have found all previously existing – at least legally founded – 
but since dissolved organizations in Hungary, as the court registry of the country 
reliably contains all of them.
 9 In Hungary, the proportion of dissolved higher education organizations comes close to 
the level of energy organization dissolutions but is still lower with 6 percentage points.
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 10 This comprises Czechoslovak organizations up to 1993, most of which then split up 
into Czech and Slovak organizations. 
 11 However, the court registry does not include the newly emerging protest committees 
(see Vlk et al. in this volume).
12 Including Czechoslovak organizations up to 1992.
13 See Labanino and Dobbins (2020), who show that academic dissidents have instead 
opted for non-formalized civic mobilization.
 14 Financing was switched from tax-based insurance to compulsory social insurance, the 
Social Insurance Fund was established, and full private healthcare entrepreneurship 
was legalized. These reforms were an outcome of a longer process led by the Reform 
Secretariat at the ministry, which also launched pilot projects. The head of the reform 
secretary remained in a key position in healthcare policy as a secretary of state along 
with other technocrats from the pilot projects after 1990 (Gaál, 2004).
References
Albreht, T., & Klazinga, N. (2009). Privatisation of health care in Slovenia in the 
period 1992–2008. Health Policy, 90(2–3), 262–269. https://doi.org/10.1016/ 
j.healthpol.2008.10.007
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After the fall of communism, a body of literature emerged focusing on the trans-
formation of CEE. Since CEE countries share a legacy of environmental neglect 
and highly inefficient energy usage, their energy and environmental policies 
were a frequently discussed topic. The transition heralded different sets of re-
forms with different degrees of success. The transformation of the energy sector 
resulted in steps to use less energy and cut emissions, which was partially facili-
tated by mass bankruptcies of energy-intense industries. Yet energy dependency 
and the low diversification of energy supplies constituted significant obstacles. 
Common to our three analyzed countries, the Czech Republic, Poland and Slo-
venia, are limited deposits of natural resources, increasing energy competition 
and prices as well as dependence on energy imports. Against this background, 
they are pursuing multiple goals aimed at diversified energy sources, increasing 
energy efficiency and forming regional energy markets (Sprūds, 2010).
As a result, energy advocacy interest groups have proliferated in the region, 
opening up many new fields of action – and research. Despite the difficult legacy 
of interest groups in CEE (Kubik, 2005), environmental groups soon would 
become integral to the democratic process by engaging in decision-making and 
policy implementation in different arenas. Simultaneously, the growing impor-
tance of energy security (often based on fossil fuels) and the strong position of 
organizations associated with the production of fossil fuels shaped different levels 
of policy-making. This has significantly enhanced our possibilities to explore 
interest groups in CEE. In this chapter, I focus on the wide range of interest 
groups (IG) lobbying strategies that are being used to achieve political results in 
line with the groups’ preferences.
4
IN SEARCH OF CIVIC PARTICIPATION
Advocacy tactics in the energy and 





In the political context, there are many paths to influence the policy-making 
process, from which we can distinguish direct (administrative or parliamentary) 
or indirect (media and mobilization) forms of advocacy to maximize political 
influence. Taking into account the diversity of goals and advocacy strategies, 
I explore how lobbying strategies of interest organizations vary by type (sec-
tional and cause groups), strategic goals regarding environmental and energy 
policy, and the country of origin. The literature on interest groups indicates 
that organization type is an important determinant of lobbying behavior. Var-
ious classifications have been provided, for example, “concentrated vs. diffuse” 
interests based on Olson’s collective action theory (Olson, 1965) and “sectional 
vs. idealistic”, groups with “corporative resources versus public interest groups” 
(Binderkrantz, 2005, 2008). Despite terminological differences, these classifica-
tion schemes largely correspond to each other.
Interest groups included in this study operate in two “combined” policy areas, 
energy and environment, but also display diversity in other ways. The first dif-
ference refers to the structure and focus of the groups. Some groups are idealistic 
organizations with individual membership working toward idealistic goals such as 
environmental protection, while other IGs representing business groups formed to 
obtain material benefits for specific groups of people (Binderkrantz, 2005). These 
differences put these groups in different situations during the advocacy process.
Interest group activity is always affected by the political environment in 
which groups operate. As a result, the effective study of public interest groups 
must situate them in a larger political context (Meyer & Imig, 1993). It has to be 
outlined that the three countries analyzed in this study are significantly different 
due to their level of political coordination as well as their energy sectors. Poland 
constitutes a relatively liberal market economy with a weak degree of coordina-
tion, thus providing the foundations for a more pluralist interest group landscape. 
However, elections are publicly funded and extensive lobbying regulations exist, 
which may stymie the influence of interest groups (McGrath, 2008). The Czech 
Republic is also a highly open market economy with privately funding elections 
and weaker lobbying regulations (McGrath, 2008; Šimral, 2015) and thus poten-
tially more penetrable by organized interests. Slovenia is the most coordinated 
market economy in CEE (Avdagić & Crouch, 2006; Bohle & Greskovits, 2012), 
and as an ex-Yugoslav country, the Slovenian economy has historically been 
highly decentralized and enjoyed considerable autonomy from the state.
Despite similar attempts at energy supply diversification, the energy and en-
vironmental policies of Poland, Czechia, and Slovenia also substantially vary. 
According to the European Environment Agency (EEA), Poland has one of the 
highest levels of contamination by carcinogenic benzopyrene among all EU coun-
tries (Skoczkowski et al., 2018). Excessive atmospheric air pollution occurs on over 
20% of Polish territory due to its power industry based on coal and lignite, wood, 
and litter for energy production in households, the limited number of waste gas 
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purifying installations, and automobile traffic (see Chapter 10 in this volume). 
The spatial distribution of pollutant emissions is very uneven – the highest level 
is found in areas of large urban agglomerations and major industrial districts, e.g., 
the  Silesian Voivodeship, where 20%–25% of national emissions of sulfur dioxide 
(SO2), nitrogen oxides, and dust are concentrated or Lesser Poland (Małopolska), 
one of the most polluted EU regions. Dependence on Russian energy supplies has 
greatly shaped Polish energy policy and the direction of its implementation. As 
with other CEE countries, Poland faced issues regarding energy security. In 1997, 
an Energy Law Act was presented, in which energy security was defined as an aim 
of the state economy to meet the demands of citizens as recipients for energy, tak-
ing into account environmental or economic requirements. The newest strategic 
plan for energy by 2040 assumes that the Polish energy mix will be still based on 
coal (50%–60%), renewables (21%–23%), and planned nuclear power.
In contrast to Poland, nuclear energy accounts for approx. 40% of Czech energy 
production. It is also well known for its extensive surface mining of brown coal 
in the Sokolov and Most Basin. The coal mined in these quarries supplies coal-
fired power plants, which are the source of approximately 40% of the electricity 
produced in the Czech Republic. According to the EEA Report No. 12/2018, 
the northeastern part of the Czech Republic is more affected by air pollution than 
the rest of the country, but Southern Moravia is also struggling with a high degree 
of air pollution despite the absence of the coal industry. Moravia-Silesia is the 
traditional industrial center specialized in metallurgy and black coal mining and 
has the highest degree of air pollution. However, the governmental strategy is to 
phase most of it out over the next 20 years, replacing part of it with new nuclear 
power plants as well as gas, renewables, and energy imports.
The Slovenian energy sector is comparatively small, with oil constituting the 
main energy source (45%). Electricity generation is equally divided between hy-
dropower (36.5%), nuclear energy (36.5%), and coal (21.6%). Trends in energy 
policy go in the direction of maintaining the status quo (Živčič & Tkalec, 2019). 
Renewables still contribute a limited share of electricity generation, with solar 
accounting for less than 2%, and wind energy even less (0.02%), which makes 
Slovenia the EU country with the smallest forecasted concentration of wind 
power in electricity consumption in 2020 (Živčič & Tkalec, 2019). Slovenia’s vi-
sion for the energy sector is gradually to transition to low-carbon energy sources 
by focusing on efficient energy consumption, renewables (RES), and the devel-
opment of active electricity distribution networks. This strategy will likely lead 
to a strong reliance on nuclear energy and further development of hydroelectric 
power (see Czarnecki, Piotrowska, & Riedel in this volume).
3 Theoretical framework and hypotheses
Interest groups rely on a wide repertoire of tactics for influencing public poli-
cies. They may coalesce with other like-minded actors, employ inside or outside 
82 Szczepan Czarnecki
tactics, target specific institutional venues at multiple levels of government, and 
employ different types of information (Binderkrantz 2005, De Bruycker, 2014). 
While tactics may be conceptually classified as belonging to either an inside or 
outside strategy, it is an empirical question whether they coalesce into more over-
arching strategies in the behavior of NGOs (Dellmuth & Tallberg, 2017). Efforts 
to influence policy-making through the media or public support are referred to 
as outside lobbying (Binderkrantz, 2005). Inside lobbying, by contrast, refers to 
attempts to influence policy-makers through direct interaction, e.g., by means 
of advisory boards, consultations, or personal contacts (Beyers, 2004, p. 213). 
The literature suggests that group type is an important determinant of organiza-
tions’ lobbying behavior (Maloney et al., 1994). There is a common distinction 
between groups depending on whether they work to obtain goods that will se-
lectively and materially benefit group members or not (Berry, 1977). According 
to Jeffrey M. Berry, a public interest group is one that seeks a collective good, 
which will not selectively or materially benefit the membership or activists of the 
organization (Berry, 1977, p. 7). This allows us to divide the studied groups into 
groups with a broader idealistic character and groups working to meet the needs 
(certain goods) of their members. Binderkrantz (2005) emphasizes that interest 
organizations drawing their members from particular groups of people often 
will find themselves in a monopoly situation when it comes to supplying these 
people with certain goods. Organizations with idealistic goals more often will 
attract their members from different parts of society; the welfare of the members 
will not depend directly on the success of the group, and competition between 
groups will occur more often (Binderkrantz, 2005; Dunleavy, 1991). For groups 
working on such issues, it is particularly important to constantly mobilize their 
membership base and to inform the public regarding the disputed issue (Binder-
krantz, 2005; Gais & Walker, 1991; Streeck & Kenworthy, 2005). Only constant 
debate and the buildup of peer pressure can solve the collective action problem 
(Brennan, 2009). Binderkrantz points out that idealistic groups are thus in a situ-
ation, in which they need to continually reinforce the loyalty of their members. 
They are therefore expected to more often pursue outside lobbying tactics (e.g., 
protesting, holding press conferences, making public speeches, and organizing 
petitions), because the visibility of such strategies signals to members and po-
tential members that the group is effective and worth supporting (Binderkrantz, 
2008). Thus, I hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1: Idealistic interest groups are more likely to rely on outside 
lobbying tactics than sectional interest groups.
Advocacy organizations can strategically select one or more venues for lobbying 
in a system providing multiple access points to lawmakers in both national and 
local governments. However, the specificity of the advocacy goals itself cannot 
be neglected either. Wilson (1973) argued that when the debated issue is divis-
ible, groups are more likely to seek direct interaction with policy-makers. By 
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contrast, when pursued goals are non-divisible, organizations are more likely to 
use outside lobbying tactics. I hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2: Groups pursuing a non-divisible goals are more likely to 
“go public”, while groups lobbying for divisible goals are more likely to use 
direct lobbying techniques.
Moreover, the goals organized interest groups pursue may also shape their lob-
bying strategies. Baumgartner et al. (2009) argued that a determinant of success 
is whether the group goal is to change the policy or rather to keep the status quo. 
Groups protecting the status quo benefit from the existence of a so-called coali-
tion of the status quo, which prevents change by controlling access to the political 
system (Binderkrantz & Krøyer, 2012). Therefore, I distinguish between groups 
pursuing to uphold or change existing policies and argue that groups seeking to 
protect the status quo will mainly approach bureaucrats and politicians, while 
groups seeking to dismantle the status quo seek to widen the scope of the policy 
conflict by going public (Schattschneider, 1960) and engaging in various forms 
of public protest (Grant, 2000). Therefore:
Hypothesis 3: Groups seeking to protect the status quo will more likely 
approach bureaucrats and politicians, while groups seeking to dismantle 
the status quo are more likely to go public.
Finally, lobbying regimes and thus the broader political environment in which 
they operate may also shape strategies (Meyer & Imig, 1993). Here, I assume that 
privately funded elections (Czechia) may give more space to the business groups, 
while in the case of Poland and Slovenia, where elections are publicly funded, 
groups will choose outsider strategies more often to foster stronger links between 
society and political parties.
Hypothesis 4: Privately funded elections are more likely to give more 
space to business groups, while publicly funded elections will more likely 
result in outside strategies to foster stronger links between society and po-
litical parties.
4 Methods
To gather data suitable to the research question, I drew on population ecologies 
of energy and environmental groups in the three selected countries. Using the 
official registries published by the Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic, 
Ministry of Justice of Poland, and Ministry of the Interior of Slovenia, searches 
were conducted with every combination of words for organizations related to the 
third sector categories in the three countries.1 Based on our survey methodology 
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outlined in the Introduction and Annex, survey responses were collected from 
organizations which met three criteria: (1) they are officially registered, (2) they 
are non-profit and non-governmental, and (3) they deal with energy or environ-
mental policy. Organizations received a set of questions regarding lobbying and 
access as well as their internal structure, professionalization, and resources. The 
sample for this specific analysis includes 132 organizations.
Referring to the wide range of lobbying strategies used to achieve political 
results in line with their preferences, I analyzed and described specific lobbying 
tactics. As there are various ways to influence the policy-making process, from 
which we can distinguish direct or indirect forms of advocacy, the dependent 
variable is divided into eight variables covering parliamentary, administrative, 
media, and mobilization strategies. For the purpose of this specific analysis, 
groups were asked, e.g., to indicate if they used the specific tactics in energy 
policy in terms of direct, e.g., contacts with political parties and government and 
indirect: a) media (using traditional media as TV, radio and newspapers, social 
media) and b) mobilization strategies such as protest, petitions, and common po-
sitions or initiatives. Positive responses for a given form of lobbying were coded 
as 1, and negative answers were coded as 0.
Group type. According to the literature, many variables, such as institutional 
structures, group characteristics, and issue-specific factors, can condition IG tac-
tics (Dür & De Bièvre, 2007). Some scholars differentiate organizations with 
corporative resources from public interest groups, NGOs, and business inter-
ests (Beyers et al., 2008; Binderkrantz et al., 2015). Others distinguish sectional 
from cause groups (Stewart, 1958). However, these type classifications largely 
overlap. This chapter employs a typology differentiating groups as sectional or-
ganizations that are formed to obtain material benefits for specific groups of 
people and represent special interests that create concentrated costs and benefits 
for their supporters, e.g., business groups, trade unions and cause groups that are 
more idealistic, while acting for the public interest and public goods, e.g., energy 
consumers, environmentalists, and ecologists (Klüver & Saurugger, 2013). To 
measure which organizations are idealistic or sectional interests, I created a di-
chotomous variable that takes the value 0 for public interest idealistic groups and 
1 for sectional organizations (see Table 4.1).
Group policy goals may also vary considerably. To measure whether organi-
zation goals are divisible or non-divisible, I conducted qualitative textual anal-
ysis based on the highlighted expectations of the IGs and the degree of change 
TABLE 4.1  Cause and sectional groups
Cause groups Sectional groups
• civic IGs promoting clean, sustainable, renewable energy • energy producers
• civic IGs promoting energy efficiency • associations of energy 
suppliers• civic IGs representing energy consumers
In Search of Civic Participation 85
sought. The analysis was conducted using websites of the organizations (status 
and goals sections). If organizations emphasized an absolute goal such as the need 
for a complete change of the implemented policy, total reduction of fossil fuels 
use, or, by contrast, maximization of the use of fossil fuels in terms of electric-
ity production, the goals were coded as non-divisible with a given value 1. In 
cases when groups emphasized the need for reduction instead of, e.g., absolutely 
urgent decarbonization, goals were coded as divisible with a given value of 0. 
Applying the same logic as previously, IGs focusing on change were coded with 
1 and those aiming to keep the status quo were given the value 0.
In order to measure lobbying tactics, I conducted a binary logistic regression. 
The most important feature of logistic regressions is that the predicted variable 
is dichotomous; that is, it takes two values 0 and 1 for the occurrence or absence 
of a certain phenomenon. Binary logistic regression is used to predict the odds 
of being a case based on the values of the independent variables. The odds are 
defined as the probability of comparing the odds of the two events. The odds 
of an event are the probability that the event occurs divided by the probability 
that the event does not occur. I used the value 0 for the absence of the predicted 
variable and 1 for its presence (e.g., if the organization applies protest tactics, 
I added 1, if not 0). Collinearity was tested by checking the pairwise correlation 
of the independent variables, thus providing no evidence of collinearity. To test 
whether specific lobbying regimes result in different lobbying strategies, I con-
ducted Pearson’s chi-square test of independence to determine whether there is a 
significant association between the two variables.
5 Data analysis
The dependent variable(s) are forms of lobbying by IGs operating in energy and 
environmental policy. To avoid a simple dichotomous division between insider 
and outsider groups, while measuring direct (inside) and indirect (outside) lob-
bying strategies, I divided lobbying tactics into eight different forms of lobby-
ing. The division is related to the direct strategies: a) parliamentary lobbying 
when certain lobbyists contact directly political representatives (politicians and 
parties), b) administrative: when lobbyists contact relevant ministries and pub-
lic servants (indicated as government) and indirect strategies when lobbyists use 
media strategies such as c) social media, d) traditional media, and e) PR cam-
paigns and when implemented strategies are based on mobilization as f ) petitions, 
Divisible Goals Non-divisible goals
Flexible Absolute
FIGURE 4.1 IG goals division
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g) protests, and h) common positions. In accordance with the hypotheses, I start 
with a short reflection of different dimensions of lobbying strategies. The first 
step in the analysis of group strategies aims to gain a clear picture of the extent 
to which different tactics are deployed by IG due to the group type, their goals, 
and countries of origin.
As shown in Figure 4.2, differences exist between specific lobbying tactics 
among two indicated groups. The most visible difference concerns protests and 
conducting petitions. Only 7.83% of the sectional IGs reported protest as part 
of their advocacy strategies, while idealistic IGs indicated protest much more 
often (67.63%). This means that almost two out of three idealistic groups oper-
ating in energy and environmental sector use protest to influence the political 
debate. Public interest groups are also much more active in holding petitions, 
as 73.10% of the idealistic IGs indicated using petitions as an advocacy strat-
egy. Like in the previous case, specific interest groups are much less involved in 
this form of activity, as only 10.67% of specific groups from the three analyzed 
countries indicated petitions as their preferred form of advocacy. Direct forms of 
lobbying commonly are used in both analyzed groups. 57% of analyzed idealistic 
groups reported that they contact political parties, and 60.1% the government. 
It seems that the governmental and parliamentary strategy is popular among 
public interest organizations. However, these forms are used even more often by 
the sectional interest groups. 88.6% of sectional IGs reported using administra-
tive strategies and 90.77% indicated using the parliamentary strategy. The media 
strategy seems to be more popular among public interest groups. 86% of idealis-
tic groups use social media, 69.7% traditional media, and 69.7% public relations 
campaigns when trying to influence the policy process.
FIGURE 4.2 Lobbying tactics: group type (%)
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When it comes to strategic goals, the analysis shows that interest groups with 
absolute, non-divisible goals attach much more importance to indirect forms 
of lobbying than groups with divisible goals (Figure 4.3). The data reveal that 
groups with the non-debatable goals understood as “all or nothing” use out-
side strategies more often than groups with more divisible goals. “Absolute goals 
groups” more frequently hold petitions (46.6%) and protests (43.74%) than groups 
with more debatable “more or less” goals. However, for both analyzed types 
of goals, direct strategies are used often. Even as groups with divisible goals 
more frequently reported parliamentary (89.41%) and administrative (86.2%) 
strategies, it is visible that these strategies are still important and often used by 
“non-divisible goals” groups (66.19% parliamentary) and (62.13% government).
As shown in Figure 4.4, the lobbying strategies moderately differ between 
countries. The data show that IGs from the Czech Republic indicated indirect 
strategies less frequently than groups surveyed in Poland and Slovenia. Also, the 
governmental strategy seems to be less attractive for Czech IGs (64.6%) than 
for their counterparts in Poland and Slovenia. By contrast, groups in Czechia 
reported contacting political parties more often (75%) than groups from Slovenia 
(69.5%), but less than Poland (79.45%).
Applying a chi-square test, I analyzed whether there is a significant relation-
ship between the types of groups in the three countries and the usage of specific 
lobbying tactics as expected in hypothesis 4. In the case of Poland, the p-value in 
two cases of indirect tactics, i.e., protest and petitions, is lower than our chosen 
FIGURE 4.3 Lobbying tactics: goals (%)
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significance level (α = 0.05). I conclude that there is an association between 
organization type and outside lobbying tactics. There is a stronger tendency 
for idealistic groups to organize petition campaigns and protest. I also found 
that both traditional tactics and social media are favored by idealistic groups 
compared to sectional organizations. Direct lobbying tactics seem to be less de-
pendent on group type. However, in the Polish case, contacting the government 
and political parties is more common for sectional IGs. The results for Czech or-
ganizations are somewhat different from those in Poland. Data suggest stronger 
intergroup differences than in the Polish case. Sectional groups are more focused 
on direct lobbying tactics, i.e., contacting political parties and government, 
while idealistic groups are more geared toward outside activities such as protest, 
petitions and common positions. Yet again, for Slovenia, I found that idealistic 
organizations, like in Poland, more frequently use outside lobbying methods, 
while sectional groups prefer contacting politicians. However, in this case, the 
p-level is higher than the chosen significance level (α = 0.05). Thus, the results 
partially confirm hypothesis 4. Indeed in the Czech case, where elections are 
privately funded, sectional groups have more space to use direct lobbying strate-
gies. Yet in each case, the distinction between groups by type suggests that even 
in Poland and Slovenia, where elections are publicly funded, sectional groups 
are more focused on direct lobbying, while indirect activities such as protest and 
FIGURE 4.4 Lobbying tactics: country (%)
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TABLE 4.2  Pearson’s chi-square test results for lobbying tactics by group type in countries
Value df p % Idealistic % Sectional
Poland
Government 1.625 1 0.336 61.3 89.9
Political parties 1.926 1 0.165 71.6 87.3
Mass media 4.523 1 0.033 86.4 53
Social media 4.788 1 0.029 100 80
Public relations 1.915 1 0.166 72.7 53
Protest 20.442 1 0.000 86.4 12.5
Petitions 19.6 1 0.000 85.7 14
Common positions 5.639 1 0.018 86.4 50
Czechia
Government 26.705 1 0.000 41.7 87.40
Political parties 21.565 1 0.000 48.4 97
Mass media 0.066 1 0.798 40.6 44
Social media 3.715 1 0.054 65.6 40
Public relations 2.523 1 0.112 54.8 33.3
Protest 11.437 1 0.001 43.8 4
Petitions 13.291 1 0.000 59.4 12
Common positions 7.336 1 0.007 71.9 36
Slovenia
Government 0.97 1 0.755 77.3 88.5
Political parties 1.912 1 51 88
Mass media 0.697 1 0.404 80 64
Social media 1.262 1 0.261 90.9 73.3
Public relations 1.418 1 0,234 81.8 60
Protest 15.758 1 0,000 72.7 7
Petitions 14.973 1 0,000 74.2 6
Common positions 4.547 1 0,033 76.8 36
petitions seem to be more common for idealistic organizations in every country. 
In every analyzed case, the results for the “protest” and “petitions” variables are 
statistically significant.
In the next step, I conducted a logistic regression (Table 4.3) to model the 
probability of a certain event for eight selected lobbying tactics models referring 
to direct and indirect lobbying strategies. Each object was assigned a probabil-
ity between 0 and 1, with a sum of one. In the multivariate analysis presented 
in Table 4.3, coefficients are expressed as the odds ratios of a specific type of 
lobbying tactic to the comparable odds of the reference category for each vari-
able. Odds ratios above 1 indicate that the particular category is associated with 
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higher chances than the reference category, whereas values below 1 indicate 
the opposite. The analysis included the following reference categories: group 
type ( sectional IGs), IG country of origin (Slovenia ref. cat.), goal characteristic 
( divisible goal ref. cat.), and the status quo.
The group type appears to be the most robust predictor in every tested model 
of lobbying tactics. In Models I and II, it is visible that sectional groups are several 
times more likely to use direct lobbying tactics (governmental and parliamentary) 
than idealistic interest groups. Opposite results were obtained in terms of indirect 
lobbying tactics, especially in the probability of protest actions (Model VI) and 
petitions (Model VII). In both models, odds ratios are lower than 1, which means 
that protest and petitions correspond with lower odds for sectional groups. These 
activities can be expected more frequently of idealistic organizations. Also, organ-
izations that represent public interests more often encourage other organizations to 
engage in common actions. Regarding media strategies, our data are also signif-
icant for the traditional media variable (Model III) and public relation campaigns 
(Model IV). Idealistic groups are less likely to use direct lobbying tactics (govern-
mental and parliamentary). The analyzed models suggest in line with hypothesis 1 
that idealistic groups indeed rely more intensively on outside lobbying tactics than 
specific interest organizations, especially in terms of mobilization strategies.
Regarding specific organizational goals, I found significant results in terms of 
protest activities of the groups. In Model V, groups representing absolute, non- 
divisible goals are several times more likely to protest than groups that are more 
able to negotiate the final results. The data also show that groups pursuing divisible 

















B S.E Odds 
rat.
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B S.E. Odds 
rat.
B S.E.
Sectional IGs 1.532* 0.681 4.628 1.581+ 0.785 4.858 −0.224+ 0.541 0.799 −0.403 0.706
Country
Slovenia  0.00 0.00 0.00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(ref. cat.)
Poland 0.481 0.813 1.627 0.259 0.560 0.772 0.121 0.758 1.129 −0.300 1.315
Czechia −0.664 0.791 0.515 0.063 0.535 1.065 −0.921 0.743 0.398 −2.715 1.183
Non-divisible −1.482 0.933 0.227 −0.475 0.988 0.609 0.015 0.684 1.015 0.582 0.747
Goal
Status Quo 0.285 0.889 1.330 1.085 1.224 2.959 −0.516 0.654 0.597 −0.233 0.759
Constant 1.542 1.224 4.674 1.213 1.131 4.215 0.671 1.072 1.956 1.555 1.082
Nagelkerke’s 
pseudo R 0.327 0.383 0.121 0.117
Log-likelihood 92.934 77.782 117.739 115.723
Observations 132 132 132 127
. Odds 
rat.
B S.E. Odds 
rat. 
B S.E. Odds 
rat.
B S.E. Odds 
rat.
B S.E. Odds 
rat.
0.699 −0.511+ 0.533 0.600 −3.756** 0.870 0.231 −3.743* 0.890 0.024 −1.676* 0.578 0.187
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.741 −0.501 0.737 0.606 0.382 0.801 1.465 0.224 0.955 1.252 0.451 0.754 1.570
0.665 −0.753 0.716 0.471 −1.521 0.924 0.212 −1.008 0.947 0.365 −0.588 0.758 0.555
1.790 0.965 0.673 2.626 1.567+ 0.709 4.791 1.923 1.195 4.957 0.225 0.697 0.555
0.792 0.263 0.655 1.288 −0.788 1.006 0.455 −0.639 0.978 0.528 −0.15 0.669 0.985
4.734 0.269 1.026 1.270 −0.113 1.460 0.893 −0.281 1.463 0.755 1.453 1.110 4.227
0.119 0.376 0.304 0.266
118.478 72.212 71.658 103.733
131 131 129 124
Columns show beta coefficient, standard error and odds ratio. Levels of significance: + = 5%, * = 1% and ** = 0.1% significance.
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Log-likelihood 92.934 77.782 117.739 115.723
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Columns show beta coefficient, standard error and odds ratio. Levels of significance: + = 5%, * = 1% and ** = 0.1% significance.
goals can be expected to seek direct interactions with decision-makers. The results 
in Models I and II suggest that groups with non-divisible goals are less likely to use 
direct lobbying tactics, but they are statistically insignificant. Interestingly, I found 
no significant evidence that status quo groups are more likely to use direct lobby-
ing strategies. The analysis indicates that groups pushing to keep the status quo are 
more likely to use the administrative and parliamentary strategy and less likely to 
go public. However, all the results are insignificant. Both analyses partially con-
firm our second hypothesis that the orientation of IGs goals may influence their 
lobbying strategies. Groups preferring to keep the status quo or groups with more 
divisible goals are expected to be more interested in personal contacts with gov-
ernmental and parliamentary decision-makers, while groups pursuing change and 
with absolute goals will go public using both mobilization and media strategies.
I also hypothesized (H4) country-specific variations in lobbying strategies. 
As Poland, Czechia, and Slovenia differ regarding lobbying regimes and election 
funding, I expected Czech IGs to employ more direct lobbying strategies and 
Polish and Slovenian groups more diversified approaches. I found little support 
for this hypothesis. Indeed, it is visible that IGs from Czechia are more likely 
to lobby political parties than their counterparts from Poland and Slovenia (see 
Chapter 5 in this volume). Also in terms of mobilization, Czech groups are less 
likely to protest or conduct petitions and encourage the other groups in their 
strategies. However, the results are not statistically significant in any of the mod-
els. Hence, our theoretical expectations cannot be conclusively confirmed by 
the data, but they do suggest a tendency in line with hypothesis 4.
92 Szczepan Czarnecki
6 Conclusions
This chapter explored various strategies of energy and environmental interest 
groups in Czechia, Poland, and Slovenia. Addressing a major previous research 
gap, I focused on three group-related categories such as the group type, goal 
specificity and country-related factors and analyzed how they affect lobbying 
behavior. The most important finding is that group type is an important factor 
determining lobbying strategies (see also Dür & Mateo, 2013). Idealistic, or pub-
lic interest, groups much more frequently pursue outsider strategies to impact 
the policy-making process. This includes protests, petitions and encouraging 
other actors active in the relevant policy area. However, it has to be emphasized 
that public interest groups pursue both parliamentary and governmental (inside) 
strategies as well. Thus, public interest organizations display a broader range of 
lobbying tactics.
I also found that goals may impact lobbying behavior. Although the evidence 
is limited, there is a visible trend toward outsider tactics for groups pursuing 
non-divisible goals such as environmental groups lobbying for a total reduction 
of fossil fuels. Groups advocating absolute goals more frequently use outsider tac-
tics than groups with more divisible or negotiable goals, which partially confirms 
the hypothesis regarding goal diversity and lobbying strategies.
In addition, more country-specific differences are also apparent in terms of 
lobbying strategies among IGs in the three analyzed countries. In the Czech 
case, there is a slight orientation toward insider tactics. The analyzed sectional 
groups prefer parliamentary contacts, and there are more pronounced differences 
in strategies based on group types. In Poland and Slovenia, by contrast, tactics 
are more spread between group types, with a visible orientation toward inside 
strategies among sectional IGs. Additionally, it is visible that Polish groups lobby 
the government more often than groups from Czechia and Slovenia. In every 
country, public mobilization strategies are more common for idealistic environ-
mental groups.
The present findings offer numerous avenues for future research. For exam-
ple, it would be interesting to investigate whether there is a relation between 
the groups’ levels of professionalization, longevity, internal resources, and their 
applied lobbying strategies (see Chapter 7). It would also be very exciting to ex-
plore whether differences in lobbying strategies continue to exist between CEE 
and Western Europe or whether the variations between CEE countries are larger 
than those between the eastern and western parts of the continent.
Note
 1 e.g., Spolek, Nadace, Nadační fond, Ústav, Obecně prospěšna společnost in Czech; Sto-
warzyszenie, Fundacja, Związek Zawodowy in Polish; and Društvo, Zavod, Združenie or 
Ustanova in Slovene and all the words potentially pertaining to the energy and envi-
ronmental issues in the three languages in all declinations, in the singular and plural 
(see also Chapters 2 and 3).
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1 Introduction
How is interest intermediation organized in Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE)? Unlike Horváthová and Dobbins (see Chapter 7) who show how inter-
est group-specific factors such as professionalization and expertise help interest 
groups access policy-makers, we explore the aspect of political coordination and 
deliberation between the state and organized interests. Also focusing on health-
care, we are interested in whether corporatist-like structures have evolved to 
balance rivalling interests in Poland, Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Hungary. 
This question is of great importance because most CEE countries continue to 
stand out with their overall weak healthcare performance and low life expec-
tancy in European comparison (OECD, 2019). While this clearly also can be 
attributed to low funding levels, dysfunctional governance structures may nega-
tively impact healthcare outcomes, as reflected in a very critical evaluation by pa-
tients themselves (Euro Health Consumer Index, 2019).1 Moreover, the support 
of major interest organizations may also be a crucial prerequisite for passing and 
implementing successful reforms.
Against this background, we address the following questions: Have corpo-
ratist platforms emerged to promote social partnership in CEE healthcare? Do 
rivalling interest groups consult regularly with the state and one another? To 
what extent do governments systematically integrate groups with structural 
disadvantages (e.g. patients or people with disabilities) into decision-making? 
We first introduce our theoretical framework derived from three ideal types of 
state- interest group relations – corporatism, pluralism and statism – and discuss 
existing analyses of state-interest group relations in the region. We then briefly 
explore the growing literature on corporatist arrangements in healthcare, before 
deriving a series of indicators to better understand interest intermediation in 
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CEE. Based on a large-scale standardized survey, we present our results in Sec-
tion 4. Drawing on our survey findings, secondary sources and interviews, we 
conclude with a healthcare “corporatism score” for all countries in Section 5.
2 State of the art
Corporatism is a standard analytical paradigm in political science, which aims 
to grasp systematized negotiations between major social partners. Corporatist 
systems generally enable the institutionalized integration of privileged organized 
interests in policy-making and implementation (Christiansen et al., 2010). The 
term originally emerged from the idea that society should be organized by cor-
porate groups and associations (e.g. agricultural, scientific, economic) to promote 
social harmony. Ideas based on corporatism became prominent in Fascist Italy 
and Southern Europe. This “authoritarian corporatism” aimed not so much for 
social representation and harmony, rather “productivism” to boost industrial pro-
duction with state-industry pacts (Gagliardi, 2016). After World War II, Western 
European Christian and social democrats, in particular, pushed for policies based 
on institutionalized tripartite negotiations between the state and employers’ and 
employees’ associations. These emerging forms of “neo- corporatism” (Schmit-
ter, 1985) often resulted in the partial self-management of social spheres by social 
partners. Such systems strongly contrasted with pluralist systems traditionally 
characterized by diverse and competing interests, which purportedly bring about 
a democratic equilibrium (Dahl, 1967).
Targeted efforts to balance socio-economic interests increasingly attracted 
the interest of political scientists (Korpi, 1983). Schmitter (1974), for example, 
defined corporatism as a system of interest representation for linking organized 
interests of civil society with state decision-makers. This coincides with other in-
terpretations highlighting the consensus orientation of corporatist arrangements. 
For example, Woldendorp defines corporatism as “any form of cooperation be-
tween the state and socio-economic interest groups aimed at forging consensus 
over socio-economic government policies” (1997, pp. 49–50). Along these lines, 
Müller-Jentsch (1991) understands corporatism as a conflict partnership, whereby 
the state aims to facilitate compromises by intervention between rivalling organ-
izations. Therefore, neo-corporatism can be any structured relationship between 
interest groups and public authorities, combining values of cooperation over 
competition, hierarchy over horizontal social structure ( Jacek, 1986, p. 421). Yet, 
seen critically, neo-corporatist arrangements may also result in the marginaliza-
tion of social groups and issues, which are poorly organized or not represented by 
major interest organizations. Schmitter (1989) later addressed this point himself. 
He highlights that representation monopolies for certain interest organizations 
are generally crucial ingredients of corporatism, which often goes in hand with 
official recognition by the state and/or a semi-public status.
Siaroff (1999, p. 177) was arguably the first to lay out concrete indicators to meas-
ure corporatism. Defining corporatism as the “[…] co-ordinated, co-operative, 
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and systematic management of the national economy by the state, centralised 
unions, and employers […], presumably to the relative benefit of all three actors”, 
he spells out 22 components of corporatism in economic policy. These span from 
strong unionization (with relatively few unions), institutionalized business and 
labour input into policy-making, their mutual recognition as social partners, to 
the prevalence of tripartite agreements and consensus-oriented policy-making.2 
However, Jahn (2016) points out that Siaroff (1999) somewhat convolutes the char-
acteristics of and/or outcomes of corporatism (e.g. small open economies, high 
social expenditures and successful economic performance). Jahn not only aimed 
to remedy these deficits, but also included – for the first time – numerous CEE 
countries in his “corporatism” ranking. He outlines three components: structure, 
i.e. peak organizations negotiating for their members; function, i.e. arrangements 
where governments intervene in wage bargaining, whereby unions are heavily in-
volved in governmental decision-making; and scope, i.e. the coordination of wage 
bargaining and applicability of collective agreements to wider spheres of society. 
Based on these indicators, Poland and Hungary (along with slightly more corpo-
ratist Romania and Bulgaria) received low “corporatism scores”, albeit somewhat 
higher than the United States, Canada and United Kingdom.
2.1 Post-communist corporatism?
Aside from the special case of Slovenia (see Stanojević, 2011), the collapse of com-
munism generally heralded the at least partial collapse of trade unions. In the turmoil 
of the unprecedented political and socio-economic transformation process, trade 
unions were generally unable to mobilize public support. Other interest groups, 
many of which were appendages of the communist party, were often viewed with 
mistrust, resulting in comparatively low associational membership and political par-
ticipation (Kostelka, 2014). In this regard, Ost argues that trade unions sometimes 
tended to side with government parties over their own members, because their 
operations were partially managed by governments (2000). The collective organi-
zational dilemmas of post-communist trade unions and other interest organizations 
were further compounded by the neoliberal political environment of the 1990s and 
2000s, leaving organized labour little room to assert its demands. At least in Hun-
gary and Poland, the 2000s additionally heralded the decline of social- democratic 
parties, which are generally vocal supporters of corporatist arrangements.
Nevertheless, even in the immediate aftermath of communism, reform- 
oriented governments endeavoured to promote social dialogue, appear more re-
sponsive to civil society and more effectively manage social divisions. According 
to Ost (2000), multiple new platforms for tripartism and civil society engage-
ment emerged in CEE, a trend likely reinforced by the desire to conform with 
Western European norms (Falkner, 2003). However, Ost shows that such con-
sultative institutions generally failed to fulfil their intended function and instead 
evolved into informal “pseudo-corporatist” meeting places for social partners. 
Labour unions were often affiliated with state-owned enterprises, many of which 
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underwent privatization, while others proved unable to adapt to the new service 
economy. Ost goes on to argue that workers often shied away from collective or-
ganization out of fear that it would undermine their chances to benefit from the 
new capitalist economic system (ibid., p. 111). Thus, instead of a functional Scan-
dinavian or Western European-style corporatism, CEE interest intermediation 
systems – at least in economic policy-making – were characterized by “illusorily 
corporatist” structures, which often merely served to justify (neoliberal) govern-
mental policy, instead of effectively balancing social partners’ rivalling interests. 
Ost (2011) later re-examined this claim, concluding that tripartism in CEE still 
produces meagre results and that most of what labour has gained came not from 
tripartism, rather results from better organization and smarter use of resources.
Olejnik (2020) took Ost’s argument a step further with regard to the current 
“illiberal governments” of Poland and Hungary (see Sata and Karolewski, 2020). 
He classifies them as “patronage corporatist” to the extent that they actively divide 
organized interests into allies required for reaching their political objectives and 
hostile organizations who purportedly lack the “necessary moral authority to ad-
vocate for the interests of the citizenry” (ibid., p. 184). Accordingly, governments 
tend to only engage in political consultations and exchange with social partners 
with coinciding interests, many of which often directly receive subsidies from the 
government, while rivalling organizations are actively discredited and combatted. 
Hence, obedience is rewarded and dissent is sanctioned (Olejnik, 2020).
However, we see two weaknesses in the pre-existing literature on post- 
communist corporatism. Aside from Jahn (2016), most pre-existing research 
remains descriptive and is often not backed up by concrete empirical data. Sec-
ond, essentially all previous studies are restricted to economic policy (for energy 
policy, see Horváthová and Dobbins, 2019), a policy area arguably too vast and 
multifaceted to be fully grasped with existing concepts and typologies. After all, 
public–private interactions and arrangements may vary not only between policy 
areas, but also within societal sectors depending on the specific issue or decision 
process. Thus, in this chapter, we build on and apply various assumptions and 
concepts put forward in the previous literature to healthcare. Just like the eco-
nomic sector, healthcare systems may equally be characterized by corporatist 
social pacts and institutionalized consensus-making.
2.2 Healthcare interest representation in CEE
Corporatist traditions historically are directly linked to social and health insur-
ance systems. In fact, the first Bismarckian welfare insurance scheme was devoted 
to healthcare and aimed to secure social peace based on the idea of transition 
from “peasants to patients”. It is therefore not coincidental that the size, power 
resources and mobilization of trade unions and patients’ organizations are often 
key variables in explaining the existence of universal health insurance systems. 
Gerlinger (2009) defines healthcare corporatism as the institutionalized integra-
tion of conflicting interests in decision-making, while highlighting the role of 
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private interest groups in the formulation and implementation of binding collec-
tive rules. In his understanding, healthcare corporatism is based on the relative 
parity between representatives of the insurance industry, medical profession and 
patients organized in centralized administrative bodies. Such systems generally 
are characterized by the co-management by the state, medical profession, pa-
tients’ organizations, as well as the insurance and pharmaceutical industries. Not 
least because the globally top-performing healthcare systems exhibit corporatist 
features (e.g. Norway, Netherlands, Switzerland), scholars have also explored in-
terest intermediation in this area (Zimmer, 1999; Hunter, 2013).
However, interest intermediation in CEE healthcare remains largely unex-
plored. Initial steps towards healthcare corporatism were taken in the early 1990s 
in order to secure social peace and amortize transition costs (Ząbkowicz, 2014, 
p. 12). Post-communist reforms aimed at abandoning the integrated, tax-based 
Semashko model of state control and establishing Bismarckian-like, compulsory 
health insurance systems. In addition, those reforms were aimed at decentraliza-
tion, reducing the size of the hospital sector, introducing private providers, cor-
poratizing public healthcare facilities and improving the quality of care (Rechel & 
McKee, 2009; Sześciło, 2017). The birth of health insurance systems in CEE also 
heralded the emergence of institutions essential for social dialogue and a shift 
from “governing” into institutionalized “governance”. Different countries chose 
different pathways. Bohle and Greskovits (2012) differentiate between neoliberal 
arrangements of the Visegrád countries and more neo-corporatist settings in Slo-
venia. Other scholars argue that CEE countries developed a statist health insurance 
type, in which state actors are predominant in regulation and governance, while 
financing is organized by societal actors, and provision delegated to private entities 
(Böhm et al., 2013). Against this background, we now address to what extent and 
which organizations are heavily integrated into CEE healthcare policy-making, 
whether the systems are gravitating towards the corporatist paradigm and how 
interest intermediation arrangements vary by country (see also Kaminska, 2013).
3 Methodological approach
To develop an integrated framework for exploring interest intermediation in CEE 
healthcare, we first analytically distinguish corporatism from two contrasting con-
cepts: pluralism and statism. Pluralism is characterized by the existence of diverse 
and competing interests which operate in organizationally fragmented and less 
integrated interest intermediation systems (Truman, 1951; Dahl, 1967). Instead of 
power being vested in “peak associations”, heterogeneous organizations compete 
to effectively articulate their demands towards the state (Streeck, 1983). Interests 
are brought to bear by unstable and fleeting alliances between advocacy groups. 
While pluralist systems may offer numerous avenues for interest group partici-
pation, there are generally few institutionalized consultation platforms with the 
specific aim of balancing rivalling interests. Thus, interest groups usually operate 
outside the government through political pressure, personal contacts with actors or 
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by parliamentary lobbying (Wilson, 1983, p. 897). In statist systems, by contrast, 
private interest and advocacy groups are mainly viewed as a disturbance. Instead, 
a strong, technocratically operating executive generally dominates the policy pro-
cess without regularly consulting non-governmental stakeholders (Woll, 2009).
To demarcate corporatism from contrasting paradigms, we bind together the 
above-mentioned concepts and define several “ingredients” of corporatism. In eco-
nomic policy and beyond, corporatism generally entails the transfer of policy- making 
away from parliament and the concentration of self-management capacities in “peak 
organizations”. Streeck and Kenworthy (2003) refer to this as the structural aspect 
of corporatism. Second, the functional dimension (ibid.) sees for strong political co-
ordination and exchange between the state and organized interests. As shown above, 
corporatist arrangements are also characterized by a distinct consensus orientation 
and relatively equal representation of diffuse (e.g. patients) and concentrated interests 
(e.g. medical chamber, hospitals associations). Fourth, corporatist constellations ex-
hibit mechanisms for policy coordination between rivalling interests.
To grasp these aspects, we designed an online questionnaire and contacted 
all national-level healthcare organizations in Poland, Hungary, Slovenia and the 
Czech Republic. The survey included numerous open and closed questions re-
garding their interactions with political parties, governments, regulatory author-
ities as well as policy coordination with the state and rivalling organizations. The 
advantage of the survey is that we can gather insights and authentic opinions 
from interest organizations themselves. National governments or ministries may 
be inclined to exaggerate the democratic quality and consensus-oriented nature 
of their political institutions. We received approx. 200 responses from healthcare 
organizations in the four countries (Czech Republic N = 68, Hungary N = 38, 
Poland N = 45, Slovenia N = 48), and from nearly all major players (e.g. larger 
patients’ groups, medical chambers, healthcare employees). We also conducted 
numerous interviews with interest groups and analysed official data on existing 
institutionalized tripartite dialogue bodies as well as unionism in general.
We identify two main ingredients of the functional dimension: institutional-
ized inclusion of organized interests into policy-making, reflecting a strong cul-
ture of consultation and deliberation with the state, as well as consensus-oriented 
relations between organized interests themselves.
Addressing the first dimension, we asked all organizations about their percep-
tion of policy coordination:
How would you rate the level of policy coordination/political exchange 
between the state and your interest group? (1 – very weak, 2 – weak, 
3 – moderate, 4 – strong, 5 – very strong)
We then asked a series of questions about their inclusion into consultations:
Approximately how often does your organization consult with po-
litical parties? (1 – never, 2 – approx. annually, 3 – approx. biannually, 
4 – monthly, 5 – weekly)
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Approximately how often does your organization consult with regula-
tory authorities in your field of activity? (1 – never, 2 – (approx.). annually, 
3 – (approx.) biannually, 4 – monthly, 5 – weekly)
Furthermore, we are interested in the stability of interest intermediation constel-
lations over time:
Approximately how many times does the (present) government consult 
interest groups in your field of activity? (1 – never, 2 – (approx.) annually, 
3 – (approx.) biannually, 4 (approx.) monthly, 5 (approx.) weekly)
Approximately how many times did the previous government consult 
interest groups in your field of activity? (1 – never, 2 – (approx.). annually, 
3 – (approx.) biannually, 4 – monthly, 5 – weekly)
A high degree of continuity spanning beyond different governing coalitions 
would indicate relatively stable interest intermediation arrangements and that the 
government is not just consulting its temporarily preferred interest groups. This 
aspect comes into play, in particular, with Hungary and Poland, but arguably also 
with the Czech Republic (Hanley & Vachudova, 2018), which, according to vari-
ous observers, have been affected by “democratic backsliding” in the 2010s (Sata & 
Karolewski, 2020). This also enables us to explore Olejnik’s (2020) argument 
about “patronage corporatism” under “populist” governments.
To address the second ingredient of functional dimension, namely consensus- 
oriented relations between organized interests, we first asked two questions:
Do you think that opportunities for participation in the policy process 
are equally distributed among interest organizations? (1 – very much to 
the favour of other organizations, 2 – somewhat to the favour of other 
organizations, 3 – equally distributed, 4 – somewhat to the favour of our 
organization, 5 – very much to the favour of our organization)
To what extent do you assess the ability of your organization to assert 
its interests? (1 – very low, 2 – low, 3 – somewhat, 4 – high, 5 – very high)
As corporatism generally entails a strong degree of political exchange and co-
ordination between rivalling interests instead of open political competition, we 
asked:
Approximately how often does your organization consult with interest 
groups representing opposing interests in your area of activity? (1 – never, 
2 – (approx.) annually, 3 – (approx.) twice a year, 4 – (approx.) monthly, 
5 – (approx.) weekly)
We identified three main “ingredients” for the structural dimension: the trans-
fer of policy-making away from parliament, existence of a regular interest inter-
mediation body with a platform devoted to healthcare issues, a representation 
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monopoly for certain encompassing organizations, and the existence of self- 
managed, peak organizations of capital and labour (see below).
4 Empirical analysis
We broke down all responding healthcare organizations into subgroups based on 
structural features and focus of activity. We divided the organizations into “small 
organizations” (fewer than 500 members or 50 member institutions), “large or-
ganizations” (500 members or more and 50 institutional members or more), 
“umbrella organizations”, “non-umbrella organizations”. In pluralist constella-
tions, one would normally expect smaller organizations to have relatively equal 
access to decision-making bodies, whereas corporatist structures are generally 
characterized by representation monopolies of larger, encompassing “umbrella” 
organizations. Regarding their focus, we divided the organizations into “medi-
cal profession”, “patients’ groups”, “health employees” and “employers’ and em-
ployees’ organizations”.3
We also engage with the scholarly debate on public and state funding of in-
terest groups. Some scholars argue that public funding negatively influences in-
terest groups’ autonomy, while others contend that it boosts their access and 
participation (Crepaz et al., 2019). We therefore created a list of state-subsidized 
organizations. This also includes EU funds for healthcare, which are generally 
managed and distributed by the member states themselves (Nicolaides, 2018). In 
fact, Crepaz and Hanegraaff (2020) argue that many organizations would cease 
to exist without the EU funding.
Our survey respondents provide data on both national government subsidies 
and EU funds (allocated via national governments) which we both treat as state 
subsidies. We therefore set a threshold of at least 20% of organizations’ budg-
ets (both from national governments and EU subsidies)4 to classify them as the 
“subsidies group”. This enables us to test Olejnik’s (2020) argument that illiberal 
governments are giving incentives and privileges to certain organizations in ex-
change for political support.
4.1 Functional dimension of corporatism
All countries reported a low policy coordination and exchange with the state, 
especially Slovenian organized interests. Hungarian organizations, in general, 
report a somewhat higher level of political coordination than their Polish and 
Czech counterparts.
We would interpret the low aggregated score for Slovenia potentially as a 
reflection of corporatism, as the scores for the many responding smaller organiza-
tions likely watered down the overall score. Looking at umbrella organizations, 
we see a significantly higher score pointing to the existence of steady representa-
tion arrangements.
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We then measured the intensity of consultations between groups of interest 
associations and political parties in general. For Hungary, we observe an ex-
tremely low level of interactions with political parties. Not even umbrella, large 
or employers’ organizations reported consulting with parties more than once an-
nually. Polish organizations report more frequent political consultations, with a 
clear bias towards employers’ associations. In Slovenia, umbrella, large employ-
ees’ organizations (trade unions) report relatively frequent consultations with 
political parties from once to twice a year, while non-umbrella, employers’ 
and medical organizations almost never consult with parties. The reason could be 
that many Slovenian medical profession organizations view themselves as “apolitical 
organizations”, as reflected in numerous survey responses, whereas larger umbrellas 
and employees’ organizations consult with parties more often. The Czech situation 
is markedly different, where at least large umbrella organizations, employers’/hos-
pital organizations and employers relatively frequently engage with political parties.
As an indicator for the corporatist self-management of the healthcare sector, 
we measured the intensity of consultations with regulatory authorities. In all 
respective countries, both large and umbrella organizations consulted with regu-
latory authorities more frequently than others. Poland reported the most frequent 
consultations, together with Hungary exhibiting a small bias towards umbrella 
organizations and employers’ organizations, whereas patients’ organizations and 
the medical profession score rather low. In the Czech Republic, large groups 
FIGURE 5.1 Perceived level of policy coordination.
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demonstrated the highest score. Slovenian organizations again seem to exhibit 
an aversion to the political process. Instead of regularly consulting parties, em-
ployees’ organizations (trade unions) consult with regulatory authorities on a 
monthly basis, while large organizations indicate a moderate level (at least twice 
a year). Small and medical profession organizations rarely consult them though.
Assuming that corporatist arrangements remain stable over time, we compared 
the intensity of consultations between the present governments (Poland = the moder-
ately national-conservative PiS government, 2015–present; Hungary = the strongly 
national-conservative Fidesz government, 2010–present; Slovenia = the centre-left 
LMŠ (Lista Marjana Šarc), 2018–March 2020; Czech Republic = the liberal Ano 
/ Social Democratic ČSSD government, 2018–present) and previous governments 
(Poland = Civic Platform (PO) (2007–2015); Hungary = socialist MSZP – liberal 
SZDSZ (2004–2010); Slovenia = centre-right SDS (2014–2018); Czech Republic= 
ČSSD / Ano & Christian Democratic KDU-ČSL (2014–2018)).
For Poland, we observe no change in policy style between the liberal PO 
government (2007–2015) and the national-conservative PiS government (2015–
present). If anything, the current PiS government appears slightly more open to 
consultations with organized interests than the previous government, especially 
towards employees’ and umbrella organizations. In fact, we even see – at least for 
this indicator – a slight advantage for patients’ organizations, which are tradition-
ally more difficult to organize than professional interests. This was confirmed 
by one large umbrella patients’ organization in an interview ( July 2019) which 
cited the PiS government as being very open to consultations. Figure 5.4 only 
FIGURE 5.2 Consultations with political parties.
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FIGURE 5.3 Consultations with regulatory authorities.
FIGURE 5.4 Consultations with present and previous government: Poland.
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FIGURE 5.5 Consultations with present and previous government: Hungary.
lends very slight evidence to Olejnik’s “patronage corporatist” argument that 
national-conservative governments give preferential treatment to organizations, 
which they subsidize.
For Hungary, our findings also reflect stability. However, we do see a slight 
decline in consultations with patients and increase with the medical profession, 
a finding also confirmed by respondents’ comments. Returning to Olejnik’s 
argument, we see at best a minimal difference between subsidized and non- 
subsidized organizations.
Slovenian healthcare associations more frequently consult with the present 
government than the previous (centre-right) government.
For the Czech Republic, we see slightly more frequent consultations with the 
present Babiš government than before, especially for patients’ organizations, and 
also slight preferential treatment of organizations receiving state subsidies.
Our next illustrations reflect the views of interest organizations on their op-
portunities for political participation and their perceived influence. Apart from 
few exceptions, such as Polish small and large organizations, we see no major dif-
ference in perceived equality of opportunity for political participation regarding 
concentrated and diffused interests. All Czech groups of organizations reported 
being disadvantaged. In Hungary, government-subsidized organizations also 
seem themselves at a clear advantage over non-subsidized organizations, lending 
some evidence to Olejnik’s claim (2020). In Slovenia, healthcare organizations, 
in particular, employees’ and umbrella organizations, generally perceive their 
opportunities for political participation as relatively equally distributed, whereas 
patients report being disadvantaged in comparison with both other domestic 
organizations and their counterparts in the other CEE countries. Interestingly, 
Exploring interest intermediation 107
non-subsidized organizations assess their opportunity structures more favourably 
than government-funded organizations.
Figure 5.9 offers a mixed bag of partially eye-catching findings. In Poland 
and the Czech Republic, no group of organizations viewed its ability to assert 
its interests as low. In fact, in all four systems, patients see themselves as equally 
or even more assertive than medical organizations. The Polish system seems to 
FIGURE 5.6 Consultations with present and previous government: Slovenia.
FIGURE 5.7 Consultations with present and previous government: Czechia.
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better balance the interests of groups with diverse focuses and sizes, whereby our 
data contradict Olejnik’s argument of an advantage for subsidized organizations. 
The situation with the Czech Republic is also quite interesting: while all groups 
report being disadvantaged vis-à-vis other interest groups, they all also report a 
moderate to high ability to assert their interests in policy-making.
Finally, we explored whether CEE organizations engage in consultations with 
rivalling groups. Hungary stands out here. While nearly all Polish, Slovenian 
FIGURE 5.8 Perceptions of equal opportunities.
FIGURE 5.9 Ability to assert interests.
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and, in particular, Czech (groups of ) organized interests report at least annually 
or biannually consultations with rivalling interest groups, Hungarian organiza-
tions do not frequently coordinate with one another, pointing to a more stat-
ist mode of policy-making. In line with the corporatist paradigm, in the other 
countries, employers’ associations as well as various other umbrella organizations 
operating in the healthcare sector more frequently interact with organizational 
rivals, while Hungarian organizations seem to only engage with the state.
4.2 Structural dimension of corporatism
Now, we explore the forums in which consultations take place. Is decision- 
making transferred away from the parliament? Do intermediate coordination 
bodies exist? And do certain groups hold representation monopolies within them 
and elsewhere? To assess whether the organizations tend to engage in parliamen-
tary lobbying, which is less typical of corporatist systems, we asked:
How would you describe your level of participation in parliamentary hear-
ings/parliamentary committees? (1 – very weak, 2 – weak, 3 – moderate, 
4 – strong, 5 – very strong)
We found considerable variation by country. Most Polish organizations report 
a moderate level of parliamentary participation, and patients’ and other dif-
fused groups, such as non-umbrellas, even high participation, shedding doubt 
on the presence of corporatist structures, whereas Hungarian organizations are 
essentially not active in the parliament. Slovenia, by contrast, exhibits lower 
FIGURE 5.10 Consultations with rivals.
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parliamentary participation, an observation which also appears to apply to the 
Czech Republic, albeit to a lesser extent. In both countries though, healthcare 
employees are frequently involved in parliamentary hearings.
However, the disadvantage of the approach up to now is that aggregating 
organizations into groups makes it difficult to identify specific organizations 
frequently engaged in political consultations, i.e. acting as peak organizations. 
In other words, the aggregate scores of diverse organizations by type may wa-
ter down the impact of “outliers”, i.e. organizations with “representation 
monopolies”.
To further grasp the structural dimension of corporatism, we took two fur-
ther steps. Regarding intermediate governing bodies and the overall institutional 
set-up, we relied on survey responses to open questions, interviews and desk 
research. Then, we constructed a country-specific variable for “representation 
monopolies” to reflect specific organizations’ negotiation position. To do so, 
we aggregated all scores for all organizations for the frequency of “government 
consultations”, “consultations with parties” and “consultations with regulatory 
authorities” into one score per organization. For annual consultations, we gave 
each organization one point, for biannual consultations two points, for monthly 
consultations 12 points and for weekly consultations 52 points to roughly reflect 
the approximate frequency of actual consultations. Organizations not involved 
in any consultations are not included. For reasons of anonymity of our survey 
responses, we only indicate the areas of activity of the “major players” in each 
country.
4.2.1 Czech Republic
In the Czech Republic, the Ministry of Health plays a strong regulatory role, 
while the Council of Economic and Social Agreement of the Czech Republic 
(RHSD) was founded in 1990 to channel the dialogue between the govern-
ment, trade unions and employers (Navratil & Pospisil, 2014). A Working Group 
on Health Care operates within this institution. The health insurance system is 
based on seven funds, all of them governed within the tripartite system. Medical 
professionals are organized within chambers on compulsory basis as well as other 
voluntary organizations. The most prominent is the Czech Medical Chamber, 
despite limited support from its members (Kafonkova, 2007). The biggest health-
care trade unions, such as the Trade Union of Doctors and Union Association of 
Health and Social Care, negotiate wages in collective contracts with employers. 
The main politically active umbrella patient organization is the Czech Associa-
tion of Patients.
Despite these apparent efforts to formally establish a more corporatist mode 
of policy-making, numerous indicators in our data point in a more pluralistic 
direction. First, we see larger, umbrella organizations mainly focusing their ac-
tivities on political parties (see Figure 5.2) and, to a lesser extent, the parliament 
(Figure 5.11), while others, in particular patients, only seem to occasionally be 
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included. This is also reflected in our “consultation score”. Based on data pro-
vided for each organization per country, we calculated its total share participa-
tion in all total annual consultations, giving us an overview of which groups are 
most heavily involved.
FIGURE 5.11 Level of participation in parliamentary hearings.
FIGURE 5.12 Share of consultations by organizations: Czech Republic.
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Here, we see seven or eight organizations representing different fields of med-
icine and hospitals most heavily involved, whereas a highly pluralistic array of pa-
tients’ groups and other groups occasionally consult with the state. Nevertheless, 
Figure 5.9 shows that they are relatively successful in asserting their demands de-
spite the lacking representation monopoly of a large umbrella organization. This 
again supports Roberts’ finding (2009) that Czech political parties are highly 
open to civil society input and relatively quick to embrace their positions, but 
sheds some doubt on the institutionalization of corporatist structures including 
all key stakeholders.
4.2.2 Hungary
In Hungary, in 1980s, several new trade unions, professional and scientific as-
sociations were established, replacing the communist healthcare trade union. 
The largest were the Health Workers’ Democratic Union, the Federation of 
 Hungarian Medical Societies and the Hungarian Medical Chamber. In the 1990s 
and 2000s, patients’ associations grew in numbers and influence. Their partici-
pation was institutionalized in waiting list committees, in the National Health 
Council, in regional health councils and in hospital supervisory councils (Gaal 
et al., 2011). Today, a single health insurance fund provides coverage for the pop-
ulation, whereby the government exerts strong control over healthcare policy. 
The Ministry of Human Capacities administers the system through the National 
Healthcare Service Centre (ÁEEK). The parliament is responsible for determin-
ing the size of the health insurance budget. Since 2010, Hungary returned to the 
model of a single, monopolistic, government-friendly union confederation(s), 
followed by decentralized collective bargaining and union structures. This is a 
sign of a decline of tripartite corporatism (Neumann & Toth, 2018). In health-
care, which largely remains under governmental control, the power and density 
of trade unions are relatively higher than in other sectors. Currently, there is no 
tripartite social dialogue in the public sector in Hungary. The National Eco-
nomic and Social Council (NGTT, Nemzeti Gazdasági és Társadalmi Tanács), 
founded in February 2012, consists of the representatives of trade unions, in-
dustry chambers, various social and scientific organizations and even churches. 
It is not a consultative body as government representatives are merely observers 
on its sessions, and it can only draft proposals for the government. However, 
no patients’ organization is formally included, an observation also reflected in 
Figure 5.13.
Breaking down the share of consultations by individual organizations, it ap-
pears that many responding organizations (approx. 20) essentially never negotiate 
with the state (not shown in pie chart). In line with the literature cited above, 
we see a strong presence of trade unions, as some four or five groups primarily 
representing the medical profession appear to have a quasi-monopoly status in 
negotiations with the state.
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However, other than one organization representing patients with disabilities, 
both general and specific patient groups appear to be consulted seldom or never, 
a finding also confirmed by two responding large patients’ organizations who 
claim to be never included in dialogue or substantially consulted by the govern-
ment (May 2020; June 2020).
4.2.3 Poland
In Poland, healthcare governance – based on social health insurance – appears 
to be “a bit of everything”. The system is itself much more fragmented than the 
Hungarian system, as the Polish Ministry of Health shares governance duties 
with three levels of territorial self-governments. The state holds strong regula-
tory, budgetary and managerial powers, while corporate actors are not accorded 
a significant role in healthcare regulation (Wendt et al., 2013). The system relies 
on statutory health insurance with a growing role of the private sector.
Our data paint a relatively pluralistic picture regarding the share of consulta-
tions by organization. Here, we see two large employers’ organizations heavily 
involved in political consultations, but also frequent negotiations with various 
patients’ organizations and those dealing with specific diseases.
Under Law and Justice (PiS), many reforms were adopted, generally aimed at 
centralization and potentially heralding a shift towards more statist interest inter-
mediation (Szęściło, 2017). Poland also introduced in 2015 a tripartite dialogue 
FIGURE 5.13 Share of consultations by organizations: Hungary.
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body, Rada Dialogu Społecznego (Social Dialogue Council – RDS), which was 
indicated by various responding employers’ organizations to be an important fo-
rum. However, our data show that patients’ organizations continue to target the 
parliament (see Figure 5.11). Thus, the RDS seems to have further consolidated 
the already existing situation of intense consultations with the employers’ side to 
the neglect of the patients’ side. Therefore, healthcare policy-making seems to 
be very fragmented due to the scattered authority between the government and 
local governments as well as the openness of parliamentarians to discussions with 
the social stakeholders and interventions by the Ministry of Health. Many actors 
with non-peak status seek other points of contact, for example, Senior Councils 
(representing older people), whose advisory and consultative role in local health-
care decision-making is growing (Frączkiewicz-Wronka et al., 2019).
However, there are some contrary observations. In 2017, the Junior Doctors’ 
initiative carried out a hunger protest with a series of demands, including rais-
ing their salaries and increasing public expenditures for healthcare. During the 
protest, a treaty of all medical professions was signed. At first ignored by the 
government, strikes spread quickly among residents and specialists (Polak et al., 
2019). In order to strengthen their bargaining position, Junior Doctors joined the 
Nationwide Trade Union of Doctors (OZZL) and succeeded in achieving their 
goals. Even though OZZL is not formally part of RDS, the umbrella of a large, 
representative professional organization facilitated the negotiations. This showed 
that despite declining trade union power and density in general, institutionalized 
trade union umbrellas and bureaucracy still matter in healthcare.
FIGURE 5.14 Share of consultations by organizations: Poland.
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4.2.4 Slovenia
The Slovenian political system offers healthcare interest groups numerous im-
portant points of access. It is unique to the extent that the National Council 
(Državni svet) functions directly as the representative of organized interests of a 
socio-economic, professional and local character within the legislative system. 
It does not write or block legislation itself; rather its elected “councillors” from 
academic, civil society and healthcare have a corrective function in the legislative 
process. Medical professionals are traditionally gathered in medical chambers 
that administer and regulate their licensing, continuous education and training, 
as well as voluntary NGOs, such as the Slovenian Medical Association.
In 1994, as a result of an agreement on wage policy, the Economic and Social 
Council (ESC) was also established and still functions as an important tripartite 
body for social partners and the government. Within the ESC, the Commit-
tee on the Organization of the State and Public Affairs address issues regarding 
healthcare policy. The social health insurance system, operated by a single pur-
chaser, is backed by the voluntary, supplementary insurance with almost full 
coverage of the population. The system is relatively centralized with a leading 
role of the Ministry of Health and National Council at various stages of decision- 
making, as indicated by various survey respondents. Social partners play a dual 
role in welfare state matters: an advisory role through the ESC and an adminis-
trative role through their own representatives in the tripartite boards of the Insti-
tute for Pension and Disability Insurance (IPDI), the Health Insurance Institute 
of  Slovenia (HIIS) and the Employment Service of Slovenia (ESS) (Albreht et al., 
2016). Several trade unions represent the interests of health professionals, such 
as the Slovenian Union of Physicians and Dentists, the Slovenian Health Service 
and Social Service Union, the Federation of Slovenian Free Unions (Healthcare 
and Social Care Union Department) and the Union of Healthcare Workers of 
Slovenia. Several health-related NGOs are active in the system. Patient organi-
zations are often invited to participate in the drafting of policies and regulations 
in their specific area. However, there is no umbrella organization representing 
organized patients’ interests (Bugaric & Kuhelj, 2015).
Looking at the share of consultations by organization, Slovenia presents the 
most balanced picture of our four countries and largely reflects the considerations 
above, with healthcare workers, professionals, administrators and the medical pro-
fessions being relatively equally represented. However, the survey data also reflect 
the lack of a large patients’ organizations, rather a multitude of smaller, specialized 
patients’ organizations (not labelled) who are able to make themselves heard.
5 Comparative corporatism scores
What do all these data tell us? Following Jahn’s (2016) lead, we calculated a 
“corporatism score” for healthcare policy-making in each country taking all the 
survey results and our broader research into account. To do so, we defined ten 
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indicators for the functional and structural dimensions with a maximum score of 
5 points, resulting in 50 as a maximum value.
For the functional dimension, we calculated the average scores for all or-
ganizations for the following variables on a 1–5 scale: perceived level of policy 
coordination, consultations with political parties, consultations with regulatory 
authorities, consultations with the present and previous government. Regarding 
the latter, to grasp the stability over time, we opted to award 1 or 2 points for a 
decrease in the stability of consultations, 3 points for no change and 4–5 points 
for an increase in consultations. Regarding consensus-oriented relations between 
organized interests, we included the score for “consultations with rivals” of all 
organizations on 1–5 scales, again based on the survey outcomes. Assuming that 
patients’ organizations are traditionally at a structural disadvantage, we calcu-
lated patients’ “perception of equal opportunities”.
Then, we looked at the structural dimension by assessing whether a reg-
ular institutionalized intermediation body exists. In each country, except for 
Hungary, we identified an institutionalized, tripartite consultation platform 
with a healthcare working group operating within in: i.e. Czech Republic – 
the  Tripartita – Council of Economic and Social Agreement (RHDS), Poland – 
 Social Dialogue Council (RDS), Slovenia – Economic and Social Council (ESS). 
Here, based on secondary literature and survey comments, we granted maximum 
5 points: one for the existence of a tripartite body, one for the existence of a health-
care dialogue platform within the body, then one for the inclusion of patients’ 
representatives and from 1 to 2 points depending on the number of health-related 
topics on the political agenda (number of health-related meetings).5
FIGURE 5.15 Share of consultations by organizations: Slovenia.
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TABLE 5.1  “Corporatism score” in CEE healthcare policy-making
Dimension Ingredient Variable Czech 
Republic

















































































Sum 27.66 24.23 24.64 28.38 50
Then, we used our survey question regarding parliamentary lobbying (1–5 
points) as a sign of non-corporatist policy-making. The scores were reversed 
from the original values in the survey: the higher the parliamentary access per 
country, the fewer corporatism points given. To reflect representation monopo-
lies of certain encompassing organizations, we calculated what share of all annual 
consultations the most frequently consulted groups6 participate in, and trans-
posed this number to a 1–5 scale.
Our aggregate “corporatism score” shows Slovenia in the lead, with almost 
60% of possible points. This is a result of a combination of the existence of 
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two bodies for civil interest intermediation, both within the legislature with the 
National Council (Državni svet) and outside through the Economic and Social 
Council (ESC), but also high scores for consultations with regulatory authorities 
and a high perception of equal opportunities. As a further sign of corporatism, 
we also find strong interactions between healthcare employers and employees, 
the latter of which, in particular, reported a high level of policy coordination and 
exchange with the state. In other words, Slovenian healthcare policy-making is 
not characterized by unfettered competition among interest groups, rather its rel-
atively consensual and non-political nature, as noted by numerous respondents, 
in particular several rivalling umbrella organizations (see Figure 5.10).
However, our data show that Slovenian healthcare is not as extremely corpo-
ratist as in Jahn’s (2015) ranking for socio-economic issues. We would attribute 
this to the relatively weak position of patients, who are not organized in an 
umbrella organization in the main corporatist intermediation bodies. Hence, 
we would classify Slovenian healthcare as moderately corporatist, to the ad-
vantage of various healthcare trade unions and partial disadvantage to 
patients’ organizations.
Again in contrast to Jahn’s classification, the Czech Republic scores relatively 
close to Slovenia regarding healthcare. It constitutes an interesting case, because 
political parties, and not the parliament, are the main targets for interest groups 
(see also Roberts, 2009). As a sign of more corporatist policy-making, respond-
ing organizations, in particular umbrella organizations, report the highest fre-
quency of consultations with rivalling organizations. Czech organizations also 
demonstrate the highest self-perceived influence of organized interests, whereby 
diffused interests (e.g. patients) and non-umbrellas see themselves as equally 
influential as umbrellas and representative medical profession associations. We 
also see patients’ groups as being relatively fragmented and only occasionally 
involved in governmental consultations despite their declared strong influence. 
Czech healthcare organizations also aggregately report an intensification of con-
sultations under the Babiš government. Therefore, it remains to be seen whether 
this will push the existing emerging moderately corporatist system with pluralist 
elements further towards the corporatist ideal type.
In Hungary, healthcare organizations seem to downright avoid the parliament 
and political parties. However, we would not interpret this as a sign of corporat-
ism, rather as a reflection of the relatively closed nature of the political system (see 
Sata & Karolewski, 2020). Along these lines, our data confirm that Hungary is 
the country in which healthcare organizations have the weakest ability to assert 
their interests (see Figure 5.9) and in which organizations least frequently engage 
with rivalling interests. Similarly to Slovenia, we see signs of representation mo-
nopolies of medical and healthcare professionals, who strongly engage in political 
coordination with the state, whereas patients (other than one disabilities’ organ-
ization) are at a disadvantage. We would therefore classify Hungary somewhere 
between a one-sided, moderately corporatist and technocratic statist sys-
tem of interest intermediation.
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Poland, the second least corporatist country in the list with less than half of pos-
sible points, is arguably the polar opposite of Hungary. Organized interests report 
good access to parliamentary bodies, in particular more “diffuse” groups such 
as patients and non-umbrellas. We also found no marked difference in the level 
of political coordination between government-subsidized and non- subsidized 
groups. There are also few signs of representation monopolies, although one large 
patients’ organization and several smaller patients’ organizations reported a high 
to moderate level of coordination with the state. Particularly noticeable is also the 
strong level of political coordination between several large employers’ organiza-
tions and the state, political parties and regulatory authorities. Thus, on the one 
hand, interest organizations do form and shape the political process and political 
institutions appear to be much more accessible for traditionally weaker interest 
groups (e.g. patients) than in Hungary. We also see a higher level of coordination 
between organizational rivals than in Hungary. On the other hand, the Polish 
healthcare interest intermediation system remains organizationally fragmented 
and structurally less corporatist than Slovenia, as the Council for Social Dialogue 
(which still formally excludes patients’ organizations) has only been recently in-
troduced. Therefore, we would classify Polish healthcare interest intermediation 
as more pluralist with emerging corporatist structures, which according 
to our data enable a relative balance of concentrated (e.g. employers, medical 
profession) and diffuse interests (patients’) in terms of asserting interests.
6 Concluding remarks
Exploring interest intermediation structures in post-communist policy-making 
posed numerous challenges. Besides a complex specification of the dependent var-
iable, clear-cut categorization of organizations and identification of outliers in the 
given structures, we must cope with the reality that interest configurations may still 
differ within individual policy areas. For example, interest mobilization for hospital 
reform may play out entirely differently than reforms of patients’ rights or the regu-
lation of pharmaceuticals. Nevertheless, our respondents have provided us a wealth 
of information to map out the broader contours of the policy-making process. Our 
dual approach of aggregating scores for different groups of organizations for multi-
ple dimensions of corporatism and later singling out organizations with or without 
quasi-representation monopolies enabled us to show both broader cross-country 
trends while also pinpointing country-specific interest intermediation networks.
Our data show that all four interest intermediation systems are roughly half-
way towards fully fledged corporatism, with Slovenia in the lead, Hungary 
maintaining strong components of the statist paradigm and Poland and the Czech 
Republic being more pluralist. Our aggregated data also indicate that health-
care policy-making in all four countries is more consultative than in the past. 
Moreover, we found only little to no evidence for Olejnik’s (2020) assump-
tion of favouritism towards state-subsidized groups (“patronage corporatism”), 
as both state-funded and independently funded organizations declared similar 
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perception of equal opportunities, influence and the frequency of consultations 
in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. However, this claim should be 
subject to further research, with both aggregate data and individual case studies. 
Therefore, we encourage scholars to conduct case studies on individual reform 
processes not only to test our aggregate findings, but also to better understand 
the opportunities and limits for action of organized interests in the emerging 
corporatist arrangements. And most importantly, this would enable us to un-
derstand whether and when the demands and preferences of key stakeholders are 
translated into concrete policy changes.
Notes
 1 Czech Republic 14th place, Slovenia 21st place, Poland 32nd place, Hungary 33rd 
place in European comparison regarding self-evaluations of healthcare outcomes.
 2 Several were only applicable to economic policy (e.g. works councils, worker 
co-determination).
 3 Due to data inconsistencies between countries, we did not include the pharmaceuti-
cal industry and medical devices manufacturers.
 4 We stick to 20% as it constitutes a significant share of organizations’ budgets, 
greatly affecting their capacity to act. Also, the 20% cut-off is a logical baseline 
due to the dispersion of our gathered data (i.e. few borderline cases such as 
19% or 21%).
 5 We checked on the websites of tripartite bodies whether healthcare issues are dealt 
with frequently (approx. once a month) or seldom.
 6 i.e. what share of all consultations the four to six largest groups (depending on 
country- spread) account for.
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PART 3




Combating climate change by reducing greenhouse gas emissions, improving 
energy efficiency, and promoting wider usage of renewable energy sources is of 
the highest importance on the EU’s political agenda. The European Green Deal 
is one of the most ambitious priorities announced in President Ursula von der 
Leyen’s political guidelines. However, many countries from the post-Soviet bloc 
still remain coal-dependent, and their visions to move away from fossil fuels 
substantially vary from those promoted by the EU, which are heavily focused on 
renewables.
Decisions impacting the environment, climate, and energy are supported 
or contested by various interested parties. Businesses and industry may lobby 
for laxer standards, less stringent enforcement, and later compliance deadlines; 
whereas, green activists lobby against them (Heyes & Liston-Heyes, 2005). They 
instead advocate for lower emissions, stricter norms of environmental protection, 
and more urgent enforcement. The threat of impending environmental EU reg-
ulations forces stakeholders to choose the timing and levels of strategic responses 
on a continuum from passive to active (Clement, Bamford & Douglas, 2008).
Together with the growing body of research dedicated to this topic, scholars 
have become better informed about green advocacy (GA) movements and their 
impact on the policy process (Heyes & King, 2020). In the post-communist 
world, in which the culture of political participation remains at relatively low 
levels, GA has its own specifics, making environmental policy one of the most 
intriguing in the region. This has stimulated scholarly interest in the Central 
and Eastern Europe (CEE) advocacy organizations, their origin, resources, ways 
of operating, and contribution to the legitimacy and accountability of political 
decision-making. Still, the governmental – societal relationship in the climate 
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and energy domain notoriously remains an under-studied field, which requires 
further scientific exploration. Additionally, although scholars of GA often make 
comparisons to other interest organizations, there has been little systematic anal-
ysis of what distinguishes GA groups from other interest groups operating in 
energy and climate policy domains. This chapter aims to fill this research gap, 
by focusing on CEE.
The shared experience of the post-communist world (central planning and 
authoritarian rule) includes, among other things, a common legacy of environ-
mental neglect, inefficient energy usage, limited deposits of natural resources, 
and increasing energy competition and prices. While environmental concerns, 
as exemplified by the climate change issue, are at the forefront of the political 
debate, GA organizations focused on a green future across CEE occupy a some-
what ambiguous position in the spectrum of climate and energy stakeholders. 
They are a relatively new phenomenon and promoting an ecological agenda pits 
them against the current status quo agents – at least in some countries of the re-
gion, such as Poland. However, such groups enjoy a special mandate from the 
EU, as their environmental acquis and financial resources provide them with new 
tools to reach their aims (Börzel & Buzogany, 2010). GA groups by nature share 
an ambition to shape energy and climate policies. They may help to formulate 
and implement an environmentally friendly political course by recognizing and 
building public awareness about specific problems and solutions. However, it is 
critical for them to gain access to the policy-making apparatus, which is the focus 
point of this analysis.
Therefore, this chapter explores the position of GA groups compared to other 
energy and climate advocacy groups. We focus on GA in four selected CEE 
countries – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia – and examine 
what kind of resources (including financial stability, levels of professionalization, 
and various types of expertise) enable them to gain access to executive bodies, 
i.e., governing parties and regulatory authorities. Methodologically, the chapter 
relies on descriptive and inferential statistics using survey data.
In the following, we outline the theoretical framework based on the resource 
mobilization literature with special attention to its linkages to access to executive 
bodies. Then, we provide an overview of the GA landscape in CEE, which has 
blossomed in the past years. In the next section, we explain our research design 
by introducing the hypotheses, their operationalization, and how we test them. 
The data analysis is followed by a discussion and concluding remarks.
2  Resource mobilization and executive bodies –  
a theoretical framework
The question of interest group representation is strongly rooted in the social 
sciences, and the roles and interactions of social actors have been the subject of 
interest of public policy researchers for years. Various theoretical approaches and 
perspectives are applied in interest group research, which include both the studies 
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of their types and functions, as well as institutional conditions and related strate-
gies of interest representation. There is also an extensive and growing literature 
on interest organizations in the environmental context and, more generally, GA 
as social movement, civic society ‘syndromes, or interest group is an increasingly 
popular object of scientific inquiry.
The role of GA in the policy process can be understood by applying several 
theories, including identity-oriented theories, social responses, resource mobili-
zation, and others. This study is rooted in resource mobilization theory, which 
focuses on the salience of acquired resources (e.g., monetary, staff, expertise, etc.) 
and the ability to use them. This approach correlates closely with rational-choice 
explanations, as it perceives policy stakeholders as rational decision-makers who 
weigh costs and benefits when deciding whether taking action is worth the time 
and effort.
Scholars employ a variety of analytical lenses when investigating interest 
groups’ linkages with the policy-making process. Rational-choice assumptions – 
which are at the core of this chapter – highlight the added value of access strate-
gies. Sociological institutionalism views interest group engagement largely as an 
effect of participatory norm diffusion and the logic of appropriateness. Interest 
groups’ participation in the policy-making process is conditioned by many ex-
ogenous and endogenous factors (Dür & De Bièvre, 2007). The first group of 
factors is the institutional environment, understood as the nature of the political 
system, the infrastructure of intermediation of interests, the degree of openness 
of the policy-making apparatus, election funding, or applicable lobbying regula-
tions. The second group of factors is strongly connected with the interest groups’ 
characteristics such as the size, degree of concentration or dispersion, internal 
structure, nature of membership, financial resources, expert knowledge, hier-
archy of power, level of representativeness, and ability to take collective action 
or various aspects of professionalization. The third group of factors refers to the 
nature of a given policy in which stakeholders are involved, including its level of 
relevance, salience, and complexity.
In this chapter, we rely in particular on the resource-dependency theory to 
examine to what extent selected resources (including finances, levels of pro-
fessionalization, various types of expertise, etc.) condition access to executive 
bodies. Scholars have produced a great deal of studies testing how various types 
of resources determine the interest groups’ access to the policy-making apparatus 
(Beyers & Kerremans, 2007), often relying on resource mobilization (McCar-
thy & Zald, 1977) and exchange relationship theories (Berkhout, 2013). In this 
approach, bureaucrats and interest groups interact due to the mutual need for 
resources. However, the ability to provide resources is strongly connected with 
the interest group type.
According to the access and exchange of resources model (Bouwen, 2004), 
resources are the most important factor conditioning access to decision-making 
processes. There is an ongoing exchange process between interest groups and 
decision-makers, while selected resources, such as expert knowledge, constitute 
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the good desired by decision-makers (Woll, 2007). A prominent hypothesis in 
interest group research is that resource-rich groups are more successful. Resource 
exchange can therefore either result in stronger influence over policy outputs or 
at least greater access to decision-makers (Dür & De Bièvre, 2007).
A normative assessment of the political role of interest groups depends on how 
much power interest groups have, and how power is distributed among different 
groups (Dür & De Bièvre, 2007). Several of them are worth mentioning, for 
example, the alignments with political actors or the resources available for mobi-
lization. Internal group resources, such as the number of members and financial 
and professional staff resources can affect their options for engaging in intensive 
efforts to influence politics (Baumgartner & Leech, 1998; Christiansen & Nør-
gaard, 2006). The lack of resources might force groups to restrict themselves to a 
narrow range of activities, and abundant resources may enable groups to engage 
in a wide range of activities (Gais & Walker, 1991).
Since measuring influence is a problematic enterprise in political science, an 
alternative approach can be taken (Huberts & Kleinnijenhuis, 1994). Using ‘the 
logic of access’ instead of focusing on impact, we explore the factors that shape 
access to institutions. Several models can be identified here. The ‘direct effect’ 
model captures situations in which the interest groups interact with the govern-
ment or its branches, directly. The ‘mediated effect’ model grasps how environ-
mental groups affect public opinion to raise general awareness and consciousness. 
In this scheme, public opinion acts as an intervening variable between and among 
societal environmental groups and the governmental policy-making capacity. The 
‘political alliance model’ sees ecological groups using support by powerful allies 
inside institutional arenas and providing support to governmental officials (Tar-
row, 1994). In this approach, organized interests focus on different political arenas 
in accordance with their goal and then match their resources to the demands of 
gate-keepers (Binderkrantz, Christiansen & Pedersen, 2014). In this chapter, we 
focus exclusively on the ‘direct effect’ by examining the interest groups’ access 
to two types of executive bodies: political parties in power and public admin-
istration. Based on the literature, we assume that the executive is important for 
energy organizations: according to Gais and Walker (1991), organizations aiming 
to participate in the preparation and implementation of policies are more likely to 
approach bureaucrats. Scholars distinguish between the two organizational levels 
of the executive branch: the political executive (governing party or coalition) and 
public administration (inter alia regulatory authorities) (Egeberg, 2007). The basis 
for this distinction is the separation of political (fundamental) decisions belonging 
to the government from executive and technical decisions (administrative routine) 
that are the responsibility of the administration.
3 Green advocacy in Central Eastern Europe
Research dedicated to GA has been a well-established part of scholarship grow-
ing parallel to environmental advocacy evolving on the ground. There are 
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interdisciplinary studies focusing on the economic (Heyes & Liston-Heyes, 
2005), political (Grossmann, 2006), societal (Holt, 2019), or business (Hung-Che 
& Ching-Chan, 2017) dimensions. Relatively, little has been published on inter-
est groups’ impact on the enforcement of environmental law (for a notable excep-
tion, see Hofmann, 2019) and even less on the earlier stages of the policy cycle. 
‘Green Advocacy’ as a descriptive term embraces both private and public interest 
organizations, acting in favor of a green future, no matter if the motivation is 
profit or idea. The common denominator is raising awareness of environmental 
issues, promoting green capital and technology ( Jones, 2008), protesting green-
house emissions, and climate protection. Advocacy by various green actors helps 
to reach new levels of trust and commitment and develop transparency, dialogue, 
and partnership (Hung-Che & Ching-Chan, 2017). Such a categorization goes 
hand in hand with some conceptualizations present in the early political science 
research in the field, which favored pluralistic explanations of interest group eco-
systems, emphasizing their goals over their organizational features and objectives 
over their incentives (Smith, 1984).
The field of GA research, as well as scholarly investigations on other organized 
interests, have blossomed in the past decades. There are many streams of scien-
tific investigations addressing various aspects of green activism, its sources, inspi-
rations, ways of manifesting, access to the policy process, its influence on political 
decisions, and related issues. Some scholars explored factors that determine the 
formation, mobilization, and dynamics of ecological groups (Steel et al., 2003; 
Wapner, 1996). Other subfields address whether and how green activists’ de-
mands are heard during various phases of the policy formation (Fiorino, 1996; 
Güney, 2015). Other scholars (Börzel & Buzogany, 2010; Lafferty & Meadow-
croft, 1996; Mason, 1999) focus on the inclusive capacity of governments when 
processing specific climate or energy policy issues.
GA groups are a specific type of interest organizations as they engage in the 
defense of public goods that are not attributed to any specific individual(s) or 
group(s). They mobilize resources (material, expertise, membership, etc.), expos-
ing themselves to the potential ‘free-rider’ problem, as the incentives for partic-
ipation are less individually-attributed than in the case of classical lobbyists. As 
claimed by Hansen (1985), people are more likely to participate in environmental 
activism if the object of collective action is the prevention of a ‘collective bad’, 
rather than the creation of ‘collective good’.
At the beginning of the transition, CEE countries were struggling with the 
problem of energy dependence, the lack of diversification of energy suppliers, 
and old energy infrastructure. Most of the efforts during the transition were 
focused on economic shock therapy and recovery understood as a massive inflow 
of foreign direct investments. Thus, ecological standards were generally not a 
priority. Meanwhile, transnational corporations have been recognized as major 
contributors to environmental problems worldwide (Wescott, 1992). Environ-
mental protection was sacrificed during the process of opening up to the western 
world. As a result, the carbon intensity of the economic output in most CEE 
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countries is above the EU average today. According to the Emissions Database 
for Global Atmospheric Research, the Czech Republic and Poland emit 0.3 tons 
of CO2 per $1,000 of GDP; Slovenia and Hungary, 0.2 tons.
The post-communist states differed not only in the starting points as regards 
their energy mixes, but also various aspects of policy-making. The transition 
process brought about changes and opened up a field for action for various in-
terest groups. Public ownership of the means of production meant that natural 
resources were often treated as free goods. Environmental problems were at-
tributed to the imperfections in planning and poor economic governance. The 
specific context of the post-communist transformations affected environmental 
groups’ activity and behavior. Most of them were neglected for many years. Later 
on, the Europeanization pressures for the energy transition appeared, while the 
‘climate change’ agenda became an influential factor shaping the energy agendas 
of CEE countries and supporting selected green interest groups.
Despite similarities and the shared post-communist legacy, the energy and 
climate policies of Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia differ. 
According to the reports of the European Environment Agency, Poland’s at-
mosphere is one of the most contaminated by carcinogenic benzopyrene among 
all the EU countries, exceeding the concentration of 1 ng/m3. The main cause 
of high CO2 emissions and dramatically bad air quality is the coal-based power 
industry (Skoczkowski et al., 2018). No matter who has governed since 1990, 
the mining sector was always under government protection (see Kubin in this 
volume). The newest strategic plan for energy by 2040 assumes that the Polish 
energy mix will be still based on coal (50%–60%), renewables (21%–23%), and 
nuclear power. In the Czech Republic, coal-fired power plants are the source of 
approximately 40% of its produced electricity. The government wants to phase 
most of it out over the next 20 years, replacing part of it with new nuclear power 
plants as well as gas, renewables, and energy imports. The attitude of the gov-
ernment toward renewable energy sources is still complex and reflects patterns of 
externally imposed standards (Gamze & Petr, 2020). Naturally poor in fossil fuel 
resources, Hungary is highly dependent on external fossil fuel; as close to 90% 
of its total primary energy supply comes from foreign fossil and nuclear sources. 
It also lags behind other European countries in terms of renewables (Vadovics, 
2019). In Slovenia, oil is the main energy source (45%). Electricity production 
is based on hydropower, nuclear energy, and coal, and the government plans to 
maintain this status quo (Živčič, 2019).
The skepticism of these CEE countries to the EU’s climate neutrality goal 
should not only be seen in the light of the tremendous costs of energy transfor-
mation and defending the national status quo. Most of these countries are moving 
toward more green energy usage but at their own conditions and pace. Today, 
their share of energy from renewable sources is among the lowest across the EU: 
11% in Poland, 12% in Hungary, 15% in Czechia, and up to more ambitious 21% 
in Slovenia, which is close to the EU average (EUROSTAT, 2018). Common 
to the countries is their strong declared focus on strengthening other energy 
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sources after their initial resistance toward the European Green Deal. While most 
of them (apart from Poland) pledged to leave carbon as a source of energy, they 
declared their will to develop nuclear power rather than renewables, which is 
not in line with the European Commission strategy and might cause further 
resistance in the future. This is why it is important to shed some light on the GA 
groups in the region, who seem to be torn between national interests and their 
own interests, which are consistent with the EU objectives.
4 Hypotheses, research design, and methods
Bearing in mind the above-mentioned state of knowledge on GA in CEE as well 
as theoretical claims on access to the decision-making apparatus, we launch our 
study of empirical material with the starting assumption that the group type and 
resources matter for interest group access. Against this background, we derive 
three more specific hypotheses related to resources.
Expertise is recognized as a key resource in knowledge-intense sectors 
( Peterson, 2018) such as climate and energy. It remains critical both internally (for 
group members) and externally (as exchange good for decision-makers) (Beyers, 
Eising & Maloney, 2008). However, there are different theoretical expectations 
regarding various types of expertise and the match between the provided and 
demanded information (Hanegraaff et al., 2019). According to Bouwen (2004), 
 parliamentarians – who remain under relatively direct electoral control – are 
likely to favor political support information on voters’ preferences, whereas ex-
ecutive decision-makers are more focused on scientific and technical expertise. 
Other researchers focus rather on the type of interest groups providing the exper-
tise, arguing that citizens’ groups are more likely to pass valuable information on 
public preferences to policy-makers (Flöthe, 2020). The innovative nature of the 
green transition requires high levels of expertise among environmental activists, 
renewable energy businesses, and other actors involved in the decision-making 
process. Based on these findings, we predict that various types of expertise (scien-
tific, legal, and economic) will be positively correlated with interest group access:
Hypothesis 1: Expertise resources facilitate interest group access to executive 
bodies.
Organizational theories rooted in the sociology of organizations emphasize pro-
fessionalization as a structure and process that refers, for example, to the crea-
tion of positions requiring a high degree of qualification in terms of educational 
training and relevant working experience (Kubicek & Welter, 1985). Accord-
ing to Salamon (2012), professionalization is a shift in organizational staffing 
and operations, representing an increasing reliance on a paid worker with spe-
cialized knowledge gained through formal education (Hwang & Powell, 2009; 
Salamon, 2012). In other words, professionalization may be understood as a pro-
cess of transformation of the internal structures of interest groups toward more 
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professionalized practices. Some scholars argue that professionalization differs 
systematically across the interest group types, whereas others suggest that insti-
tutional pressures lead to converging professionalization patterns so that different 
types of groups are similarly professionalized (Klüver & Saurugger, 2013). The 
professionalization of interest groups certainly may vary across different sectors 
of activity. For instance, some groups may be more focused on internal devel-
opment and member empowerment, whereas other groups will be less oriented 
toward professionalization. However, in our study, we are less focused on the 
process of professionalization itself but rather on how increasing professionaliza-
tion (in terms of human resource and organizational development – two varia-
bles covering two aspects of the professionalization) enhances access.
Hypothesis 2: Interest groups with large professionalization resources enjoy better
access to executive bodies than less professionalized groups.
 
Interest groups can also substantially vary in terms of financial resources. This 
variable is recognized as a typical resource used in influencing the decision- 
makers (Woll, 2007). Although some scholars argue that money has little meas-
urable effect on policy outcomes (Baumgartner et al., 2014), we assume that 
it allows interest groups to literally purchase other resources and therefore can 
facilitate access to executive decision-making. Moreover, for CEE GA groups, 
who operate on unfavorable domestic grounds, money can be a critically impor-
tant resource. The green agenda is exceptionally strong in the EU, and Brussels 
perceives various types of GA organizations as vital for its democratic decision- 
making process. Hence, it sometimes financially stimulates their involvement 
in policy-making. The EU fund dependency is understandably one of the main 
ways in which Europeanization is operationalized in interest group studies 
(Beyers, 2002; Beyers & Kerremans, 2007; Dür, 2008; Klüver, 2011; Maloney, 
Hafner-Fink & Fink-Hafner, 2018; see Chapter 9 in this volume), making EU 
funding a legitimate sub-variable in analyzing financial resources in GA in CEE. 
However, we hypothesize more generally that financial resource-rich organiza-
tions will enjoy better access to the policy-making apparatus, having in mind this 
important sub-variable.
Hypothesis 3: Financial resources of interest groups translate into better access to 
executive bodies.
To measure the role of selected resources on access to executive bodies, we rely 
on quantitative research: a large-scale online survey was conducted among the 
representative samples of interest groups in climate and energy in four respec-
tive countries (total N=117) (see Introduction and Annex). Unlike conventional 
scholarly classifications by the nature of interest (diffused/concentrated, public/
private, cause/sectional), we rather employ a wider, ecumenical approach of GA 
groups, which includes both green business organizations (focused on renewa-
bles) and green environmental protection activists. This group is juxtaposed with 
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all the other energy policy actors, including general energy organizations as well 
as fossil and nuclear organizations. This selection is backed by the Green Deal 
approach for Europe, which promotes renewable energy while pushing national 
agendas to transform existing energy mixes. Both ‘opposing’ groups represent a 
quite similar sample in terms of numbers.
The dependent variable was constructed based on the obtained data regarding 
‘access to governing parties’ and ‘access to regulatory authorities’. Access demon-
strates not only how inclusive the authorities are but also how influential the con-
crete interests are. It is a two-way street in which society and politicians meet and 
interact. As far as access to governmental institutions is concerned, if opportunity 
structures are perceived by interest organizations as closed, they will refrain from 
input attempts or try alternative access strategies. Therefore, we asked:
How difficult is it to access governing parties? (1 – extremely difficult, 2 – difficult, 
3 – sometimes possible, 4 – easy, and 5 – extremely easy)
How difficult is it to access regulatory authorities? (1 – extremely difficult, 
2 –  difficult, 3 – sometimes possible, 4 – easy, 5 – extremely easy)
The first independent variable comprises financial resources. We asked re-
spondents to indicate to what extent their organization is focused on fundraising 
activities compared to 1015 years ago, again using an ordinal scale from 1 to 5 
(1 – much less, 2 – less, 3 – the same, 4 – more, 5 – much more). In the next 
step, we asked about the general share of EU funds in their budgets, and for the 
purposes of the statistical analysis, we recorded these data to present them on 
an ordinal scale from 1 to 5 (much less – much more). To measure scientific, 
economic, and legal specialized expertise, we asked our respondents to indicate 
the importance of provided expertise/information for their influence on policy 
outcomes using a 1 to 3 ordinal scale (1 – unimportant, 2 – somewhat important, 
3 – very important). To measure professionalization, we asked our respondents to 
what extent their organization is focused on general organizational and human 
resources development compared to 10–15 years ago, again using an ordinal scale 
from 1 to 5 (1 – much less, 2 – less, 3 – the same, 4 – more, 5 – much more).
We first analyzed our data using descriptive statistics to picture the general trends 
observable in access to executive bodies. Since the collected data were largely pre-
sented on ordinal scales, we carried out an ordinal regression (Polytomous universal 
model) that incorporates the ordinal nature of the dependent variables.
5 Data analysis
In line with the presented research design, we begin with a short descriptive 
analysis of the dependent variables reflecting the means of access to governing 
parties and regulatory authorities. In general, for all energy groups across CEE, 
regulatory authorities seem to be more accessible. Both types of energy organ-
izations aggregately indicated having at least ‘sometimes possible’ access to reg-
ulatory authorities, with other energy interest groups indicating close to ‘easy’. 
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As regards the access to governing parties, both types indicated that it is ‘diffi-
cult’, with other energy groups indicating close to ‘sometimes possible’ access. Gen-
erally, in every analyzed country, other energy organizations enjoyed better access 
to both types of executive bodies than GA groups. The only exception was Hun-
gary, where GA groups indicated significantly higher access to governing parties.
FIGURE 6.1 Access to governing parties.
Note: 1 – extremely difficult, 2 – difficult, 3 – sometimes possible, 4 – easy, 5 – extremely easy.
FIGURE 6.2 Access to regulatory authorities.
Note: 1 – extremely difficult, 2 – difficult, 3 – sometimes possible, 4 – easy, 5 – extremely easy.
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As mentioned above, our two dependent variables are ‘access to regulatory 
bodies’ (Table 6.1) and ‘access to governing parties’ (Table 6.2). Both variables 
previously measured on a five-point Likert scale were recoded into three-point 
scales from 1 – (extremely) difficult, 2 – sometimes possible and 3 – (extremely) 
easy to facilitate our interpretation. As independent variables, we used three 
groups of explanatory variables, tested in different models. First, we tested the 
role of different types of expertise for each organization to determine whether 
provided specialized knowledge may be the key to the political process. Orig-
inally measured on three-point scales scientific, economic, and legal expertise 
was added to our analysis. The second group of independent variables comprises 
three professionalization factors. We categorized professionalization into three 
different categories: focus on organizational development, focus on fundraising, 
and focus on human resources over the last 10 – 15 years. We also added an EU 
fund variable to test whether European funding plays a role for interest groups 
in accessing policy-makers. We also measured whether the group type in terms 
of group activity plays a role. Group type variables are dummies coded on 0/1 
scales. We also tested whether there is any country-related variance by adding a 
country categorical variable. To test our hypotheses, we conducted two ordinal 
regressions that contain five models each (Tables 6.1 and 6.2). Collinearity was 
tested using Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient exhibiting no major colline-
arity issues among our independent variables.
Group Types
We started our analysis by testing our predictions for the relationship between the 
group type and access. In Model I, we tested whether the group type affects access 
to governing parties (Table 6.1) and regulatory authorities (Table 6.2). The results 
show that the group type indeed impacts access to executive bodies, especially 
regulatory authorities. We see that other energy groups enjoy better access to 
regulatory authorities. The first row of Table 6.2 shows that the estimate param-
eters −1.05 and their significance at the 0.01 level, suggesting an association be-
tween the group type and access executive bodies. With the exception of Model 
III, in which we test the professionalization variables, and Model V where all the 
variables were tested, three Models (I, II, and IV) were statistically significant, 
confirming a relationship between the group type and access to the regulatory 
bodies. By contrast, in the models, in which we tested the association between the 
group type and access to the governing parties, the coefficient shows negative val-
ues. However, we found no significance at any level in any of the tested models.
Expertise resources
In Model II (Tables 6.1 and 6.2), we tested whether expertise matters for the 
groups in accessing relevant political bodies. For both analyzed forms of access, 
we found out that expertise matters: scientific expertise significantly facilitates 
access to governing parties (H1).
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In Model II (Table 6.1), the coefficient takes the positive value of 1.35 and 
is significant at the 0.001 level, confirming that scientific expertise plays a key 
role in accessing governing parties. Furthermore, in Model V (Table 6.1), when 
other variables are added, our estimate parameter takes the value 2.02 with a sig-
nificance level at 0.001, confirming the strength of the tested association. Legal 
and economic expertise seems to play a less important role in access to govern-
ing parties. The role of scientific expertise is also confirmed in the models in 
which we tested whether there is an association between ‘expertise holders’ and 
access to regulatory bodies (Table 6.2). Again, we found that scientific expertise 
seems to be a robust factor. In the models where expertise is tested (Model II 
and Model V), we see that the coefficient takes values from 1.18 to 3.20 and its 
significance is at the p < 0.001 level, which means that the holders of scientific 
expertise may enjoy better access to the policy-making process. Moreover, we 
see that our group type estimate parameter is still significant (p < 0.001), taking 
the value −1.21 and suggesting that other energy interest groups better equipped 
with scientific expertise enjoy better access. In contrast, legal expertise was found 
to be significantly negatively associated with access. Considering the effect of 
expertise on access to the policy formulation process, we found a positive (1.13) 
and significant association p < 0.05 for access to political parties among Czech 
organizations. We, therefore, assume that expertise plays a more important role 
in Czechia than in the other analyzed countries. Oppositely, in the model testing 
the impact of expertise on access to the regulatory bodies, the estimated param-
eter for Czechia takes a negative value. However, the results are not statistically 
significant. In both the analyzed cases, it looks like the Hungarian organizations 
have the lowest access, both to the governing parties (Table 6.1, Model II) and 
regulatory authorities (Table 6.2, Model II), but yet again, the results are not 
statistically significant.
Professionalization resources
In contrast to the expertise variables measured in Model II, two of our pro-
fessionalization variables (focus on organizational development and focus on 
human resources) seem to be insignificant in every tested model (Model III, 
Tables 6.1 and 6.2). Our prediction that the focus on organizational and human 
resources development would be positively associated with access to executive 
bodies (H2) was not supported. Especially in Czechia and Poland, the coeffi-
cient takes a positive value regarding access to governing parties in the models 
where the professionalization variable is tested. Yet, our data again suggest that 
Hungarian organizations struggle with lower access to policy-making bodies 
compared to their counterparts from Poland, Slovenia, and Czechia. However, 
the results are not statistically significant. Concerning access to regulatory au-
thorities, we see a rather negative effect of professionalization on access in 
Czechia and Hungary.
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Financial resources
We found that a focus on fundraising is positively associated with access to regu-
latory authorities and governing parties (Tables 6.1 and 6.2) in model five, where 
we ran the ordinal regression for all dependent variables and control variables. In 
terms of access to governing parties and regulatory bodies, we found EU funds 
to be insignificant for access to policy-makers.
6 Conclusions
The literature on GA and ecological and environmental movements, in general, 
has so far generally overlooked CEE (with some noticeable exceptions, see for 
example, Usacheva, 2012). This chapter partially fills this gap by providing a 
comparative analysis of CEE GA groups’ access compared to other energy inter-
est groups based on freshly obtained empirical data.
At the core of the scientific discourse on GA groups is the idea that they matter 
for climate and energy policy, as they offer added value both for the content of 
specific policies and their legitimation. They change the policy milieu within which 
political decisions are taken (Hood, 1995). Distinguishing between and among 
different kinds of groups operating within the climate and energy policy process is 
a natural step toward explaining their success in accessing policy-makers.
The results of our analysis confirm that the group type matters, especially as 
regards access to regulatory authorities. Other energy interest groups indicated 
easier access than GA groups in every analyzed country. The highest averages 
of the access variables can be observed in Poland and Slovenia (for both types 
of organizations), while lower values were obtained among the Hungarian and 
Czech groups. Regarding access to governing parties, again other energy groups 
by average gain easier access than GA groups in Czechia, Poland, and Slovenia. 
However, in this case, the results from Hungary were opposite, resulting in easier 
access of green groups to governing parties.
We also strongly drew on the resource-dependency theory, by examining to 
what extent selected resources (including various types of expertise, aspects of 
professionalization, and financial stability) condition access to executive bodies. 
We found that expertise is of crucial importance in accessing regulatory authori-
ties as well as governing parties. Importantly, it relates only to scientific expertise. 
It is associated with a high level of complexity and innovation, which is required 
for all stakeholders involved in the green transformation. This needs to be seen in 
the context of the technologically underdeveloped power industry in most coun-
tries of the region. The present energy infrastructure remains, to a large extent, 
a relic of the past, very often dating back to the pre-1989 era. Decarbonization 
processes require totally different skills and knowledge than the traditional power 
generation methods known in CEE. Scientific expertise, focused on the new 
technologies, matters in accessing authorities and especially regulatory bodies.
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Interestingly, focus on human resources and organizational development turned 
out to be entirely unimportant for interest groups seeking access to executive bod-
ies. On the contrary, focus on fundraising is positively associated with access to 
regulatory authorities and governing parties. However, contrary to our expecta-
tions, EU funds do not translate into better access at all. This finding is important 
both for the Europeanization literature and real decision-making ‘on the ground’. 
Financial (or any other) assistance stemming from Brussels creates beneficial con-
ditions for the functioning of the GA organizations. Taking into account the high 
position of the ‘greening economy’ on the EU’s agenda, it is understandable that 
supranational authorities care about the wide societal acceptance for the climate cru-
sade. Equally understandable is the financial support for the GA, especially in these 
EU member states in which the energy mix remains highly carbon-dependent. 
Undoubtedly, such assistance serves to build public awareness, enhance knowledge 
distribution, and foster a generally positive atmosphere for pro ecological policy 
solutions. Nevertheless, our study has shown that funding alone is not an effective 
tool for GA in gaining access to the core of national executive decision-makers.
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1 Introduction
For the functioning of any democracy, the voice of the civil society, its interests, 
its demands, and inputs are of utmost importance (Dahl, 1961). Besides political 
parties, interest groups serve as intermediators to voice the demands of soci-
ety (Schmidt, 2010). However, weaknesses in interest intermediation systems 
have increased as recent research shows (Olejnik, 2020; Ost, 2011). Even though 
formal institutions exist, Crouch warns of a legitimation crisis if civil society 
grows weaker and impacts the political process less and less (Crouch, 2004). In 
political systems where the input function of organized interests is impaired, the 
main channel for citizens to raise their voices in the political process (Dür & 
De Bièvre, 2007) vanishes. This puts pressure on any democratic system since 
it ceases to be accountable to its citizens. Contrarily, in some cases, only certain 
groups may have access to the decision-making process, which is also problem-
atic because it undermines the legitimacy of the system. In this context, espe-
cially the young Central and Eastern European (CEE) democracies might find it 
difficult to ensure legitimacy as civil society participation has traditionally been 
weak (Howard, 2003). As nearly three decades have passed since the transition, 
it is worth exploring how and whose interests find their way into the policy- 
making system. In a broader context, this is a crucial determinant of the quality 
of democratic regimes (Berg-Schlosser, 2004).
Only a few studies have systematically measured interest group influence per 
se (Dür, 2008b; Klüver, 2009; Mahoney, 2007), while even less research has been 
conducted on CEE (for exceptions see, e.g., Gallai, Döme, Molnár, & Reich, 
2015). As numerous authors have already laid the foundation for measuring the 
influence of interest groups focusing on the western European countries, the Eu-
ropean Union (EU), and the United States of America (USA) (Dür & De Bièvre, 
7
INTEREST GROUP ACCESS IN CEE IN 
THE HEALTHCARE SECTOR
Brigitte Horváthová and Michael Dobbins
DOI: 10.4324/9781003049562-7
146 Brigitte Horváthová and Michael Dobbins
2007; Mahoney, 2007), the innovation of this chapter lies in its comparative focus 
on CEE. However, as measuring influence is notoriously difficult, we stick to the 
analysis of access as a necessary precondition for influence. Many scholars have 
researched formal political institutions or party systems in CEE, but the analysis 
of the access of interest organizations still constitutes a gap. We seek to overcome 
this gap, first by exploring interest group structures in this region. Second, we 
evaluate and further develop already established theories on interest group access 
by creating a framework that fits the region under investigation and measuring 
access. Altogether, the analysis is guided by the following research question: 
What interest groups have strong access to healthcare decision-making processes 
in CEE and why? Access varies across policy sectors (Fraussen, Beyers, & Donas, 
2015, p. 571). Thus, we expect relevant insights into one of the most relevant 
and understudied sectors of any society – namely healthcare policy. Altogether, 
CEE has gone through significant changes in its sociopolitical structures in the 
past century. After the collapse of socialism in 1989/90, all CEE countries faced 
the challenge of systemic transitions, including the rearrangement of healthcare 
sectors. Major reforms targeted the insurance system as well as primary medical 
care. Many of these decisions were made without including the civil society, 
i.e., interest groups (Rechel & McKee, 2009). Even though there have been 
many changes, the healthcare systems of CEE are ranked among the worst in 
the EU (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)/
European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2019).
Nevertheless, healthcare represents a central sector vital for the social and 
economic development of nations. Healthcare policies directly affect individual 
citizens as well as doctors, hospitals, insurers, and employers (Immergut, 1992). 
Roberts (2009) argued that “political institutions are the key causes of […] di-
vergent paths” (2009, p. 306) in CEE healthcare. Moreover, he explains policy 
change as being mainly caused by different access opportunities by physicians: 
“[…] a penetrable single-party government and weak bureaucratic capacities al-
low physicians to capture the reform process and implement their preferred pol-
icies” (Roberts, 2009, p. 305).
Healthcare policy in CEE is especially interesting because these countries 
share similar starting positions but followed different paths after the transition. 
The focus of this chapter is on Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slove-
nia. Poland is characterized by an increasing tendency toward coordination and 
centralization (Holman & Luneburg, 2012). The Czech Republic introduced 
a system of competing private insurers in the early 1990s; Hungary remained 
more conservative and moved toward a single national insurer, whereas Slovenia 
created a Bismarck-type social insurance system in 1992 with a single national 
health insurer and uniform legislation. These foundations have essentially re-
mained in place ever since despite the limited privatization of certain services. 
These reforms have led to different institutional architectures (see Chapter 5 in 
this volume), funding mechanisms, and different performance levels. In H ungary, 
poor health outcomes are coupled with one of the lowest life expectancies in the 
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EU (Gaál, Szigeti, Csere, Gaskins, & Panteli, 2011), while Poland and Czechia 
also find themselves below the EU average (OECD/European Observatory on 
Health Systems and Policies, 2019). As the following section shows, there is a 
lack of analysis of what role interest groups play throughout these processes (see 
Roberts, 2009 for a partial exception). We address this gap and the need for a 
more in-depth analysis while enhancing our understanding of interest groups in 
post-communist healthcare.
2 Related studies, theoretical background, and hypotheses
2.1 Literature review
Healthcare is an ever-present issue in public policies due to its importance for 
society. It is also an area ripe with interest groups who have specific preferences 
and resources and vociferously aim to shape policy. Research on organized inter-
ests in healthcare can arguably be traced back to Alford (1975), who studied the 
barriers of ideology that hindered interest groups from reforming the US system. 
In her seminal study, Immergut (1992) analyzed the politics of national healthcare 
insurance from an institutional perspective. Lowery and Gray (2007) focused 
on American healthcare interest groups and discovered that their densities vary 
according to “changes in the sizes of constituencies” (2007, p. 18). Maarse (2006) 
analyzed western European countries and found that they have become more 
privatized over time. Heaney (2006) described how interest groups play mediat-
ing roles as dispersed actors in decentralized systems, rather than as central me-
diators that intervene in various policy disputes. Carpenter (2012) found that in 
developed countries healthcare policies are different in a number of dimensions 
with voters and decision-makers more likely to accept redistributive policies; 
therefore, it is consensus – rather than efficiency – oriented. Similarly, Contan-
driopoulos (2011) argues that decisions in healthcare are made mostly based on 
political preferences rather than science and evidence. They also found that de-
spite a wide political consensus among stakeholders, a veto by a few could be a 
barrier in implementing coherent policy reforms (Contandriopoulos et al., 2018).
While some authors have comparatively explored developments in CEE health-
care (e.g., Björkman & Nemec, 2013; Roberts, 2009; Watson, 2011), analyses of 
organized interests in healthcare in CEE remain scarce. To address this research 
gap, we analytically align this analysis with numerous studies that have compara-
tively explored the influence of interest groups (Bernhagen, 2012; Binderkrantz, 
Christiansen, & Pedersen, 2014; Dür, 2008a, 2008b; Klüver, 2011; Mahoney, 
2007). As Dür and De Bièvre (2007) highlight, three bundles of factors – 
institutional structures, interest group characteristics, and issue-specific factors – may facil-
itate or inhibit interest groups trying to assert their demands. As for institutional 
structures, the frequency of elections, the political setup (e.g., presidentialism vs. 
parliamentarism), the economic setup (corporatism vs. pluralism), or federalist vs. 
unitarist political systems may mediate the impact of organized interests. In this 
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tradition, Kitschelt (1986) focuses on the interest intermediation structures and 
finds that the “political opportunity structure” (1986, p. 58), i.e., the resource 
configuration, institutional regulations as well as historical factors facilitate or 
impede the mobilization of social movements. Other authors (e.g., Mahoney, 
2007) show that the context and scope of an issue have more weight than politi-
cal institutions. Specifically, the greater the scope and ramifications of the policy, 
the less successful individual groups are due to the many actors involved. More-
over, opposing forces may be crucial, i.e., the more conflict-ridden an issue, the 
less successful organized groups may be.
Aizenberg and Hanegraaff (2020) analyzed the access of business groups to 
parliamentary hearings. Even though the literature identified this kind of access 
as unrepresentative for access in general, for the Netherlands, it appears to play 
an important role. Two factors affect access: the economy and political oppor-
tunities. The economy affects access negatively, i.e., the worse the economy, the 
more access business groups have. Political opportunities in terms of European 
integration also increased access significantly. The authors also identify a gap in 
the literature: most studies focus on the United States when it comes to access, 
while only a few deals with European interest groups (Aizenberg & Hanegraaff, 
2020; Beyers, 2002, 2004; Binderkrantz, Christiansen, & Pedersen, 2015), not to 
mention CEE. Hence, we focus on types of access. Fraussen and Halpin (2016) 
provide an important study on access by investigating whether there is a bias 
when governments cooperate with certain groups, i.e., whether they exclu-
sively usually cooperate with “privileged partners” (2016, p. 569). They measure 
whether the type of interest group, size of personnel, the structure of the organ-
ization (umbrella/nonumbrella), size of membership as well as age affect their 
access to advisory councils. The authors find that apart from age, these factors 
exert a significant impact on access. However, they did not find evidence for the 
organizational type.
Turning toward access and healthcare, a seminal study by Roberts (2009) 
showed that in healthcare “[i]nstitutions in short provide the points where in-
terest groups – particularly physicians but latterly health insurers – can block 
change” (Roberts, 2009, p. 309). Hence, he urges scholars to analyze institutions 
as they not only block change but also enable windows of opportunity for po-
litical change (2009). To do so, governing parties must be accessible (hence the 
focus on governing parties), and the bureaucracy must be weak.
In this chapter, we focus exclusively on the characteristics of interest groups. 
Olson (1965) showed how their structure and focus may significantly increase 
or decrease their capacity for collective action. Diffuse interests (e.g., patients’ 
groups, consumer groups) may be more difficult to organize than concentrated 
interests (e.g., the medical profession, business associations). Hence, size may 
be critical; the bigger a group, the fewer individuals may take action to achieve 
common interests. Large organizations representing diffuse causes (e.g., patients’ 
rights, environmental issues) may suffer from the “free-rider” problem. This 
means that if public benefits emerge from collective action, not only individuals 
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who actively pursued them but also those who did not benefit. This may encour-
age individuals to “free-ride” on the efforts of a few. Smaller groups representing 
concentrated interests, therefore, may have an organizational advantage, as they 
are easier to organize, monitor, and control.
More recently, authors have focused on additional group-specific factors, 
which Olson’s theory arguably overlooks. These encompass material resources 
such as funds, staff, members, and volunteers, which may also increase their non-
material resources such as public support, policy expertise (Bernhagen, 2012), 
and information on voters’ interests (Dür & De Bièvre, 2007). Besides financial 
resources and staff size, membership levels may also be a key variable affecting an 
organization’s legitimacy toward policy-makers.
Even though much research has been conducted on civil society, organized 
interests, and their assumed influence, Lowery (2013) suggests that much of it has 
generated few substantial findings. This may be due to the difficulties in measur-
ing the sheer concept of influence, as it can only be defined in relation to power, 
i.e., controlling outcomes, resources, and actors (Dür & De Bièvre, 2007, p. 3). 
Hence, power relates to influence in terms of control over political actors. At the 
same time, actors are powerful when “they manage to influence outcomes in a 
way that brings them closer to their ideal points” (2007, p. 3). Thus, the effects of 
power rather than power itself are of relevance. The main difficulty is that these 
definitions assume clear preferences of the lobbying actors – hence, organized 
interests have an ideal point on legislative proposals and try to push legislation 
in that direction (Schneider & Baltz, 2003, p. 5). Often, however, there is no 
clear preference at the beginning of a political process, or preferences might even 
change due to interactions.
This presents scholars with major challenges. In this and Chapter 5, we there-
fore pragmatically bundle the strengths of qualitative and quantitative research. 
Specifically, we ask why certain interest groups succeed and others fail in gain-
ing access to political systems. Access is a key indicator of political influence at 
a later stage of the policy process. If a group does not participate in the political 
process, this will likely diminish its ability to defend its interests (see Binder-
krantz et al., 2014): “A crucial step in gaining influence is accessing political 
arenas” (Binderkrantz et al., 2015, p. 98). Thus, frequent interactions with the 
executive, bureaucrats, members of parliament, or regulatory authorities will 
enhance the position of organized interests (see also Eising, 2007). However, 
admittedly “access is not equal to having an influence on policy outcomes; ac-
cess should be considered as a necessary, but not sufficient condition for influ-
ence” (Beyers, 2002, p. 587). Still, before exerting influence, groups must have 
access that can be defined as “the exchange of policy-relevant information with 
public officials through formal or informal networks” (Beyers, 2004, p. 213). 
Binderkrantz et al. (2015) also stress the “exchange of resources” among interest 
groups and decision-makers as: “[g]roups supply decision-makers with relevant 
resources and gain access and eventually political influence in return” (Binder-
krantz et al., 2015, p. 98).
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2.2  Interest group-related factors: resources, expertise, 
professionalization, and longevity
Building on the “interest group approach [emphasis in original]” (Beyers, Eising, & 
Maloney, 2008, p. 1110), we explore the factors mediating political access. First, 
organized interests have different material and nonmaterial resources spanning 
from finances, personnel, support of the public, outside input to information – they 
are anything that affects the possible course of action as well as strategies of their 
respective counterparts (Dür & De Bièvre, 2007, p. 5). According to Dür and De 
Bièvre (2007), more resources mean more influence over outcomes as well as ac-
cess: “Some group resources, such as finances and staff, are relevant for access across 
all political arenas” (Binderkrantz et al., 2015, p. 96). Korpi (1985) speaks of power 
resources “such as human capital, i.e. physical capital and money”, that might not 
directly lead to influence. This is supported by McKay (2011) who argues that 
“business interests report significantly more success than public interest lobbyists, 
though business interests are no more likely than public interests to achieve their 
desired outcome” (McKay, 2011, p. 920). Woll summarizes such assets as “[…] 
financial resources, social capital, legal or technical expertise or other informa-
tion that might be useful to policy-makers […]” (Woll, 2007, p. 63). Actors, in 
our case interest groups, differ in many ways – they target different demands of 
policy-makers, i.e., the resources that policy-makers demand. If politicians remain 
dependent on the resources of interest groups, it is easier for them to access relevant 
institutions – information hence makes a great difference (see Bernhagen, 2012).
Hypothesis 1: Organized interests well equipped with resources – financial1 and 
personnel – will more likely enjoy privileged access than groups with weaker resources.
Hypothesis 2: Organized interests with specialized expertise – be it scientific, le-
gal, economic, or impact-related – will more likely access the policy-making apparatus 
than interest groups with no specialized information.
Closely related is the type of interest group. The literature provides various clas-
sifications of the types of organizations, e.g., organizations with corporative re-
sources versus public interest groups, NGOs, and business interests (Beyers et al., 
2008; Binderkrantz et al., 2014), sectional and cause groups. In line with Olson’s 
notion of concentrated interests, sectional organizations represent specific groups 
such as business associations of well-established and protected professions, doc-
tors, and workers’ unions. These groups represent special interests that create 
concentrated costs and benefits for their supporters and are formed to obtain 
material benefits for specific groups (Klüver & Saurugger, 2013). Diffuse (Olson, 
1965), civic, or cause groups (e.g., patients’ or healthcare advocates) are more 
idealistic, representing some belief or values as such. According to Lohmann, 
special interests generally win over diffuse interests as they have an advantage 
in terms of controlling or monitoring the actions of policy-makers (Lohmann, 
Interest group access in CEE in healthcare 151
1998). Hence, the organized groups are more successful in gaining access. Due 
to the collective action problem, individuals remain passive when it comes to 
nonexclusive public goods because they will benefit either way. Thus, they can 
“ride freely” on others’ efforts (Olson, 1965).2
Hypothesis 3: Concentrated (sectoral, business) interests will more likely access the 
policy-making apparatus than diffuse (civic, cause-related) interests.
Professionalization and longevity also may affect interest groups’ success in ac-
cessing institutions. Professionalization is often connected with Europeanization 
(Grabbe, 2001) and its impact on the domestic context (Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, 
2006). However, considering that the EU only has limited regulatory authority in 
healthcare, Europeanization is unlikely to be a mechanism for professionalization 
(see Riedel and Czarnecki in this volume). Rather, other learning processes, both 
domestic and perhaps also through international contacts, may enable organized 
interests to lobby more effectively (Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, 2006).
Klüver and Saurugger (2013) specifically characterize professionalized organ-
izations as having leadership with large resources, large membership, the claim 
to represent specific supporters, and the goal to influence policy outcomes as 
supporters wish. Furthermore, professionalized groups are organized and focus 
on the development of their personnel resources as well as on knowledge and 
the training of “technical skills” (Klüver & Saurugger, 2013, p. 187). Especially, 
the latter factor appears essential: “we define professionalization as the creation 
of positions, which require a high degree of qualification in terms of training 
and relevant working experience” (Klüver & Saurugger, 2013, p. 193). L obbyists 
must undergo additional training, have relevant experience, and education lev-
els. Hence, for the functioning and “strategic activities” both “operational” 
and “expert knowledge,” i.e., know-how is necessary (Carmin, 2010, p. 187). 
These “technical skills” are usually “acquired through professional training” 
(McGrath, 2005, p. 125; Staggenborg, 1988) and their need for development, 
i.e., training lobbyists.
Resources in terms of staff and finances might also play an important role in 
professionalization together with the age3 of an advocacy group (Maloney, 2008, 
p. 71). Material and human resources enable the continuous operations of the 
administrative apparatus of the organization: “In general, human resources refer 
to leadership, staffing, volunteers, and members. Professionalized organizations 
rely on paid staff to perform ongoing functions. Therefore, in these types of or-
ganizations, funding and staffing tend to be interrelated” (Carmin, 2010, p. 187). 
Thus, professionalization is strongly related to the mobilization of resources as 
it enables the “maintenance of the organization” (Staggenborg, 1988, p. 597) as 
well as its expansion.
Hypothesis 4: The more professionalized an interest group, the more likely it will 
access the policy-making apparatus.
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Regarding longevity, with growing age, organizations might have created long-
term bonds with political decision-makers (Carmin, 2010; Fraussen et al., 2015; 
Klüver & Saurugger, 2013). Furthermore, long-term organizational survival 
might have enhanced professionalization and, thus, strengthened an advocacy 
group. Put differently, the longer an organization lives, the more access it might 
enjoy (Kohler-Koch, Kotzian, & Quittkat, 2017). This may be of particular im-
portance in the CEE context, as organizations that have survived the transforma-
tion process are likely to be highly viable and resilient (see Chapter 2).
Hypothesis 5: The older an organization, the more likely it will access 
policy-makers.
3 Research design
3.1 Data, variables, and operationalization
The dataset is based on a unique survey targeting healthcare interest groups in 
Czechia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia (n = 217).4 The participants responded 
to a set of questions, which we now draw on to identify general patterns that 
may explain the effect of interest group-related factors on influence – measured 
by access as a proxy. Before turning to the ordinal logistic regressions to estimate 
how the identified factors affect interest group access – access to parliamentary 
hearings and access to governing parties – and whether there is a cross-national 
variation, we briefly describe the data.
Access was measured on a five-point scale. Access to the parliament or partic-
ipation in parliamentary hearings ranges from “no participation” to “very high 
participation” while access to governing parties is measured from “extremely 
difficult” to “extremely easy.” To facilitate data interpretation, both variables 
were recoded into a three-point scale. Parliamentary access ranges from “no 
participation,” “low to occasional participation” to “high to very high participa-
tion” while access to governing parties spans from “(extremely) difficult access,” 
“sometimes possible” to “(extremely) easy access” (see Table 7.1 for details).
We also categorized interest groups as diffuse or concentrated. We coded 
all patients’ and healthcare advocacy organizations as diffuse, and professional 
doctors, trade unions, and employees as concentrated interests. Furthermore, 
we created the variable “employees” by simply adding values of the variables 
staff and volunteers. This enables us to grasp the number of people working on 
an issue regardless of their status. The variable was then logged in order to not 
distort the results. Expertise was operationalized in terms of relevance: in the 
survey, we broke down expertise into four areas – scientific, legal, economic, and 
impact – and asked organizations to assess their relevance for influence on a scale 
ranging from “unimportant” to “very important.” Here, we also created a com-
pound variable based on the means of the four mentioned areas. Financial stabil-
ity (Carmin, 2010) has five values (see Table 7.1). Professionalization is measured 
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TABLE 7.1  Summary statistics of the dependent, independent, and control variables
Variable Obs. Mean St. dev. Min. Max.
Dependent variables
Access to the parliament 175 1.53 0.76 1 3
Access to the government 134 1.70 0.76 1 3
Independent variables
Concentrated/diffuse 217 0.43 0.50 0 1
Employees (logged for analysis) 217 143.30 1 364.68 0 20 000
Financial stability 170 2.81 1.50 1 5
Expertise 167 2.43 0.68 1 3
Networking with other groups 166 1.55 0.70 1 3
Cooperation with other groups 175 2.10 0.63 1 3
Development focus 170 2.46 0.60 1 3
Members (logged for analysis) 217 28 960.99 342 678.20 0 5 012 008
Age (logged for analysis) 215 22.14 17.31 1 156
Control variables






Notes: Coding of parliament access variable: 1 = no or low participation, 2 = occasional participa-
tion, 3 = high or very high participation. Coding of governing parties access variable: 1 = extremely 
difficult or difficult, 2 = sometimes possible, 3 = extremely easy or easy. Coding of type of interest 
group: 0 = diffuse, 1 = concentrated. Coding of employees: the row total of volunteers and staff; for 
the analysis the value was added 1 and subsequently transformed into a logarithmic scale. Coding 
of financial stability: 1 = stable for less than 1 year, 2 = stable for 1–2 years, 3 = stable for 3–5 years, 
4 = stable for about 5 years, 5 = stable for more than 5 years. Coding of expertise: 1 = unimpor-
tant, 2 = somewhat important, 3 = very important. Coding of networking: 1 = no, 2 = somewhat, 
3 = very much. Coding of cooperation: 1 = never, 2 = occasionally, 3 = frequently. Coding of de-
velopment focus: 1 = much less or less than 10–15 years ago, 2 = same as before, 3 = more or much 
more than before. Coding of members: the row total of individual, firm, and institutional mem-
bers; for the analysis, the value was added 1 and subsequently transformed into a logarithmic scale. 
Coding of age: age as of 2020. Coding of the type: 1 = business interests, 2 = employees, 3 = trade 
unions, 4 = patients, 5 = doctors/professionals. Coding of country: the variable was transformed 
into a numeric variable with 1 = Czechia, 2 = Hungary, 3 = Poland, 4 = Slovenia.
first based on cooperation with others: interest groups reported whether they 
cooperate with other groups in terms of representation on advisory boards, joint 
statements, and joint political strategies (scale 1–3). These variables were ag-
gregated based on their arithmetic mean. The variable “focus” is composed of 
focus on organizational development, focus on human resource development, 
fundraising, evaluation of efficiency and effectiveness, and strategic planning as 
154 Brigitte Horváthová and Michael Dobbins
opposed to 10–15 years ago (Maloney, 2008).5 Furthermore, the increase or de-
crease of networking with like-minded organizations abroad might affect access 
(scale 1–3: no networking, increased somewhat, and increased very much). The 
last professionalization measurement targets the amount of members in an organ-
ization (Klüver & Saurugger, 2013) be it either individual, firm, or institutional 
members, also transformed into a logarithmic scale. Finally, we collected data on 
the founding year, which we then transformed into the age of the variable as of 
2020. We also control for country and type of organization.
3.2 Method and descriptive overview
To obtain valuable information on the ordinal nature of the dependent varia-
ble “access,” we use ordered logit regressions (Eising, 2007; Kohler-Koch et al., 
2017; McKelvey & Zavoina, 1975). As the dependent variable is ordinal, this 
method is most suitable to fully exhaust the potential of the data. Collinearity 
was tested with the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient: our dependent var-
iables indeed correlate but do not raise significant multicollinearity issues. Most 
estimates were highly significant. There is a relatively strong correlation between 
the number of members and the age of the organization. This is not surprising as 
with the rising age, organizations can acquire more members.
We collected 217 responses with a rather similar country distribution. The ma-
jority of respondents represent diffuse interests (nearly 60%) and more than 40% 
concentrated interests, while this distribution also applies for each country – apart 
from Hungary, where it is vice versa. Figure 7.1 describes organizations by type.
Here, the distribution is quite similar for each country with the difference that more 
than 50% of responses came from patients’ organizations while less than a third come 
from medical professionals. The survey data suggest that the perceived influence of 
interest groups is rather high in all four countries (see Table 7.1 for the summary 
FIGURE 7.1 The type of organization by country.
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statistics). Moreover, 50% of the sample organizations suggest that they have more or 
much more influence now compared to 10–15 years ago while only fewer than 20% 
suggest the opposite. The majority of Czech organizations report growing influ-
ence in the past 10 – 15 years (69.6%), while Polish and Slovenian organizations are 
less optimistic, but many still report no change or growth in their influence. Most 
Hungarian organizations, however, report during the same period either that their 
influence has been waning (31.4%) or stagnating (34.3%) (see Figure 7.2).
We analyze the dependent variable access with respect to access to the par-
liament (Figure 7.3) and governing parties (Figure 7.4). It is striking that the 
Hungarian and Slovenian sample organizations report in 85% and 73% of cases, 
respectively, no to low participation in parliamentary hearings while this is the 
case for only slightly more than one-third of Polish interest groups (see also 
Chapter 5 in this volume). Nearly two-thirds of Polish organizations report oc-
casional or high to very high parliamentary participation. In Hungary, this per-
tains to 15% of the sample. Regarding access to governing parties the sample of 
Hungarian organizations report (extremely) easy access (31.6%) while in Slovenia 
only 13% enjoy (extremely) easy access to governing parties. 
Turning toward the aggregate variable of expertise,6 there is a striking vari-
ance among groups in our sample of individual countries (Figure 7.5). Slovenian 
healthcare organizations appear to be most concerned about information as more 
than two-thirds (70%) regard it as very important followed by Hungarian or-
ganizations with nearly two-thirds (64%) opposed to only nearly 30% in Poland.
Regarding financial stability, only 5% of Slovenian organizations are stable for 
less than one year, while financially unstable organizations in Czechia, Hungary, 
and Poland account for a quarter of the sample. Contrarily, while two-thirds of 
Slovenian organizations claim to be financially stable for more than five years, 
our highest value on the scale, this only pertains to 10%–15% of organizations in 
the remaining countries.
The professionalization variables include the focus on organizational devel-
opment, human resources, financial resources, evaluation as well as planning 
FIGURE 7.2 Perceived influence by country.
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compared to 10–15 years ago. “Organizational focus” is similarly high across the 
samples in all three countries (Figure 7.6). The focus on human resources, how-
ever, varies slightly across countries: in Slovenia, 70% of organizations claim to 
focus more or much more on human resources than in the past, while Hungar-
ian organizations report no major changes. Organizations increasingly monitor 
their development everywhere except Hungary, where more than 50% of interest 
groups report no major changes. Finally, strategic planning is also of the highest 
relevance, while again, but Hungarian organizations seem to be less concerned 
about this aspect. 
FIGURE 7.3 Participation in parliamentary hearings/committees by country.
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For the regressions, we aggregated these indicators into a new mean-based 
variable “organizational focus” (for more details see the part on operationaliza-
tion). We proceeded similarly with the variables “cooperation with other inter-
est groups” in representation on advisory boards, in joint statements, and joint 
political strategies (Figure 7.7). There is noticeable variation regarding advisory 
boards: while for all countries the mean is “occasional” cooperation, Slovenian 
organizations appear to cooperate more often than the remaining countries. For 
cooperation on joint statements with other groups, the same distribution applies 
FIGURE 7.4 Level of difficulty when seeking access to governing parties by country.
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FIGURE 7.6 Aggregated focus of interest groups in the sample.
with the exception that Polish organizations appear to cooperate in this manner 
more “frequently” (46%), followed by Slovenian organizations (36%). Regard-
ing strategies in our samples, strikingly 50% of Czech organizations “never” 
cooperate with others, while nearly a third of Slovenian organizations cooper-
ate “frequently.” Apart from Czechia, “occasional” remains the mean response. 
The compound variable shows that Polish and Slovenian organizations cooperate 
FIGURE 7.5 Expertise by country on average.
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the most, while in Czechia a quarter cooperates “never.” Finally, on average, 
more than 52% of organizations have not increased networking (in Poland 61% 
opposed to 45% in Hungary) while healthcare organizations in Slovenia and 
 Hungary increased networking “very much” or “somewhat” in approximately 
54% of the cases (Figure 7.8). Slovenia hence appears to have the most profession-
alized interest groups in our sample.
The age of an organization might also affect its ability to access relevant insti-
tutions. Nearly all surveyed organizations emerged after the transition. However, 
some are even older (Figure 7.9), i.e., one foundation peak is in 1990/91, another 
one in 2006/07 probably in turn to the EU accession in 2004, and another finally, 
after 2009 (for more on longevity and foundation rates see Chapters 2 and 3).
FIGURE 7.7 Aggregated cooperation of interest groups in the sample.
FIGURE 7.8 Increased networking for influence on national legislation.
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FIGURE 7.9 Age of the sample organizations.
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4 Results
Tables 7.2 and 7.3 summarize the results of the stepwise regression – variables 
were added gradually to test how the coefficients change.7 However, as different 
models were tested, the results seem to go in the same direction. To facilitate 
the interpretations, we draw on probabilities, where some parameters are set to 
specific values while the others are kept at their means. We focus both on the 
overall prediction levels of factors and country-specific differences. Considering 
resources, first, financial stability appears to have a negative effect on the access 
to parliamentary hearings in our samples (Figure 7.10). The number of employ-
ees that was logged to prevent distortion due to extreme values, on the contrary, 
has a positive effect on participating in parliamentary hearings and committees, 
i.e., access to the parliament (Figure 7.11). However, the confidence intervals 
become wider as the number of employees rises – this is because there are only a 
few organizations with very many employees.8 
The sample data show that the more employees, the greater the likelihood of 
access to the parliament. When considering individual countries, the number of 
employees appears to facilitate access to the Polish parliament the most. This, 
however, cannot be confirmed for access to governing parties. Regarding the 
effect of financial stability on parliamentary access, it counterintuitively appears 
that the financially stronger an organization, the weaker its access to the parlia-
ment. Hence, financial resources do not seem to enhance parliamentary access. 
Regarding access to governing parties, our hypothesis must also be rejected. 
Altogether, the data point toward confirming H1 regarding the impact of the 
number of employees on parliamentary access but not on the access to govern-
ing parties in the sample. Finances counterintuitively prove to have a negative 
effect on accessing the parliament and a positive effect when accessing governing 
parties. This, however, is not significant in the multivariate model, only in the 
univariate model, and hence cannot be confirmed. In the first case, therefore, 
our findings are in line with the result of Baumgartner et al. (2009) that financial 
resources do not automatically lead to success.
Expertise appears to have a positive effect on access, i.e., participation in par-
liamentary hearings: groups that regard expertise as very important are more 
likely to obtain access, but the results are not significant. For governmental ac-
cess, this effect is confirmed only in the univariate model. Also contrary to our 
hypothesis, we find that concentrated groups neither enjoy privileged access to 
the parliament nor to governing parties. This variable appears to have a negative 
effect: the more concentrated, the weaker the access. However, the results across 
our models are not statistically significant.
Another set of factors, i.e., professionalization, might also affect the ca-
pacity of interest groups to access relevant institutions. The first component 
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TABLE 7.2  Ordinal logistic regression: access to the parliament
Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a Model 4a Model 5a Model 6a







0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Hungary −1,28** −1,44** −1,61** −2,02** −1,50* −2,44**
(0,49) (0,54) (0,61) (0,69) (0,64) (0,75)
Poland 1,27** 1,35** 1,60** 1,10* 1,24* 1,49*
(0,42) (0,47) (0,51) (0,55) (0,51) (0,59)
Slovenia −0,52 −0,38 −0,55 −0,86 −0,44 −0,15
(0,43) (0,54) (0,49) (0,55) (0,54) (0,65)
Business groups 
(ref. cat.)
0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Employees 
groups
1,18 0,70 0,38 0,91 0,44 0,12
(0,92) (0,96) (1,00) (1,28) (1,16) (1,39)
Trade union 
groups
−0,14 −1,11 −1,69+ −0,82 −1,92+ −1,59
(0,86) (0,94) (1,02) (1,33) (1,17) (1,41)
Patient groups −0,17 −0,89 −0,97 −0,67 −1,43 −2,42+
(0,81) (0,73) (0,81) (1,11) (0,97) (1,42)
Doctors / 
professionals
−0,30 −0,77 −1,09 −0,81 −1,58 −0,96



























cut1 −0,15 −0,65 0,17 1,69 −1,42 −0,19
(0,83) (0,83) (1,08) (1,53) (1,29) (2,13)
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Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a Model 4a Model 5a Model 6a
cut2 1,66* 1,32 2,04+ 3,85* 0,48 2,16
(0,84) (0,84) (1,10) (1,58) (1,29) (2,15)
Observations 175 153 138 120 119 119
Pseudo R2 0.114 0.148 0.152 0.213 0.135 0.267
Log likelihood −154.80 −130.56 −117.64 −96.86 −105.82 −89.69
Standard errors in parentheses + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
TABLE 7.3  Ordinal logistic regression: access to governing parties
Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b Model 4b Model 5b Model 6b







0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Hungary 0,12 −0,21 −0,35 −0,39 −0,35 −0,50
(0,51) (0,54) (0,59) (0,72) (0,65) (0,76)
Poland 0,62 0,10 0,17 −1,01 −0,21 −0,91
(0,46) (0,50) (0,53) (0,68) (0,59) (0,68)
Slovenia −0,23 −1,33* −0,85+ −1,50* −1,01+ −2,25**
(0,44) (0,57) (0,49) (0,61) (0,56) (0,81)
Business groups 
(ref. cat.)
0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Employees groups −0,09 0,22 −0,02 1,47 1,09 1,03
(0,93) (0,97) (0,95) (1,46) (1,19) (1,60)
Trade union groups −0,50 −0,32 −0,64 1,13 −0,24 0,62
(0,98) (1,02) (1,01) (1,70) (1,26) (1,78)
Patient groups −0,43 −0,02 −0,27 1,63 0,39 0,90
(0,84) (0,79) (0,77) (1,34) (1,03) (1,70)
Doctors / 
professionals
−0,53 −0,40 −0,48 0,98 −0,33 1,14
(0,78) (0,85) (0,84) (1,38) (1,09) (1,45)
Employees (logged) 0,12 0,13
(0,10) (0,14)
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FIGURE 7.10  The negative effect of financial stability on the access to parliamentary 
hearings.
Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b Model 4b Model 5b Model 6b






Age (logged) 0,23 −0,11
(0,28) (0,34)
cut1 −0,56 0,54 0,86 6,33** 0,34 6,64*
(0,86) (0,92) (1,06) (2,24) (1,42) (2,85)
cut2 0,94 2,15* 2,39* 8,26*** 1,88 8,70**
(0,86) (0,94) (1,08) (2,32) (1,43) (2,91)
Observations 134 119 111 91 90 90
Pseudo R2 0.022 0.043 0.035 0.183 0.037 0.210
Log likelihood −135.07 −117.98 −110.86 −77.73 −90.94 −74.57
Standard errors in parentheses + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
of  professionalization is cooperation in terms of representation on advisory 
boards, joint statements and joint political strategies: according to our data, with 
higher levels of cooperation, groups are more likely to have a higher level of both 
parliamentary access and access to governing parties with a very significant effect. 
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Figures 7.12 and 7.13 show that access is more likely when cooperation is 
stronger and vice versa: groups are more likely to experience difficult access when 
there is little to no cooperation between them. The second graph shows how 
access is likely to change with higher cooperation rates, especially in Poland. In 
FIGURE 7.12 The positive effect of cooperation on the access to parliamentary hearings.
FIGURE 7.11 The positive effect of staff size on the access to parliamentary hearings.
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Hungary and Slovenia, the effect is somewhat weaker. Part of H4 is hence con-
firmed. Considering the effect of “focus” (on organizational development) on 
accessing the parliament, there is a negative effect, i.e., focus does not increase 
the likelihood of parliamentary access. Thus, the higher the levels of focus, the 
more likely access to the parliament drops. However, this negative effect is not 
significant and cannot be confirmed with certainty. By contrast, when access-
ing governing parties, “focus” is slightly significant (10%) with a positive effect; 
organizations focusing on their development are more likely to be successful in 
accessing governing parties. Hence, this part of H4 cannot be confirmed with 
certainty. Another hypothesized component of professionalization is network-
ing; data show that networking with like-minded organizations does not affect 
parliamentary access. By contrast, networking has a negative effect on access to 
governmental parties. The trend thus seems negative despite the lacking statistical 
significance. Large membership in interest groups is also very likely to positively 
affect parliamentary access, i.e., the more members an organization has, the more 
likely it enjoys parliamentary access (significant). The finding is the most striking 
for Poland, where the trend toward the predicted probability of (very) high par-
ticipation is more pronounced than for other countries (Figure 7.13).
The same applies to access to governing parties, but only in the univariate model, 
where the effect is positive and significant. As this trend is not confirmed when 
controlling for other factors, we cannot confirm that membership affects access to 
governing parties. Our data support H4 for every type of cooperation. Membership 
is significantly relevant only for parliamentary access while ‘focus’ is only slightly 
significant in the case of accessing governing parties. Theoretically, this makes sense 
as groups with more members represent a greater part of the society and, hence, are 
able to exert more pressure on politicians (Klüver & Saurugger, 2013).
FIGURE 7.13 The positive effect of cooperation on the access to governing parties.
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Finally, does the age of organizations affect access? Our data show that access 
is not, or if at all negatively, affected by the age of the organization. However, 
this effect is not significant and cannot be confirmed with confidence as  the 
estimation error is too high. Hence, Hypothesis 5 cannot be confirmed as the 
results are ambivalent and not robust. Even though secondary data support 
the relevance of a long-term relationship (Kohler-Koch, Kotzian, & Quittkat, 
2017), our data are inconclusive.
5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we measured political access by means of the participation in par-
liamentary hearings or committees (parliamentary access) and political access to 
governing parties based on a sample of more than two hundred healthcare organ-
izations in four post-communist countries. We explored and tested commonly 
theorized factors facilitating political access as a proxy for measuring political 
influence. Based on data from a unique large-scale survey, we analyzed the data 
with ordinal logistic regressions (Eising, 2007; Kohler-Koch et al., 2017), while 
taking the factors “resources,” “expertise,” “concentrated vs. diffuse interests,” 
“professionalization,” and “longevity” into account.
Our data show that resources (H1) are an important driving force for ac-
cess. Human resources appear to facilitate both parliamentary access and ac-
cess to governing parties. It is likely that more personnel can better monitor 
FIGURE 7.14  The positive effect of membership size on the access to parliamentary 
hearings.
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the policy-making process and simultaneously enable the organization to en-
gage more quickly due to the more efficient distribution of the work burden. 
Even though the theoretical literature emphasizes the significance of financial 
resources for lobbying success, the results do not show a link between financial 
strength and institutional access, at least to the parliament. We did observe an 
effect on accessing governing parties though. This might be related to lobby-
ing regulations and electoral laws in the respective countries and should be re- 
evaluated with in-depth case studies.
We also found some evidence of the importance of expertise (H2). Despite 
its relatively weak statistical significance, the level of expertise and the ability 
to share it appear to be more important than finances, which is noteworthy 
from the perspective of democratic quality. This rather positive image of post- 
communist healthcare policy-making is also supported by the negative findings 
on concentrated (e.g., medical doctors) and diffuse interests (e.g., patients) (H3); 
both camps seem to have equal chances of accessing political institutions. Hence, 
there seems to be no major democratic imbalance as societal groups generally 
endowed with weaker organizational capacities are given a voice as well. Again, 
from the perspective of democratic quality, the insignificance of longevity (H5) 
means that there is no pronounced representation monopoly of older organi-
zations, many of which existed under communism, as our analysis shows that 
younger organizations have an equal chance of being heard.
Regarding professionalization (H4), cooperation with other groups and mem-
bership increases the likelihood of institutional access, while the focus on or-
ganizational development and networking did not. Moreover, it appears to be of 
utmost importance that they have enough personnel to tend to day-to-day busi-
ness and prepare relevant expertise. Especially in the healthcare sector, personnel, 
interorganizational cooperation, and to some extent expertise are essential for ac-
cessing political institutions as the policy area itself strongly demands both exper-
tise and qualified personnel. Particularly encouraging for patients’ organizations 
is that they have the same chance of being heard as professional organizations and 
that financial resources are not a prerequisite for access. Rather, organizations 
wishing to gain access need to cooperate and demonstrate strong membership 
support as more members facilitate greater success in institutional access.
Despite these relatively clear findings, our approach bears some limitations. 
First, the models convey a first assessment and are not necessarily generalizable 
to other policy areas and country contexts. The significance levels and confi-
dence intervals posed an additional statistical limitation. Yet, even though they 
were low, the models proved to be robust, as the results were similar even in 
other models if not stated differently. Nevertheless, we have no means to test 
the accuracy of the data provided by organizations, as they are largely based on 
self-perception. Furthermore, we focused solely on direct strategies, and indi-
rect ones, i.e., raising voice through media have to be considered as well (see 
Czarnecki in this volume). A larger sample would also add to the reliability of 
the findings. Thus, despite the notorious difficulties of interest group research 
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and the low number of interest groups in these countries, this study lays the 
groundwork for future research. For example, scholars should engage with case 
study methods to more systematically explore the causal mechanisms revealed in 
this study. Specifically, other scholars should explore exactly how the demands of 
different stakeholders are balanced, what institutionalized forms exist for collab-
oration between different stakeholders, and how individual stakeholder groups 
have shaped concrete healthcare reform endeavors in CEE.
Notes
 1 This hypothesis warrants caution as scholars like Baumgartner (2009) find support 
that monetary resources do not automatically translate into success.
 2 Interestingly, on the European level Bruycker, Berkhout, and Hanegraaff (2019) find 
opposing evidence to Olson’s theory. Business interests are weak while civil society is 
strong especially on specific policy issues.
 3 For more on longevity and its importance as well as detailed analysis, see Chapter 2.
 4 The organizations were contacted based on a population ecology (see Chapter 3) 
created by means of public registries. More on the survey design can be found in 
Chapter 1 and the Annex in this volume.
 5 Individually they were measured on a five-point scale (much less, less, the same, 
more, much more) and the compound variable was recoded to take values from 1 to 
3: (much) less, the same and (much) more.
 6 We asked about the importance of technical or scientific, economic, legal, impact as-
sessment expertise/information on the influence on policies and created an aggregate 
variable.
 7 Summary statistics are presented at the bottom of both tables. The log likelihood 
is indicated and the overall fit of the model is estimated by the log likelihood ratio 
Chi-Square test indicates that the models are highly significant. McFadden’s R2 test 
shows that the model explains 26.7% of variance for the model of government party 
access and 21% in the case of parliamentary access – for the models where all variables 
are included (Model 6a and 6b). The univariate models account for less variance. The 
Brant test was not significant in most of the models, only in the models 3b, 5b and 
6b, hence making the ordinal logistic regression for the access to governing parties 
slightly inappropriate.
 8 In general, the confidence intervals vary in a wide range with many of the models. 
We omit detailed information on confidence intervals for the sake of undisturbed 
readability. The same applies for specifications on significance.
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1 Introduction
This chapter examines very different recent trends in Polish and Czech higher 
education (HE) while contributing to a broader discussion on organized inter-
ests in post-communist democracies. Previous research has highlighted how 
academic mobilization was instrumental in bringing down communism and 
facilitating the restoration of Humboldtian-style structures of academic self- 
governance (Dobbins, 2011; Junes, 2011; Kwiek, 2014). Indeed, both systems are 
characterized by numerous institutions to defend the integrity and independence 
of the academic profession. Throughout the 1990s, academia in both countries 
seemed very disinclined to any state intervention into HE, while in the 2000s 
and 2010s, both systems consolidated institutions of participative “academic de-
mocracy” with strong “internal” stakeholdership (Dobbins, 2014).
However, Poland has recently experienced a striking shift toward recentral-
ization and power concentration, while the Czech system has largely remained 
embedded in its restored model of fragmented academic self-rule. How do 
we explain this divergent development, in Poland in particular? We move be-
yond simplified explanations that HE reflects a broader societal trend toward 
authoritarian nationalism in numerous Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
countries (Greskovits, 2015). Instead, we focus on two factors: (1) the config-
uration and strategies of organized academic interests vis-à-vis the state and (2) 
the state’s capacity to govern the sector. We argue that a combination of an 
increasingly strong state in Poland and fragmented interest organizations re-
sulted in the centralization of HE, while a combination of a weaker state and 
much more consolidated stakeholders in the Czech Republic resulted in the 
persistence of preexisting policy arrangements. Specifically, we show that the 
national-conservative Polish government strategically played with the interests 
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of particular stakeholders and transformed the opportunity structures of aca-
demic organizations. Despite changes in the political landscape including the 
dominance of several reform-minded right-wing governments, Czech HE has 
remained almost unaffected. Internal stakeholders and institutions of “academic 
democracy” continue to dominate, whereby pressures and conflicts have evolved 
inside HE institutions rather than between the government and institutions.
We first look at research on HE interest groups before discussing Olson’s 
argument about diffuse and concentrated interests. Next, we provide a brief 
overview of Polish and Czech HE governance with a focus on stakeholder con-
stellations, while highlighting their similar post-communist trajectory. We then 
explore the driving forces for their recent divergent development. Specifically, 
why was the Polish government able to impose a reform, which was by objective 
standards desirable (see below) but whose final outcome was largely rejected by 
the academic community? Following Olson (1965), we show that concentrated 
interests, in particular Polish university rectors, were able to forge tight alliances 
with state policy-makers, both of which were pushing for a centralization of HE 
and concentration of power (at the systemic and university levels). This arguably 
has undermined well-established institutions of academic stakeholdership.
In contrast, the Czech government has never been able to gain considerable 
power to steer the system and push through reforms. We show that three groups 
of internal stakeholders – rectors, academics, and students – were able to use 
their concentrated power, as firmly legitimized in HE legislation, to mobilize 
and mutually fight off attempts to reform institutional governance and even fur-
ther consolidate some autonomous features of the system. Thus, while in the 
Czech Republic, an “internal academic alliance” has succeeded in preserving 
the status quo and weakened the position of the state, a “state-rector corporatist 
alliance” has evolved in Poland to the detriment of other actors and stakeholder 
democracy.
To show how these different models of “academic corporatism” have evolved, 
we rely on the process-tracing method (Bennett & George, 2005), drawing from 
numerous interviews with HE stakeholders (rectors, deans, professors, repre-
sentatives of students’ associations, and managerial staff ) and open questions in a 
survey of Polish and Czech HE interest organizations.
2 HE interest groups: a brief overview
HE stakeholders remain somewhat understudied from a comparative perspective. 
Considering the increasing number of individuals and organizations active in HE 
though, interest organizations have become an increasingly relevant factor in HE 
governance (see Tandberg, 2010 for the American context). Drawing on the clas-
sic interest group research (Schmitter & Streeck, 1999), Klemenčič (2012, 2014) 
distinguishes corporatist and pluralist systems. In the corporatist paradigm, the 
state engages with a limited number of intermediary associations often having 
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a representation monopoly. This may go hand-in-hand with an administrative 
funding arrangement for selected organized interests. Pluralist arrangements, by 
contrast, are characterized by a diverse array of organizations, who often com-
pete with one another for access to state decision-makers. Membership is gener-
ally voluntary, and the state negotiates on an ad hoc basis with some groups.
Recently, Vukasovic (2018) provided a strong impetus to the study of HE 
stakeholders. She argues that political decisions regarding HE must increasingly 
be legitimized toward economic stakeholders, fee-paying students, tax- payers, 
and the electorate. Thus, various organized stakeholders are increasingly present 
on the institutional and system-level (Gornitzka & Maassen, 2000), as well as 
in supranational arenas ( Jungblut & Vukasovic, 2013). Building on Klemenčič’s 
analyses of student unions (2012, 2014), Vukasovic (2018) breaks down HE 
stakeholders into three key groups: organizations representing students, aca-
demic staff, and university management. Academic staff organizations are es-
sentially trade unions with high autonomy and a strong professional ethos (2018, 
p. 420). HE institutions also collectively assert their interests at different levels 
through rectors’ conferences and alliances of university groups (e.g., polytech-
nics, research-oriented universities, private universities, etc.). Finally, student or 
academic unions may also be potent actors in shaping HE policy. In some cases, 
their participation may be merely symbolic, whereby in others, they actually may 
function as veto-players or co-agenda setters.
Besides the institutional settings, factors inherent in interest groups them-
selves may be decisive for influence. Olson (1965) shows how the structure and 
focus of interest groups may impact their means for collective action. Concen-
trated interests (traditionally, business groups, but in our case, also university 
rectors or lobbyists for certain groups of universities) generally have relatively 
homogenous preferences and seek concentrated benefits. Diffuse interests (e.g., 
here, universities academics as a whole or student lobbies) may be more difficult 
to organize, because they often lobby for nonexclusive public goods (e.g., better 
working conditions for academic staff ). Accordingly, size may be critical: the 
bigger a group, fewer the individuals taking action to achieve common interests. 
Olson (1965) argues that individuals may, therefore, “free-ride” on the efforts of 
few members of diffuse groups. Smaller, better-consolidated groups may have 
an organizational advantage as they are easier to organize and monitor. Organ-
izations involved in the implementation of (state-defined) policies may also be 
privileged by their crucial role in the policy cycle.
Against this background, numerous questions emerge for the study of HE 
stakeholders in Poland, the Czech Republic, and beyond. First, is the state even 
actively involved in policy-making? And, if not, which organized interests are 
dominant? How do more diffuse interest groups such as the academic profession 
or students overcome collective action dilemmas and wield clout? Which groups 
are insiders or outsiders in the policy process, and how has interest intermedia-
tion evolved over time?
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3  The evolution of Polish and Czech HE and the stakeholder 
landscape from the historical perspective
3.1 Poland
The history of Polish HE is particularly turbulent and characterized by a dual 
legacy of both academic self-governance and, since the communist phase, perva-
sive state regulation. Numerous Polish institutions are among the oldest in Eu-
rope, e.g., the Jagiellonian University of Cracow (1364). However, the partitions 
of Poland essentially terminated Polish academics for more than a century. With 
the reestablishment of Poland in 1918, a governance model based on Humbold-
tian principles of academic self-rule was reintroduced, only to be eradicated by 
Nazi occupiers 20–25 years later.
Nevertheless, remnants of academic self-rule persisted even after Poland suc-
cumbed to Soviet control. While the academic sector remained heavily central-
ized and subject to political repression and bureaucratic command-and-control, 
Polish academics had more freedom in teaching and research than their Soviet, 
Czechoslovak, or Romania counterparts (van Beek, 1995). Some contacts with 
western academic peers were tolerated, and Marxist–Leninist ideology was 
somewhat less intrusive than in other CEE countries.
After 1989, public HE essentially was realigned with a Humboldtian-type 
model of academic self-rule (Kwiek, 2014; for private HE see Duczmal, 2006). 
This “return to history” logic was reflected in the 1990 HE Act that gave pub-
lic universities extensive autonomy to shape their organizational structures, fi-
nancial, personnel, and enrolment policies. The historical trauma of partition, 
occupation, and Soviet dominance was a major leitmotiv of Polish academics’ 
struggle to preserve their institutional autonomy (van Beek, 1995). The 1990 Act 
devolved decision-making to individual faculties and chairs (World Bank, 2004) 
while concentrating power within decentralized self-governing bodies. This se-
verely diminished the power resources of the state, university management, and 
other external stakeholders.
Although the state continued to fully (under)fund public universities, in-
ternal stakeholder structures were essentially akin to an “academic oligarchy” 
(Clark, 1983). Academic senates were modeled after national parliaments, 
whereby leading academics (with the title of habilitated doctor) accounted for 
approx. 90% of the representation. Academics also rapidly mobilized to col-
lectively assert themselves at the state level. For example, the General Council 
for Science and Higher Education (Rada Glówna Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego) 
was created as a state-licensed body to represent the broader academic commu-
nity and uphold its grip over policy design (OECD, 2006a, p. 77). The Polish 
Rectors’ Conference (KRASP) also emerged as an advisory body to politically 
advocate the narrower interests of university rectors. Thus, while internal uni-
versity operations were based on internal “stakeholder democracy,” academics 
largely succeeded in gaining a monopoly over political interest intermediation, 
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resulting in a “hyper-corporatist system” characterized by academic stake-
holder dominance.1
However, faced with large-scale deindustrialization and unparalleled ed-
ucational expansion (Kwiek, 2014), the Bologna Process provided Poland 
a window of opportunity to critically assess the viability of largely unreg-
ulated academic self-rule. A State Accreditation Commission (Państwowa 
Komisja Akredytacyjna) was established in 2001 to evaluate the quality of study 
programs based on relatively strict minimal standards. Again, here though, 
high-ranking academics turned the Commission into an additional bastion of 
academic power. Its members are appointed by the Minister of Education (from 
2006, Minister of Higher Education and Science) but have consistently been 
high-ranking academics, upon nomination by (equally academic- dominated) 
academic senates and the General Council. Despite the introduction of some 
state-control and market-oriented instruments in the 2000s ( Dobbins, 2014), 
the predominance of academic stakeholders in academic decision- making 
and state-licensed bodies remained extremely high by European comparison, 
whereby the power of the government and external stakeholders was very low 
(Shaw, 2018).
3.2 The Czech Republic
The roots of the Czech HE can be traced back to the 14th century with the 
establishment of Charles University in 1348, the oldest institution of higher 
learning in CEE. Despite increasing Czech influence after the mid-19th century, 
Charles University remained largely rooted in German institutions of Humbold-
tian inspiration. Core features were strong university autonomy, a weak central 
(university management) level as well as the so-called “federation of professorial 
chairs” (Sadlak, 1995, p. 46) with formidable blocking power. However, after 
World War II, Czech HE succumbed to communism: academic freedom and 
institutional autonomy were dismantled, while mainly political appointees took 
over university and faculty management. Research was almost entirely trans-
ferred to the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences (established in 1953), and most 
teachers were cut off from international networks.
Amid the collapse of communism, policy-makers were extremely quick to 
reinstate Humboldtian university self-governance, bolstered by internal “demo-
cratic” structures, external buffer organizations, and strong student participation 
(Dobbins, 2011). Procedural and substantive autonomy was devolved to pro-
fessorial chairs, which transformed the once hierarchical system into a highly 
fragmented one. The retreat of the state was reflected in the 1990 HE Act that 
granted universities control over teaching and research programs as well as stu-
dent numbers, admission criteria, leadership positions, and all internal structural 
decisions (ibid.). Rectors were also chosen by fellow high-ranking academics via 
academic senates and shared governance authority with them. Both academics 
and students were thus heavily represented in faculty and university senates.
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In fact, de Boer and Goedegebuure (2003, p. 219) spoke of the “abolition of 
government.” Any policy change required the consensus of the Czech Rectors’ 
Conference and Council of Higher Education Institutions (Rada vysokých škol), 
which consisted exclusively of academics, excluded external stakeholders and 
served to represent academic senates and faculties. The Council of Higher Ed-
ucation Institutions also comprised students, and subsequently, a student cham-
ber of the Council was established, representing students’ interest vis-à-vis not 
only academics but also the state. Thus, altogether, the post-1989 trajectory was 
swift and dramatic, as far-reaching university autonomy was reinstated practi-
cally overnight and facilitated by a widespread belief among politicians that HE 
institutions would be able to transform themselves from within (Šebková & Hen-
drichová, 1995). Instead of initially seeking a more pragmatic relationship with 
the state, the academic community rapidly mobilized and consolidated to protect 
itself from state intrusions, both from within and outside.
Yet the Czech (and Polish) HE system was also confronted with an enor-
mous quantitative challenge, namely its massification. Unlike in Poland, ex-
pansion primarily took place in the public system, resulting in drastically 
increasing student numbers (File & Goedegebuure, 2003). The 1998 HE Act, 
therefore, aimed to increase the state’s leverage to steer the system. However, 
in effect, all state institutions2 were fully transformed into public bodies with 
a legal ability to manage their own assets and properties, thus effectively sepa-
rating them from the state. Within HE institutions, the powers of rectors were 
strengthened vis-à-vis individual faculties and other subunits. While faculties 
initially acted as independent legal entities, the 1998 Act cemented HE institu-
tions as single legal entities. It also introduced a Board of Trustees, comprising 
of representatives from public life, municipal, and regional authorities and the 
state administration. However, its role was rather symbolic in comparison with 
the rector or the academic senate. The position of students was also substan-
tially upgraded, as the Act specifically prescribed that they occupy a minimum 
of one-third and a maximum of one-half of senate seats on both faculty and 
university levels.
These foundations laid in the early 1990s remained remarkably stable in the 
2000s – despite the Bologna Process and the reform ambitions of the new right-
wing government coalition. Flanked by the 2006 OECD Thematic Review call-
ing for sweeping changes in HE (OECD, 2006b), the so-called “White Book on 
Tertiary Education” (Matějuº, 2008) provided strategic guidelines for drafting 
new HE legislation. It aimed to “open up” HE institutions, giving those who 
have a stake in the system – employers, regions, graduates, etc. – a greater say. 
It also anticipated more power for the state to steer the whole system. The doc-
ument also touched upon a very complex issue of the system’s structure. The 
existing system with the majority of institutions (the majority with respect to 
student numbers) having an ambition for research and high academic profile was 
not able to meet the increasingly diversified needs of students on the one hand, 
and the labor market on the other.
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However, partly due to political instability, the underlying policy and gov-
ernance patterns only incrementally changed (Pabian, 2008), and the institu-
tional privileging of academic interests served to uphold the Humboldt-oriented 
system. Above all, the lack of executive steering hindered measures that require 
transfaculty coordination. Thus, Czech HE remained characterized by a strong 
professoriate, collegial control, academic dominance of representative bodies and 
academic senates and a lack of entrepreneurial management structures.
4 Explaining policy divergence
We now, first, examine the striking policy shift toward centralization in Poland, 
again from a stakeholder perspective, before engaging with Czech policy de-
velopments. As shown above, the post-communist HE trajectory of both coun-
tries was essentially characterized by the large-scale mobilization of the academic 
community to fend off state control and consolidate academic “democracy.” 
High- ranking academics gained representation monopolies at the state level 
through rectors’ conferences and other academic interest bodies, while main-
taining a strong grip over the state accreditation process. Within universities, 
academic senates remained bastions of academic self-governance, while the very 
fragmented internal structure of universities undermined the influence of uni-
versity managers. Essentially, the post-communist pathways of both countries re-
sulted in the convergence toward a model of academic “hyper-corporatism” at the 
state level and decentralized stakeholder self-governance at the university level.
4.1 Poland: the “fake corporatist” pathway to the constitution for science
The new Polish HE Act known as “Ustawa 2.0,” which is embedded in a broader 
package of laws known as “Constitution for Science” (Konstitucja dla Nauki), 
constitutes a striking case of “divergence after convergence.” We now focus on 
the policy style leading up to the reform and then discuss the policy output 
and shifts in stakeholder constellations. The 2010 international rankings con-
tinuously highlighted the weak competitiveness of Polish HE and Poland’s poor 
performance in Horizon 2020 and ERC grants (Boyadjieva, 2017). While study 
programs became increasingly commercialized, research tended to proliferate 
low-quality publications. This led to a widespread perception that an overhaul of 
the system is necessary.
Therefore, the new (post-2015) PiS parliamentary majority (Prawo i Sprawiedli-
wość / Law and Justice) pushed for a reform package labeled: “complex change of 
approach to scientific research, teaching students and managing the university.” 
In a seemingly stakeholder-friendly, democratic manner, PiS initiated an open 
competition for proposals (założenia do ustawy) for the legislative act. Of the fif-
teen original proposals, three most prominent ones emerged (Kwiek et al., 2016; 
Izdebski et al., 2017; Radwan, 2017), all of which recommended the concentra-
tion of resources in managerially operating rectors to the detriment of existing 
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collegial bodies, while more systematically including external stakeholders in 
governance. Each paper viewed the excessive “democratization” and fragmen-
tation of the university system as dysfunctional (e.g., Radwan, 2017, p. 37) and 
advocated a more managerial model.
Particularly striking was the open and inclusive nature of the process, at least 
on the surface. More than five thousand participants (including students, profes-
sors, managerial staff, etc.) participated in thematic conferences organized under 
the banner “National Congress of Science,” arguably the largest consultation 
forum ever witnessed in Poland. However, numerous interviews conducted with 
stakeholders paint a different picture. For example, one stakeholder comments:
Consultations were conducted in a model way. There were many efforts 
to reach every university and region. However it did not affect the final 
reform, since almost everybody feels endangered by it.
(Interview 03 May 2019)
Another stakeholder claims: “This act was supposedly up for consultations for 
two years. We have voiced our claims, but nobody took them into consideration” 
(Interview 08 May 2019).
Other informants expressed more radical criticism, e.g.:
It was a purely political process. And propaganda of success.
(Interview 01 May 2019)
Consultations? Let’s not joke. It was not a participatory process. There 
were crowds of people who were for the reform.
(Interview 06 May 2019)
Many informants also emphasized the gap between the initial ideas in the three 
policy papers and the Ministry’s draft bill, e.g.:
There has never been a consultation process on this scale, but many voices 
were not heard and many things were changed at the parliamentary stage.
(Interview 03 June 2019)
Thus, while the draft bill was widely consulted in the prelegislative phase, the 
main details apparently were decided in ministerial corridors. Counter to the 
Ministry’s claims of an open, democratic process, a largely façade exercise seems 
to have occurred. Specifically, the national-conservative government engaged in 
alliances with like-minded groups, in particular, university rectors, while essen-
tially remaining deaf to arguments voiced by opposing stakeholders from more 
diffuse interest organizations (in particular, university researchers).
We label this policy-making mode “fake corporatism.” Like in corporatist 
arrangements, decision-making power was to some extent transferred away from 
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the parliament to socioeconomic interest groups. However, here it was not a 
matter of balancing interests and reaching consensus; rather, it was of legitimiz-
ing already predetermined policies. The authors of the three policy papers had to 
stick to the predefined modules during the drafting process. The ministry then 
organized “Byzantine-style” consultations, creating the feeling of inclusiveness 
among the various organized stakeholders. However, the most prominent and 
present stakeholders were those who already held representation monopolies, 
were state-funded and -licensed. The final act was then pushed through parlia-
ment without any open debate. As many interviewees claim, the consultations 
resembled the notion of “preaching to the convinced” (e.g., Interview 03 May 
2019; Interview 09 May 2019). In other words, the consultations served to legit-
imize already predefined goals, which were then to be implemented by rectors. 
The other scattered, and often rivaling actors, were unable to effectively support 
their pluralistic demands (e.g., more funding for doctoral students, more system 
funding, more stakeholder democracy).3 Their participation in the large-scale 
consultations allowed them to voice their preferences but not much more. Essen-
tially, their interests “sank” in the magma of the reform, and their relative power 
vis-à-vis rectors was substantially downgraded.
This policy-making mode also coincided well with the recent shift toward 
a “strong state,” advocated by center-right governments in Poland. Drawing 
on the criticism of post-1989 liberal reforms and widespread systemic corrup-
tion, the PiS party, in particular, has endeavored to (re)build state–society and 
state–market relations from above. One of the main slogans since PiS regained 
a parliamentary majority in 2015 has been “Wstawanie z kolan” (“Rising from 
the knees”), thus a more proactive state seeking to regain true sovereignty and 
strength. This translated into various reforms leading toward empowering the 
state’s position vis-à-vis many societal spheres and, hence, recentralization. Here, 
the state drew on an alliance with the rectors as “natural allies” to the detriment 
of long-standing traditions of internal academic self-governance.
4.1.1 The new face of Polish HE
The 2018 Act fundamentally transforms Polish HE and – despite the open 
civic engagement process on the façade – results in a situation in which the 
large majority of stakeholders are dissatisfied with the outcome (AKP, 2018b; 
Chrzczonowicz, 2018; Płuciennik, 2019). The Act defines the three organs of 
the university: University Council (Rada Uczelni), Rector, and Senate (Art. 17), 
among which the rector has the most authority. The University Council has the 
most strategic competences (Art. 18) and a supervisory function over the rector. 
Previously the most powerful university governing body, the Senate now focuses 
on teaching activities. University Council members are formally appointed by 
the Senate, but internal regulations allow the rector to exclusively propose the 
candidates, whereby a majority must be from outside the university commu-
nity (Art. 18 Ustawa, 2018). The rector is elected by the University Council or 
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college of electors and is responsible for managing the university, appointing 
(and dismissing) other managerial positions, as well as financial governance, rep-
resentative functions, and many other areas (Art. 23 Ustawa, 2018). Rectors also 
decide on internal university regulations. The final version of the Act known as 
“Ustawa 2.0”4 grants the University Council hard competences in appointing 
the candidates for rectors, approving the financial plans and reports or monitor-
ing university management and soft competences regarding the development of 
university strategies.
Upon enactment, “Ustawa 2.0” was again heavily criticized by many actors, 
including student unions as well as numerous labor unions (including NSZZ 
“Solidarność”), Forum Związków Zawodowych, 17 various scientific councils, and 
countless individuals (AKP, 2018b; Płuciennik, 2019), for its political infringe-
ment on university autonomy. The newly emerged protest group Akademicki 
Komitet Protestacyjny (AKP) organized an event entitled: “funeral of Polish sci-
ence” and published a list of recommendations responding to the deficits of the 
reform, including the democratization of universities’ democratic standards for 
rectors’ elections and other managerial bodies, safeguarding autonomy by de-
priving the newly established “University Councils” of the right to appoint can-
didates for rectors, depoliticization of universities, guaranteeing transparency.
Apart from students who saw their equal access to HE (guaranteed by the 
constitution) endangered, academics also opposed the measures. “In the end 
of the reforms the rectors will be like gods” (Interview 02 May 2019), to the 
detriment of collegiality, self-governance, and faculty autonomy (Interview 03 
May 2019). As one former dean noted: “With respect to autonomy, the faculties 
lost all their powers and are totally dependent on the rectors” (Interview 02 
April 2019). Yet, not only the centrality of the rectors is perceived as problem-
atic from the autonomy viewpoint, but the election process also is (Interview 10 
May 2019). Specifically, the internal regulations allow the senate to control who 
will become the member of the Council (Interview 03 April 2019), whereas the 
Council determines the candidates for rectors. “Elections of rectors are like in 
Iran. We may choose among the candidates anointed by the Ayatollahs. This is 
not an election” (Interview 01 April 2019).
The critique of the new powers of rectors is not unjustified, considering that they 
oversee the whole university apparatus consisting of professional administration, 
lawyers, experts, scholars, etc. All this further concentrates their power resources 
and is funded by the state. How and why did the balance of power tip toward the 
rectors? We argue that interactions between two types of state power resources were 
critical: one politically organized by the Minister of Higher Education and Science, 
and the other corporatistically organized by the rectors. If we view the reform as 
an exchange between the two tax-funded groups in which one – the politicians – 
have decision-making power and the other – the rectors – have the implementation 
power, then their synergy becomes crucially decisive from the point of view of 
reform success.
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Hence, the Minister strengthened the rectors, and vice versa, the rectors ena-
bled the smooth implementation of the reform, thereby strengthening the minis-
ter. It made them the most natural allies since this collaborative power exchange 
was mutually beneficial.
Returning to our theory, it appears that the preexisting institutions of internal 
academic self-rule, a restrained state, and other groups representing university 
management in corporatist arenas, were subverted by a new state–rector alliance. 
For example, the General Council (Rada Glówna Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego), 
consisting of heterogeneous representatives of academic teachers, students, labor 
unions, scientific institutions, etc. and formally a key player in the corporatist 
arrangements, was simply too diverse to speak with a common voice. Moreover, 
its statutory documents define it as a neutral agent,5 with the effect that it can-
not engage in “power politics” and that its demands are more “horizontal” (i.e., 
more funding for HE and science). By contrast, the rectors, whose interests were 
heavily concentrated in the existing state-level corporatist structures and spoke 
with one common voice, essentially reaped most of the reform benefits, which, 
in turn, also increased the state’s grip over policy. From the very beginning, 
their position was strengthened by the three policy papers recommending more 
executive authority for them. This equipped them with an external source of 
legitimation, supplementary to the already comparatively advantageous position 
vis-à-vis other actors. This encompasses not only the traditionally understood 
power resources, like finances or access to decision-makers, but also external 
justification (policy papers, experts, reform expectations) and a position in the 
already existing university hierarchies and access to state resources.
Last but not least, in the perception of many informants, centralization is not 
without purpose but falls in line with the thrust toward enhancing the state’s 
leverage over various societal spheres, e.g., “Centralization and politicization, 
understood as ‘full availability’ of universities, is coded ideologically in this gov-
ernance culture” (Interview 01 April 2019). The motivations revealed by the 
authors of the reform drew strong criticism: “Under the guise of the fight against 
nepotism and corrupt pathologies, a centralized system was created” (Interview 
09 May 2019), which further concentrated authority within already privileged 
institutions and actors.
The upgrading of rectors in the governance structures is seen by most stake-
holders as a vehicle for politicization. As one informant argues: “The rectors 
collectively mobilized. They received a lot of promises of power… They simply 
caught the hook” (Interview 04 May 2019). Others were much more explicit, 
e.g., “It is easier to politically steer or corrupt one person, the rector” (Inter-
view 09 May 2019). Such judgmental statements were omnipresent in the inter-
viewees’ claims, which consistently reflected worries about decreasing academic 
autonomy (AKP, 2018a). For example: “Everybody is less independent. The pro-
fessors are totally dependent on the rector. And the rectors on politicians (…) the 
whole reform is a political project” (Interview 01 May 2019).
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4.2 The Czech Republic: keeping the status quo
The foundations for academic stakeholder governance were laid early and proved 
to be much more change-resistant than in Poland. Šebková and Beneš (2002) 
still regarded a system of self-governance and high autonomy of HE institu-
tions together with indirect state steering mainly by the distribution of financial 
means as two main characteristics of the Czech HE system around the turn of 
the millennium. This seems to be still true two decades later. Strong resistance 
to regulatory interference into academia has been always perceived as a step back 
to communist times. Along these lines, the three decades of post-revolutionary 
Czech HE have been marked by the persistent and collective mobilization of all 
internal academic groups (academics, students, and well as rectors) to preserve 
the system of academic freedom, autonomy, and self-governance. Czech HE can 
thus be seen as a “corporatist” system based on negotiation between the Minis-
try of Education and the formal representatives of HE institutions, comprising 
Council of Higher Education Institutions (since 1993 it also includes a student 
representation) and the Czech Rectors’ Conference. Thus, on the surface, stake-
holder governance in the Czech Republic and Poland is strikingly similar.
Why has the policy pathway taken in the early 1990s become so entrenched? 
The historical roots of the Czech HE legislation and how it was drafted and 
negotiated are crucial for understanding how and why internal interest groups 
have successfully resisted reform attempts, including the last major amendment 
in 2016. Since 1990, HE policy has been based on consensus and must be im-
plemented very carefully to cater to the sensitivities of academics. In line with 
legislation, all major measures are discussed with representatives of HE institu-
tions. The 1990 Act incorporated the Council of Higher Education Institutions 
into policy-making, enabling it to be consulted on any “ fundamental proposals and 
measures concerning higher education.” These constellations were further consoli-
dated in 1998 by also including the already existing Czech Rectors’ Conference 
into all HE matters “having a significant impact on higher education institutions.” This 
provision has been interpreted basically in a way that without consensus from the 
academic community no changes can be introduced.
The HE Act has always been attributed a high symbolic value within aca-
demia itself, not only because of its origin (partly associated with the “Velvet 
Revolution” of November 1989 and the student movement in bringing down 
communism) but also because of the legal protection it offered to academic staff 
and student interests (Interview 01 January 2020). Any attempt to alter the leg-
islation thus faced profound opposition primarily on these grounds. Thus, the 
1990s saw the emergence of a weak state and strong academic community in 
Czech HE, which has had long ramifications for the system. During all reform 
attempts, the Ministry of Education was responsible for drafting new legislation, 
whereby the process was generally dominated by internal HE stakeholders such 
as rectors, the HE Council, and students.
In the early reform phase, the relationship between rectors and the state 
developed in a rather antagonistic manner. The leading Czech HE institutions 
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Charles University, and mainly its Faculty of Law, have been heavily involved 
in policy-making and essentially steer policy-making from both within and 
outside the parliament. For example, in the mid-1990s, the rector of Charles 
University, Karel Malý, sent a personal letter to all members of parliament 
who graduated at his university, asking them to block the proposed HE act 
because it deprived universities of their fundamental rights and freedoms (In-
terview 13 December 2019). This is no exceptional case, as Czech rectors have 
traditionally relied on members of parliament who are former graduates of 
their own institutions (mainly Charles University) to mobilize support against 
more managerial reforms. During this specific case in the 1990s, the Faculty 
of Law of Charles University even submitted its own reform proposal, which 
was chosen over the initial ministerial proposal as the main fundament for the 
new HE Act in 1998.
Even after the implementation of the Act in 1999, tensions between the Min-
istry of Education and HE institutions remained high, as demonstrated by the 
proclamation of the Czech Rectors’ Conference: “they ask for the establishment of 
the new ministry for higher education and science as the existing Ministry of Education, 
Youth and Sports does not defend the interests of higher education institutions.”6 Leading 
academics pushed to establish a new ministry for science and HE from time to 
time, aiming to consolidate their dominance of the sector. However, HE and 
science have remained with the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport with 
a dedicated deputy minister, who, essentially, always had an academic back-
ground. Since the Ministry is also responsible for primary, secondary schools, 
youth, and sport, HE has to some extent remained on the backburner of the 
ministry’s agenda, again enabling academics to self-govern the system. Thus, 
during the period between 1994 and 1998, the main interest groups profiled and 
the playing field was structured. The Ministry of Education representing the 
state succumbed to its weak position with respect to steering the system. Public 
HE institutions increased their power mainly by transforming from the state 
into public institutions, an idea which also goes back to members of the Faculty 
of Law of Charles University, who thereby drafted the law and transferred the 
model of municipalities as public-law corporations to HE institutions (Interview 
13 December 2019; Interview 20 January 2020).
In the 2000s, the Czech Rectors’ Conference and the Council of Higher 
Education Institutions reaffirmed their positions as the two main representations 
affecting the HE agenda. Students emancipated themselves within the Council 
of Higher Education Institutions and became an important player in the field – 
they not only brought their agenda to the Council, they also negotiated with the 
Ministry of Education and other stakeholders separately (Interview 20 January 
2020; Interview 17 December 2019). Despite some disagreement on some issues, 
rectors, academics, and students have repeatedly acted as a consolidated unit to 
protect university autonomy. No other external players such as employers, cham-
bers of business, not-for-profit organizations, or other representatives of public 
or any other interest groups have been intensively involved in the process.
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4.2.1 A long-lasting reform attempt
While the recent about-face in Polish HE occurred rather dramatically, the most 
recent amendment to the HE Act (2016) is the result of a long-term reform 
process stimulated by the already-mentioned Thematic Review of Tertiary Ed-
ucation (2006) undertaken by OECD experts and seized on by the right-wing 
government then. The OECD suggested changes regarding the system structure, 
its diversification and the institutional landscape, institutional governance, re-
sourcing, access and equity, connections to the labor market, and many others. 
Like in Poland, Czech HE stakeholders were also heavily involved. While both 
the Prime Minister and the Minister of Education at that time were not associ-
ated with academia, the Deputy Minister responsible for Higher Education and 
Science, Petr Matějuº, was a professor himself, albeit a big critic of the existing 
system and proponent of private education and tuition fees (Interview 13 De-
cember 2019).
A team consisting of both ministerial as well as external members published 
the “White Book on Tertiary Education” (Matějuº, 2008) as the main strategic 
guideline for drafting the new HE legislation. The document offered some alter-
natives to the existing system, arguing for the introduction of governance changes 
and making HE more open to those who have a “stake” in the institutions and 
the system as a whole – employers, regions, graduates, etc. The White Book it-
self received very critical reactions, mainly from old traditional universities and 
also on personal grounds. Unlike in the recent Polish reform, representatives of 
academic self-governance – traditional universities, rectors, academics – were not 
members of the drafting team.
However, the original intentions were never met. Due to governmental in-
stability and political turbulence, the main governmental players were unable to 
defend the reform project. Between 2006 and 2009, as many as five ministers and 
four deputy ministers for HE and science changed. Well organized representa-
tives of HE institutions did not have a stable and reliable partner for government 
negotiations, resulting essentially in the institutional inertia of the system estab-
lished in the 1990s.
After the vote of no confidence in the Parliament and subsequent resigna-
tion of the coalition government in spring 2009, HE reform was halted by the 
then minister (Interview 12 December 2019), and the caretaker government 
took power during 2009–2010. After early elections in May 2010, a center-right 
government took power with Petr Nečas replacing Mirek Topolánek as Prime 
Minister. Its policy statement included the introduction of differed tuition fees 
and a supplementary loan scheme. The reform draft, to some extent, constituted 
an attack on internal university democracy by calling for a strengthened role 
of the Board of Trustees, limiting student representation in the senates to one-
third, and changing the system of docents and professors from academic titles 
into working positions. The draft, which would have diminished the influence 
of major internal groups – rectors, academics, and students – met with intensive 
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criticism from students, resulting in mass demonstrations under the motto “the 
week of unrest” in 2012. Charles University was also very active in opposing the 
reform.7 The minister resigned, and his successor, a political science professor 
and former rector of Masaryk University, first softened their initial enthusiasm 
for the reform and eventually abandoned the entirely new legislation, while in-
stead pushing for changes within the existing legislation (Interview 20 January 
2020; Interview 21 January 2020).
After intensive discussion with HE representations, an amendment to the HE 
Act was ultimately passed in 2016. Even ten years since the White Book, it es-
sentially did not include any changes suggested either by the OECD experts or 
previous reform-minded governments. It did not enable the greater participation of 
external stakeholders in HE governance nor did it increase in any way the leverage 
of the state or its surrogates (as was the case with the Polish Rectors’ Conference) 
over HE. Specifically, the previous Accreditation Commission was transferred into 
the National Accreditation Office, making it more independent from the state. 
The management and chairs of various working groups include almost exclusively 
members of academia with only minor involvement of external stakeholders. The 
new amendment also introduced a new possibility within the accreditation process: 
upon meeting certain requirements, a HE institution can be awarded an “insti-
tutional accreditation”, thus the autonomy to create and abolish study programs 
internally. Accreditation and quality assessment were partly moved from an exter-
nal actor (Accreditation Commission) into internal processes. Hence, the ultimate 
outcome of the 10-year reform endeavor, which originally aimed to strengthen the 
state’s ability to steer the system, is essentially a further increase in the autonomy 
and self-governing capacities of HE institutions (Interview 21 January 2020).
What accounts for the striking level of institutional inertia in Czech HE? 
First, the intermingling of politics and Czech academics – mainly those in man-
agerial positions – was decisive. Leading academics have been active in politics 
on all levels – municipal, regional, national, and EU. Due to the high prestige of 
university professors and the academic profession in society in general, political 
parties have actively sought and engaged them for elections. The Parliament 
has consistently included around five high-ranking academics, mostly former 
or even active deans or rectors of public universities. Former rectors of Charles 
University as well as Masaryk University are now members of the Senate. The 
former rector of Masaryk University is now a leader of the right-wing opposition 
party. In fact, many of the deputy ministers responsible for HE and science have 
been former rectors or deans. Usually, the main and only task of the ministry 
with respect to HE was to ensure as many resources as possible for the system 
that has been supposedly underfinanced. Traditionally, the Ministry, through 
the deputy minister responsible for HE and science (with some short-lasting 
exceptions), has represented the interests of the HE community rather than the 
state or the public. These dual affiliations and resulting inter-parliamentary and 
outer-parliamentary power resources put them in a privileged position, thus di-
minishing the prospects of rector “power grab” as in the Polish case.
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This balancing act of many Czech rectors and other high-ranking academics 
between the political sphere and their universities, combined with a supreme 
degree of inter-university decentralization, has had the effect that Czech rectors 
have not succeeded in centralizing their institutions. Traditionally, they have 
been treated more as representatives of their universities rather than general man-
agers with the deans as their deputies (Interview 27 November 2019; Interview 
28 November 2019; Interview 4 December 2019). In 1998, universities indeed 
became legal entities. However, in reality, very little has changed. The faculties 
are still the main actors within the university. In fact, rectors have been usually 
those with higher political ambitions. Their position was rather weak within 
their institutions, but strong in the HE system – representing the universities vis-
à-vis the Ministry. It could be described as a division of power within the system. 
“As long as you leave us faculties alone within our domain, you rectors can go 
ahead and play your political games with the ministry and the state” (Interview 
28 November 2019).
Finally, Czech students have been seen as a symbol of the revolution – they 
went to the streets in 1989 and ultimately helped bring down communism. In 
Czech society, there is a strong nostalgic and sentimental attachment with stu-
dent interests, which are frequently automatically equated with university inter-
ests. Whenever the state moved to change the balance of power to its benefit by 
taking away a bit of power from the universities, students, and academics quickly 
and effectively collectively mobilized to earn the sympathy of the public. This 
often translated into a public backlash according to the motto “Do not endanger 
those who gave us the freedom!” Thus, altogether, the symbolic position of uni-
versities and students in the revolutionary phase also explains their high social 
status and strong lobbying power.
5 Conclusions
The Czech Republic and Poland embarked on a remarkably similar reform path-
way after 1989, by essentially turning back control over HE to the academic 
community. University autonomy, academic freedom, and the democratization 
of university governance were crucial early steps toward democracy. This re-
sulted in the quick and effective restoration of academic self-governance and the 
creation of numerous institutions and organizations to defend the independence 
of the academic profession (Dobbins, 2011; Kwiek, 2014).
Why was the Polish government able to vertically impose a reform largely un-
desired by the academic community and amid resistance from previously potent 
stakeholders? And why has the Czech government failed, time and time, again to 
reform and “managerialize” university governance? We argued that the reasons 
for recent policy divergence lie in the differential mobilization capacities of aca-
demic stakeholders and the state’s means for intervention.
Regarding the power distribution within the academia, universities have 
been historically fragmented with power vested in faculties or even departments. 
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In the Czech case, this posed a substantial obstacle to institutional centralization 
and strengthening university management and rectors. It seems that a tacit agree-
ment has been in place between rectors and deans about the distribution of power 
in institutional and national policy-making. Another striking phenomenon is 
the active involvement of academic management in general politics, allowing 
for intensive inner and extra-parliamentary mobilization for academic interests. 
Former or even acting rectors and deans have been represented across different 
political parties but consistently have been able to find a united position to defend 
their interests.
Thus, the Czech post-communist structures of academic democracy have 
consolidated over almost three decades, and strong internal stakeholdership has 
evolved. Indeed, the abovementioned internal stakeholders stated that their in-
fluence within the system has either remained the same or increased (Survey 
Response 15 April 2019). By contrast, external stakeholders, represented by the 
state/ministry and other players including business, employers, or regional au-
thorities, have never been able to form an adequate counterbalance vis-à-vis 
internal academic stakeholders.
In Poland, by contrast, pre- and post-communist structures of academic 
democracy (i.e., university as a community of scholars) were converted into 
semi-autocratic state–rector alliance. Following Olson’s “optimal group size” 
claim, the rectors, organized in KRASP and various other institutions, enjoyed 
a strong organizational advantage over other diffused academic interests. This 
led to a coalescence of interests between the national-conservative government 
aiming to reassert control over the sector and rectors, who stood to benefit from 
the centralization of powers within universities. Subsequently, the top of the 
managerial university structures – i.e., rectors – became the powerful agents of 
governmental policy change. This resulted in the relative downgrading of the 
interests of other stakeholders (faculties, institutes, departments, and even indi-
vidual academics) as they have become more dependent on the rector and his/her 
interests. On the one hand, more diffuse and fragmented groups were unable to 
collectively mobilize effectively due to the pluralist setting of the various stake-
holders. On the other hand, it was in the interest of the authorities pursuing the 
reform to focus on one interest group, namely the rectors, who were critical for 
the implementation of the reform. Thus, the reform not only reorganized uni-
versity governance by endowing rectors with unprecedented power at the cost of 
other previously influential, but fragmented, collegial bodies but also places more 
power in the hands of politicians.
The Polish HE reform indeed can be seen in the larger context of the post-
2015 political changes reflecting illiberal tendencies, democratic backsliding, 
and centralization. Centralization (on a systemic and university level), politici-
zation, and disruptions to academic autonomy bring about winners and losers. 
The return of the strong state is an influential precondition and incentive for 
translating the public financial dependency into dependency on public author-
ity which, in such a politicized system as the Polish one, automatically means 
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political dependency. After the judiciary and other spheres of public life, the 
Polish academic sector has thus become an additional arena in which purportedly 
well- intended reforms brought about politicization and centralization. Although 
it has been a long time since Poland departed from its ideologically driven, over- 
regulated, and inefficient communist-type HE system, some symptoms of the 
past seem to be returning. It remains to be seen whether the Czech system will 
soon move in the same direction.
Notes
 1 For a historical account of student activism in Poland, see Junes (2011).
 2 With the exception of the University of Defence and the Police Academy.
 3 Students demanded more money for scholarships, etc. and actually received it, albeit 
at more limited numbers. So there is similar amount of money for them in the system, 
but it is simply allocated among fewer individuals.
 4 “Ustawa 2.0” – the renewal of Ustawa “Prawo o szkolnictwie wyższym i nauce” was voted 
on 03 July 2018; 233 deputies were for, 195 against, 1 abstained. This vote shows 
there was no general consensus.
 5 http://www.rgnisw.nauka.gov.pl/statut/
 6 Quoted by the Czech Press Agency on 19 November 1999.
 7 The text “Kritický pruº vodce ‘reformou’ vysokých škol” is available here: https://iforum.
cuni.cz/IFORUM-12056.html.
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Prawo.pl, https://www.prawo.pl/student/prawo-o-szkolnictwie-wyzszym- ocena-
prof-huberta-izdebskiego, 391284.html (Accessed 03 May 2019).
´Izdebski, H., Swiergiel, A., Chmielnicki, P., Ruszkowski, P., Misią g, W., Kiebała, A., & 
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Mickiewicza.
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Interview 15 April 2019 – Member of Council of Higher Education Institutions
Interview 27 November 2019 – rector of a public university and member of Czech Rec-
tors’ Conference
Interview 28 November 2019 – faculty dean of public university
Interview 4 November 2019 – former dean and rector of public university
Interview 12 December 2019 – former rector of public university and deputy minister 
responsible for higher education and science
Interview 13 December 2019 – former adviser to minister of education
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Interview 17 December 2019 – former student member of the Council of Higher Edu-
cation Institutions
Interview 20 January 2020 – former student member of university senate, former director 
of department at the Ministry of Education and a former deputy minister of education.
Interview 21 January 2020 – former member of the Council of Higher Education 
Institutions
Interviews Poland:
Interview 01 April 2019 – director of institute, responsible for reform implementation at 
Opole University
Interview 02 April 2019 – member of the committee implementing the reform at UMCS 
Lublin
Interview 03 April 2019 – member of Obywatele Nauki (“Citizens for Science”): director 
of largest institute at the University of Warsaw
Interview 01 May 2019 – former rector of the University of Warsaw
Interview 02 May 2019 – director of one of the largest institutes, responsible for reform 
implementation t the institute’s level, university professor, University of Warsaw
Interview 03 May 2019 – vice-director of one of the institutes, responsible for reform 
implementation the reform at University of Opole
Interview 04 May 2019 – dean of large faculty at UMCS Lublin
Interview 06 May 2019 – vice-rector of University of Warsaw
Interview 08 May 2019 – rector of private university in Warsaw
Interview 09 May 2019 – former vice-rector of Warsaw University
Interview 10 May 2019 – rector of private university in Warsaw






While scholars have enhanced our understanding of interest groups at the EU 
level (Warntjen & Wonka, 2004; Mahoney, 2007) and the impact of the EU 
enlargements thereupon (Pleines, 2011), less research has been conducted on the 
impact of enlargement on CEE organized interests. Scholars contend that EU 
integration has fostered processes of diffusion, learning, and adaptation, resulting 
in new repertoires and templates for interest groups (Klüver, 2011; Kröger, 2017; 
Maloney et al., 2018). However, there is a substantial deficit of research on the 
internal configurations of CEE interest groups after EU accession. Therefore, in 
this chapter, we explore one of the key features of organized interests – their level 
of professionalization – and how European integration affects it. This is crucial 
for understanding the development of post-EU accession advocacy groups and 
their evolution as a vital element of civil society.
Our comparative analysis covers Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, and Czechia 
and three policy areas: healthcare, higher education, and energy. We assume 
that the professionalization of interest groups is prone to vary across different 
sectors of activity. Some groups may be characterized by more active internal 
development, while other groups will focus less on professionalization. Some 
groups may cooperate closely with EU counterparts, while others may be much 
more focused on domestic activities. Bearing this in mind, we first explore how 
the EU impacts (e.g. through public funding) the level of professionalization of 
CEE interest groups, as understood in the classical top-down Europeanization 
approaches. Second, we examine whether other types of Europeanization (e.g. 
cross-loading through trans-border exchange with like-minded interest groups) 
affect their level of professionalization.
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The data on professionalization and Europeanization were collected by means 
of our online survey of interests groups in all four countries (see Chapter 1 and 
Annex). A cross-country and cross-sectoral statistical analysis, both descrip-
tive and inferential, provides a comparative perspective allowing us to identify, 
describe, and explain the policy-specific and country-specific similarities and 
differences at the crossroads of Europeanization and professionalization of or-
ganized interests in CEE.
The chapter proceeds as follows: after this short introduction, we reconstruct 
the main arguments present in the professionalization and Europeanization liter-
ature, which we find applicable to this analysis. Then we introduce our hypoth-
eses and operationalize the dependent and independent variables, before looking 
at variations in the professionalization of interest groups across countries in the 
selected policy areas as a dependent variable. It is operationalized as a synthetized 
index based on survey responses collected in 2019–2020. In line with various 
theories established in interest group research, we expect numerous causal factors 
to condition the degree of professionalization. Focusing on Europeanization pa-
rameters such as available budgets (dependency on EU funds), membership in EU 
umbrella organizations (supra-national federalization), cooperation with partners 
from abroad (cross-border networking), we explore their impact on professional-
ization processes across the above-mentioned countries and policy areas.
2 Intersecting professionalization and Europeanization
Interest group research, in general, and in particular scholarly investigations on 
advocacy, lobbying, and civic society organizations have blossomed in recent 
decades. However, scholars have explored the role of organized interests in poli-
tics and the economy at least since the 1920s (Herring, 1929). The creation of the 
Common Market and thus the delegation of more and more competences to the 
supranational level increased not only the salience of European-level lobbying, 
but also academic interest in advocacy organizations, which have responded to 
the European integration process with varied adaptation strategies. Research has 
not determined a standardized pattern of interest group activity in the European 
multi-level setting, but rather a complex mix of tactics and strategies, consistent 
with diverse governance models (Constantelos, 2004).
Consequently, at least from the moment of enlargement, CEE advocacy or-
ganizations have operated in the multi-level system and therefore had to incor-
porate the EU dimension into their repertoire of activities. They act at least in 
the two inter-linked arenas: the domestic setting and in Brussels. An important 
issue is whether the same factors affect the organized interests’ functioning at the 
sub-national, domestic and EU level. These questions are vital for the empirical 
and normative evaluation of the Europeanization processes within interest groups 
(Binderkrantz & Rasmussen, 2015). Accession to the EU entails participation in 
a new policy-making environment characterized by distinctive rules, norms, 
and values, which – in the process of Europeanization – have gradually become 
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internalized and impact on member states’ domestic political, social, and economic 
settings. The dynamics, depth, and scope of this form of (European scale) inter-
nationalization depend on numerous factors. This evolving multi-level policy- 
making environment (with its multiple power centers) offers a novel opportunity 
structures for societal actors to pursue their own objectives and put forward their 
own agendas (Blavoukos & Pagoulatos, 2008, p. 1147–1148).
Scholarly definitions of Europeanization still differ substantially. In the most 
standard way, it is understood as a situation, process, or outcome in which dis-
tinct modes of European governance have transformed aspects of domestic pol-
itics (Buller & Gamble, 2002, p. 17). The concept of Europeanization has been 
used by some analysts to denote the process through which political actors such 
as political parties, governments, or civil society organizations adapt to Euro-
pean integration. Radaelli (2000) defined Europeanization as the processes of 
construction, diffusion, and institutionalization of formal and informal rules, 
procedures, policy paradigms, styles of doing things as well as shared beliefs and 
norms which are first defined and consolidated in EU decision-making and then 
incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures, 
and public policies (2000, p. 4). Similarly, Robert Ladrech (1994) emphasized the 
adaptive processes of organizations due to a changing environment. Professional-
ization processes are one of the outcomes of these evolutionary changes.
The professionalization of organized interests has therefore also been the sub-
ject of intense research in social sciences in recent years (Klüver & Saurugger, 
2013). However, in this chapter, we do not focus on the professionalization phe-
nomenon itself, but rather on the relationships between two specific processes, 
which at some point may cross each others’ paths, namely Europeanization and the 
professionalization of organized interests. The CEE region provides a particularly 
significant arena to deepen our understanding of the dynamics and intersections 
of professionalization and Europeanization processes of interest organizations.
Interest groups activities are always affected by the political environment in 
which they operate and the effective study of public interest groups must situate 
them in a larger political context (Meyer & Imig, 1993). In CEE, organized in-
terests are burdened with a difficult legacy. Under socialism, civil society activity 
was largely channeled through communist parties, which in turn converted any 
pre-existing interest associations into their own appendages (Kubik, 2005). In 
fact, behind the iron curtain, no truly free civil societies were permitted with-
out state control, and organizations were banned or operated only under the 
supervision of the relevant political bodies (see Chapter 2 in this volume). The 
processes of political transformation and EU accession aspirations in most CEE 
countries have led in parallel to significant changes in associational life. This 
process opened up new “fields of action” for various interest organizations.
Scholars employ a variety of theories when investigating interest groups’ link-
ages with policy-making processes (see Chapters 4–7 in this volume). It is clear, 
however, that interest groups must act professionally in order to gain access to 
decision-makers and to effectively represent their interests (Beyers, 2008; see 
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Horváthová & Dobbins in this volume). This pressures interest groups to ana-
lyze and potentially transform their internal organizational structures (Klüver & 
Saurugger, 2013), thus incentivizing – among other things – the professionaliza-
tion of their activities and strategies. But what exactly does the professionaliza-
tion of interest groups mean and how is it understood in the scholarly literature? 
Theories rooted in the sociology of organizations emphasize professionalization 
as a structure and process that refers to the creation of positions that require a 
high degree of qualification in terms of education, training, and relevant work-
ing experience (Klüver & Saurugger, 2013). The phenomenon of professionali-
zation in general is reflected in changes to structures, strategies, and core values. 
In a more direct way, professionalization describes the shift in organizational 
structure and may represent an increasing reliance on a paid workforce with spe-
cialized knowledge gained through formal education (Salamon, 2012). A profes-
sional workforce with its ability to create “professional culture” has a tendency to 
use specialized knowledge responding to social problems, which might change 
organizational behavior (Klüver & Saurugger, 2013). McGrath (2005) charac-
terizes professionalization by four criteria: the adherence to professional norms, 
technical skills gained through training, body of knowledge, and membership in 
professional organizations. Some scholars argue that professionalization is a multi- 
dimensional process and might differ across different types of organized interests 
(Klüver & Saurugger, 2013). In the case of cause groups, it often involves the 
transition from volunteer-based organizations towards a workforce recognized 
as a profession. Yet there are existing theories suggesting that institutional pres-
sure leads to similar patterns of professionalization, resulting in similar profes-
sionalization processes among different groups. However, as mentioned before, 
professionalization processes may move socially rooted organizations towards 
client-oriented service delivery, thus affecting their distance from communities. 
Taking into account the variety of existing theories, professionalization can be 
seen as a process of transformation of the internal structures of organized inter-
ests towards more professionalized features (Imig & Tarrow, 2001), including 
improvement of the professional knowledge and skills of individual members 
through formal training, hiring professionals, orientation towards internal devel-
opment, and cooperation with other professional organizations.
Consequently, in this study, we operationalize professionalization in line with 
McGrath’s (2005) criteria for professional norm development, and increasing 
knowledge and technical skills gained through education and cooperation with 
other professional organizations. As indicated above, we define professionaliza-
tion as a set of activities with a focus on human capital, i.e. membership growth 
and human resource development, and training of the lobbyists, which require 
a higher degree of qualification in terms of training and education. To fully 
capture the degree of professionalization, we also draw on several indicators that 
may give a broader view of general organizational development, such as fund-
raising development, focus on strategic planning and evaluation of efficiency, 
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and effectiveness, all of which stimulate and require the parallel development of 
members’ knowledge.
It is recognized that the professionalization process is dependent on resources, 
including financial resources. Maloney, Hafner-Fink and Fink-Hafner (2018) 
argue that an important factor for professionalization processes is public funding 
(including EU-outsourced funding). They stated that public funding may not 
only stimulate professionalization, it may simply demand it. Governments may 
effectively require or even mandate groups to adopt a specific organizational 
structure by setting standards or rules leading to the development of their human 
resources capital.
Researchers have also examined the effect of EU funds on the level of profes-
sionalization. Vráblíková and Císař (2013) pointed out that the EU accession process 
brought professionalization and bureaucratization to Czech advocacy organizations. 
Interest groups began to operate with much bigger budgets, hired more employees, 
and resorted to more bureaucratic forms of management. However, other studies 
on Slovenian organizations (Maloney et al., 2018) show that in the post-accession 
period, there were differences between interest group types in terms of profession-
alization. Specifically, the differences in the levels of professionalization are lower 
in the post-accession than pre-accession period. Recent research acknowledges the 
impact of various levels of Europeanization on interest groups (Klüver & Saurugger, 
2013; Kröger, 2017; Maloney et al., 2018). Klüver and Saurugger (2013) argue that 
both cause and sectional groups exhibit similar professionalization patterns, and the 
group type is not a factor that may differentiate their professionalization.
However, the impact of Europeanization on professionalization processes 
from a broader cross-country and cross-policy perspective has been over-looked. 
Having that in mind, we explore to what extent Europeanization or more pre-
cisely EU funding, membership in EU umbrella organizations, and strong ties 
with like-minded organizations from EU countries contribute to the profession-
alization of interest groups in four analyzed countries and three selected policy 
sectors. While these countries present four diverse and distinct environments 
for the functioning of organized interests, the forms and levels of professional-
ization may also vary by policy areas. Healthcare is conventionally meant to be 
a highly professionalized sector due to its sophistication and expertise needed 
when dealing with medical and related issues. It is also the least Europeanized 
sector analyzed here. In contrast, energy and higher education are much more 
strongly affected by Europeanization processes (see Chapter 3 in this volume), 
potentially exerting a differential impact on the professionalization of organiza-
tions operating in these areas.
Our focus on the dependency on EU funds assumes that Europeanization is a 
way of responding to external incentives (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2020). 
It certainly goes beyond the mere conditionality policy – driven by the prospects 
of EU membership – which dominated Europeanization scholarship in the pre- 
accession phase. Nowadays, almost two decades after the big-bang enlargement, 
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Europeanization has become a “business as usual” game in CEE. In parallel, the 
Europeanization literature evolved towards more detailed conceptualizations.
After a series of debates shaped the progress of Europeanization research (what 
Europeanization was, how it functioned, what it was determined by, what out-
comes it delivered, etc.), we may understand Europeanization, for the purposes 
of this analysis, as the process and outcome through which the supranational 
norms and values become interwoven with domestic policy-making structures 
(Ladrech, 2010). This way of defining Europeanization fits very well to this 
study, where professionalization norms are under question. The professionali-
zation of organized interests goes hand in hand with Europeanization no mat-
ter if we focus on bottom-up Europeanization when organized interests engage 
in the process of uploading national policies to the supranational level or top-
down Europeanization, whereby organized interests cooperate in the process of 
downloading and implementing EU policies to the domestic level. We also test 
cross-border Europeanization – horizontal collaboration with other organiza-
tions from abroad – as an additional explanatory variable.
All above-mentioned Europeanization directions and mechanisms may in-
centivize professionalization processes. By conceptualizing Europeanization 
based on the availability of the EU fund flows as well as Europeanized associ-
ational life (belonging to EU umbrella organizations and dense collaborative 
networks with like-minded organisations from abroad), we place this study 
in the mainstream of Europeanization research. Undoubtedly, it is one of the 
main ways in which Europeanization is operationalized in studies on organized 
interests (Beyers, 2002; Dür, 2008; Klüver, 2011; Beyers & Kerremans, 2012; 
Cekik, 2017; Kröger, 2017; Maloney et al., 2018), and therefore a legitimate var-
iable in analyzing advocacy in CEE. Being dependent on EU funds, belonging 
to  supra-national umbrella organizations and being involved in vibrant cross- 
border associational life create a direct linkage with Brussels as well as other 
European partners across the EU and contribute to other various ways of inter- 
connectedness. The EU perceives various types of civil society o rganizations 
as vital for the democratic decision-making process, and therefore it stimulates 
their involvement in policy-making as legitimate partners.
Bearing in mind the recognized ways of operationalizing Europeanization in 
the existing literature, we test dependency on EU funding, membership in supra-
national umbrella organizations and cooperation with other like-minded Euro-
pean organizations as explanatory variables. As stated earlier, public funding may 
not only stimulate professionalization, it might demand it. It is a two-directional 
process, where – on the demand side – decision-makers may effectively require 
or even mandate advocacy groups to adopt a specific organizational structure by 
setting standards, rules, or codes of conduct leading to the development of organ-
ized interests’ “cadre”, e.g. as the EU has done. Therefore, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 1: The greater the access to EU funding, the greater the level of or-
ganizational professionalization.
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Moreover, Europeanization understood as networking emphasizes the cross- 
border exchange of knowledge, expertise, and experience as well as other re-
sources as an additional factor determining the professionalization processes. 
This type of collaborative communication is recognized as one of the key cross- 
loading Europeanization mechanisms. Thus, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 2 The more organizations cooperate with other EU organizations, the 
greater the level of organizational professionalization
At the same time, we recognize that not all cross-border collaboration may lead 
towards improved professionalization standards. Due to data availability, we 
hence more specifically test what kind of cooperation translates into higher levels 
of professionalization. Is it the mere membership in supranational umbrella or-
ganizations or more intense contacts with other like-minded European interest 
groups sharing similar interests and values? Thus, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 2a EU umbrella organization membership results in increased 
professionalization
and
Hypothesis 2b The more intense the cooperation with like-minded EU organiza-
tions, the greater the level of professionalization.
These hypotheses connect to the selected elements of the three types of Europe-
anization logics identified by Börzel and Risse (2012), namely:
1  Instrumental rationality or logic of consequences – in line with rational-choice insti-
tutionalism assuming that actors are mostly self-interested utility maximiz-
ers who select their course of action according to cost-benefit calculations.
2  Normative rationality or logic of appropriateness – in line with sociological in-
stitutionalism which perceives actors as rule-followers who “do the right 
thing” because they want to be part of a particular community and have 
been socialized into certain rules.
3  Communicative rationality or logic of arguing – in line with constructivist ap-
proaches which see actors as deliberating and persuading (including argu-
ing, reasoning as well as challenging these reasons and legitimacy norms) 
each other about the validity claims inherent in any casual or normative 
statement.
The normative rationality drives organized interest which acts in a certain set-
ting in line with the logic of appropriateness. In our study, the EU standards 
of professionalization proliferate across all participating parties in the process 
of cross-loading, uploading and downloading Europeanization. In the process 
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of networking (cooperation with other like-minded EU interest groups), they 
become socialized in and internalize certain rules. “The right thing to do” – 
understood as a certain professionalization level – is also transmitted through 
the federalization process, in which new organized interests become members of 
EU-level umbrella organizations. Last but not the least, a more coercive mech-
anism plays a role, namely money conditionality: new member states comply 
with specific professionalization standards due to their dependency on EU funds 
which implies a certain course of conduct.
3 Analysis
This analysis includes responses from 420 organizations representing the energy, 
higher education, and healthcare sectors in Czechia, Hungary, Poland, and Slo-
venia. We define our dependent variable – professionalization – as a processes 
of internal, structural changes of the organization leading towards higher pro-
fessional standards in its functioning, e.g. creation of positions requiring higher 
qualifications in terms of education and relevant working experience, focus on 
internal development, and focus on a professional workforce. The operational-
ization of the dependent variable is based on seven questions regarding profes-
sionalization, measured on a 5-point scale. Our respondents were asked to what 
extent their organization focuses on the following activities as opposed to 10–15 
years ago (or since its founding, if founded more recently): “organizational devel-
opment”, “human resource development”, “training of lobbyists”, “fundraising”, 
“evaluation of efficiency and effectiveness”, “strategic planning”, with an added 
category “membership size growth”.
In accordance with our presented hypotheses, we begin with a short analysis 
of (our dependent variable reflecting) different dimensions of professionalization. 
As our summarized Likert items are scored in the same direction and on the 
same weight scales, for the descriptive statistical analysis, we decided to create 
one standardized professionalization indicator. However, to avoid measurement 
errors, we tested our data using Cronbach’s alpha internal consistency reliability. 
With a standardized alpha of 0.784, we created a general professionalization in-
dex based on a general score of summarized values of our seven professionaliza-
tion variables. Our general professionalization index, presented on a 0–30 degree 
professionalization scale, was prepared for analysis based on descriptive statistics, 
i.e. means, medians, and standard deviations.
The spacings between the different parts of the box indicate the degree of 
dispersion (spread) and skewness in the data, and show outliers. The distribution 
moderately differs among groups in each analyzed country, with outliers for 
Slovenia and Czechia. Data for Slovenian organized interests reflect a higher 
dispersion as well as more marginal values when compared to the organizations 
from Poland, Hungary, and Czechia.
We also analyzed professionalization for specific policy fields. Like before, 
we again observe differences between analyzed groups. The mean level of 
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FIGURE 9.1 Professionalization by country.
FIGURE 9.2 Professionalization by policy field.
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professionalization for healthcare groups is higher than for energy and higher 
education, while the healthcare sector shows a lower degree of dispersion, with-
out extremely dispersed outliers. The standard deviation is lower (closer to the 
mean) in the energy sector, but there is a much higher level of dispersion, which 
may suggest higher level of diversity between the groups operating in this sector.
In the next step, we tested our dichotomous variable of strong relations with 
other European organized interests. We asked our respondents if they have any 
strong ties with like-minded organizations from other EU countries, as like-
minded organizations may be important partners for organizations and their 
professional development. Our descriptive analysis shows that in both cases, 
minimum and maximum values are dispersed. However, in the case of organ-
izations with stronger ties with other EU organizations, there is a higher mean 
professionalization level and much lower values of standard deviation. Thus, we 
can conclude that organizations maintaining closer relations with their EU-level 
counterparts enjoy a higher degree of professionalization.
We also checked whether EU umbrella organizations play a role in the pro-
cess of organizational professionalization. As we see, members of EU umbrella 
organizations are more professionalized than the groups that are not members of 
EU umbrellas. However, the differences are rather marginal.
To analyze the impact of our independent variables on professionalization, we 
conducted a linear regression. As outlined above, our main research question is 
the effect of Europeanization on the professionalization of organized interests. 
FIGURE 9.3 Intensive cooperation with like-minded EU organizations.
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Following the same logic as above, we created a continuous professionalization 
variable based on the arithmetic mean of seven professionalization variables (i.e. 
focus on human resources development, lobbying activities, fundraising, evalu-
ation and strategic planning, organizational development, and staff growth over 
the last 10–15 years) previously measured on five point Likert scales, which we 
combined into one scale and recoded into values from 1 to 100 to facilitate inter-
pretation (Sullivan & Artino, 2013).
Regarding the “Europeanization” predictors, we applied several different var-
iables related to the EU accession and the Europeanization process of organized 
interests, whereas in line with the literature, we focus on EU funding as the main 
explanatory variable (independent variable). Based on our hypothetical starting 
point, we created five models related to different types of Europeanization. We 
applied several dichotomous independent variables such as membership in EU 
umbrella organizations to test our second hypothesis and strong ties with like-
minded organizations in the EU as a predictor to test our third hypothesis that 
close relations with like-minded organizations abroad are important for gaining 
organizational skills and achieving professional development. To indicate the ab-
sence or presence of the categorical effect that may be expected to shift the out-
come, we coded organizations that are members of EU umbrella organizations 
with a value “1”, and those that are not members of any EU umbrella organiza-
tions with a value “0”. Sorting the data into mutually exclusive categories, we 
applied the same logic to our variable regarding strong relations with other EU 
FIGURE 9.4 Membership in EU umbrella organizations.
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organizations. As an added value to our analysis, we also included interest group 
type in our models, enabling us to analyze whether being a “diffuse” or “con-
centrated” organization (Olson, 1965) impacts the level of professionalization. 
We created a dummy variable “0” for diffuse interests and “1” for concentrated 
organizations. In the energy and environmental sector, all civic organizations 
representing environmental groups, promoting sustainable and clean energy, 
and energy consumers were coded as diffuse organizations. Energy producers 
and suppliers, and workers’ unions were coded as concentrated interests. For the 
healthcare sector, we coded all the professional medical associations (doctors, 
nurses), organizations representing the healthcare and pharmaceutical industry 
as concentrated interests. All groups representing patients and patients’ rights as 
well as groups focusing on disease prevention and healthcare promotion were 
coded as diffuse. For higher education, all the student groups were coded as 
diffuse, while organizations representing the interests of the academic profession 
or individual universities were coded as concentrated. We also added categorical 
country and policy field variables to the model to check whether there are any 
variations across country and policy sectors.
The key research question, as outlined in H1, is to what extent EU funding 
directly affects the professionalization process of interest groups. We therefore 
applied the level of EU funds in organizational budgets as a main independent 
variable (predictor). To check how important EU funds are, we tested the EU 
funding predictor in each of the five models, in the first model as the EU funds 
only, then adding the group type variable, membership in the EU Umbrella or-
ganization, and cooperation with like-minded organizations across the EU. We 
analyzed the extent to which EU funding (independent variable) contributes to 
the professionalization of interest groups across four countries and three selected 
policy fields. As we see in (Table 9.1), contrary to our hypothesis (H1) regard-
ing the direct and positive impact of EU funding on interest group profession-
alization, EU funds in organizational budgets do not affect professionalization 
in any tested model. The coefficient of EU fund variable ranges from 0.074 to 
0.362, but is not significant. The expected predictive power of EU funding even 
marginally decreases when measured with other variables. Surprisingly, against 
our expectations, EU funding emerges as a statistically insignificant predictor of 
professionalization. Thus, we may conclude that organizations that are more de-
pendent on EU funding are not significantly more professionalized than organ-
izations less dependent on EU funding. We also found no statistically significant 
data for membership in EU umbrella organizations. In two of the tested models 
(III and V), we found that membership in EU umbrella organizations does not 
affect professionalization. On the contrary, the coefficient for membership in an 
EU umbrella organization in the last tested model that includes all the variables, 
changed direction and became negative.
Contrary to membership in EU umbrella organizations, our results show 
that our dichotomous variable “strong ties with likeminded EU organizations” 
matter. Importantly, our data also show that organizations that have developed 
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stronger ties with other like-minded organizations from EU countries enjoyed 
higher professionalization growth over the last 10–15 years than those without 
stronger relations with like-minded EU interest groups. In our models, the co-
efficient for strong ties with like-minded organizations in other EU countries 
significantly and substantially affects professionalization varying from 5.936** to 
6.824***, indicating a positive direction in the relationship between a predictor 
variable and our aggregated professionalization variable.
At this stage, we found no statistically significant difference between interest 
group types (diffuse vs. concentrated) in the four tested models (II–V). However, 
in every model, the coefficient of interest type is negative, which indicates that 
Europeanization processes may impact the professionalization of diffuse interest 
groups more than concentrated groups. Also, we observe statistically significant 
differences between organized interests in three analyzed policy fields. In every 
tested model, our data show that healthcare organizations seem to be much more 
TABLE 9.1  Determinants of professionalization of interest organizations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
EU funds 0.362 0.335 0.318 0.074 0.155
(0.571) (0.570) (0.578) (0.592) (0.598)
Country Slovenia (ref.
category)
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Hungary −2.797 −2.223 −2.208 −1.963 −1.649
(1.990) (2.023) (2.039) (2.150) (2.177)
Poland −0.049 0.378 0.406 0.675 0.135
(2.315) (2.319) (2.366) (2.479) (2.547)
Czech Rep. 1.057 0.497 0.510 0.718 0.815
(1.765) (1.798) (0.800) (1.896) (1.901)
Policy field higher 
education (ref. cat)
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Health care 4.164*** 3.647** 3.668** 3.624** 3.829**
(1.472) (1.498) (1.508) (1.601) (1.617)
Energy −1.816 −1.833 −1.827 −1.633 −1.714
(1.714) (1.710) (1.719) (1.835) (1.838)
Concentrated / diffuse −3.477 −3.471 −3.435 −3.447
(2.282) (2.287) (2.407) (2.408)








Observations 242 242 242 219 219
R2 0.0528 0.0618 0.0721 0.0867 0.0974
Constant 62.142*** 64.217*** 64.024*** 61.061*** 61.512***
(1.369) (1.928) (2.143) (2.555) (2.602)
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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focused on professional development activities such as strategic planning, the 
training of lobbyists, human resource development, and fundraising. The health-
care coefficient is positive and significant in every tested model. By contrast, en-
ergy interest organizations appear less focused on professionalization than the two 
other analyzed groups. The results for the other policy sectors results are not sta-
tistically significant. The country-specific analysis shows stronger growth in pro-
fessionalization among Czech organizations, while lowest values are visible in case 
of Hungary. However, the country variation is not significant in any tested model.
4 Conclusions
This chapter explored the interplay between professionalization and European-
ization processes within CEE organized interests. Specifically, we used various 
parameters of Europeanization as explanatory determinants for professionaliza-
tion processes in three sectors – higher education, healthcare, and energy. Many 
questions related to Europeanization in general and the Europeanization of CEE 
organized interests in particular are still open to debate (Kröger, 2017, p. 18). 
This chapter contributed to this debate by explaining the intersection of Eu-
ropeanization and professionalization processes among advocacy organizations 
from four post-communist states – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and 
Slovenia – which have been subject to strong Europeanization pressures both 
before and after EU accession.
We expected the professionalization of interest groups to vary across their 
different sectors of activity across four countries in question. This expectation 
was built on the general assumption in the Europeanization literature about the 
diversified reactions to similar pan-European processes and dynamics (Ladrech, 
2010). Specifically, we first explored how the EU impacts the level of profes-
sionalization of CEE interest groups (e.g. through funding). Second, we ex-
amined whether other types of Europeanization (e.g. cross-loading – through 
trans- border exchange with like-minded interest groups) play a role and affect 
their level of professionalization. Finally, we tested whether professionalization 
parameters increase together with EU umbrella organization membership.
The key finding is that various types of Europeanization pressures produce di-
versified outcomes regarding the professionalization of organized interests. Mem-
bership in supranational umbrella organizations (which is a standard parameter of 
Europeanization) does not necessarily lead to higher levels of professionalization 
(Hypothesis 2a). Instead, strong ties with like-minded EU organizations corre-
late much more strongly with greater professionalization among CEE organized 
interests. In this light, the EU can be seen as a gigantic socialization platform 
which actively promotes rules, norms, practices, and structures of meaning to 
which member states (various actors, including the advocacy and other types of 
organised interest organizations) are exposed and which they have to incorporate 
into their domestic structures (Börzel & Risse, 2012, p. 1). At the same time, our 
results show that cross-loading Europeanization mechanisms (Hypothesis 2b) 
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seem to be more effective in CEE than top-down or bottom-up mechanisms. 
Participation in transnational networks matters and the communicative process 
of exchange correlates with improving professionalization levels across the or-
ganized interests.
Cross-border cooperation among various civic society organizations has in-
creased substantially after 1989, together with the process of “opening orders”, 
but the phenomenon accelerated together with the membership in the EU (2004) 
due to the participation in the Single Market (free movement of people) and later 
in the Schengen agreement. This soft route of Europeanization, predominantly 
through transnational communication (Voegtle, Knill & Dobbins, 2011) occurred 
to be the most effective professionalization vehicle. Dense contacts and linkages 
with other organized interests of the region not only fill the gap between the 
traditional top-down Europeanization pressures or bottom-up (supranationaliza-
tion mechanism) initiatives. They create a type of organic Europeanization that 
operates much more horizontally than vertically. Domestic interests groups’ envi-
ronments interact not only with the EU level (Kendal, 2010), but they exchange 
knowledge, information, and resources across borders with their foreign counter-
parts. This analysis shows that this type of Europeanization provides an effective 
channel of professionalization among the post-communist organized interests.
We also hypothesized that professionalization processes are largely deter-
mined by classical Europeanization mechanisms, like dependency on EU funds 
(Hypothesis 1). However, we found that EU funds in organizational budgets do 
not affect professionalization in any tested model. Contrarily, we found out that 
organizations that are more dependent on EU funding are not significantly more 
professionalized than organizations less dependent on EU funding. This finding 
leads to counter-intuitive conclusions in relation to the assumption about the 
demand-driven professionalization of European(ized) organized interests.
Together with the growth of the European Union’s salience, advocacy organ-
izations increasingly seek to influence supranational policy-making. For CEE 
organized interests, EU institutions became crucially important with the 2004 
“big-bang” enlargement. While many indeed were present in Brussels before-
hand, only through the process of EU accession did they become – together 
with other political, social, and economic actors of the joining states –  legitimate 
agents in the legislative apparatus of united Europe. Their success in inserting 
themselves into the policy-making process depends on existing formal and infor-
mal ties with EU institutions (Thiel & Uçarer, 2014, p. 99). The literature pre-
dicts that policy fields with stronger EU competences will experience stronger 
Europeanization impulses and effects. Counterintuitively, our findings show that 
it is not the highly Europeanized energy policy sector, in which organized in-
terests have become increasingly professionalized, rather the relatively less Eu-
ropeanized healthcare sector. Other factors seem to play a stronger role here: 
healthcare organizations seem to focus on professional development activities 
such as strategic planning, the training of lobbyists, or human resource develop-
ment without the additional impetus from Europeanization.
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While contributing to the existing literature on Europeanization and pro-
fessionalization, these findings open many windows of opportunity for future 
research. Further analyses are needed to examine other parameters of the Eu-
ropeanization of organized interests (convergence, competition, and communi-
cation related factors) and how they interact with the structure and functioning 
of interest groups (including professionalization). Moreover, the previously as-
sumed path-dependence of democratization, consolidation, and Europeaniza-
tion is challenged by the contemporary processes of democratic backsliding and 
de-Europeanization, which may have significant implications for the environ-
ment of interest groups, their internal structures, and ways of operating.
References
Binderkrantz, A. & Rasmussen, A. (2015). Comparing the domestic and the EU lobbying 
context: perceived agenda setting influence in the multi-level system of the Euro-
pean Union. Journal of European Public Policy 22(4), 552–569. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 
13501763.2015.1008553
Beyers, J. (2002). Gaining and seeking access: The European adaptation of domestic 
interest associations. European Journal of Political Research 41(5), 585–612. https://doi.
org/10.1111/1475-6765.00023
Beyers, J. (2008). Policy issues, organisational format and the political strategies 
of interest organisations. West European Politics 31(6), 1188–1211. https://doi.
org/10.1080/01402380802372654
Beyers, J. & Kerremans, B. (2012). Domestic embeddedness and the dynamics of multi-
level venue shopping in four EU member states. Governance 25(2), 263–290. https://
doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0491.2011.01551.x
Blavoukos, S. & Pagoulatos, G. (2008). ‘Enlargement Waves’ and interest group partic-
ipation in the EU policy-making system: Establishing a framework of analysis. West 
European Politics 31(6), 1147–1165. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402380802370625
Börzel, T. A. & Risse, T. (2012). From Europeanisation to diffusion: Introduction. West 
European Politics 35(1), 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2012.631310
Buller, J., & Gamble. A. (2002). Conceptualizing Europeanisation. Public Policy and Adminis-
tration 17(4), 4–24. https://doi.org/10.1177/095207670201700202
Cekik, A. (2017). Adapting to Europe? Business interests and civil society groups in accession 
countries. West European Politics 40(5), 1066–1087. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.20
17.1308696
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PART 5
Excursions to other territories

1 Introduction
Climate and energy policy has developed into one of the most important com-
mon EU policies. In December 2008, general objectives known as the Climate 
and Energy 20-20-20 Package were approved by the European Council. It is a 
set of legally binding acts to ensure that the EU achieves three targets by the year 
2020: a 20% reduction of greenhouse gas emissions (from 1990 levels), 20% energy 
from renewable sources, and a 20% improvement in energy efficiency.1 At three 
meetings in 2014, the Council discussed and reaffirmed the EU’s efforts to combat 
climate change and adopted the EU’s framework goals by 2030. The goals for re-
newables and energy efficiency were revised upward in 2018 and now stipulate at 
least 40% cuts in greenhouse gas emissions (from 1990 levels), at least a 32% share 
of renewable energy (originally 27%), and at least a 32.5% improvement in energy 
efficiency (originally 27%). In 2018, the European Commission submitted a pro-
posal for a Multiannual Financial Framework for 2021–2027, proposing a target 
of 25% of the entire EU budget for climate goals (European Commission, 2018).
A European Green Deal was one of the first objectives of the new President 
of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen (2019), and in December 
2019, the European Council endorsed the aim of a climate-neutral EU by 2050. 
However, as stated in the conclusions, “at this stage, one member state cannot 
commit to implement this objective as far as it is concerned” (European Coun-
cil, 2019) and the European Council would come back to this problem in June 
2020. The conclusions did not include the country’s name, but it was Poland, 
where hard coal is the largest raw material for electricity production. Moreover, 
Poland is currently not planning to abandon hard coal burning as the primary 
source of electricity production. The current shape of the energy sector in Poland 
(and other CEE countries), including high dependence on hard coal, is largely 
a heritage of the past (Horváthová and Dobbins, 2019). Poland has the largest 
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amount of hard coal by EU comparison, and it has been one of its most important 
industries for many decades, long before the 1989 transformation. Later, the size 
of the hard coal-mining (HCM) sector in Poland decreased, but its political and 
economic significance remains high. Due to the many active coal organizations 
and their ties with political parties as well as the strong political polarization of 
society and political calendar, mining trade unions are among important interest 
groups in Poland, not least because the social movement and the then trade union 
“Solidarity” was crucial in overthrowing communism.
The Czech Republic is the EU’s second-largest hard coal producer. Together 
with Poland, Hungary, and Estonia, it blocked the adoption of the climate neu-
trality target for 2050 at the June 2019 Council meeting. However, the level of 
hard coal extraction is much lower than in Poland, resulting in its lower economic 
and political significance. Nevertheless, the policies of these strong coal-mining 
states directly affect the EU’s climate and energy goals. Against this background, 
this chapter explores how the main organized interests and, in particular, trade 
unions impact their energy policies and, more specifically, how they shape the 
Polish and Czech governments’ positions on the EU’s climate and energy policy.
Drawing on the theoretical literature on interest groups, I explore how HCM 
trade unions justify their position toward EU climate and energy policy. Follow-
ing up on Mahoney’s observations (2007) that the more attention the public pays 
to a specific decision, the more difficult it should be for special interest groups to 
influence outcomes, I explore whether mining trade unions have adopted a spe-
cific tactic, i.e., either “silencing” the issue (making it easier for them to achieve 
their goals) or “publicizing” their position and striving to persuade other social 
groups. I, then, address to what extent the positions and activities of HCM un-
ions have shaped government policy toward EU climate and energy policy. And, 
finally, I address why the Czech Republic changed its position at the December 
2019 European Council meeting. While doing so, I specifically focus on how 
organized interests produced different outcomes in both countries.
In the upcoming section, I present my theoretical assumptions. The third sec-
tion is devoted to the empirical analysis, which explores the trade unions’ attitudes 
toward EU climate and energy policy, the arguments they use, while also assessing 
their influence on both governments’ positions. In the final section, I readdress 
the research questions. As data sources, I rely on official trade union documents 
and statements by their leaders. Documents from Polish trade unions were ob-
tained directly from representatives of these unions and/or their websites, while 
the Czech data on HCM unions were generally available on the internet.
2  Trade unions as organized interest groups – theoretical 
assumptions
Interest groups are key actors at the national, regional, and global level (Orach, 
Schlüter, & Österblom, 2017) as they enable people to express their opinions to 
decision-makers (Dür & De Bièvre, 2007). Taking into account three criteria – 
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organization, political interest, and informality (Beyers, Eising, & Maloney, 
2008) – trade unions are among the most prominent interest groups. During 
the political and economic transformation, the significance of large, formal, 
membership- based Polish and Czech trade unions has declined, whereas rel-
atively small NGOs have become more important (Ekiert, Kubik, & Wenzel, 
2017). Despite this general assessment, trade unions are still relatively vigorous 
and influential in some sectors, in particular those under state ownership (e.g., 
education, health care, railways, energy). Their political significance is primarily 
due to their resources, the high level of unionization in these sectors, their strong 
commitment to the political process and links to political parties, and their abil-
ity to mobilize resources (including organizing strikes, blocking transport infra-
structure, and even using violence).
The restructuring of the Polish and Czech HCM sectors has been going on 
almost continuously since 1990. This was necessary primarily for economic rea-
sons, whereby the general goal was (and still is) to sustain the profitability of 
coal-mining. Among other things, this has resulted in a decrease in production, 
the number of active mines, and employment. The objectives of the EU climate 
and energy policy are the next big challenge for the HCM sector, especially in 
Poland, which forced the HCM trade unions to take a position and aim to shape 
government policy.
The social, economic, and political contexts of interest group activity are 
one of the key factors shaping their real impact on policy outcomes. Hence, 
how interest groups convey their arguments may be crucial. As Beyers, Eising & 
Maloney (2008, p. 1106) write, “this aspect is often called political advocacy, 
which refers to all efforts to push public policy in a specific direction on the be-
half of constituencies or a general political idea.” We can assume that the more an 
interest group raises arguments going beyond its own particular interests and that 
can be recognized by other social groups, the greater the chance of influencing 
policy outcomes. This strategy may be particularly important regarding energy 
and climate issues, which de facto directly affects all social groups, individuals, and 
economic sectors. Thus, essentially, every political party aspiring to power takes 
a stand on energy and climate due to their fundamental importance. Therefore, 
the right strategy of a given interest group, appropriate instruments for its imple-
mentation, and implementation itself are keys to achieving goals.
It is particularly important how significant and present an issue is in the public 
space in which a given interest group operates. As Christine Mahoney (2007) 
states, interest group influence may depend on the salience of a given problem, 
that is, the less notice public opinion pays to a given issue, the greater the chances 
for the interest group to shape the final policy decision. However, argumenta-
tively “going beyond” its own particular interests, and presenting its activity as 
defending the interests of other social groups, may also be an effective strategy 
for interest groups.
In general, though, it is notoriously difficult to measure the influence of or-
ganized interests. Yet qualitative comparative analysis (Horváthová & Dobbins, 
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2019) provides a partial solution to this challenge. Following Dür (2008) and 
taking into account the specifics of the topic of the study and its aims, I, there-
fore, draw on the preference attainment method. To reconstruct events, it is nec-
essary to identify (1) interest groups and the issues on which they take positions 
and try to influence policy outcomes, (2) the most important contextual factors, 
(3) the most important other engaged stakeholders, (4) and the final policy out-
come. This helps us to trace the actual impact of interest groups.
In the following, I show that numerous factors were crucial in explaining 
the divergent developments in both countries. Besides Poland being the larg-
est producer of hard coal and having a large number of workers in this sector, 
several very important factors explain the advantageous position of HCM trade 
unions despite the steady decline of the economic importance of coal, i.e., the 
state’s control over the sector, the energy mix based on hard coal combustion, the 
number, density, and level of organization of mining trade unions, and political 
involvement and close ties with political parties. Moreover, history is key be-
cause “Solidarity” was not only a trade union but, most of all, a social movement 
opposing the communist authorities. Despite being the second-largest hard coal 
producer in the EU, the Czech coal-mining sector and trade unions operating in 
it are much smaller. Its share in energy production is very small, while sector em-
ployment is several times lower than in Poland, and general mining production 
more than 12 times less. There is de facto one trade union in the entire hard coal 
sector, whose influence on political decisions is relatively low.
3 Empirical analysis
Trade unions in Poland are grouped into three confederations: Independ-
ent Self-governing Trade Union “Solidarity” (Niezależny Samorządny Związek 
Zawodowy “Solidarność”), All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions (Ogólnopolskie 
Porozumienie Związków Zawodowych, OPZZ), and Trade Unions Forum (Forum 
Związków Zawodowych, FZZ). In terms of significance and political influence, the 
most important are: National Hard Coal Mining Section “Solidarity” (Krajowa 
Sekcja Górnictwa Wę gla Kamiennego “Solidarność”), which is the organizational 
unit of NSZZ Solidarność, Miners’ Trade Union in Poland (Związek Zawodowy 
Górników w Polsce, ZZGwP), belonging to OPZZ, and the Trade Union “Kadra” 
(Związek Zawodowy “Kadra”, ZZ “Kadra”), belonging to FZZ.
In 2017, the level of unionization both in Poland and in the Czech Republic was 
12%, which was significantly below the European average (28% in 2017). Trade 
union density has dropped in both countries in recent years compared to 2000: 
in Poland by 4% and in the Czech Republic by 6.9% (Vandaele, 2019). In Poland, 
the trade union system is highly pluralistic, and there are about 25,000 individual 
trade unions. Three-quarters of all company unions belong to one of the three 
trade union confederations: NSZZ Solidarność, OPZZ, or FZZ (Trappmann, 2012) 
(see below). According to data for 2012, NSZZ Solidarność had around 623,000 
members, OPZZ around 793,000 members, and FZZ around 408,000 members.2
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The biggest Czech trade union confederation is the Czech-Moravian Confed-
Č ˇeration of Trade Unions ( eskomoravská konfederace odborových svazuº , CMKOS). In 
ˇ2015, 29 trade unions with approximately 287,000 members3 belonged to CM-
KOS. The most important trade union operating in the HCM sector is the Trade 
Union of Mining, Geology and Oil Industry Workers (Odborovy Svaz Pracovníkuº 
Hornictví, Geologie a Naftového Pruºmyslu, OS PHGN). Within the framework of OS 
PHGN, there is an Association of Mining Unions (Sdružení hornických odboruº , SHO).
3.1 Polish trade unions’ positions toward EU climate and energy policy
Polish trade unions operating in the HCM sector have long been strongly op-
posed to many key assumptions of the EU’s climate and energy policy. For exam-
ple, in a 2014 letter to the then Prime Minister Donald Tusk, NSZZ Solidarność 
took the position that EU goals for 2030 to reduce CO2 emissions and increase 
the share of renewable energy are “from the point of view of the Polish raison 
d’état absolutely unacceptable” and would mean the loss of several hundred thou-
sand jobs and an increase in energy prices. (NSZZ Solidarność, 2014). In the same 
year, in a joint petition to Donald Tusk, mining trade unions called for vetoing 
the so-called second EU energy and climate package, “taking into account Polish 
socio-economic conditions and the state’s energy security” (Związki Zawodowe, 
2014a). This view was repeated in the letter of the mining trade unions to the 
then Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz (Związki Zawodowe, 2014b). All three major 
mining trade unions – ZZ Kadra, NSZZ Solidarność, and ZZG – in Poland called 
the participants of the February 2018 meeting with the Polish Ministry of En-
ergy “eco-terrorists” (Związki Zawodowe, 2018a).
ZZ Kadra recognizes the threats arising from the functioning of the EU Emis-
sions Trading Scheme in Poland, which in its view may result in the loss of hun-
dreds of thousands of jobs. ZZ Kadra in 2017 expressed support for the general 
idea of establishing the Just Transition Fund to supplement the European Re-
gional Development Fund and European Social Fund and being financed from 
the ETS system in the amount of 2% of revenues (Kadra, 2017).
HCM trade unions in Poland were very active on the occasion of the Katow-
ice COP24 summit in 2018. The international scale of the summit and related 
events have been evoked by trade unions to convince Polish and foreign public 
opinion and political decision-makers of their arguments. Cooperation among 
mining trade unions and a unified position strengthened their message and posi-
tion in seeking to influence political authorities. Thus, in line with Klüver (2011) 
and Mahoney (2007), they aimed to build a coalition and raise arguments that 
could be considered justified by wider social groups.
In the petition of the National Section of Hard Coal Mining NSZZ Solidar-
ność from January 21, 2019, statements by representatives of the Polish authori-
ties regarding COP24 Katowice were “more or less in line with the mainstream 
current in COP24 – trend toward decarbonization, phasing out of coal, which 
for our state, and especially for Upper Silesia and the Dąbrowa Basin, means 
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economic death and permanent impoverishment of society.” The announce-
ment of “a drastic reduction in the share of coal in the Polish energy mix” 
contained in the Polish Energy Policy until 2040 was also criticized (NSZZ 
Solidarność, 2019a).
The opposition of the Polish Prime Minister to climate neutrality as a EU goal 
until 2050, expressed at the June 2019 European Council meeting, was echoed 
´by the Executive Board of the Slą sko-Dąbrowski Region of NSZZ “Solidarność” 
with huge approval. According to NSZZ Solidarność, the acceptance of such a 
plan would mean “a catastrophe for the Polish economy and permanent impov-
erishment of the inhabitants of our state.” The Prime Minister’s position was rec-
ognized as “the first example of successful pursuit of the Polish raison d’état in the 
area of EU climate and energy policy in many years” (NSZZ Solidarność 2019b).
In a letter containing comments on the draft Polish energy policy until 2050, 
ZZ Kadra expressed the view that the objectives of the EU climate policy until 
2030 for Poland are “unrealistic” and the energy industry based on Polish hard 
coal and lignite is “the surest investment in the future and security of the state” 
(Kadra, 2015). According to ZZ Kadra, Poland’s energy policy should be based 
on hard coal and lignite, followed only by natural gas and renewable energy 
sources (Kadra, 2017a).
Związek Zawodowy Górników (Miners’ Trade Union) in Poland also took a 
critical stance and negatively assessed the assumed decline in the importance of 
hard coal as an energy resource. It argued that Poland’s own hard coal and lignite 
resources ensure the country’s energy security and that the reduction of hard coal 
in Poland’s energy policy is already part of the European Commission’s policy 
for reducing CO2 emissions. This will result in the need to further restructure 
the HCM sector, job losses, and thus Poland’s loss of energy sovereignty and 
degradation of the main HCM regions, i.e., Upper Silesia, Małopolska, Lublin 
(ZZGP, 2015).
3.2 Czech trade unions’ positions toward EU climate and energy policy
In recent years, the trade union operating in the Czech HCM sector has fo-
cused on social problems and paid less attention to the EU energy and climate 
policy. Following the announcement of insolvency by New World Resources 
(May 2016), the OKD company was nationalized. The mining trade union 
strongly supported nationalization and blamed all Czech governments after 1991 
for OKD’s bankruptcy (Stanovisko Sdružení, 2017). OS PHGN mainly focuses 
on the annual negotiation of collective agreements and higher-level collective 
agreements (Kolektivní smlouvy vyššího stupně ). These documents regulate matters 
related to working conditions, such as working time, remuneration, work safety, 
etc. Regarding social issues, two very important events in the HCM industry in 
which OS PHGN was engaged were the reduction of the retirement age for min-
ers and regulation (Act 167/2016) and mitigating the social effects of restructuring 
or termination of activities of entities dealing in HCM concerning OKD.
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The OS PHGN trade union program neither for 2012–2016 (OS PHGN, 
2012) nor for 2016–2020 (OS PHGN 2016a) contains any specific provisions 
regarding the EU energy and climate policy. Much more important was the 
content of the call to the Czech Government, which was adopted at the VIII 
Congress of the OS PHGN in March 2016. According to participants, the state’s 
energy security can only be ensured thanks to its own natural resources, and the 
greater the independence on imported raw materials, the higher the level of se-
curity of the Czech Republic. Trade unionists of OS PHGN called on the Czech 
government not to succumb to the “mindless” pressure of “ecological fanatics” 
at the national, European, and global level (OS PHGN, 2016b).
To sum up, the attitude toward the goals of the EU energy and climate policy 
of all major Polish and Czech HCM trade unions is essentially the same. This 
also applies to OS PHGN, the de facto only Czech HCM trade union. However, 
it should be emphasized that while Polish mining unions devoted much attention 
to the EU energy and climate policy, OS PHGN focused on the survival of OKD 
after the bankruptcy of New World Resources and the (effective) fight for social 
rights. The position on the EU energy and climate policy was expressed by trade 
union activists (see Table 10.1).
3.3 HCM trade union arguments justifying their stances
Based on official documents and interviews with Czech trade union activists4 on 
the internet, Polish and Czech HCM trade unions put forward arguments, which 
can be categorized as follows (Table 10.1).
It is apparent that the arguments of Polish and Czech mining trade unions 
coincide and their rhetorical tactic is the same, i.e., although interest groups like 
trade unions “exclude[…] broad movements and waves of public opinion that 
may influence policy outcomes” (Beyers, Eising, & Maloney, 2008, p. 1106), 
mining trade unions refer to arguments that go beyond their particular interests 




Related to climate 
change
- “the opinions of scientists regarding the impact of man 
on climate change and the effects of these changes are 
differentiated” (NSZZ Solidarność, 2019b).
- “global warming theses are based on a scientific theory that 
has not yet been reliably proven” (Sábel, 2017).
- “CO2 can be absorbed by forests” and coal can be used in a 







Related to the 
desirability of 
EU climate and 
energy policy
- “the EU has a small share of global CO2 emissions and thus a 
small impact on the Earth’s climate” (Sábel, 2019b).
-  “costs of climate policy should be borne primarily by 
consumers of goods and services containing a carbon footprint 
from richer countries, and not their producers from poorer 
countries” (Związki zawodowe, 2018b);
-  “EU policy is the result of lobbying corporations operating in 
the renewable energy sector” (Sábel, 2019a).
-  “coal burning by utility power engineering does not 
contribute to the formation of smog in the least” and CO2 “is 





-  “EU’s climate and energy policy will lead to the EU 
becoming dependent on imports of natural gas and coal from 
other states” (Sábel, 2019a).
-  “solar and wind power plants are unreliable” (Sábel, 2017).
-  “considering that Czech nuclear power plants are aging, 
the need to import natural gas, the instability of energy 
production from renewable sources to ensure energy security 
and affordable energy prices for individual consumers and 
industry, coal will be irreplaceable” (Franta, 2019).
-  “Poland should ensure energy security based its raw materials” 
(Społeczny Pre_COP24).
-  “COP24 member states should be free to shape their energy 
mix” (Społeczny Pre_COP24).
Social -  “liquidating hundreds of thousands of jobs” (NSZZ 
Solidarność, 2019b).
-  “permanent impoverishment of society” (NSZZ Solidarność, 
2019b).
-  “worsening of the labor market and social security situation” 
(Kadra, 2015).
-  decarbonization is a “huge threat” for Poland and the future 
of Polish families (NSZZ, Solidarność, 2019b).
-  “increase in energy prices for households” (Kadra, 2017; 
Pytlík, 2016);
-  “climate policy and environmental protection must not lead to 
energy poverty” (Kadra, 2014).
Financial -  “very high financial cost – for Poland at least EUR 200 
billion” (NSZZ Solidarność, 2019b).
-  “stunting economic development” (NSZZ Solidarność, 2019b).
-  “electricity produced from solar and wind power is very 
expensive” (Sábel, 2017).
-  “higher energy prices” (Związki zawodowe, 2018a).




Related to the 
nature of the 
debate on 
climate change 
and EU energy 
and climate 
policy
-  “the discussion on climate change is dominated by 
propaganda and manipulation” (NSZZ Solidarność, 2019b).
-  “the public debate is dominated by IPCC reports, treated as 
revealed truth, not subject to any discussion or verification 
although IPCC forecasts are not later confirmed by reality” 
(NSZZ Solidarność, 2019b).
-  “the EU seems to be ruled by ecological and climatological 
fanatics” (Sábel, 2019b).
-  “ just transition is only an empty slogan” (NSZZ Solidarność, 
2019b).
-  “avoiding discrimination against states whose economies 
are particularly dependent on fossil fuels” (Społeczny 
Pre_COP24).
and embrace the general public. In other words, they aim to extrapolate their 
positions to other social groups, which are not directly or only indirectly con-
nected with the sector.
3.4  Assessing the impact of trade unions on the Polish and Czech 
governments’ positions toward EU climate and energy policy
As stated in the theoretical part, the conditions in which interest groups operate 
and try to influence political decisions are of key importance for assessing their 
impact. “Interest groups do not develop or operate in a vacuum” (Thomas, 2004, 
p. 67), and their influence is “highly conditional” (Orach, Schlüter, & Österblom, 
2017, p. 91). The first group of factors concerns the size and employment of the 
hard coal-mining sector for the Polish and Czech energy balance. The basic data 
for the period 1990–2018 are included in Table 10.2. It should be noted that cur-
rently about 83% of all hard coal produced in the EU is mined in Poland. However, 
the Czech share is only about 6%. What is striking, though, is the very large drop 
in production, employment and the number of active mines compared to the be-
ginning of the system transformation, both in Poland and in the Czech Republic.
Other key factors affecting Poland’s energy and climate policy are its high 
dependency on coal for electricity production – mainly hard coal (47% in 2018) 
and brown coal (29% in 2018). As reflected in Table 10.3, this is well above the 
EU average, and the share of electricity produced from hard coal in Poland is by 
far the highest in the EU. The Czech situation is completely different – it pro-
duces only 5% of electricity from hard coal, while lignite (43%) is much more 
important. The importance of hard coal is greater in the heating sector – in 2014, 
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it generated 17% of heat (Rečková, Rečka, & Ščasný, 2017). Secondly, the Czech 
Republic is a significant net exporter of electricity, while Poland consumes more 
electricity than it can produce and the shortages must be covered by import.
The document Poland’s energy policy until 2040 stipulates that in 2030 about 
56%–60% of electricity will be produced from coal in Poland. This means a slow 
phasing out of coal as a raw material (in 2018 it was 76%, Table 10.2) due to the 
lack of a real alternative in the short and medium term.
Another significant impediment to a more progressive energy policy is that 
the government – which HCM unions try to influence – is simultaneously the 
actual owner of almost all mines in Poland (directly or indirectly through subsid-
iaries).5 The same applies in the Czech Republic, since the only producer, OKD, 
until 2017 owned by New World Resources NV, was nationalized again. Hence, 
the Polish and Czech governments play multiple roles simultaneously: they are 
regulators at the national level, policy-makers at the EU level, and owners. De-
cisions regarding the state’s position in the EU are, therefore, taken by mine 
owners whose future depends on these decisions. Moreover, the Polish govern-
ment controls all large energy companies, which are the main recipients of coal 
from state-owned mines. This causes a conflict of interest – on the one hand, the 
state as the entity controlling the energy sector is concerned about the cheapest 
coal supplies (even from imports), on the other hand, it is against the interests 
of mines, which are also state-owned. As a result, energy companies – whose 
boards are staffed by political operatives – try to balance between economic ra-
tionality and concern for the financial results of enterprises and expectations of 
TABLE 10.2  Hard coal in Poland, the Czech Republic and the EU – selected data










2008 83.4 12.6 n.a.
2004 99.2 13.3 n.a.


















1990 387.9 71.7 n.a.








1990 70 27 n.a.
Source: https://euracoal.eu/info/euracoal-eu-statistics/ (21 December 2019), Euracoal (2005), 
Euracoal (2013), Euracoal (2018), Alves Dias et al. (2018), World Energy Council (2000), 
Kaczorowski & Gajewski (2008).


















































































































































































































































































political authorities, that are under pressure from the hard coal sector and which 
primarily have political goals in mind.
It should also be noted that, currently, about 80,000 people work directly in 
the Polish HCM sector and about 400,000 jobs in enterprises are linked to mining 
(according to the Polish Mining Chamber of Industry and Commerce).6 A phasing 
out of coal, therefore, would be a very serious challenge not only for miners but 
also for many people in other enterprises. This again justifies the tactics of extrap-
olating to other social groups than just those employed directly in mining.
Altogether, especially in Poland, mining trade unions have greater resources 
(financial, human) and are able to mobilize larger and more politically signif-
icant social groups than ecological organizations and interest groups working 
for the renewable energy sector. The livelihood of several hundred thousands of 
families is directly and indirectly connected with the mining sector. Hence they 
constitute a very significant group of voters, who are particularly important in 
strongly polarized Polish society. It is additionally worth noting that both coun-
tries’ green parties play virtually no political role. This is a distinct difference to 
western European countries, and to some extent, this reflects the dominant social 
views on issues regarding energy sources and environmental protection.
3.5 C ontrasting the Polish and Czech governments’ positions on the 
EU climate and energy policy
How do we explain the Czech government’s turnaround and ultimate accept-
ance of the EU’s policy of climate neutrality until 2050? In December 2019, 
before the European Council meeting, Prime Minister Andrej Babiš pointed out 
that without the activities of other states, EU activity regarding CO2 reduction 
would be ineffective, that this would mean very high costs for the Czech Re-
public and would not be possible without EU financial assistance. He stressed 
that reducing greenhouse gas emissions must not threaten the competitiveness of 
EU economies. Representatives of the Czech authorities declared that by 2050 
they want to increase electricity production in nuclear power plants and from 
renewable sources.7 And according to Popp, trade unions in Czech Republic 
representing coal miners “have a strong influence on climate and energy policy 
and are strongly opposed to any measure that might impact coal. They have close 
ties to the government” (Popp, 2019, p. 5).
There seem to be several fundamental reasons for the Czech Republic’s retreat 
from its initial stance. First, its energy mix contrasts with Poland’s, as reflected 
in Table 10.3. The need to import electricity significantly hinders the transition 
from hard coal in Poland – simply, in the absence of sources of electricity pro-
duction other than coal (hard coal and lignite), there is no short- and medium- 
term substitute for this raw material. Theoretically, the Czech Republic could 
completely give up electricity generation from hard coal without significantly re-
ducing its energy security. However, in Poland, the situation is different. On the 
demand side, what will cause its growth is economic development (the estimated 
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increase in electricity demand for this reason is approx. 2%–3% per year), ur-
banization of large- and medium-sized cities resulting in an increase in demand 
for system heating (approx. 3%–4% per year) and the possible development of 
electromobility. On the supply side, the oldest power units that cannot be mod-
ernized will be phased out.
Even assuming the dynamic development of renewable energy sources and 
taking into account the current state of affairs and financial capabilities, it is not 
possible for Poland to soon abandon coal as an energy source. Furthermore, in 
recent years (2017–2019), a few new coal units have been built or are still under 
construction: 1,075 MW unit at Kozienice power plant, two 905 MW units at 
Opole power plant, 910 MW unit at Jaworzno III power plant, 496 MW unit at 
Turów power plant, and 1,000 MW in Ostrołęka C power plant.8
Against this background, Polish mining trade unions not only strongly de-
fend the extraction of coal, but also oppose measures that could impact its future 
importance for energy production. In 2016, NSZZ Solidarność took a very clear 
position regarding the Polish energy mix: “there never was, there is not, and 
there can never be approval on our part regarding the construction of a nuclear 
power plant.” This position is justified by the risk of failure and its consequences 
and the lack of social acceptance (NSZZ Solidarność, 2016).
Summarizing, the position of the Polish government toward the EU energy 
and climate policy is the result of both the political significance, mobilization, 
activity and cooperation as well as a unified position on this matter of mining 
trade unions, and favorable objective conditions. The most important is the Pol-
ish energy mix, as fundamental change and phasing out coal would take many 
years and require significant investments. The Czech situation is different. In ac-
cordance with the energy policy of the government, “the aim of the Czech Re-
public in the area of energy and climate protection is to ensure the transition to a 
competitive low-carbon economy and to reduce the dependence on fossil fuels” 
(The Office of the Government of the Czech Republic, 2015, p. 39). In 2020, the 
share of hard coal in total final energy consumption was to be only 2.7%, and in 
2040, 2.3%. In total gross electricity production, the share of hard coal in 2020 
is 4.6%, and in 2040, it should be 2.2%. The share of hard coal in the heat supply 
in 2020 is 15.3%, and in 2040, it should decrease to 10% (Ministerstvo Pruºmyslu 
a Obchodu, 2014). Thus, even though the Czech Republic has typically taken 
a skeptical stance on low-carbon development, it has often cooperated with the 
Visegrád Group countries in blocking European climate ambitions. However, it 
is somewhat more progressive than Poland regarding the EU Emissions Trading 
System (ETS) and energy efficiency (Popp, 2019, p. 4).
An additional reason is trade union politicization. Informality is a characteristic 
feature in the sense that interest groups do not normally seek public office or com-
pete in elections, but pursue their goals through frequent informal interactions 
with politicians and bureaucrats (Beyers, Eising, & Maloney, 2008). “However, 
many nonpolitical interest groups are forced to become politically active because 
there is no other way to protect or promote the interests of their members or an 
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organization such as a business” (Thomas, 2004, p. 8). Consequently, the Polish 
trade union movement is strongly politicized. This situation dates back to 1989 
and even earlier, when, in the 1980s, NSZZ Solidarność was not only a trade union 
but also a social movement opposing the communist authorities. In the 1990s, 
trade unions saw and treated political parties and parliamentary representation as 
a tool of political influence. Several Polish political parties have emerged from the 
trade union movement, and trade union activists frequently enter politics (Zien-
tara, 2009). Roughly speaking, NSZZ Solidarność ideologically is center-right 
and/or right-wing and officially supported the conservative Law and Justice party 
(Prawo i Sprawiedliwość ) in parliamentary elections and their candidates in presi-
dential elections. Since 2015, NSZZ Solidarność has become an even stronger ally 
of Law and Justice. OPZZ is ideologically on the left or center-left and is politi-
cally closer to left-wing parties (Democratic Left Alliance, Left Together, Labor 
Union). FZZ is generally centrist. The most important opposition political party 
in Poland – Civic Platform – is not linked with any trade union.
These circumstances have very strong practical significance. At a time when 
the Polish government had to make a decision regarding its position on the EU’s 
climate and energy policy, Poland was de facto in a permanent election campaign. 
In 2018, local elections were held; in 2019, elections to the European Parlia-
ment (spring) and the national parliament (autumn); and in 2020, presidential 
elections. Under the conditions of very strong rivalry and political polarization 
in Poland, the Law and Justice government could not risk losing the support of 
mining trade unions.
In the Czech case, only 9,500 people work in mines (of which approx. 20% 
are Poles), which significantly weakens the strength of their political impact. The 
potential reduction in employment or even the closure of all mines will not have 
such negative social and political effects as in Poland. Czech trade unions had 
much less influence on politics after 1989 than Polish trade unions (especially 
“Solidarity”), and the links between Czech trade unions and political parties are 
much weaker. “Formally and institutionally independent of any political parties, 
ČMKOS’s position is closest to the Czech Social Democratic Party” (Drahok-
oupil & Kahancová, 2017, p. 9). It is one of the most important Czech political 
parties after 1989, and since 2018, it has again joined the government led by An-
drej Babiš, but in the 2017 elections, it received only 7.27% of the vote.
In addition, past experiences are very important. In Poland, the restructur-
ing of the hard coal-mining sector was very turbulent and accompanied by nu-
merous conflicts between the government as the owner of the mines, on the 
one hand, and miners and trade unions on the other hand, including the use of 
force during demonstrations by both parties, i.e., by trade unions and the police. 
In the Czech Republic, in turn, coal-mining restructuring was relatively calm: 
“in the Ostrava region, the miners’ union cooperated with the government – and 
the government consulted with the union – which led to a peaceful process of 
restructuring despite the significant decline in employment” (Bruha, Ionascu, & 
Jeong, 2005, p. 4).
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The third reason relates to differences in the Polish and Czech trade union 
systems. One of the most important features of the Polish trade union movement 
is its fragmentation. The hard coal-mining sector is among the economic sec-
tors with the highest level of unionization, in which several dozen trade unions 
are active. Very characteristic of the trade union movement in Poland is that it 
is already very pluralistic. This means not only that there are very many trade 
unions, but also that in many enterprises, there are several or even several dozen 
trade unions acting simultaneously. This is most evident in sectors where enter-
prises are primarily state-owned such as HCM. According to the latest available 
data, in 2014 in Poland, 72% of the total employees in the “mining and quarry-
ing” sector belonged to trade unions, which was the highest union density ratio 
by sector (GUS, 2015).9
The very high level of unionization, exceeding several times the national 
average, with several dozen trade unions operating in one mine, and employees 
belonging to more than one union causes constant competition and rivalry be-
tween trade unions. Thus, in practice, trade unions sometimes try to outbid one 
another when raising claims (e.g., wage increases, defense of endangered jobs, 
protests against mines liquidation, conditions of mining restructuring, conditions 
of employment, opposition to hard coal import, opposition to mine privatization 
plans, pressure for financial public support). Besides political involvement, trade 
unions in Poland recently frequently initiated collective disputes and organized 
various types of protests, demonstrations, petitions, demands, etc.
Another very significant difference in the Czech Republic is the predomi-
nance of a one-workplace-one-union principle, a legacy of decentralization af-
ter 1990 that eliminates such motivations in trade union activities as in Poland 
(Veverkova & Wegenschimmel, 2016). The most prevalent level of collective 
bargaining is the company level. It is worth adding that, as Mansfeldová writes, 
strikes are relatively very rare. Trade unions rather tend to declare a strike alert, 
which is announced during collective bargaining (Mansfeldová, 2015). In Po-
land, after Law and Justice came to power in 2015 supported by “Solidarity”, 
there were no strikes or very radical forms of protests (during the rule of the 
Civic Platform in 2007–2015, there was even physical violence used by miners 
and the police). However, mining trade unions almost always organized forms 
of protests such as petitions, mass crew demonstrations, underground protests, 
roadblocks, railway blocks, crew occupation of the mines’ offices, strike alerts, 
or strike referendums.
Therefore, taking into account the energy mix and the much smaller eco-
nomic importance of HCM and the much smaller political importance of min-
ing trade unions than in Poland, the Czech government changed its position 
of June 2019 and jointly declared the objective of climate neutrality with other 
EU countries – except for Poland. Two other very important factors are, first, 
a very large reduction in coal and lignite stipulated in the Czech Energy Pol-
icy until 2040 (Ministerstvo Pruºmyslu a Obchodu, 2014). Second, moving 
away from coal will enable the use of the financial resources from the Just 
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Transformation Fund, the EU financial instrument supporting regions most 
affected by the transition toward climate neutrality. Hence, the Czech govern-
ment considered that the political costs of opposing climate neutrality in the 
EU arena would be too high.
4 Conclusions
The position of Polish and Czech HCM trade unions toward EU climate and 
energy policy is clearly negative. To justify their opposition, they refer to ar-
guments that go beyond sectoral interests and aim to convey the impression 
that they also act in the interest of other social groups. Thus, they seek to 
‘publicize’ their position rather than ‘silencing’ the issue and achieving their 
goals ‘quietly’.
Despite the success of coal-mining organizations in fueling Poland’s opposi-
tion to phasing out coal, the long-term prospects of this strategy are uncertain. 
Rising prices of energy produced from coal (a consequence of geological condi-
tions and the EU regulations), together with falling prices of renewable energy, 
may decrease the importance of coal as an energy resource. This process has been 
going on in Poland (and Europe) for several decades, and the pressure of mining 
trade unions may slow it down, but it is not able to stop it.
Altogether, several factors explain the differential clout of mining trade un-
ions on governmental policy. In Poland, there are many more member-strong 
unions; they have relatively large resources at their disposal; and, importantly, 
they compete strongly with each other, which promotes the radicalization of 
their demands and tools used to achieve objectives (strikes or even violence). 
The political calendar and elections (to local governments, the European Parlia-
ment, national parliament, presidential elections), which were held in Poland in 
2018–2020, were also very important. For example, in the 2020 Polish presiden-
tial election, the difference in the second round between Andrzej Duda – openly 
supported by the trade union “Solidarity” – and the opposition candidate Rafał 
Trzaskowski was only about 422,000, which is almost exactly the number of 
people estimated employed in mining and sectors directly related to it. Taking 
into account the energy mix, the Czech Republic may consider it easier to give 
up energy produced from hard coal, and the social and political effects would be 
much smaller.
Finally, one cannot neglect the current impact of coronavirus on the sector. 
High infection rates among coal-miners have turned the traditional mining re-
gions into national epicenters of the pandemic. Resulting short- and long-term 
health issues may not only weaken the practical organizational capacity of min-
ing unions but also shed further doubt on the sector’s viability in the future. This 
unexpected calamity may further facilitate the decline of the sector not only in 
the Czech Republic but also in Poland despite the many factors outlined above 
that have stalled its downsizing.
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Notes
 1 Detailed solutions were included in secondary legal acts: Directive 2009/28/EC, De-
cision 406/2009/EC and Directive 2009/29/EC.
 2 https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/pl/country/poland#actors-and-institutions (26 
December 2019).
ˇ 3 As Vevekova and Wegenschimmel (2016) note, according to CMKOS, which does 
not keep ex-act records on the number of members. Myant (2010, p. 891) writes that
the figure cannot be calculated with precision partly because of uncertainty over 
the exact level of union membership […] and partly because unions generally 
retained pensioners as members and these were often not counted separately. The 
number of pensioners varied enormously between unions, but often exceeded 
20% of total membership.
 4 Jan Sábel – president OS PHGN, Jaromír Franta – president SCO/CCG (Sdružení 
odborových organizací/Czech Coal Group) Jaromír Pytlík – president SHO OKD 
(Sdružení hornických odboruº , Association of Mining Unions in OKD).
 5 Only three very small hard coal mines in Poland are 100% private property: Przed-
siębiorstwo Górnicze Silesia Sp. z o.o., Zakład Górniczy Siltech Sp. z o.o. and Eko-
Plus Sp. z o.o.
 6 https://www.slaskibiznes.pl/wiadomosci, firmy-okologornicze-blagaja-o-pomoc-
czy-plan-sasina-to-fikcja, wia5-1-3235.html (22 July 2020).
  http://www.solidarnosckatowice.pl/pl-PL/przemysl_okologorniczy_potrzebuje_
wsparcia.html (22 July 2020).
ˇ 7 Boj s klimatickou změnou bude Cesko stát biliony korun, zapojit se ale musí celý svět, 
02 December 2019.
  https://www.osphgn.cz/clanky/aktuality/boj-s-klimatickou-zmenou-bude-cesko-
stat-biliony-korun--zapojit-se-ale-musi-cely-svet.html (21 December 2019).
 8 In February 2020, owners of the Ostrołęka power plant decided to suspend construc-
tion of the C unit.
 9 In the biggest hard coal-mining company in Poland (and EU) – Polish Mining Group 
(Polska Grupa Górnicza, PGG) around 43,000 people were employed at the end of 2017. 
In entities of the PGG Capital Group in 2017, there were 148 trade union organiza-
tions grouped in 24 trade unions, which included over 40,000 employees, meaning a 
unionization level of 93.1%. In numbers, the largest trade unions at PGG are: NSZZ 
Solidarność (24.5% of the total trade unions members in PGG), ZZG (15.4%), Sier-
pień 80” (14.8%), and Kadra (9.9%), Związek Zawodowy Ratowników Górniczych (5.4%), 
Związek Zawodowy Pracowników Dołowych (5.3%), other trade  unions – 17.8% (PGG, 
2017). In the second biggest mining company in Poland in terms of employment 
and hard coal extraction – Jastrzębie Coal Company ( Jastrzębska Spółka Węglowa, 
JSW) – 28,268 people were employed at the end of 2018. At JSW, 125 trade union 
organizations operated, with 31,739 members. The number of trade union members 
is higher than the number of JSW employees because each employee may belong to 
more than one trade union. This meant that the union density rate at JSW was 119.9% 
( JSW, 2018). In 2018, the hard coal-mining company in the Lublin Basin – Lublin 
Coal “Bogdanka” Capital Group (Lubelski Węgiel Bogdanka, LW “Bogdanka”) em-
ployed 5,420 people, and six trade unions operated in it, with 3,319 members, which 
meant that the union density ratio was 70% (LW Bogdanka, 2018).
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w okresie transformacji. Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Oeconomica, 219.
Polish and Czech hard coal-mining trade unions 235
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darność z dnia 25 czerwca 2019 r. w sprawie odrzucenia przez rząd RP kolejnego zaostrzenia 
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ws. polityki klimatyczno-energetycznej, które będzie przedstawione na COP24 w Katowicach.
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Górników w Polsce do Projektu Polityki energetycznej Polski do 2050 roku, Katowice, 11 
September 2015.
1 Introduction
Among the diverse actors present in the discourse on interest groups, religious 
groups have been rarely, albeit increasingly, discussed. In Europe, this refers in 
particular to historical majority Churches, which in different parts of the continent 
contributed significantly to the development of both social and political institu-
tions shaping contemporary European states. The Catholic Church is one such in-
fluential actor, which has attracted much attention in research on Western Europe 
(Werner, 2001; Minkenberg, 2003; Fink, 2008) but received less attention in CEE 
(Stan & Turcescu, 2011; Ramet, 2014; Grzymała-Busse, 2015). The chapter aims 
at the comparative analysis of the evolving role, goals, and strategies applied by 
the Catholic Church in Poland and the Czech Republic, taking into consideration 
the significantly different position of the religious factor in social-political con-
texts in both countries. Following the argument that religion is a major structural 
factor characterizing societies and likely to change little over time (Fink, 2008, p. 
1646), I argue that the political entanglement of particular national churches in the 
post-communist context needs to be viewed as a relatively dynamically evolving 
phenomenon. According to this perspective, national church hierarchies adjust 
their strategies to altering sociopolitical reality, depending on their accessibility to 
the political arena. This process can lead to backing off from active engagement in 
the political sphere as in the Czech Republic or moving from an agenda-setting 
strategy to a veto-player function in Poland (see Fink, 2009). In the Polish case, 
the veto-player strategy may be based not on the mobilization potential of the 
religious electorate but on doctrinal premises, as I illustrate on the abortion issue. 
Due to the growing role of the identity factor in policy-making, it is an option for 
political elites to instrumentalize the Church, especially in countries where reli-
gion has been an important tool in shaping loyalty toward the state.
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2 Theorizing the Catholic Church as a political actor
There are two basic understandings of the Catholic Church, a more institutional 
and a more communal understanding. According to the first, the religious com-
munity forms the organizational–institutional unity represented by its leaders 
who hold their posts and act uniformly as such. According to the second, the 
Catholic Church is the community of the faithful who want to follow the values 
and norms of the religion and not perform their religious affiliation as a uniform 
institutionalized subject (Böckenförde et al., 1994, p. 92).
In its own understanding, the Church is not an interest group. This percep-
tion is the result of the aspirational character of the Catholic social doctrine based 
on three main principles, subsidiarity, solidarity, and the common good (Höff-
ner, 1992, pp. 29–41). According to this approach, if the Church’s institutions 
function based on those directives, they do not conflict with state institutions. 
They also do not aim at achieving particular goals gained with harm to the com-
munity. The crucial argument used in this regard is the postulate of independ-
ence toward the state and the postulate of coordination (Papieska Rada Iustitia 
et Pax, 2005, pp. 276–278).
Political science analyses of the Church’s political–institutional specifics are 
much more complex, because the Catholic Church is an institution that does not 
follow clear-cut categorizations. The Church is perceived as a denominational 
organization, institutionalized religious community, interest group, political 
actor, or political subject (Kowalczyk, 2014, p. 126). Looking at the Catholic 
Church as an interest group, three main approaches exist. First, the Church is one 
of many interest groups and regardless of its religious mission, it also performs so-
cial functions and participates in the public debate on not only sociocultural but 
also political issues. Second, it is a specific interest group as the social engagement 
of the Church complements its religious mission. Third, the Church is not an 
interest group as its social engagement is only an additional aspect of its activities 
(Dylus, 2005, pp. 99–101).
Almond et al. (2000) categorize churches, along with the army, bureaucracy, 
and corporations, as institutional interest groups which, while articulating their 
own interests, also carry out other political and social functions. In this sense, 
they carry out an evangelizing mission but simultaneously may have a signifi-
cant influence on political processes (Kowalczyk, 2014, p. 128). Following this 
approach, it needs to be stressed again that there are various understandings of 
the Catholic Church. Since the Church as a whole includes both Catholic laity 
and leadership, it can be looked upon from two different perspectives: the per-
spective of the membership group and the perspective of the institutional group 
representing a hierarchical institution acting similarly to a corporation (Camissa 
& Manuel, 2016, p. 4).
A useful categorization of this atypical interest group was proposed by Warner, 
who perceives the Catholic Church as an institution aiming at accessing goods 
from the political and economic system of the state just like other interest groups 
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but, at the same time, having some specific features which no other interest 
group possesses. As such, the Catholic Church is the authoritative supranational 
institution to which all “national branches” are supposed to refer. Also, typical 
of only this particular interest group is that it functions based on the claim of 
universality of moral authority and is treated as the ultimate moral authority by 
its followers (Warner, 2001, pp. 7–8). As an interest group not following une-
quivocal categorizations, the Catholic Church can also be regarded as unique 
due to its number of followers. Contrary to interest groups usually representing 
“minority groups”, the Catholic Church represents the majority of the society, at 
least in Poland among other countries (Graniszewski, 2015, p. 118).
The Church’s range of concerns reaches beyond those of other interest groups. 
The Church was not created for the purpose of lobbying governments to obtain 
resources for its leadership and members or battle various institutional enemies 
(Warner, 2001, p. 7). Gaining influence over political authorities is not an aim in 
itself for the church. This influence is meant to secure the institutional stability 
of its structures and improve its effectiveness in performing social and religious 
functions (Zuba, 2010, p. 117). Yet, while Churches undoubtedly embody the sa-
cred and the divine, their interests and influence extend well beyond the spiritual 
realm to the extent that warrants exploring the aims of the Church exceeding its 
mission. As Anna Grzymała-Busse shows in her seminal book: “Many countries 
are ‘nations under God’, where churches are powerful political actors, shaping 
policy and transforming lives in the process” (Grzymała-Busse, 2015, p. 2).
When achieving their goals, Churches rarely stand alone and united against 
the state. In reality, they create alliances with other political actors and other 
churches (Enyedi, 2003, p. 227). They also do not stick to one universal strategy 
as they have to take into consideration national specifics and sometimes long lists 
of factors shaping their national political standing. As a result, they can influence 
particular political systems either directly or indirectly. First, they influence pol-
icy by openly declaring their convictions, contacting public officials, or organiz-
ing protests. Second, they gain institutional access, which is a far more powerful 
instrument than creating partisan coalitions or relying on diffuse voter demand 
(Grzymała-Busse, 2015, p. 332).
Looking at the place and role of the Catholic Church in the political system, 
its relation to civil society must not be overlooked. According to many categori-
zations, religious organizations and bodies are subjects of the civil society sector. 
This approach is expressed, among others, in the official documents of the Eu-
ropean Union (EU), which define Churches as institutions of civil society that 
engage citizens, especially at the local level (Szymczak, 2015, p. 52). They have 
functioned as such for decades in Western Europe, where processes of regulating 
mutual relations were initiated much earlier than in CEE. However, their rela-
tionship to civil society in the central part of the continent appears to be more 
complex and political. Moving away from the atheist model severely limiting 
the freedom of conscience and belief and organizing, often from the scratches, 
the mutual relations between the state and the Church were challenging in all 
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possible aspects. These included the social–political sphere but also political at-
tempts to strengthen the political position of dominating churches including the 
Catholic Church. This not only resulted in formal legal challenges but also raised 
the question to what extent the Churches would or would not contribute to the 
processes of pluralization and building a strong, active, and independent civil 
society.
Although “catholic” means “universal,” the Catholic Church is by no means 
homogenous in terms of both its formal-legal standing and social–political en-
tanglement. The Catholic Church is a transnational organization with a cen-
tralized hierarchical structure to which the representatives of national Catholic 
Churches are responsible. Since the doctrine or institutional structure, being the 
same, do not determine the specifics of national churches, any differences that 
may exist are the result of the national settings that override their commonali-
ties (Kratochvíl, 2009, p. 126). Thus, by theoretically following the same uni-
versal pattern regulating the mutual relations between state and Church based 
on the principle of separation of religious and world orders, national contexts 
of delimitating between the given, concrete state and Catholic Church differ 
significantly. Also, the issue of the internal fractions occurring at the highest 
state- level organizations such as the National Conferences of Bishops should be 
taken into consideration. Finally, the Church in the institutional sense has been 
significantly diversified not only at the national but also at the local diocese and 
parish level where different political-religious settings exist1 (Cammisa & Ma-
nuel, 2016, p. 4). Hence, the universality of the Church should be analyzed as 
the general principle and point of departure for interpreting the doctrine and the 
scope of activities but not in terms of specific relations with the political power 
determined by national and local factors.
3  Poland: the Catholic Church as an agenda-setter and 
veto-player
Weakened by the communist regime in a material sense due to the nationali-
zation of the majority of the Church’s property, the Catholic Church in Poland 
entered the transformation period as a strong and influential mediator between 
the old and the new political elites. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the Church 
mobilized with a new sense of mission based on “religious truths” in order to in-
fluence political decision-making, thought, and language. A good example is the 
term “unborn children” that has become rooted in the public discourse. Since 
then, the activities of the Church have taken on a more or less political character, 
never abandoning the political sphere totally (Zuba, 2010, p. 116).
The foundations of the mutual relations between the state and the Church 
in Poland were defined within the first four years after 1989 (Gowin, 1995; 
Gowin, 1999). At that time, the political scene was dominated by the centrist 
and rightist parties that generally deemed taking into consideration the religious 
values and material interests of the Church as justifiable (Zuba, 2020, p. 3). These 
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developments found expression at the institutional level where the bilateral bod-
ies serving as the platforms for regular consultations between the Church and the 
government such as the Joint Commission of the Episcopate, the Property Com-
mission, and the Concordat Commissions, in fact, became quasi-corporation 
forums for the Church to influence the government (Zuba, 2010, p. 124). Using 
its institutional access, the Church not only proposed bills at this stage but also 
intervened in appointing civil servants and officials.2 “All sides of the political 
spectrum acceded to these demands for fear of destabilizing Polish democracy 
and newly found sovereignty” (Grzymała-Busse, 2015, p. 165).
The opposition toward the “special treatment” of the Church, even though 
then absent at the societal level,3 grew fast within left-liberal political circles. In 
the atmosphere of the “religious cold war”4 which embodied increasing criti-
cism against the Church among society as well as anticlerical parties and media 
(Dudek, 2016, pp. 169–173), some important concessions toward the Church 
were made. They involved introducing religious education to schools as well 
as antiabortion regulations, which since then have been a constant topic in the 
political discourse accompanied by the return of Church’s property and the reg-
ulations on Christian values in education and public radio and television. Civil 
partnerships and in vitro fertilization were added later to the list of issues influ-
enced by the Church.
Three main political strategies were applied by the Polish Catholic Church 
during the first two decades of transformation. First, it acted as a political prin-
cipal, which meant exerting direct influence on the political scene by supporting 
Catholic national parties. Second, it shaped political values which, in practice, 
meant supporting the establishment of Christian Democratic parties. Finally, 
after 2004, while formally withdrawn from political activities, the Church en-
gaged politically by supporting the Catholic national Radio Maryja, which has 
been very influential in sustaining the traditional, conservative wing of Pol-
ish Catholicism.5 In the following years, both direct and indirect instruments 
of influence were applied (Zuba, 2010, p. 124) in the form of the official and 
back-channel meetings of the bishops with political decision-makers, confer-
ences, symposia, letters, and statements directed at politicians but also activities 
of religious advocacy groups (Kowalczyk, 2019, pp. 95–96).
According to Grzymała-Busse (2015), the Polish Church has been the most 
powerful interest group and is likely to remain so due to various sociocultural 
and political factors. First, despite the strong criticism and growing distrust to-
ward the Church, society is often passive and disengaged from reforming an 
institution, which represents a crucial element of self-identification. Although 
critical toward the Church’s political engagement, voters do not express this 
criticism at the ballot box. At the same time, Polish politicians preserve the “tra-
dition” of good relations with the Church and avoid, except for some rare cases,6 
open conflict with the Church. As Poland is arguably an example of the greatest 
possible fusion of religious and national identities in the region, it is also one of 
the examples of the greatest moral authority of the Church gained in the course 
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of its “stormy history.” Even though this type of authority does not correspond 
with the popular need for engaging the Church in politics, it corresponds with 
the attitudes of the political elites wary of offending organized religion. Charac-
teristic of Poland is thus the level of mutual links both between the nation and 
faith and between politicians and the Church’s hierarchy. A system of “supra- 
political” bonds that are often stronger than the political cleavages has been cre-
ated (Grzymała-Busse, 2019, pp. 23–25).
“Supra-political” bonds characterizing relations between the state and the 
Church have not prevented the latter from altering its strategy in post- 
transformation Poland. While the Church initially could have been perceived as 
an active agenda-setter, later it adopted a veto-player strategy, before eventually 
becoming a quite passive, selective “third-way seeker” on some issues. Although 
this last strategy definitely is not applied by the whole Catholic clergy and not 
even the whole leadership embodied by the Episcopate, it does apply to the more 
open and more self-critical Church’s leadership meaning, among others, the pri-
mate archbishop Wojciech Polak. The lack of internal cohesion is well evidenced 
at the level of the Episcopate of Poland where the strong divisions between the 
more conservative and the more liberal wings have been observed, with the 
conservative one “winning the battle” in the public reception (Dylus, 2019, 
pp. 131–140).
Its role as agenda-setter developed when the belief in the Church’s pivotal 
role during the communist period was politically utilized by the ruling centrist 
and rightist parties in the early transformation period. Later, under conditions 
of the decreasingly favorable social–political climate, a slow evolution toward 
less-direct engagement could be observed. The political strategy of the Church 
developed toward that of a veto-player, as displayed by ever-present issues such 
as abortion, civil partnership regulations, and in vitro fertilization, which were 
opposed by the Church even in the moderate versions proposed by Catholic 
politicians such as Jarosław Gowin (Dąbrowska & Szacki, 2020, pp. 19–21). The 
Church expressed clear disapproval toward the legal proposals introduced at par-
liament, but the final outcomes were the result of different political settings: 
either the decisions made by state organs (the president, Constitutional Tribunal) 
practically applying Church’s argument (abortion), or the members of parlia-
ment expressing their personal religious convictions in the legislative process 
(civil partnerships), or conservative political party (PiS – Prawo i Sprawiedliwość/
Law and Justice) introducing financial restrictions from the state budget (in-vitro 
fertilization) (Zuba, 2020). Regarding abortion, religious interest groups such as 
Fundacja Pro, Instytut Ordo Iuris or Polska Federacja Ruchów Obrony Życia (Polish 
Federation of Movements to Defend Life) have also been increasingly influential 
actors (Kowalczyk, 2019).
The turn from a more active agenda-setter toward a more passive veto-player 
seems to have been determined by two main developments: the increasing in-
strumentalization of the Church by conservative parties and the increasing social 
criticism and distrust among the society toward the Church.7 This tendency 
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became more apparent since PiS and its allies entered the political scene and 
openly used religious–national arguments for political purposes. The break-
through moment may have been the dispute over the “Smoleńsk cross”8 in 2010. 
While the Episcopate did not take sides in the conflict, politicians and conserv-
ative media, including the leader of PiS, Jarosław Kaczyński, openly instrumen-
talized the symbol of the cross to mobilize more religious supporters (Kublik 
et al., 2013).
Two other issues exemplify the new Church strategy of distancing itself from 
political engagement and embracing the “third-way seeker” option, namely the 
discourse on migration and the problem of nationalistic attitudes. Though often 
presented in public discourse as the Church’s political attitude, the Church, in 
fact, has never officially declared anti-migrant views or support for nationalistic 
radicalism. By contrast, in both cases, the Church’s official stance was directed 
against the goals of the PiS government. Since 2015, the official position of the 
Episcopate was to accept a limited number of migrants in the spirit of Chris-
tians’ obligation to help refugees, and it has not changed since then (Modrze-
jewski & Raczyński, 2019). Despite numerous calls of the Episcopate, including 
the primate Wojciech Polak, and the president of Polish Episcopate Conference 
archbishop, Stanisław Gądecki, as well as signing the official agreement on co-
operation with the Community of Sant Egidio as the leader of the project of 
Humanitarian Corridors in Europe, the Polish government’s stance on the issue 
has stayed the same. As to the problem of increasing radical nationalism in 2017 
in the document entitled “Christian shape of patriotism,” the Episcopate made a 
sharp distinction between the positive attitude of patriotism meaning the “love 
of the homeland” and the attitudes contrary to patriotism, among them “na-
tional egoism, nationalism, cultivating the sense of own superiority, closing itself 
against other national communities and all-human community” (Konferencja 
Episkopatu Polski, 2017).
The historical–demographic matrix that resulted in the political–legal posi-
tioning of the Catholic Church was one of the essential determinants shaping 
the Polish public sphere after 1989. The Church not only influenced the trans-
formation process and the axiological fundaments of the political system but also 
contributed to legitimizing post-Solidarity elites, electoral behaviors, and the 
public debate. The model embarked by the Church turned out to be the one “in- 
between” the political and the metapolitical, meaning both the presence in the 
life of the political community as a participant in the political process and carrier 
of values (Kowalczyk, 2019, p. 96). As such, the Church used multiple strategies, 
from agenda-setter to veto-player, but it also attempted to signal its own political 
voice even at the cost of opposing “friendly” political decision-makers.
4 Czech Republic: the Catholic Church as a civil society actor
Contrary to Poland, the structural weakness of the Czech Catholic Church after 
1989 became a key issue in the process of regulating relations with the state and 
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exerting political influence. Problems such as the lack of organizational structures 
at the dioceses and national level as well as lacking experience in contacts with 
the government bodies were visible. The essential factor influencing church–
state relations were the Church’s dependence on the government in communist 
times, which in practical terms meant that priests and bishops received their sal-
aries from the state budget and were thus regarded as civil servants (O’Mahony, 
2003, p. 180). From an institutional perspective, both the nonreligious percep-
tion of Hussitism and the noninstitutional reception of religion by President 
Masaryk were also crucial.
The Czech Catholic Church is characterized by its passiveness, especially in 
the social–political realm. It also aimed to renew its institutional structures based 
on tactics from the pre-communist era, but in general, it is only weakly in-
volved in social consultations (Kaczmarek, 2016, p. 282). This passive approach 
can also be explained by the political failure to make meaningful headway in 
the institutionalization of civil society (Potuºček, 2000, pp. 107–121). As Joan 
O’Mahony (2003) noted, this failure brought with it numerous attacks on many 
religious organizations, not just the Catholic Church. This politics of exclu-
sion can be perceived in the wider context of the Church’s inability to impact 
policy- making, neither through direct linkages with the state nor by influencing 
political parties.9
While supported by over 50% of society, including non-Catholics in the 1990s 
(Kaczmarek, 2016, p. 247), the relatively strong social position of the Church 
has been significantly weakened by the political controversy over the return of 
Church property. In the mid-1990s, the growing strength of the political party 
ˇKDU-CSL, traditionally perceived as connected to the Church, resulted in the 
recognition of the Catholic Church’s involvement in political issues and a fur-
ther decrease in trust. Declining support for the Church was also effected by 
statements by the head of the Catholic Church at that time, Cardinal Vlk, who 
became not only the face of the restitution issue but also a public critic of the 
current political developments, including the critics of Václav Klaus’ government 
(1996–1997). The period of controversies and disputes lasted until 2006 when, 
among others, the Catholic Church softened its unfavorable view of Jan Hus.10
Since 2010, the political position of the Church has been shaped by the new 
primate Dominik Duka, who started his term in office by solving the dispute on 
the issue of the Saint Vitus Cathedral with President Klaus. The process of reach-
ing a settlement between the Church and the government took two decades. It 
started in 1992 and culminated in 2012 during the intensive political debate and 
the passing of the bill on restitution. Primate Duka’s attempts also increased the 
level of engagement of the Church in the social and cultural realm. An important 
part of his activities were current issues of Czech public life from the perspective 
of the Church’s teachings. In the following years, the Czechs found themselves 
among countries expressing the lowest level of trust in the Church.11
According to Jan Vánĕ, the fact that Roman Catholics represent the largest 
religious group in the Czech Republic, with 10% of society declaring affiliation 
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to the Catholic Church, can be approached from two perspectives. On the one 
hand, this makes the Church a powerful institution
formally disposing of 10% of the population on which it can rely in polit-
ical and religious disputes with the non-religious majority. On the other 
hand, various research projects have shown that in the eyes of the broad 
public, the Church hardly exercises influence that would match its cultural 
and historical significance.
(Vánĕ, 2013, pp. 115–116)
In the legal sense, its weak position is evidenced by the lack of a binding agree-
ment regulating its status. Signed in 2002 by the Apostolic Nuncio Archbishop 
Erwin Josef Ender and Minister of Foreign Affairs Cyril Svoboda, it was never 
ratified by parliament.
While, in Poland, the Catholic Church has held a monopolistic position in the 
sociopolitical structure, the Czech Catholic Church is perceived as one of many 
interest groups and, as such, has never been subject to a more detailed analysis in 
political science (Kaczmarek, 2016, p. 230). Society expects less and less from the 
Church except for its social services. As a result, the Church’s strategy has been to 
turn its attention away from the state. Instead, it has formed alliances and strived 
“to draw the public’s attention to civil society and to be active in the public space, 
also emphasizing the need to work for the community in its broadest possible 
sense” (Vánĕ, 2013, pp. 116–117). In the practical sense, this approach has been 
pursued, along with other entities, by Caritas, which runs 1,340 facilities and 
serves 145,000 registered clients (Czech Bishops Conference, 2019).
The Czech Catholic Church has focused on family, old age, sickness, and 
pastoral activism aimed at young people. Even though its agenda has been de-
fined, the Church has been unsuccessful in creating tools enabling it to become 
involved in political decision-making. With decreasing interest and support from 
political parties, it withdrew from active political involvement and focused more 
on economic and social problems. Thus, the current public agenda is formulated 
outside official Church structures. The leading role is thus played by individuals 
and driven by their personal effort to formulate current areas of interest. In prac-
tice, this means paying a lot of attention to the laity which the Czech Catholic 
Church recognizes as an integral part of the Church (Vánĕ, 2013, pp. 113–120).
5  Catholic Church in Poland and the Czech Republic: between 
national religion and civic religion
Poland and the Czech Republic are considered extremely different cases in terms 
of constructing national identity and legitimizing the contemporary position of 
the Catholic Church, both socially and politically. In the Czech Republic, a 
non-denominational civic religion12 was developed, “laic Christianity” as de-
scribed by the prominent philosopher and anti-communist activist Jan Patočka. 
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Both the Polish Church and political authorities have “politicized” and instru-
mentalized religion based on the concept of “regaining” national culture and 
national identity, with the Church at the center of the “great Polish nation”. 
The aims of the Catholic Church are thus political and nonpolitical. It strives for 
both concrete short-term objectives as well as the long-term alteration of social 
and political values, attitudes, and behaviors. As such, independently of the same 
doctrinal source and organizational patterns, they constitute examples of differ-
ent roles and political strategies of the Church.
In Poland, where the Catholic Church is said to constitute “the fourth branch 
of the government” (Ramet, 2017, p. 1), it holds a religious monopoly. In the vastly 
homogenous society, roughly 10% do not identify with the Catholic Church. 
In the highly secularized, though at the same time spiritual Czech population 
(Havliček, 2006, p. 331), 10% identify as Catholics. While in Poland the Roman 
Catholic Church is perceived as the protector of the nation during the partition 
and loss of independence, in the Czech Republic it is perceived as opposing the 
Czech nation and associated with Habsburg rule against pro- independent ambi-
tions of Protestant nobles. Hence, 75% of Poles perceive a fusion of the Church 
and nation, while only 29% of Czechs do (Grzymała-Busse, 2015, p. 28). Poland 
offers examples of frequently offensive nationalism, the instrumentalization of 
religion, and its de-universalization (Zenderowski, 2010, p. 39). Czechs mean-
while may be considered the only example of modern national identity con-
structed upon laicized religious tradition (Zenderowski, 2018, p. 199).
The different political position of the Church is also visible in public discourse. 
Czech public discussions are rarely framed in religious terms (Kratochvíl, 2009, 
p. 128). In Poland, references to the heritage of Poland’s Christian civilization are 
crucial elements of the public discourse conveyed by the government-controlled 
public media, especially since 2015. The essence of this strategy was the opinion 
expressed by the leader of the ruling party PiS, Jarosław Kaczyński, who declared 
in September 2019 that outside the Catholic Church in Poland there is only ni-
hilism.13 One year earlier at Jasna Góra monastery, considered the “spiritual cap-
ital of Poland,” Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki warned supporters of the 
Catholic Radio Maryja, the perceived political arm of PiS, that just like during 
the Swedish invasion in the XVII century “in the free Poland for the last 25 years 
and even today different ideological opponents have been trying to excavate 
under Poland, under Polishness, under our traditional values: family, patriotism, 
the dream of the great, magnificent Poland” (Deon, 2018).
Both in Poland and the Czech Republic, the Catholic Church influences ed-
ucation and social services on different scales. The Church became involved in 
Czech education, health care, and the army by offering religious services and 
psychological support, and in public television by having the right, in the ca-
pacity of a social organization, to appoint representatives to the national media 
board (Maćkowiak, 2020, p. 48). Since 1989, more than 100 church school in-
stitutions at all levels of education have been established or restored (Havlíček, 
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2006, p.  337), including three Catholic theological faculties in Prague, Olo-
ˇmouc, and Ceské Budĕjovice (Tretera & Horák, 2017). Also crucial from the 
perspective of strengthening civic activeness, the influence and importance of 
church humanitarian organizations have increased with The Charity of the Ro-
man Catholic Church14 among the most important organizations in Czechia.
The Polish Roman Catholic Church is the biggest nongovernmental organi-
zation not only in Poland but also in Europe (Zuba, 2010, p. 117). It counts over 
10,000 parishes and almost 25,000 clergies (ISKK, 2020, p. 4). It also acts as the 
“mobilizer” in terms of social engagement. Being the largest nongovernmental 
organization, the Church fosters the civil engagement of otherwise passive cit-
izens. Janusz Czapiński concludes that religious and Church organizations are 
the forms of organized advocacy in which a significant part of Poles engage. As 
he underlines, in general, Poles rather do not participate much, do not belong 
anywhere, and do not act, unless mainly religious and Church organizations 
are involved (Szymczak, 2015, p. 52).15 The Church became engaged in the 
educational sector and social sector by developing a broad educational and social 
network consisting of over 560 Catholic schools, two Catholic universities in Lu-
blin and Cracow, and nine theological faculties. Three million beneficiaries have 
been offered support by the Church’s institutions, not counting the help offered 
at the parish level. The Church has become the second provider of social services 
after the state (KAI, 2018).16
What both countries have in common is a model of Church–State relations 
based on autonomy and cooperation (German model), which recognizes the posi-
tive social role of the Church(es) and its presence in the public sphere. Meanwhile 
social–cultural, political, and formal–legal differences regarding the position of 
the Church are enormous. Two examples are the relations to the Holy See and 
financing of the clergy. The Czech Republic is the only CEE country without a 
concordat or some kind of other agreement signed with the Holy See. Follow-
ing the old Habsburg pattern of Church-state relations, it also fully finances the 
clergy, which in Poland would be unacceptable17 due to the historical independ-
ence of the Church.
6 Abortion: from universality to locality
The evolution of the abortion policy in the whole post-Soviet bloc was one of 
the most visible examples of the Catholic Church’s influence in the countries 
where it had played a strong political role in the pre-communist period. Prior 
to the collapse of communism, abortion was legal in all Soviet-bloc countries 
since the 1950s, including the Soviet Union, except for Romania where it was 
delegalized under Ceauşescu. The passing of these laws did not result from the 
women’s movement or demands for reproductive freedom. The logic was rather 
of economic nature and was motivated by the state’s need to increase women’s 
participation in the labor force (Githens, 1996, p. 55).
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Regarding abortion in Poland, the Church has acted as both a trendsetter 
and veto-player depending on the phase of the process. In particular in the early 
transformation period, even before the semi-free elections in Poland when the 
first official talks were held between the Church and the communist government, 
it acted as a trendsetter. The first bill banning abortion, which later became the 
basic point of reference to all next proposals, was drafted by lawyers appointed 
by the Episcopate, finalized in the Joint Commission, and introduced in the Sejm 
in the last days of the communist regime in May 1989 (Grzymała-Busse, 2015, 
p. 171).
From the beginning, the Church framed abortion as both a fundamental mat-
ter of natural law and the condition of the survival and development of the na-
tion. Even then, the Church declared it will defend the unborn children even if 
it had no allies left (Episkopat Polski, 1991, p. 23). Simultaneously, it stressed that 
abortion should not become a topic of public debate due to its fundamental moral 
character. Following this line, a strategy was adopted, aimed at preventing a ref-
erendum on the issue. This proved to be effective within the next years when the 
parliament attempted to pass a bill on the referendum.18 The divisions regarding 
abortion, which later turned into political conflict, emerged both within the 
political arena and at the public opinion level, making abortion one of the most 
important and most controversial political issues in post-transformation Poland. 
In the heated debate, the pro-choice camp was referred to as “communist” or 
even the “Eichmann-Mengele-Stalin” option, while the opposite pro-life option 
was named “medieval” and “clerical” (Wielowieyska, 2020).
After the more than three-year controversy, a settlement was reached in 1993. 
Referred to as “the Anti-Abortion Act,”, and known in the public discourse as 
the “abortion compromise,” the Act of 7 January 1993 restricted the possibil-
ity of performing abortions to just three cases: a threat to the woman’s life or 
health; irreversible damage to the fetus; and pregnancy resulting from a prohib-
ited act (The 1993 Act). In the following years, with leftist governments, and 
later a leftist president Aleksander Kwaśniewski, the Act of 7 January 1993 was 
not changed and is binding until now. The reform attempt, namely The Act of 
Amendment of the Penal Code which was passed by the parliament in 1994, was 
vetoed by President Lech Wałęsa the same year. Two years later, when a group of 
MPs proposed another liberalization of the Anti-Abortion Act, it was overruled 
as nonconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. Though this is impossible to 
prove this decision was based on religious premises, this verdict was among the 
most controversial in the history of the Constitutional Court (Zuba, 2020).
Abortion became a fundamental political issue again before the 2003 EU Ac-
cession Referendum, with the Church acting now more in the capacity of a 
( potential) veto-player. At that time, the Church pursued a significantly mod-
ified approach compared to its earlier direct engagement. It is debatable what 
form of political influence the Church exerted before the referendum. Some 
observers raise arguments that the Church offered to back accession if the abor-
tion law was not liberalized (Grzymała-Busse, 2015, p. 176). However, the then 
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leading politicians such as Leszek Miller suggest that the influence was not di-
rect but rather a method of preventive steps undertaken by the ruling left-wing 
government. According to Miller, there was no “pacting” with the Church. 
His decision not to “go on war” with the Church, meaning not reopening the 
abortion issue, was not due to an agreement with the Church but mainly out of 
fear that the local parish priests could discourage their parishioners from partici-
pating in the EU accession referendum (Wielowieyska, 2020). Thus, the element 
of  bottom-up negative mobilization over abortion affected the crucial political 
developments regarding EU accession. During the following years, internal di-
visions emerged within political parties such as PSL and PiS, between which 
opposite attitudes on the abortion issue have always been present.19
The abortion issue as one of the most important political topics of the post- 
transformation decades has come to bear in recent years especially in the form of 
civic legislative initiatives such as Stop aborcji (Stop abortion) or Zatrzymaj aborcję 
(Halt abortion) supported by the Church by means of public appeals and letters. 
Noticeable in this regard is the change of rhetoric used in the debate compared to 
three decades ago. The narrative is no longer that abortion is “evil,” rather some-
thing that is “not ok.” Arguments of scientific nature have also been increasingly 
used by the Church. Meanwhile, support for eugenic abortion has been decreasing 
according to public opinion polls (Konferencja Episkopatu Polski, 2018).
Yet, a decision by the Constitutional Tribunal issued on 22 October 2020 has 
again somewhat unexpectedly heated up the “cultural war” (Korolczuk, 2020). 
Based on a petition led by a group of PiS parliamentarians in late 2019, the Con-
stitutional Tribunal ruled abortion unconstitutional due to heavy, uncurable, 
and lethal damage to the fetus. This sparked massive protests engaging various 
political, social, and cultural groups expressing diversified views and attitudes. 
In addition to reproductive rights, the groups also called for LGBT rights, the 
removal of religious education from school curricula, climate action, animal 
rights, better education, and health care, among others (Strajk Kobiet, 2020). 
Eventually, abortion served as the “umbrella” issue which was well visible on the 
often very innovative posters carried by the protesters. While for the majority 
of protesters the fundamental right of women to decide on abortion was the 
fundamental issue, for many others it was an opportunity to demonstrate their 
hatred for the Church (expressed also by the acts of apostasy), the government, 
and, often personally, Jarosław Kaczyński.
This shed light on deep internal divisions within the Polish clergy. More 
liberal circles of the Church, both the clergy and Catholic journalists (Prze-
ciszewski, 2020) trying to justify the protests, avoided open confrontation and 
appealed for deep reflection within the Church. More conservative members 
spoke of “collective possession,” attributing the protests to the radical, ultra- 
leftist activities carrying out “Satan’s deeds” and “persecuting the Church.” The 
strategy of political confrontation and “using” the Church was well evidenced 
in the rhetoric applied by the representatives of the Episcopate, on the one hand, 
and the government, on the other hand. When primate Wojciech Polak appealed 
250 Joanna Kulska
for respect for “holy places,” Jarosław Kaczyński called on PiS supporters to de-
fend the church for any price, arguing that attacks on the church should not be 
perceived as accidental. Soon, Jarosław Kaczyński made the argument that the 
parliamentary opposition has “blood on its hands” due to the rising numbers of 
Covid victims as an alleged sideeffect of the protests.
Contrary to Poland, the topic of abortion has not been a significant political 
issue in the Czech Republic. Already in the 1950s when abortion was legalized 
in Czechoslovakia, it was framed as a medical issue, not an ethical one, and as a 
way to healthier motherhood (Dudová, 2010, p. 945). Since 1989, the issue has 
returned periodically, also in the moral context, but the political influence of 
the Catholic Church has not been the determining factor. Focus has been placed 
more on economic issues and the necessity to build a stronger civil society. This 
line of reflection and teaching was expressed, in particular, in the letter “Peace 
and good” (Pokoj a dobro) published in 2000 in which Czech bishops critically 
looked at the direction of development of the country in an excessively liberal 
and free-market direction. As a reaction to the letter, President Václav Klaus 
expressed his critique toward this engagement by the Church. In an article pub-
lished in “Lidové noviny” in 2001, he encouraged the Church to pay more at-
tention to issues such as abortion or the death penalty (Kaczmarek, 2016, pp. 
302–303).
In the next years, the dominating force politically engaged in the abortion 
ˇissue were single representatives of the Christian-Democrat KDU-CSL. How-
ever, neither in 2003 nor in 2008 when they proposed banning abortion was it a 
top political issue. At the same time, abortion has been constantly addressed by 
different organizations gathered under the pro-life movement organizing yearly 
Marches for Life. However, they do not demand a ban on abortion, as this idea 
is perceived as unrealistic. Instead, their main focus has been the pragmatic goal 
of decreasing the number of the abortions performed and organizing more suffi-
cient care for mothers and their families.
7 Concluding remarks
Three decades after the transformation, the Czech Catholic Church tends to be 
“one of many” actors in the social–political sphere. In Poland, its status is rather 
“one over many” still, though decreasingly, advocating corporatist aims and strat-
egies. This status has resulted in still existing close bonds between the Church 
and the state, through which both the Church and the state exploit their mu-
tual dependence. In the Czech Republic, the lack of such dependence translates 
into more civil society-oriented activities in the social and charity domains and 
avoiding direct political participation. At the same time, the element common 
to both models has been the move toward more passive political engagement. In 
this regard, the recent involvement of the primate of the Czech Catholic Church, 
Dominik Duka, in controversies around political attempts to limit the freedom 
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of public media has been quite puzzling. In Poland meanwhile, this passiveness 
has gained its own dimension. The question has been increasingly discussed in 
which direction the political influence of the Catholic Church will evolve in the 
connection to “dark side” of civil society and illiberal democracy problem. Once 
linked to democratic transformation, the process of pluralization and building a 
strong, active, and independent sphere of engaged citizens challenging the state, 
now some segments of civil society are turning away from those values. In-
stead, this illiberal civil society leans toward authoritarian power-promoting, 
top-down processes of building alternative organizations and movements sup-
portive of government policies (Ekiert 2018; Ekiert, 2019). In Poland, this has 
already resulted in the adoption of new financing rules for NGOs and support 
for organizations with a more nationalist and Roman Catholic profile (Mandes, 
2020, p. 112). Whether and to what extent the Church will engage itself in this 
strategy of the government may define not just short-term political interests but 
its long-term political and social standing.
Notes
 1 Subsidiarity is a basic concept of Catholic theology that it is incumbent upon society 
to nurture basic human relationships. Thus, policies should be administered when-
ever possible at the level closest to the individual (Cammisa & Manuel, 2016, p. 5).
 2 The undebatable sign of the close relations between the Church and the politicians 
was the consent to use the name Catholic by the coalition of the conservative right-
wing Catholic Electoral Action (Wyborcza Akcja Katolicka) in the election of 1991.
 3 In the early transformation period, public support for the Church was 90%. It dropped 
to under 40% by mid-1993.
 4 The term “cold religious war” was coined by Jarosław Gowin to describe church-
state relations in 1990 (Sowiński, 2014, p. 660).
 5 Radio Maryja has become a central ideological pillar for consolidating Polish 
national- catholic ideology (Krzemiński, 2016, pp. 85–112).
 6 Anna Grzymała-Busse notes that in the post-transition period open conflict with the 
Catholic Church would have negative consequences for political parties. The more 
significant political parties are thus more or less clerical, but look for compromise 
with the Church (Grzymała-Busse, 2019, p. 24).
 7 Social trust in the Church decreased 17% between 2017 and 2020 to a level of 39.5%, the 
lowest in history (Przewodnik Katolicki, 2020). The sexual abuse scandal and political 
engagement of the Church were the main reasons (Boniecki, 2019; Sporniak, 2019).
 8 The “Smoleńsk cross” reflects the socio-political divisions since the crash of the plane 
carrying 96 Polish top officials including President Lech Kaczyński and his wife on 
10 April 2010. The delegation was on its way to Katyń in Russia to commemorate 
the 70th anniversary of the Katyń Massacre in which NKVD forces executed almost 
22,000 Polish citizens including some 10,000 Polish officers. The wooden cross in-
stalled after the catastrophe by a group of scouts in front of the Presidential Palace has 
reflected long and emotional disputes on the role of religion and the Catholic Church 
in the public sphere.
 9 See Dobbins, Piotrowska and von Bronk in this volume for a contrasting finding on 
the openness of Czech political parties.
 10 Jan Hus, a main figure Czech history, was a philosopher, theologian and 15th- century 
religious reformer who anticipated the Lutheran Reformation by a full century. 
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He was convicted of heresy at the Council of Constance and burned at the stake 
in 1415.
 11 In 2008, 27% of citizens declared their trust in the Churches, while in Poland it was 
70% (Kaczmarek, 2016, p. 249).
12 Interestingly both “fathers” of Czech modern democracy –Tomáš Masaryk in the 
interwar period and Václav Havel in the post-communist period - referred to the 
religious dimension in their visions of the Czech state. For Masaryk the religious 
dimension, which he perceived mainly through the prism of its humanizing values, 
constituted the inherent element of harmonious existence of the society (Kaczmarek, 
2016, p. 119). Václav Havel, while not referring to the religious terminology in 
the direct way, had deep consideration for “what reaches beyond” (Różańska, 
2019, p. 48).
13 The opinion expressed by Jarosław Kaczyński was criticized by the Catholic media 
in Poland, while pointing out that this is not the view of the Catholic Church itself 
(Królak, 2019).
 14 Caritas Czech Republic is among the biggest organizations of that kind. It is involved 
in 30 countries and runs 1200 social and health services. It also runs the biggest vol-
untary aid project in Czech Republic “Three Kings Collection.” Its organizations 
employ over 7,700 employees and have 60,000 volunteers.
15 The number of participants, i.e., parishioners actively involved in the parish organi-
zations, grew from 4% in 1993 to 8.1% in 2018 (ibid., p. 33). According to the Main 
Statistical Office (GUS) in 2018, there were 88.1 registered non-profit entities in 
Poland. The parish organizations constitute a separate category of non-registered 
non-profit entities and count 611 of 65.5 non-registered non-profit organizations. All 
registered organizations counted 8.9 million members at the end of 2018. Compared 
to 2010 the number of those participating in these organizations decreased by 12.8% 
which is about 1.3 million (GUS, 2019, p. 103). Approximately one in five Poles 
participates in those organizations. On average, the number of members is 30 partic-
ipants (Stowarzyszenie Klon/Jawor, 2015, pp. 4–9).
 16 Church charity activities in Poland are conducted at three levels: diocesan, religious 
orders and parish organizations. The number of bodies carrying those services was 
835 in 2015. They carried out over five thousand charity projects, mainly with chil-
dren and youth, the poor, homeless, handicapped, elderly and jobless. 
 17 In Poland, the state finances social and healthcare insurance contributions of the 
clergy.
 18 Already in 1991, public opinion polls conducted by OBOP showed that ¾ of respond-
ents wanted a referendum, which was supported with the petition for a referendum in 
January 1991 collecting 1.3 million signatures (Karolewska, 2018, p. 143). During the 
heated debate, the Episcopate rejected the proposal of the referendum. The Church 
argued that ethics issues cannot be resolved this way as “voting on the matter of the 
legalizing human’s life not only violates human rights but it undermines the entire 
natural order” (Dudek, 2016, p. 172).
 19 One politician strongly advocating the total ban on abortion was Sejm marshal Marek 
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254 Joanna Kulska
KAI (2018). Raport na 25-lecie. https://ekai.pl/kosciol-w-polsce-raport-na-25-lecie-kai/ 
(Accessed 15 February 2020).
Karolewska, I. (2018). Aborcja jako przedmiot analizy dyskursu, in: Religia wobec wy-
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ferencji Episkopatu Polski przygotowany przez Radę ds. Społecznych. https://episkopat.
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1 Introduction
While political parties have been at the center of scholarly attention in recent 
decades, research on interest groups has gained traction only lately. Besides a 
few notable exceptions (Thomas, 2001; Witko, 2009; Allern, 2010; Allern & 
Bale, 2012, 2017; Otjes & Rasmussen, 2017), we lack a systematic analysis of 
interactions between these two actors, not to mention whether interest groups 
are replacing political parties in representing certain groups of citizens. For ex-
ample, as Lefkofridi et al. (2014) have suggested, some groups of voters are less 
represented by parties than others. Furthermore, scholars have also suggested that 
political parties are increasingly interested in the cartelization of politics, where 
they are more inclined to penetrate the state than to fight for voters and members 
(Katz & Mair, 1995). Are interest groups at least partially able to compensate for 
the absence of political parties?
I investigate whether both political parties and interest groups carry the same 
type of representational biases or whether the latter could make up for parties’ 
shifts towards certain types of electorate. To empirically verify this assumption, 
I map groups’ and parties’ positions on Gal-Tan and economic matters. The Gal-
Tan dimension (green, alternative, libertarian versus traditional, authoritarian, 
nationalist) has become increasingly popular among scholars investigating party 
stances on Europeanization (Hooghe et al., 2002). Regarding economic matters, 
where parties are set apart by different points of view on economic redistribu-
tion, welfare, and government regulation of the economy, it allows researchers 
to map political parties on four ideological quadrants (left-tan, right-tan, left-gal, 
and right-gal) (Vachudova & Hooghe, 2009). As party competition has recently 
been dictated not only by the left-right division, Gal-Tan adds multidimension-
ality regarding the socio-cultural dimension.
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DOI: 10.4324/9781003049562-12
Filling the blanks 257
I analyze six countries – three from CEE (Poland, Slovenia, and Lithuania) 
and three from Western Europe (Belgium, Sweden, and the Netherlands). Both 
regions have had diverging trajectories of party politics (Vachudova & Hooghe, 
2009). The collapse of communism in the East, Europeanization, and, last but 
not the least, the lack of societal embeddedness, created completely different dy-
namics for the institutionalization of political parties and civil societies.
There are various definitions and interpretations of what an interest group is 
(for discussion, see Beyers et al., 2008). I follow the definition of interest groups 
provided by Thomas (2001, p. 7): “An interest group is an association of indi-
viduals or organizations, usually formally organized, that attempts to influence 
public policy”. By contrast, a political party is “any political group that presents 
at elections, and is capable of placing through elections, candidates for public 
office” (Sartori, 1976, p. 64).
2 Cartelization
As argued in a seminal article by Katz and Mair (1995), in contrast to previous 
time periods when other organizational models (elite caucus or cadre party, mass 
party, catch-all party) were dominant, the cartel party emerged in the late 20th 
century. Contrary to its predecessors, the cartel party is less interested in gain-
ing people’s support than exploiting the resources of the state and position itself 
within it. Parties, as Katz and Mair have argued, function therefore as cartels, 
trying to limit the emergence of competition and ensure that the party in public 
office has the upper hand over the party on the ground and the party central 
office (Krašovec & Haughton, 2011).
The research on cartelization has primarily been focused on western democ-
racies, with a few notable examples (Yishai, 1998; Szczerbiak, 2001; Sikk, 2003; 
van Biezen, 2003; Bolleyer, 2009). Where does it leave us with CEE countries? 
As Katz and Mair (2012) point out, political parties in post-communist democ-
racies share many problems with those in old democracies, but contrary to them, 
they do not have the institutional advantage of having functioned for several dec-
ades. Moreover, it has been debated that parties in CEE might immediately em-
brace the cartel model, according to which the relationship with interest groups 
and, in general, civil society is loose (Szczerbiak, 2001; Sikk, 2003; Krašovec 
& Haughton, 2011). There have also been concerns that civil society itself is so 
weak and fragmented that it would not channel societal interests into organized 
forms (Dobbins & Riedel, 2018). Katz and Mair (2012) even argued that instead 
of arduously building relationships with civil society, political parties could take 
a shortcut, build their own organizations, and establish permanent dominance 
over them. They also contended that all the previous models of party competi-
tion have focused on their relationship with voters, while their relationship with 
the state should be treated as equally important.
First, after the Second World War, parties became less and less agents of civil 
society acting in the interests of their constituency and penetrating the state 
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on their behalf. Instead, they became agents of the state themselves (Katz & 
Mair, 1995, p. 18). Thus, cartel parties have become detached from their tradi-
tional constituencies even more as their dependence on state subsidies has grown 
substantially. Such parties penetrate and operate within the state, are highly 
professionalized, weakly anchored in society, and use their privileged financial 
positions – above political divisions – to limit the likelihood of new entities en-
tering the system (Mair, 1997; van Biezen et al., 2012; Fraussen & Halpin, 2018).
Secondly, Katz and Mair distinguished three ideal types of a modern politi-
cal party – (1) party in office (in parliament or in government), (2) party on the 
ground (activists and local branches), and finally (3) party’s central office (party 
leaders). Particularly remarkable for Katz and Mair is that the party in office has 
dominated the other two types. They argue that “as the party in public office 
gains ascendancy within the party as a whole, its particular interests will be 
treated as being the interests of the party writ large” (Katz & Mair, 2009, p. 756).
I argue that political parties in Europe are generally drifting towards the car-
tel mode. As the proliferation of new parties entering the system decreases, the 
ideological saturation of the party scene could be reduced as well (for a discussion 
about party funding, see Häusermann & Geering, 2011; Casal Bértoa & Spirova, 
2019). Political parties are becoming more interested in achieving electoral and 
financing thresholds. Therefore, they could strategically turn away from political 
positions that do not guarantee staying in the (cartel) system. Moreover, ties with 
parties’ collateral organizations like trade unions or agrarian associations have 
been more relaxed lately. Parties used to rely on such grassroot organizations 
to mobilize support and gain new members. With the emergence of the catch-
all model, political parties attempted to appeal to broader audiences. In conse-
quence, parties took a more independent position on interest groups, trying to 
free themselves from constraining relationships (Katz & Mair, 1995; van Biezen 
et al., 2012; Allern & Bale, 2012).
3 Interest groups as a second go-to option
As a consequence, the “decline of parties” and party democracy (Dalton et al., 
2011) paint a different picture for citizens. Parties may no longer be interested in 
representing a broad spectrum of voters and this may create gaps in representa-
tional relationship. Voters may no longer feel represented and may show anti- 
party sentiment as well (Poguntke, 1996). Subsequently, they could look for 
alternatives and turn to interest groups as another form of preference aggrega-
tion. As Borang and her colleagues have argued, interest groups do not neces-
sarily carry the same ideological history, pre-existing voting constituencies, or 
organizational structures that make it difficult for political parties to reach voters 
above socio-economic cleavages in societies (Borang et al., 2017).
Furthermore, it has been debated elsewhere that it is actually plausible to ad-
dress interest groups as “political organizations” in the same manner as political 
parties (Fraussen & Halpin, 2018). Heaney (2010, p. 568) has even argued that 
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groups and parties are “intricately and inextricably linked to one another”. Fur-
thermore, Fraussen and Halpin hypothesized that
given the high level of similarities, not only in organizational form but 
also in the external challenges that they face, studying political parties and 
interest organizations in tandem can deliver more insights into the nature 
and evolution of these organizations.
(2018, p. 26)
More generally, interest organizations are seen here as entities channeling policy 
preferences and bringing them to the political arena in the form of agenda setting, 
and simultaneously also influencing policy processes, becoming  intermediaries – or 
transmission belts – between the public and the state (Easton, 1971; Truman, 1993).
One important difference between parties and interest organizations is that 
the latter do not compete in elections. In order to influence policy-making pro-
cesses, they need to interact with political parties, parliamentary committees, or 
governmental agencies. Keeping in mind this important difference, some schol-
ars have observed many similarities between interest organizations and political 
parties (Fraussen & Halpin, 2018).
According to Burstein and Linton (2002, pp. 381–382), either parties or inter-
est organizations “define public problems, propose solutions, aggregate citizen’s 
policy preferences, mobilize voters, make demands of elected officials, commu-
nicate information about government action to their supporters and the larger 
public, and make relatively coherent legislative action possible”. Allern and Bale 
(2012) have highlighted the role of parties and groups in aggregating the public’s 
interests into collective demands and seeking to influence the form and content 
of public policy. By contrast, Fraussen and Halpin (2018) have discussed the pos-
sibility that interest groups might have followed the same path as political parties 
by becoming very professionalized, managed from above and having little to do 
with local constituencies apart from collecting membership fees.
According to Theda Skocpol, older groups are more likely to undergo the 
process of professionalization and centralization. These organizations are often 
devoid of membership involvement and usually focused on single issues, result-
ing in “diminished democracy”, whereby their civic and integrative dimension 
is lost (Skocpol, 2003).
Organized interests – grassroots movements, various professional associations, 
or cause groups – allow citizens to pursue shared objectives in an institutional way 
(Putnam, 1995). A high density of interest organizations along regular channels 
of communication between citizens and interests and their governments is seen 
to be crucial for the emergence of liberal democracy (Putnam, 1993; Elster et al., 
1998). For instance, when interest groups and the public are on the same page in 
terms of policy preferences, the likelihood of adoption of a jointly preferred law 
increases (Gilens, 2012). Groups’ activities in certain policy areas have also had 
a positive impact on bringing decision-makers’ attention to issues (Rasmussen 
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et al., 2014; Berkhout et al., 2020; Bevan & Rasmussen, 2020). In this sense, 
the chapter bridges research on social movement organizations (SMOs), civil 
society organizations (CSOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and, 
obviously, interest organizations. Beyers et al. (2008) bitterly remark that schol-
ars of former groups can go to great lengths to avoid the “interest group” label, 
often seen as something negative, elitist, and undemocratic. However, interest 
groups research sees them as politically and democratically useful, and, in fact, 
analyzes the same phenomenon as research on SMOs or NGOs, “as [interest 
groups] evolve over time, incorporate multiple purposes and structural features 
from all three prevailing forms” (Hasenfeld & Gidron, 2005, p. 98). Finally, one 
could say that “NGOs” is a “hurrah” word for the “boo” word “interest group”, 
as Grant argues (2001).
Nonetheless, our knowledge about interest groups as a potential substitute for 
political parties is very scarce and limited to Western Europe and the United States. 
We know very little about how political parties and interest groups behave in the 
post-communist environment. It should be also noted here that the development 
of organized interests and political parties has had a different dynamics than in 
Western Europe (Mair, 1997; Kitschelt et al., 1999; Enyedi, 2006). The departure 
point for democracy was not a century-long overlapping process, but rather an un-
expected collapse of communism. In consequence, the transition was three-fold, 
with simultaneous creation of new political, economic, and constitutional systems, 
and in some cases also new states (Offe & Adler, 1991; Bunce, 1995; Bohle & 
Greskovits, 2012; see Labanino & Dobbins in this volume). A half century of 
authoritarianism destroyed traditional parties, weakened classes and interests, and 
undermined the social trust necessary to kick-start social participation (Crawford & 
Lijphart, 1995). Moreover, when this particularly relates to the Gal-Tan dimen-
sion, the whole region underwent the process of Europeanization in the form of 
EU accession talks, which became an overriding national priority (Vachudova & 
Hooghe, 2009). As Hooghe et al. (2002) suggested, the Gal-Tan is more useful 
here in predicting stances towards EU than the standard left-right division.
4 Data sources and methodology
The countries included in this study are Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
Lithuania, Poland, and Slovenia. By including three “old” West European de-
mocracies with newcomers from CEE, we are able to compare how interest 
groups position themselves in different environments and find out whether there 
are any substantial differences between East and West.
Each country is different, not only in size and population, but also the state of 
civil society, institutional representation of its interests as well as the structure of 
party systems and political parties. Furthermore, we can expect the institutional 
nature of an interest group system to play a role here. Here, one discerns two 
dominant systems: neo-corporatism and pluralism (see Chapter 5 in this volume). 
This distinction refers to variation regarding “the extent of state autonomy, the 
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degree of societal organization, the variety, legitimacy and degree of interest 
group participation” (Eising, 2008; Fraussen & Beyers, 2016). A pluralist system is 
mainly fragmented and shaped by competition among interest groups for policy- 
makers’ attention. By contrast, in neo-corporatist settings, access is highly or-
ganized, usually granted to few privileged groups (Binderkrantz & Christiansen, 
2015; Christiansen et  al., 2018). As Western European countries and Slovenia 
have been portrayed as neo-corporatist, other CEE countries, including Poland 
and Lithuania, have had weak organized arrangements with a plethora of actors 
competing for influence (Hassel, 2008). Taking this into account, the selection 
of both Eastern and Western European countries differing on a range of other 
factors (e.g. level of corporatism, party system properties, interest group popula-
tions) makes the findings reasonably generalizable within the European context.
In order to measure ideological positions of interest groups and political par-
ties, I use the “Gal-Tan” and economic “left-right” scale. While the economic 
placement is still crucial for party competition, the former allows us to capture 
the cultural and post-material dimension of politics (Hooghe et al., 2002; Born-
schier, 2010; Rohrschneider & Whitefield, 2012). The Gal-Tan scale indicates 
positions involving such issues as gay marriage, abortion, the role of religion, 
immigration, multiculturalism, and environmentalism (Wheatley & Mendez, 
2019). Furthermore, it has been shown in other studies that Gal-Tan could be 
very useful in predicting party positions on the above-mentioned matters. The 
only drawback is that the data comes from 2014 and therefore might not nec-
essarily be up-do-date with current developments on party positions and emer-
gence of new parties (Hanley & Sikk, 2016) (Table 12.1).
Party positions are measured based on the Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2014 
(CHES). The CHES data provide expert evaluations on dozens of issues and it 
so far has been one of the most popular and reliable sources on party research. 
CHES treats Gal-Tan as stances on democratic freedoms and rights (Polk et al., 
2017, p. 19). “Libertarian” or “postmaterialist” parties favor expanded personal 
freedoms, for example, access to abortion, active euthanasia, same-sex marriage, 
or greater democratic participation. “Traditional” or “authoritarian” parties of-
ten reject these ideas; they value order, tradition, and stability, and believe that 
the government should be a firm moral authority on social and cultural issues. 
Similarly, on the economic left-right scale, “parties want government to play an 
active role in the economy. Parties on the economic right emphasize a reduced 
economic role for government: privatization, lower taxes, less regulation, less 
government spending, and a leaner welfare state” (Polk et al, 2017, p. 18).
Subsequently, the data on interest groups come from Comparative Inter-
est Group Survey (CIGS), a multinational project which investigates dozens of 
 European countries.1 Surveys were conducted in 2016 in Slovenia, Lithuania, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Sweden. Poland joined the project between 2017 
and 2018. For the purpose of this chapter, we use data from 4,100 interest groups 
from Poland, Slovenia, and Lithuania – the only three post-communist coun-
tries involved in the project – as well as three Western European democracies: 
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TABLE 12.1  Political parties included in the analysis
Country Party Vote Seats aFamily
Lithuania LSDP 18.4 26.2 Socialist
















Lithuania DP 19.8 20.6 Liberal































Poland KNP 1.1 0 Conservative
































Slovenia ZL 6 6.7 Conservative
Slovenia ZaAB 4.4 4.4 Conservative











Netherlands VVD 26.6 27.3 Liberal
Netherlands D66 8 8 Liberal
Netherlands GL 2.3 2.7 Green
Netherlands SGP 2.1 2 Confessional
Netherlands SP 9.69 10 Rad left
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Belgium, the Netherlands, and Sweden. Table 12.2 provides a typology of sur-
veyed organizations as well as distributions across different countries.
The sampling procedures applied to gather the data differ between different 
countries, which is normal if we take into account difficulties in accessing the in-
formation. The response rate ranged from 27% for Poland, 36% for Slovenia, 40% 
for Lithuania, 38% for the Netherlands, 41% for Belgium, and 42% for Sweden.
Country Party Vote Seats aFamily
Belgium PS 11.7 15.3 Socialist
Belgium SPA 8.80 8.69 Socialist
Belgium ECOLO 3.3 4 Green
Belgium Groen 5.3 4 Green
Belgium MR 9.6 13.3 Liberal
Belgium VLD 9.80 9.30 Liberal
Belgium cdH 5 6 Christian democracy
Belgium CD&V 11.6 12 Christian democracy
Belgium N-VA 20.3 22 Regionalist
Belgium FDF 1.8 1.3 Regionalist
Belgium VB 3.7 2 Rad right
Belgium PVDA 3.7 1.3 Rad left
Belgium PP 1.5 0.7 Conservative
a The typology of political parties according to Chapell Hill Expert Survey, not the author of the 
chapter. See https://www.chesdata.eu.
Source: CHES 2014.
TABLE 12.2  Types of interest groups and their populations
Belgium The 
Netherlands
Sweden Lithuania Poland Slovenia
Business 
associations (1) 
0.23 (219) 0.16 (138) 0.19 (192) 0.22 (80) 0.29 (112) 0.09 (41)
Professional 
associations (2) 




0.02 (19) 0.01 (12) 0.03 (43) 0.06 (23) 0.03 (14) 0.07 (34)
0.15 (142) 0.22 (192) 0.07 (103) 0.14 (51) 0.10 (39) 0.14 (63)
Cause 
organizations (5) 
0.20 (196) 0.14 (120) 0.46 (416) 0.08 (32) 0.40 (157) 0.08 (35)
Leisure 
associations (6) 




0.04 (35) 0.16 (141) 0.02 (25) 0.05 (20) 0.05 (20) 0.02 (10)
Rest (8) 0.03 (29) 0.01 (3) 0.02 (32) 0.07 (26) 0.07 (26) 0.02 (10)
959 866 1,111 367 397 438
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To measure the economic left-right dimension, interviewees were asked:
Interest organizations and civil society associations have different views on 
the role of government in economic matters. Some want government to play 
an active role in the economy, e.g. through taxation, regulation, government 
spending, or a strong welfare state. Others prefer a reduced economic role 
for government, e.g. through privatization, lower taxes, less regulation, less 
government spending, or a leaner welfare state. On a scale from 0 to 10, 
where “0” means that government should play a much reduced role in the 
economy and “10” means that government should play a very active role in 
the economy, where would you position your organization on this scale?
Similar to CHES, interest groups were asked about their positions on “personal 
freedoms”:
Interest organizations and civil society associations have different views on 
personal freedoms and rights. Some support greater personal freedom, e.g. 
access to abortion, euthanasia, same-sex marriage, or greater democratic 
participation (libertarian views). Others reject these ideas; they value order, 
tradition, and stability, and believe that the government should be a firm 
moral authority on social and cultural issues (traditional views). On a scale 
of 0 to 10, where “0” is “of no importance” and “10” is “of great impor-
tance”, how important would you say are social, moral, and cultural issues 
of this kind to your organization in its lobbying and advocacy activities?
The important difference between both survey questionnaires is the fact that while 
in CIGS “0” indicates that state should play a reduced role in economy, in CHES 
“0” means that parties want government to play an active role in the economy. 
To synchronize both datasets, I reversed the CHES scale to mirror the CIGS data 
points. This means that parties and groups placed farthest right on the horizontal 
axis assume that state should play a key role in the economy (see Table 12.1).
The CIGS project follows a broad definition of interest groups, where the 
group is an entity standing between the state and the civil society. Its aim is to 
aggregate and represent the interests (e.g. companies, workers), a cause (e.g. the 
environment, health, consumers), or some constituency (e.g. refugees, unem-
ployed, poor) (Beyers et al., 2016). Therefore, it allowed us to catch a variety 
of groups: business associations, employers’ associations, citizens groups, trade 
unions, or third sector organizations.
Below I present a descriptive analysis of Gal-Tan and economic placements 
of political parties and interest groups. I am particularly interested in whether 
the latter could occupy spaces left by political parties, or, whether either of them 
follow suit and strategically place themselves. The positive aspect of such an 
analysis is that we can spatially map policy preferences, clearly identify patterns, 
and compare them between certain actors (parties, groups, and citizens). The 
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drawbacks we should be aware of are that two-dimensional positioning strips 
the analysis of the necessary context. Moreover, if used to compare different 
countries (or cultures) with different experiences, we never know how to un-
derstand “traditional”, “liberal”, or “active role of the state”, not to mention 
language-specific subtleties.
5 Results
Figure 12.1 presents the Gal-Tan and economic left-right placement of political 
parties according to CHES data. As we can see, there are substantial differences 
between countries. Obviously, in democratic regimes, political parties cannot 
stray too far away from public opinion and the electorate, meaning that extreme 
spaces are less populated. However, in the six countries of interest, there are no 
parties placed in left-tan spaces, with the outermost position around 7.0. Regard-
ing CEE countries, the explanation might lie in the legacy and unpopularity of 
communism. When the democratic transformation began, parties – especially 
post-communist ones – were incentivized to abandon left-authoritarian posi-
tions and move towards Tan positions. As Vachudova and Hooghe (2009) sug-
gest, EU accession talks and EU membership influenced party politics in such 
a way that eventually political parties fine-tuned their programs to EU stand-
ards. Furthermore, the process of Europeanization, marketization, and course 
towards neoliberalism could have prevented parties from extreme left-leaning 
policies (Haughton, 2014; Coman, 2017). As for Western European democracies, 
the supply and demand dynamics of party systems after the Second World War 
FIGURE 12.1 Gal-Tan and economic left-right placement of political parties.
Source: CHES 2014.
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perhaps have never materialized to establish institutional actors representing na-
tionalist, traditional agendas melting with redistributive policies.
Thus, what gap do interest groups fill for political parties? Apart from aban-
doned outmost spaces in each quadrant, populating vast spaces in tan-economic 
left would be worthy of further investigation, particularly from a bottom-up 
perspective. However, it could be safely assumed that as party politics has moved 
to the 45 degree axis between tan-right and tan-left to presumably seek political 
gain and moderate voters, it does not mean that these spaces are not populated by 
interest organizations that are not subjected to verification in elections and are 
not constrained by adjusting to EU and market policies.
There are some similarities between Lithuanian and Polish political parties, 
where many have been located around the upper half. Moreover, there is no 
shortage of parties in the authoritarian half, which might be symptomatic of cur-
rent events in the region, sometimes referred to as the illiberal turn or democratic 
backsliding (Sata & Karolewski, 2020). Moreover, only three parties are located 
in the right-green-alternative-libertarian quadrant.
Now, we move to self-placement of interest organizations. Similar to party 
positioning, Lithuania and Poland appear to have more in common with each 
other than with Slovenia. Even though we can see clear bias towards right-wing 
authoritarian politics and an almost empty left-authoritarian quadrant, it is defi-
nitely interesting that interest groups tend to be more evenly distributed than 
Polish and Lithuanian parties, particularly in the right-wing economic and Gal 
quadrant. The difference between these two countries lies in the extreme posi-
tion. While in Lithuania, there are many such groups, in Poland there are only 
FIGURE 12.2  Gal-Tan and economic left-right self-placement of interest groups in 
Lithuania.
Source: CIGS.
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few. Regarding which types of groups “fill the blanks”, the case of Lithuania is 
quite representative. However, they are mostly trade unions, business groups, 
and professional associations. In Poland though, the outmost positions in the 
upper-right corner are filled by cause groups and business associations.
By contrast, Slovenian interest groups appear to be more left-leaning, cul-
turally often self-placed in extreme areas, where hardly any Lithuanian and 
Polish groups were to be found and with sparsely populated right- authoritarian 
areas.
The divergence between Slovenia and other countries in the region is strik-
ing and lays ground for further research how interest organizations emerge to 
“satisfy” the demand for certain types of representation among citizens. It is also 
safe to say that Slovenian interest organizations do not compensate for political 
parties in the above-mentioned gap in the upper-right quadrant. Interestingly, 
in the Slovenian case, we have plenty of groups presenting extreme positions in 
the lower-left corner, which means the highest support for state’s reduced role in 
economic matters as well as libertarian point of view of cultural issues. In view 
of the neo-corporatist tradition of the Slovenian state, the further analysis should 
focus on whether interest groups represent a neo-liberal counter- movement. 
What would support this hypothesis is the type of groups – a handful of associa-
tions of professionals, business, and cause groups.
Apart from Slovenia, we see dozens of groups populating spaces left by politi-
cal parties. Particularly interesting is the large number of such groups in Sweden, 
Belgium, and the Netherlands. The disillusionment with market politics after 
the Euro-crisis could be one factor. However, the shift towards the center-right 




“traditional” space is another issue and begs for further investigation, accounting 
for cross-national surveys of populations as well.
In terms of what types of groups fill the spaces left by political parties, we do 
not see any dominating trend. In the Netherlands, these spaces are dominated 
FIGURE 12.4  Gal-Tan and economic left-right self-placement of interest groups in 
Slovenia.
Source: CIGS.
FIGURE 12.5  Gal-Tan and economic left-right self-placement of interest groups in 
the Netherlands.
Source: CIGS.
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FIGURE 12.6  Gal-Tan and economic left-right self-placement of interest groups in 
Sweden.
Source: CIGS.
FIGURE 12.7  Gal-Tan and economic left-right self-placement of interest groups in 
Belgium.
Source: CIGS.
mostly by trade unions and cause groups. In Sweden business groups and some 
cause and identity groups spilled over to the “more active role of the state” half, 
but are not entirely in Tan areas. In Belgium, we have the most representative case 
where a myriad of different organizations occupy areas left by political parties.  
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6 Conclusions
The goal of this chapter was to analyze the propensity with which interest groups 
populate two-dimensional ideological spaces left by political parties. I used the 
Chapel Hill Expert Survey as well as novel data from a multinational interest 
group survey project to investigate six EU countries representing the east and 
west of the continent. The CHES data allowed us to identify the gap, which 
could be seen in the upper-right quadrant, suggesting a shortage of representa-
tion of voters strongly supporting an active role of the state with a traditional and 
nationalist cultural agenda. By analyzing the interest group survey data, I found 
out that in five of six countries, there are groups that could potentially compen-
sate for the absence of political parties. This does not necessarily suggest causal 
inference, where voters are – firstly – aware of the existence of organizations 
representing their points of view. Secondly, even though they could have been 
aware of their existence, it does not mean that there are no other factors in play 
here that would make citizens reluctant to rely more on interest organizations 
than on political parties, even though the latter are not congruent with their 
beliefs.
The fundamental question – whether groups can compensate for political 
 parties – boils down to being able to influence public policy processes and there-
fore satisfy needs of groups’ constituencies. As the gap is somewhere between 
culturally right-wing (Tan) and economically redistributive policies, the impact 
of groups might be rather limited, but again to assess that, further research is 
needed.
Secondly, it is worth asking whether interest groups themselves would like to 
compensate for political parties. There is some evidence that groups face similar 
internal and external challenges, particularly involving their membership base, 
funding, and growing professionalization during their evolution from grass-root 
movements.
Interest groups appear to cover a wider range of ideological spaces than polit-
ical parties. This pattern allows us to be wary of region-specific generalizations 
as there is very much variability in the dynamic relations between political par-
ties and interest groups in CEE. Furthermore, interest groups follow – more or 
less – country-specific patterns. If we see political parties dominating certain 
ideological areas, the same is likely to happen with interest groups, for example 
the left-Gal combination in Slovenia and clear right-authoritarian bias in Poland.
Due to the greater supply of interest groups than political parties, citizens 
could find atypical combinations that suit them. The fundamental question – and 
material for further analysis – is whether citizens really look for party alternatives 
and whether interest organizations seek the vast support of citizens. It would be 
fascinating to combine the current research with a bottom-up approach and use 
cross-country data from the European Social Survey to thoroughly investigate 
the supply and demand dynamics of voters’ representation. The bottom line is 
that in five of six countries, some interest groups are where political parties are 
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not. Sounding like a truism, associative democracy is vital for the health and 
stability of representative and democratic governments.
Note
 1 See http://www.cigsurvey.eu/. As for today (mid-2020) the project includes Bel-
gium, Lithuania, Poland, the Netherlands, Sweden, Slovenia, Italy, and Spain. Data 
are currently being collected for Montenegro, the Czech Republic and Portugal.
References
Allern, E. H. (2010). Political parties and interest groups in Norway. Colchester: ECPR Press.
Allern, E. H., & Bale, T. (2012). Political parties and interest groups: Disentangling com-
plex relationships. Party Politics, 18(1), 7–25. doi: 10.1177/1354068811422639.
Allern, E. H., & Bale, T. (Eds.). (2017). Left-of-centre parties and trade unions in the twenty- 
first century. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Berkhout, J., Hanegraaff, M., & Statsch, P. (2020). Interest groups in multi-level con-
texts: European integration as cross-cutting issue in party-interest group contacts. 
Politics and Governance, 8(1), 61–71. doi: 10.17645/pag.v8i1.2516.
Beyers, J., Bernhagen, P., Borang, F., Braun, C., Fink-Hafner, D., Heylen, F., Maloney, 
W., Naurin, D., & Pakull, D. (2016). Comparative interest group survey questionnaire. 
Antwerp: University of Antwerp.
Beyers, J., Eising R., & Maloney, W. (2008). Researching interest group politics in Eu-
rope and elsewhere: Much we study, little we know?. West European Politics, 31(6), 
1103–1128. doi: 10.1080/01402380802370443.
Bohle, D., & Greskovits, B. (2012). Capitalist diversity on Europe’s periphery. Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press.
Bornschier, S. (2010). Cleavage politics and the populist right. The new cultural conflict in West-
ern Europe. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
Bevan, S., & Rasmussen, A. (2020). When does government listen to the public? 
 Voluntary associations and dynamic agenda representation in the United States. Policy 
Studies Journal, 48(1), 111–132. doi: 10.1111/psj.12231.
Binderkrantz, A. S., & Christiansen, P. M. (2015). From classic to modern corporatism. 
Interest group representation in Danish public committees in 1975 and 2010. Journal of 
European Public Policy, 22(7), 1022–1039. doi: 10.1080/13501763.2014.1000365.
Bolleyer, N. (2009). Inside the cartel party: Party organisation in government and oppo-
sition. Political Studies, 57(3), 559–579. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2008.00741.x.
Borang, F., Naurin D., & Polk J. (2017). Making space. A cross-country comparison of 
parties and interest groups positioning in multiple policy dimensions. Conference 
paper presented at ECPR General Conference in 2017.
Bornschier, S. (2010). The new cultural divide and the two-dimensional 
 political space in Western Europe. West European Politics, 33(3), 419–444. doi: 
10.1080/01402381003654387.
Bunce, V. (1995). Should transitologists be grounded?. Slavic Review, 54(1), 111–127.
Burstein, P., & Linton, A. (2002). The impact of political parties, interest groups, and so-
cial movement organizations on public policy: Some recent evidence and theoretical 
concerns. Social forces, 81(2), 380–408. doi: 10.1353/sof.2003.0004.
Casal Bértoa, F., & Spirova, M. (2019). Parties between thresholds: State subsidies and 
party behaviour in post-communist democracies. Party Politics, 25(2), 233–244.
272 Paweł Kamiński
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In this book, we journeyed though the world of organized interests in the 
post-communist region. Functional systems of interest intermediation and dy-
namic links between the political system and civil society are important pre-
conditions for successful democratic consolidation. In CEE, organized interests 
operate in a particularly fluid environment. Economic systems have undergone 
complete structural makeovers, political systems have been fundamentally rede-
signed, and policy-specific reforms have transformed pre-existing institutions 
to the core. The transformation on numerous fronts has opened new avenues 
for activity for organized interests in multiple arenas. Unlike in the communist 
system, where interest intermediation was channeled through the communist 
party and state bureaucratic apparatus, CEE interest groups now operate within 
parliaments, ministerial bodies, and new interest intermediation forums, while 
also fostering ties with government and oppositional parties. They are now free 
to calibrate their strategies to their needs and demands of their members and 
leadership, consolidate their ties with like-minded or rivaling groups, or actively 
lobby the public outside formal political channels.
European integration has also offered a multitude of new opportunities for in-
terest groups from the region to gain experience and expertise from and share re-
sources with like-minded groups abroad. However, these new openings for civil 
society and advocacy organizations at the transnational level have arguably coin-
cided with closings and, to some extent, crackdowns on civil society in the coun-
tries affected by democratic backsliding. In particular, Poland and Hungary have 
recently experienced a re-centralization of policy-making processes, a shift away 
from liberal, globalist ideals, and reinvigoration of illiberal, national- conservative 
forces. These changes have significant implications for the functioning of 
13
ROUNDING UP OUR JOURNEY 
THROUGH THE WORLD OF 
ORGANIZED INTERESTS IN THE  
POST-COMMUNIST CEE REGION
Michael Dobbins, Emilia Piotrowska, and Rafał Riedel
DOI: 10.4324/9781003049562-13
278 Dobbins et al.
interest groups and other civic societal actors, as they may need to adapt to the 
de-democratization tendencies and the re-emergence of clientelist networks.
The authors of the chapters aimed to comparatively grasp the activities, strate-
gies, constraints, interrelationships, and concrete influence of organized interests 
in the region from multiple angles. To accommodate the heterogeneity of the 
region, the authors affiliated with the core OrgIntCEE project applied a large 
arsenal of qualitative and quantitative methods to the study of interest groups in 
three diverse policy areas – higher education, healthcare, and climate-energy – 
which are critical for the future viability and competitiveness of four CEE 
 countries – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia – and beyond. 
Three external authors also provided detailed insights into additional dimen-
sions, which are essential to understanding the dynamics of civil society and 
overall policy-making in the region: the Catholic Church, labor unions, and the 
interlinkages between interest groups and political parties.
The differentiated perspectives added new nuanced insights into the well- 
established perception that civil society is weak in the region, that interest 
organizations are inexperienced, lack professional lobbying skills, and that 
policy- making is mainly centralized, state-driven, and over-particized. The au-
thors provided in-depth analysis of patterns of interest intermediation, lobbying 
strategies, and the broader effects of the transformation and Europeanization 
processes as well as domestic reform processes on populations of interest groups. 
In this final chapter, we wish to briefly revisit the findings of the chapters. Then 
we present some new data reflecting broader trends in the four countries. The 
new data and illustrations are also based on our survey of organized interests (see 
Annex). On the one hand, they offer additional support to some of the major 
findings of the chapters, while also painting a more comprehensive, overarching 
picture. They also enable us to draw some generalizable conclusions about the 
state of civil society, lobbying, and advocacy in the region.
2 A review of our findings
The first two empirical chapters contributed to the growing body of literature on 
organizational populations (see Berkhout & Lowery, 2008; Nownes, 2004), while 
tracing the determinants for the increases and decreases of interest group popu-
lations operating in our three core policy fields – energy, healthcare, and higher 
education. In Chapter 2, Rafael Labanino, Michael Dobbins, and Rafał Riedel 
showed that “varieties of communism”, spanning from the more bureaucratic- 
authoritarian Czech(oslovak) version to the national-accommodative versions 
of Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia significantly impacted communist and pre- 
transition organizational formations. The accommodative regimes proved much 
more conducive to the foundation of civic organizations than the more rigid 
Czech(oslovak) regime, whereby periods of experimentation with economic re-
forms and political liberalization also boosted foundation rates. In Slovenia, by 
contrast, organized interests proliferated under communism. The nature of regime 
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change also proved crucial, as political fragmentation, partisan competition, and 
increasing grassroots mobilization (e.g. in Hungary) brought about stronger for-
mation rates than in Poland, where there was a relatively united front against the 
communist party. For all countries though, the authors showed that there was an 
at least moderate level of organizational activity under communism, and thus no 
“tabula rasa” during 1989–1990. In fact, for Hungary, organizations founded be-
fore 1989 are even more viable in the post-communist phase than those founded 
after the breakdown of communism. With their findings, the authors contribute 
both to the “varieties of communism” literature and to the scholarly debate about 
the heritage of the pre-1989 past, including the ever-existing dilemma about the 
sources of strength and weakness of the CEE civil societies.
In Chapter 3, Michael Dobbins, Rafael Pablo Labanino, and Brigitte Hor-
váthová look at how organizational populations evolved after 1989. They hy-
pothesized that organizational populations would be boosted by the transition to 
democracy, the European integration process as well as major domestic policy- 
specific reform processes, many of which are linked with Europeanization. They 
also argued that populations may eventually become saturated, or “density- 
dependent”, leading to a slow-down in formations, while also providing some 
preliminary insights on the impact of national-conservatism or illiberal democ-
racy in Hungary and Poland on organizational populations.
Their data show that the transition to democracy was an enormous impetus 
for organizational formations, but that Hungary and Slovenia – as already shown 
in Chapter 2 – had large pre-existing populations due to the relative openness 
of their anciens régimes, the ideological diversity of civic initiatives during the 
struggle for Slovenian nationhood, as well as the nature of regime change. The 
late 1990s and early to mid-2000s – marked by the European integration pro-
cess and large-scale national reforms – heralded another acceleration in organ-
izational formations. Their data also showed that “democratic backsliding”, in 
particular in Hungary, has not provided a conducive climate for organizational 
formations. However, the authors also found evidence of “density-dependence” 
in all national-level organizational populations, making it difficult to distinguish 
between saturation effects and the impact of national-conservative governance. 
Finally, and importantly from a civil society perspective, they showed that many 
organizations founded in the past decade are “diffuse” civic or cause groups 
representing interests that otherwise are often difficult to organize due to Ol-
son’s collective action dilemma (1965). With the exception of Hungary, where 
the 2000–2010 decade was more favorable to such organizational formations, 
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia witnessed strong growth in environ-
mental, patients’ and students’ organizations representing broader societal goals 
in the past ten years. These three countries also experienced a boom in new 
groups representing renewable energy businesses, while renewable organizations 
proliferated in the 2000–2010 period in Hungary.
In the next segment, we tackled advocacy patterns in the region from two 
different angles. In Chapter 4, Szczepan Czarnecki explored lobbying tactics 
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in CEE. Directly tying into the distinction between “civic” and “concentrated” 
(i.e. business) groups elaborated on above, he explored whether group type and 
the nature of issues impact the lobbying strategies chosen by organized interests. 
His findings for CEE are largely in line with those of Binderkrantz et al. (2015) 
that ideationally oriented civic groups operating in the “public interest” tend 
to pursue “outsider” strategies. They mobilize the public by means of protests, 
petitions, and directly engaging with potential supporters. Yet, he also shows 
that they do not shy away from direct strategies targeting the parliament and 
government and thus apply a broader array of lobbying approaches than classical 
concentrated interests. Czarnecki also shows that issues matter. Groups pursuing 
non-divisible goals, e.g. environmental protection more frequently pursue out-
sider lobbying tactics, while groups with more divisible or negotiable goals prefer 
insiders strategies.
Chapter 5 by Michael Dobbins, Emilia Piotrowska, and Maximilian von 
Bronk is embedded in the literature on interest intermediation between the state 
and organized interests (Avdagic, 2005; Ost, 2011; Schmitter, 1989; Streeck & 
Kenworthy, 2003). Building on and adapting previous classifications of corpo-
ratism by Jahn (2016) and Siaroff (1999), they explore how interests of rivaling 
interests groups in the healthcare sector (e.g. the medical profession, patients, 
healthcare workers) are channeled into policy-making. Drawing on survey data 
and a catalogue of indicators of “healthcare corporatism”, they first aggregate 
scores for different groups of organizations (e.g. healthcare workers, patients) for 
multiple dimensions of interest intermediation (e.g. consultations with rivaling 
interest groups, the state, and regulatory agencies; the perceived level of policy 
coordination). Then they examine to what extent certain organizations domi-
nate the policy-making process, while also providing some descriptive details on 
institutionalized interest intermediation forums in post-communist healthcare.
The data show that all four systems are approximately half-way towards the 
corporatist ideal-type of policy-making, with Slovenia in the lead, while Hun-
gary gravitates more towards a state-centered paradigm. Poland and the Czech 
Republic bear stronger features of pluralism. In any case, the standardized data 
show that healthcare policy-making in all four countries is more consultative 
than in the past, although strong country variations exist regarding the inten-
sity of consultations with different groups of organizations. Healthcare workers’ 
organizations are more heavily involved in the Slovenian policy-making process 
than in other countries. Policy-making in Hungary is dominated by the medical 
profession, whereas the Czech and Polish systems offer more advocacy avenues 
for patients’ organizations.
Chapter 6 authored by Szczepan Czarnecki, Emilia Piotrowska, and Rafał 
Riedel deals with climate and energy policies in CEE. The chapter explores the 
ways in which green advocacy groups gain access to the policy-making pro-
cess in Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic in comparison to 
other organized interests operating in climate and energy policy. The authors 
explain patterns of access to two types of executive bodies: governing parties 
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and regulatory authorities. Taking a resource-exchange perspective, they argue 
that access is determined by the match of supply and demand of resources, but 
also conditioned by various types of provided expertise, selected aspects of pro-
fessionalization, and financial resources. They find that scientific expertise and a 
focus on fundraising is of crucial importance in accessing regulatory authorities 
as well as governing parties. Focusing on human resources and organizational 
development as well as acquired EU funds turn out to be less relevant factors.
Chapter 7 written by Brigitte Horváthová and Michael Dobbins also deals 
with CEE healthcare from a different angle by exploring the characteristics of 
individual interest organizations, which enable their access to policy-makers. 
They hypothesize that financial and human resources, specialized expertise, 
the level of professionalization, and longevity enhance the position of interest 
groups. They also test Olson’s (1965) classic hypothesis that concentrated groups 
(here the medical profession) are at an advantage over more diffuse groups (i.e. 
patients).
They first present an array of descriptive and comparative statistical data from 
our standardized survey reflecting the perceived influence of groups, their venues 
of political access, and their activities aimed at organizational professionaliza-
tion. Their ordinal logistic regression analyses show that human resources, i.e. 
employed staff and membership, are key determinants of access to governmental 
policy-makers, whereas the financial strength of an organization does not play a 
significant role. Horváthová and Dobbins also show that factors such as expertise 
and, in particular, organizational professionalization tend to be more important 
than finances. Particularly noteworthy is their finding that inter-organizational 
cooperation, which generally is somewhat underdeveloped in CEE (see below), 
strongly facilitates access to policy-makers.
Chapter 8 by Aleš Vlk, Michael Dobbins, and Rafał Riedel is one of the 
first analyses of higher education policy in the context of post-communist 
national-conservatism, democratic backsliding, and other forms of authoritar-
ian populism. They address an empirical puzzle from a stakeholder perspective: 
despite very similar starting points, why has Polish higher education recently 
experienced a significant degree of centralization, while Czech academics have 
largely preserved their tradition of internal stakeholder democracy? For Poland, 
they show that university rectors, who are well-organized in the Rectors’ Con-
ference (KRASP) and numerous other governing bodies, exploited their organ-
izational advantage over more diffused other academic interest representations. 
A coalescence of rectors’ interests with those of the state seeking to impose more 
hierarchical, managerial governance structures simultaneously enabled the gov-
ernment to re-assert control over the sector. The reform not only re-organized 
university governance by endowing rectors with unprecedented power at the 
cost of other previously influential, yet fragmented stakeholder groups, but also 
places more power in the hands of politicians.
In the Czech Republic, rectors and other high-ranking stakeholders have suc-
cessfully carried out a balancing act between the political sphere (i.e. through 
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parliamentary mandates) and their universities. Together with the extreme 
degree of inter-university decentralization, this has had the effect that Czech 
rectors have not succeeded centralizing their institutions. Instead, corporatist, 
stakeholder-oriented governance structures have been upheld.
Chapter 9, written by Rafał Riedel and Szczepan Czarnecki, deals with 
the intersections of two processes, namely Europeanization and professionaliza-
tion. The analysis explores how the EU impacts the level of professionalization 
of CEE interest groups, as understood in the classical top-down Europeaniza-
tion approaches, while also addressing how other types of Europeanization (e.g. 
cross-loading through trans-border exchange with like-minded groups) affect 
their level of professionalization. The key finding is that various types of Eu-
ropeanization pressures produce diversified outcomes regarding the profession-
alization of organized interests. Counter-intuitively, it is not membership in 
supranational umbrella organizations (i.e. a standard parameter of Europeani-
zation) or funding from EU-level interest organizations that necessarily lead to 
professionalization, rather to a much greater extent strong ties with like-minded 
EU organizations. Thus, the results show that cross-loading Europeanization 
mechanisms such as transnational communication and linkages are a stronger 
catalyst for organizational development than traditional top-down or bottom-up 
mechanisms.
Chapter 10 authored by Tomasz Kubin focuses on labor unions, which are an 
essential part of the ecosystem of organized interests. He explores how coal min-
ing unions justify and lobby their standpoints on EU climate and energy policies. 
Specifically, he addresses why the Polish government consistently has refused 
to declare climate neutrality as a long-term goal, while the Czech government 
changed its position at the European Council meeting in December 2019. He 
shows that the position of coal mining trade unions towards EU climate and en-
ergy policy is clearly negative and that they use arguments that go beyond the in-
terests of the mining sector. Hence, they aim to convey the impression that they 
also act in the interest of other social groups. In other words, the tactics adopted 
by trade unions are not based on “silencing” the issue and achieving their goals 
“quietly”, rather on “going public” with their positions and arguments. Kubin 
provides an important case study analysis describing and explaining the lobbying 
tactics adopted in a sector that is strategically essential for the carbon-dependent 
economies of numerous CEE states.
Joanna Kulska provides another interesting Polish-Czech comparison in 
Chapter 11. She focuses on the Catholic Church, which holds extremely different 
positions in Poland (where it is exceptionally strong and influential) and the Czech 
Republic (where it is weak and marginal). The author analyzes the evolving role, 
goals, and strategies applied by the Church, taking into consideration the signifi-
cantly different positions of religion in the social-political contexts of both coun-
tries. The analysis places itself in the increasingly developing strand of research in 
comparative politics emphasizing the role of cultural and, more specifically, reli-
gious determinants in explaining policy-making. In the highly illustrative Polish 
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case, the state and church exhibit extraordinarily close bonds, through which 
both sides exploit their mutual dependence. She also addresses how the Catho-
lic Church relates to a “darker side” of civil society and illiberal democracy in 
general. Once a key part of the democratic transformation, the process of plural-
ization and the building of a strong, active, and independent sphere of engaged 
citizens challenging the state, some segments of civil society are now turning away 
from those values. Instead, this illiberal civil society leans towards authoritarian 
forces promoting top-down processes of building alternative organizations and 
movements supportive of government policies (Ekiert, 2019). In Poland, this has 
already resulted in the adoption of new financing rules for NGOs and the support 
for organizations with a more nationalist and Roman Catholic profile (Mandes, 
2020). The semi-authoritarian populists ruling in Poland use Catholicism as a po-
litical ideology, and the Polish Catholic Church entertains its influential position 
in the political system dominated by (so-called) Christian and conservative forces. 
This mutually inter-dependent constellation produces political outcomes that en-
danger the liberal democratic order and free, pluralistic civic society.
Last but not least, Chapter 12 by Paweł Kamiński contributes to the stream 
of literature claiming that associative democracy is vital for the health and sta-
bility of representative and accountable democratic governments. He follows the 
recognized wisdom that political parties and interest groups are the two most 
important actors functioning as “transmission belts” between the public and the 
state, bringing citizens’ demands to the political agenda. He explores whether 
interest groups “compensate” in representing citizens in policy areas left open 
by political parties, or quite contrary, whether they follow the same pattern of 
biased representation and indifference towards civil society. Using quantitative 
and comparative data gathered between 2016 and 2018 from three “old” and 
“new” member states, respectively, he sheds light on the interplay between inter-
est groups and political parties in the context of civic engagement. His essential 
conclusion is that in the vast majority of the analyzed countries, interest groups 
occupy positions neglected by political parties.
3 Some final general trends
To wrap up, we now briefly revisit our survey data and present some simple com-
parative figures. This will enable us to detect various country-specific trends, 
while also addressing the strengths and weaknesses in the consolidation of ma-
ture interest group systems in CEE. We do not wish to engage in new in-depth 
causal analysis, rather simply outline some broader characteristics of the devel-
opment of interest groups and interest intermediation systems in the region. In 
doing so, we return to four main dimensions in interest group studies, which 
the book has covered – the ecosystem dimension, coordination/consultation dimension,1 
access and power dimension, and professionalization dimension.
For this final overview, we simply aggregated all responses to various sur-
vey questions by country. We excluded responding organizations with less than 
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FIGURE 13.1 Perception of increases in the number and size of interest groups.
50 individual members or 10 business or institutional members so that the data 
only reflect the perceptions of mid-sized or larger organizations that are more 
predestined to be involved in the policy-making process.
First, returning to the opening chapters, we address the ecosystem dimen-
sion. We asked our respondents about changes in the number of organizations 
and their membership over time:
In your opinion, is the number of interest organizations attempting to influence 
decision-making and legislation in your area increasing, decreasing, or stable over 
the past 10–15 years? (1 – strongly decreasing, 2 – decreasing, 3 – the same, 
4 – increasing, 5 – strongly increasing)
The illustration largely confirms the finding of Dobbins et al. (2020) (Chapter 3) 
that organizational populations have become more or less “saturated” and that the 
main periods of foundational activity lie in the past (the immediate transformation 
phase, the Europeanization phase of the late 1990s and 2000s). While we do see 
some slight bumps, the aggregated results point to a relatively stable playing field 
with only slight increases in new foundations, despite different points of departure 
in terms of pre-existing organized interests under communism (see Chapters 2 
and 3). Yet, if we ask whether individual organizations’ membership is increasing 
or decreasing over time, we see slightly stronger dynamics (Figure 13.1).
How has the size of your organization’s membership changed in the past 10–15 
years (or since its founding, if founded more recently)? (1– much less, 2 – less, 3 – 
the same, 4 – more, 5 – much more)
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Across the board, responding organizations report that their membership bases 
are growing, even in Hungary where only few new organizations have been 
founded in our policy areas since 2010 (see Chapter 3) and policy-making tends 
to be carried out in closed technocratic state-industry circles (see Horváthová & 
Dobbins, 2019 for energy policy; see Chapter 5 for healthcare). Yet altogether, 
we do see notable changes over time in terms of interest group expansion and 
mobilization.
Second, we look at the coordination and consultation dimension to 
address the intensity of deliberations, the points of contact of organizations as 
well as advocacy structures. One key indicator of an effective interest interme-
diation system, and in particular those of a corporatist type, are targeted efforts 
to bring rivaling organizations to the table to jointly coordinate policy. We 
therefore asked:
How would you rate the level of policy coordination/political exchange between the 
state and your interest group? (1 – very weak, 2 – weak, 3 – moderate, 4 – 
strong, 5 – very strong)
Most groups indicated a relatively low level, shedding doubt on corporatist-like 
policy-making. However, the scores do rise somewhat if we exclusively look at 
umbrella organizations (for a more nuanced picture of healthcare, see Chapter 5 
in this volume; for energy policy interest intermediation, see Horváthová et al. 
forthcoming, for higher education, see Dobbins et al., forthcoming; for labor 
policy, Rozbicka et al., 2020).
FIGURE 13.2  Perception of the level of policy coordination between the state and 
organizations.
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Particularly interesting is the very low score for Slovenia, which contradicts 
Jahn’s (2016) classification of Slovenia as the most corporatist country in CEE, at 
least in socio-economic policy-making. While Slovenia did receive the highest 
score for “healthcare corporatism” (see Chapter 5), respondents pointed out that co-
ordination often takes place among the medical profession outside the state. Moreo-
ver, there exist many smaller patients’ groups without large umbrella organizations 
speaking for patients with one voice. In both healthcare and higher education (see 
Dobbins et al., forthcoming), numerous well-established workers’ organizations 
compete for influence over wages and working conditions. For healthcare, this takes 
place within the Economic and Social Council (ESC), whereas for higher educa-
tion, there is no formalized platform for such coordination. Moreover, Slovenia 
exhibits an enormous diversity of student and academic interest groups (see Chap-
ter 3), making joint policy coordination among all of them enormously difficult. 
This, therefore, may explain the strikingly weak perception of policy coordination.
Remaining within the consultation/coordination dimension, we also 
explored the intensity of contacts between interest organizations and various 
political institutions, which in turn enables us to assess what public bodies they 
calibrate their strategies towards. We asked:
In the last five years, approximately how many times did the government consult 
interest groups in your field of activity? (1 – never, 2 – annually, 3 – bi-annually, 
4 – monthly, 5 – weekly)
Approximately how often does your organization consult with regulatory author-
ities in your field of activity? (1 – never, 2 – annually, 3 – bi-annually, 4 – 
monthly, 5 – weekly)
Approximately how often does your organization consult with political parties? 
(1 – never, 2 – annually, 3 – bi-annually, 4 – monthly, 5 – weekly)
As a reflection of a more mature interest intermediation system and consensus- 
oriented, corporatist policy-making (see also Chapter 5), we inquired whether 
organizations regularly consult organizations with opposed or rivaling 
positions.
Approximately how often does your organization consult with organizations rep-
resenting opposing interests? (1 – never, 2 – annually, 3 – bi-annually, 4 – 
monthly, 5 – weekly)
In terms of consultations with governments and rivaling interest groups, annual 
to bi-annual consultations seem to be the prevalent norm, whereas regulatory 
authorities seem to be a major point of contact. Particularly eye-catching is the 
weak degree of interactions with political parties in all countries, in particular 
in Hungary (and with the partial exception of the Czech Republic). This indeed 
lends additional support to Kamiński’s argument (see Chapter 12) that organized 
interests in the region2 are occupying political and territory which political par-
ties are abandoning. In other words, there seems to be a pronounced deficit when 
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it comes to collective mobilization and strategic coordination between parties 
and civil society organizations, with both apparently constituting two separate 
venues of political advocacy.
This impression is somewhat reinforced when it comes to our data on cooper-
ation between organized interests. Not only is strong cooperation and coalition- 
building between like-minded organizations a sign of a well-developed system 
of advocacy and interest intermediation, but also a key variable for the success of 
interest groups in reaching their objectives ( Junk, 2020; Klüver, 2011; Mahoney, 
2007). We asked:
How frequently does your organization cooperate with other interest organizations in 
fundraising/representation on advisory boards/joint statements/joint political strate-
gies? (1 – never, 2 – occasionally, 3 – frequently)
Other than fundraising, which appears to remain the domain of individual or-
ganizations, we see relatively strong dynamics in strategic cooperation between 
organizations. Interestingly, Hungarian organizations are somewhat more coop-
erative than others, at least regarding joint strategies. We would postulate that 
this is an effect of the generally weaker access to political institutions, forcing 
organizations into joint coordination.
Now let us look at how organizations fare in country comparison on the 
power and access dimension. We asked:
How difficult is it for your organization to access governing parties/opposition parties/
regulatory authorities? (1 – very difficult, 2 – difficult, 3 – moderate, 4 – easy, 
5 – very easy)
FIGURE 13.3  Frequency of consultations between organizations, political bodies, and 
rivaling organizations.
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FIGURE 13.5 Perception of ease of access to political bodies by organizations.
How would you describe your level of participation in parliamentary hearings/
parliamentary committees? (1 – no participation, 2 – low participation, 3 – 
 occasional participation, 4 – high participation, 5 – very high participation)
Particularly shocking is the finding for Hungary where ties between interest groups 
and the governing party (Fidesz) are effectively non-existent, and organizations 
tend to lobby oppositional parties while also neglecting the National Assembly. 
FIGURE 13.4 Willingness to cooperate with other organizations.
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These general results also lend evidence of a shift towards de-parliamentarization 
across CEE, which is (to some extent, as underlined by the Europeanization litera-
ture) also a result of the supranationalization of lobbying activities and transferring 
of advocacy activities to Brussels (see Fink-Hafner, 2011). However, the Polish case 
is significantly different with the parliament as a main venue for interest interme-
diation, and with organizations targeting all political institutions equally.
To further grasp the power and access dimension, we asked organizations 
how they perceive their own opportunity structures vis-à-vis those of others and 
whether they assess their opportunities to influence policy more favorably than 
10–15 years ago:
Do you think that opportunities for participation in the policy process are equally dis-
tributed among interest organizations? (1 – very much to the favor of other or-
ganizations, 2 – somewhat to the favor of other organizations, 3 – equally 
distributed, 4 – somewhat to the favor of our organization, 5 – very much 
to the favor of our organization)
To what extent do you assess the ability of your organization to assert its interests 
as opposed to 10–15 years ago (or since its founding, if founded more recently)? (1 – 
much less than before, 2 – less than before, 3 – the same, 4 – greater now, 
5 – much greater now)
Do you experience intensive competition from organizations active in your field 
that represent opposing interests or values? 1 – much less than before, 2 – less 
than before, 3 – the same, 4 – greater now, 5 – much greater now)
FIGURE 13.6 Perception of opportunity structures and influence.
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FIGURE 13.7 Various aspects of professionalization of organizations.
The data again appear to confirm that the organizational playing fields have be-
come rather consolidated (see ecosystem dimension above). At least with respect 
to perceived competition from similar organizations, we do not see an American- 
like system of dynamic competition among rivaling interest organizations in any 
of the countries, except to a limited extent in Poland. Unsurprisingly, organi-
zations tend to subjectively report that their opportunities for participation and 
thus influence as worse than their rivals (Slovenia and Hungary to a lesser extent). 
However, when we ask directly about their perceived influence, the data paint a 
relatively positive picture, with Czech organizations visibly more optimistic than 
others. Yet, Polish and Slovenian organizations also (aggregately) evaluate their 
opportunities relatively favorably.
Turning back to Chapter 9, we also present some simple final data on the 
professionalization dimension based on their own assessments. We asked:
To what extent does your organization focus on the following activities as opposed 
to 10–15 years ago (or since its founding, if founded more recently): organizational 
development/HR development / training of lobbyists/fundraising/evaluation of effi-
ciency and effectiveness/strategic planning? (1 – much less, 2 – less, 3 – the same, 
4 – more, 5 – much more)
We see that organizations across CEE are becoming more and more profession-
alized, with a leading position of Slovenian groups and Hungarian groups as 
slight laggards. At the same time, especially in the democratically backsliding 
countries, we observe a growing aversion to lobbying, which may be the result 
of the anti-elitist mood of the authoritarian populist politics, but is worthy of 
further exploration. Importantly though, the chapters showed that the role of 
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professionalization in facilitating access to policy-makers is not the same. While 
Horváthová and Dobbins determined in Chapter 7 that professionalization – 
together with inter-organizational cooperation (see above) – provides a key for 
healthcare groups to access policy-makers, Chapter 6 by Szczepan Czarnecki, 
Rafał Riedel, and Emilia Piotrowska revealed that resources, and in particular 
financial capacity, are more central to political access than professionalization. In 
either case though, our data reflect an increasing activity in all aspects of profes-
sionalization, which our survey covered.
4 Pathways for future research
The newly generated data and analyses presented in this book shed new light on 
the current status of state-civil society relationships in post-communist CEE and 
in particular interest groups as key representatives of civil society. Despite this 
increasingly complete picture, we encourage scholars to conduct further research 
to fully grasp the dynamically changing ecosystems and playing fields of organ-
ized interests in the region.
Apart from the observed deficit in the scholarly interest dedicated to post- 
communist organized interests, which we wished to overcome with this book, 
we are also witnessing significant changes to the liberal democratic status quo in 
CEE, which constitutes a salient contextual variable for any analysis of the subject 
matter. The champions of the 1989 pro-democratic transition, most spectacularly 
Hungary, but to some extent also Poland, have taken a U-turn towards the still 
poorly understood realm of illiberal democracy. Amid encroachments on the rule 
of law, civil rights and free civil society in general have increasingly been ques-
tioned or gradually replaced by illiberal forms of civil society engagement (see 
Kulska in this volume). Clientelistic networks of inter-dependence between and 
among the state and societal actors are arguably also undermining the healthy 
advocacy process. No matter if they manifest themselves in oligarchic mafia 
state-like forms observed in Hungary (Magyar, 2016), or softer versions of Polish 
semi-authoritarianism, they are generally hostile to a well-functioning civic so-
ciety. Ever more centralized policy-making and the state-driven, over-particized 
decision-making process create an unfavorable environment for balanced advo-
cacy and lobbying activities. Thus, before CEE interest intermediation systems 
reached their potential and full maturity, they have arguably started to erode 
under the influence of the democratic backsliding tendencies. These patterns are 
worth scholarly investigation, enabling deeper explanations of various aspects of 
CEE civil society developments. This applies in particular to Olejnik’s (2020) 
argument on the preferential treatment of state-subsidized groups, for which we 
were only able to provide inconclusive counter-evidence, or organized interests 
representing state-owned enterprises (see Kubin in this volume).
Tying into this, future studies should focus more on the territorial dimension 
of lobbying in the region. One interesting question is whether the increasing cen-
tralization of policy-making in numerous CEE countries is prompting organized 
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interests to increasingly target their advocacy activities at the European or re-
gional level, or whether they react to political centralization by expanding their 
national-level activity. Along these lines, scholars should also address what inter-
est group-related factors (see Chapters 6 and 7) best enable organized interests to 
operate simultaneously on multiple territorial levels and, in turn, how this affects 
their ability to shape policy. In other words, national and transnational “venue 
shopping” should be give more attention. While transnational lobbying is heav-
ily contingent on the specific policy areas and incentives (see Chapter 9), it may 
also be equally influenced by domestic political dynamics and the openness or 
closure of political systems.
The analyses collected in this volume also challenged a number of well- 
established claims present in the literature, most notably the “weak civil so-
ciety hypothesis”, as reflected in inexperienced interest organizations lacking 
professional lobbying skills (see Guasti, 2016; Howard, 2003). We show that CEE 
countries differ not only at the point of arrival, but also at the very point of depar-
ture understood as the beginning of transition processes, laying the foundations 
for various systems of interest representation. The precise picture is much more 
nuanced and shows many ways in which the country-specific or sector-specific 
characteristics of civic society manifest themselves in CEE. In this book, we pro-
vided a better understanding of the conditions of policy-making processes from 
the interest groups perspective as important players in post-communist democra-
cies. We did so by comparatively exploring their position, structures, status, and 
patterns of behaviors, taking into account interest group-related factors, issue- 
related factors, socio-economic institutions, and aspects of Europeanization.
Apart from the provided in-depth analysis of patterns of interest interme-
diation, lobbying strategies, and the broader effects of the transformation and 
Europeanization processes as well as domestic reform processes on populations 
of interest groups, more research is imperative in all of the above-mentioned 
areas based on both qualitative and quantitative (as well as mixed) methods. This 
applies not only to the expansion of the countries but also to policy areas cov-
ered. Scholars should also focus more on the advocacy and lobbying tools used 
by organized interests, their communication strategies, as well as new social and 
protest movements. In addition, scholars of the region should integrate other var-
iables for interest group success, which have also proven to hold strong explana-
tory value in recent interest group research. These include not only, for example, 
the size of coalitions ( Junk, 2020; Mahoney, 2007), but also public opinion, the 
framing of issues (Rasch, 2018), the polarization of preferences (Bunea, 2013), 
and whether organizations are wishing to preserve or modify the status quo. Thus, 
a stronger focus on specific issues, their salience, and the public and organized 
group coalitions shaping policy would strongly enhance our understanding of 
lobbying and advocacy in the region.
Another important stream of research worth further scientific exploration is 
the public (mis)perceptions of various forms of organized interests. Relatively 
little research addresses how the various forms of advocacy and lobbying are 
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welcomed or rejected by the public. These questions are of vital importance 
for the legitimacy and accountability of organized interests and their role and 
place in the socio-political system. Looking beyond our data on organizational 
professionalization, scholars should delve deeper into the internal dynamics of 
CEE interest groups and explore how they are governed internally, how they 
recruit and maintain their members, how they formulate their policy positions, 
and to what extent internal democratic decision-making has been institutional-
ized. Last but not least, comparative analyses between the consolidated western 
systems of interest intermediation and post-communist systems are highly desir-
able. Cross-country and cross-sectoral analyses exploring diversified similarities 
and differences between and among organized interests would provide a full(er) 
picture of the European advocacy and lobbying systems.
Notes
 1 Also denoted as the functional dimension in Chapter 5.
 2 His analysis deals with Poland, Slovenia, Lithuania and covers interest organizations 
from more policy areas.
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APPENDIX
OVERVIEW OF THE ORGINTCEE 
SURVEY
Survey Languages: Czech, English, Hungarian, Polish, Slovenian
Survey Timeframe: February 2019–June 2020
Survey Platform: LimeSurvey
Survey Questions
What is the name of your organization?
Does your organization represent business interests? Yes/No
Are you an umbrella organization? Yes/No
How many individuals are members of your organization?
How many firms are members of your organization?
How many interest organizations or institutions (e.g. hospitals) are members of your 
organization?
How many volunteers work for your organization?
Approximately how many paid (full-time/part-time) staff work for your 
organization?
Is your organization a member of a European, international or national umbrella 
association?
• International (No/Yes, Please name)
• European (No/Yes, Please name)
• National (No/Yes, Please name)
In your opinion, is the number of interest organizations attempting to influence 
decision-making and legislation in your area increasing, decreasing or stable over 












If possible, please specify which political parties.
Approximately how often does your organization consult with interest groups 






If possible, please specify which ones.
Approximately how often does your organization consult with regulatory authorities







In the last five years, approximately how many times did the government consult 






How many times did your organization participate in these consultations?
Approximately how many times did the previous government consult interest groups 







How many times did your organization participate in these consultations?
How difficult is it for you to access the following institutions/organizations relevant 

























• Very high participation
How would you rate the level of policy coordination/political exchange between the



























Do you think that opportunities for participation in the policy process are equally 
distributed among interest organizations?
• Very much to the favour of other organizations
• Somewhat to the favour of other organizations
• Equally distributed
• Somewhat to the favour of our organization
• Very much to the favour of our organization





Do you experience intensive competition from organizations active in your field that 







Interest organizations often supply specialized expertise to policy-makers and 
political institutions. Thinking about the information or expertise you supply 
how would you rate the importance of the following types of information for 
your influence on policy?
















How has the size of your organization’s membership changed in the past 10–15 years 
(or since its founding, if founded more recently)?




• Increased very much
Does your organization have any strong ties with like-minded organizations in other
EU countries? Yes/No (please specify the organizations in the comment box)
 
In recent years, have you increasingly networked with like-minded organizations 
abroad when trying to influence national legislation?





What kind of support does your organization receive from related organizations 
abroad? (Multiple choice with comments.)
• Professional help (expertise)
• Financial and material support
• Training (education) of stakeholders
• Preparation of joint statements and declarations about the general issues
• International exchange of personnel
• Other – please specify
What are the most important consequences of this relationship? (Multiple choice 
with comments.)
• Greater strength of your organization in placing issues on the domestic policy 
agenda
• Gaining permanent consultative or partnership status in relation to government 
actors
• Stronger inclusion of your organization in other key stages of policy-making
• Transfer of knowledge, expertise and experience
• Financial support
• Other – please specify
To what extent does your organization focus on the following activities as opposed 






































In your view, how important are different levels of representation for your activities 



























To what extent do you assess the ability of your organization to assert its interests as 
opposed to 10–15 years ago (or since its founding, if founded more recently)?
• Much less than before
• Less than before
• The same
• Greater now
• Much greater now
Finally, we are wondering about the financial health of your organization. How 
would you assess your financial planning horizon?
• Financially stable for less than one year
• Financially stable for one to two years
• Financially stable for three to five years
• Financially stable for about five years
• Financially stable for more than five years
Please indicate the approximate proportion of these sources of funding in your entire 
budget. (Multiple choice with comments.)
• Member fees
• Donations
• Subsidies/grants from national governments
• Commercial and marketing activities
• European Union funds/projects
• Other foundations/institutions/organizations
Data on the response rate
TABLE A.1  Response rate per country in the energy policy field
Country Responses in the 
energy policy field
% of total 







the energy policy 
field per country 
Response rate in 
the energy policy 
field in % per 
country
Czechia 37 31.4 106 34.9
Hungary 26 22.0 71 36.6
Poland 25 21.2 102 24.5
Slovenia 30 25.4 46 65.2
Total per policy 
field
118 100 325 36.3
Note: Organizations were contacted up to three times per e-mail and organizations up to two times 
per phone.
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TABLE A.2 Response rate per country in the healthcare policy field
Country Responses in the
healthcare policy 
field
 % of total 







policy field per 
country 
Response 
rate in the 
healthcare 
policy field in 
% per country











Slovenia 50 23.0 101 49.5
Total per policy 
field
217 100 723 30.0
Note: Organizations were contacted up to three times per e-mail and up to two times per phone.
TABLE A.3 Response rate per country in the higher education policy field
Country Responses in the 
higher education 
policy field
% of total 
responses in the 
higher education






in the higher 
education policy 
field per country 
Response rate 
in the higher 
education policy 
field in % per 
country











Slovenia 38 38.0 81 46.9
Total per policy 
field
100 100 216 46.3
Note: Organizations were contacted up to three times per e-mail and up to two times per phone.
TABLE A.4 Total response rate per country in all policy fields
Country Total responses 
per country








rate in % per 
country
Czechia 123 28.3 366 33.6
Hungary 97 22.3 275 35.3
Poland 97 22.3 395 24.6
Slovenia 118 27.1 228 51.8
Total in all 
policy fields
435 100 1264 34.4
Note: Organizations were contacted up to three times per e-mail and up to two times per phone.
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General note: Organizations perceived as critically important in the three pol-
icy areas (e.g. major umbrella organizations, large workers unions, large student 
unions, large medical associations) were contacted more intensely and nearly all 
responded to the survey. The data above reflect all organizations, including very 
specific organizations contacted less intensely (e.g. geography students associa-
tion, alternative medical associations).
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